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Introduction	
The	malleable	notion	of	barbarism	has	served	 the	various	critiques	of	Western	
modernity	enormously	well.	It	is	hardly	an	overstatement	to	maintain	that	over	
the	course	of	time	many	a	critique’s	genesis	has	by	and	large	drawn	on	the	term	
as	a	state	(political,	economic,	social,	cultural,	aesthetic)	vis-à-vis	which	critique	
and	 at	 times	 subsequent	 agency	 in	 turn	 constructs	 its	 addressee	 as	 other.	
(Historically	 and	 to	 this	 day	 as	 a	 critique	 frequently	 speaking	 from	 a	 location	
within	this	other,	expressing,	not	only	indignation	–	or	conversely,	admiration	–	
but,	 more	 importantly,	 complicity,	 fatigue,	 resignation,	 nihilism	 and	 indeed	
lackadaisical	casualness	towards	any	such	barbaric	state).	
	 The	 barbaric	 other	 of	 Greek	 antiquity	 –	 historically	 and	 territorially	 of	
oriental	descent	–	as	an	alien	subject	of	deformed	expressivity 	borne	essentially	1
of	 the	small-town	mentality	and	social	structure	of	 the	polis ,	apparently	 found	2
its	 best	 deployment	 in	 the	 later	 Roman	 Empire	 as	 a	mercenary	 contracted	 by	
	Barbarism	derives	from	barbarismós	(Greek	noun)	based	on	barbarízein:	to	speak	1
incomprehensibly/in	a	foreign	tongue	(i.e.	non-Greek).	Note	that	the	notion	of	barbarity	girst	
appears	in	the	Latin	barbaria	denoting	rawness,	non-culture	etc.	(Oxford	English	Dictionary)	
		“The	earliest	phase	of	social	formations	found	in	historical	as	well	as	in	contemporary	social	2
structures	is	this:	a	relatively	small	circle	girmly	closed	against	neighbouring,	strange,	or	in	some	
way	antagonistic	circles.	[…].	The	smaller	the	circle	which	forms	our	milieu,	the	more	anxiously	
the	circle	guards	the	achievements,	the	conduct	of	life,	and	the	outlook	of	the	individual,	and	the	
more	readily	a	quantitative	and	qualitative	specialization	would	break	up	the	framework	of	the	
whole	little	circle.	The	ancient	polis	in	this	respect	seems	to	have	had	the	character	of	a	small	
town.”	Georg	Simmel,	“The	Metropolis	and	Mental	Life”,	1903.	In	The	City	Cultures	Reader,	(eds.	
Malcolm	Miles,	Hall,	Borden),	London,	2004,	p.	16.	
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enemy	 armies. 	 Other	 than	 that	 -	 and	 to	make	matters	 worse	 -	 the	 no	 longer	3
oriental	but	Teutonic	barbarian	was	mostly	irritating	to	civilized	Rome.	Blithely	
ensconced	in	the	woods	north	of	the	Alps,	the	barbaric	tribes	apparently	did	not	
much	care	for	the	allure	of	commodities	and	the	giner	things	in	life.	They	were	an	
anti-consumerist	lobby	spoiling	the	lay	of	the	land’s	smooth	commerce	of	goods,	
welcoming	merchants	only	to	hawk	their	“loots”	to	them	while	acquiring	little	in	
return,	 seemingly	 in	no	need	of	 “foreign”	novelties	and	content	with	 their	 “bad	
ponies”	 .	In	essence,	any	business	community’s	most	dreaded	target	group.	4
	 In	 modernity	 proper,	 this	 seemingly	 headstrong	 subject	 of	 deformed	
expressive	 and	 indeed	 pecuniary	 communication	 emerged	 as	 the	 now	 literally	
deformed	 body	 of	 the	 proletarian,	 toiling	 away	 physically	 and	mentally	 to	 the	
factory’s	 clock-time	 “rhythm	 reverberating	with	 every	 barbaric	 drum” .	Having	5
been	 sent	 to	 his	 father’s	Manchester	 sweatshop	 in	 1842	 to	 acquire	 a	 taste	 for	
business,	 Friedrich	 Engels	 instead	 used	 his	 stay	 to	 gather	 the	 raw	 data	 of	
industrial	barbarity	 from	 local	medical	 records,	 so	as	 to	compile	a	catalogue	of	
	“Männer,	nicht	zum	Ackerbau	geschickt	oder	zur	Schiffahrt,	oder	die	von	Herden	ihren	3
Unterhalt	suchen,	die	im	Gegenteil	nur	ein	Werk	und	eine	Kunst	pglegen;	stets	zu	kämpfen	und	zu	
überwinden,	was	sich	ihnen	entgegenstellt.”	Plutarch	quoted	in	Friedrich	Engels,	Zur	Urgeschichte	
der	Deutschen,	Marx/Engels.	Werke.	Bd.	19,	Berlin	1973	[1882],	p.	429.	In	this	context	it	should	be	
noted	that	based	on	a	historical-economic	evaluation	which	Engels	in	part	derived	from	Lewis	
Henry	Morgan’s	1877	book	Ancient	Society,	barbarism	was	the	stage	between	savageness	and	
civilization,	thus	precisely	not	the	most	atavistic	societal	model.	See	his	Der	Ursprung	der	Familie,	
des	Privateigentums,	und	des	Staats	(Zurich,	1884)	
	Ibid,	pp.	434-435.	“Kaugleute	lassen	sie	nur	ins	Land,	damit	sie	jemand	haben,	der	ihnen	die	4
Kriegsbeute	abkauft,	sie	selbst	kaufen	ihnen	fast	nichts	ab;	was	hätten	sie	denn	auch	Fremdes	
nötig?	Sogar	ihre	schlechten	Ponys	ziehn	sie	den	schönen	und	guten	gallischen	Pferden	vor.”	“[…]	
Gold	und	Silber	ist	den	inneren	Deutschen	gleichgültig,	den	Fürsten	und	Gesandten	von	Römern	
geschenkte	Silbergefäße	dienen	demselben	gemeinen	Gebrauch	wie	irdene.”	[Nach	Tacitus]	
	Max	Horkeimer,	Theodor	Adorno,	Die	Dialektik	der	AuIklärung,	Frankfurt	a.M.	1969.	[1947].	5
p.27.	(Translation	by	the	author).	
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deformities	unveiling	The	Condition	of	the	Working	Class	in	England .	There,	the	6
advancement	of	machined	production	concurred	with	the	erosion	of	the	“factory-
hands’“	literal	backbone:	
The	reports	of	the	[Factories’	Inquiry]	Commission	touching	this	barbarism	
surpass	everything	that	is	known	to	me	in	this	line.	The	Commissioners	mention	
a	crowd	of	cripples	who	appeared	before	them,	who	clearly	owed	their	
distortion	to	the	long	working-hours.	This	distortion	usually	consists	of	a	
curving	of	the	spinal	column	and	legs,	and	is	described	as	follows	by	Francis	
Sharp,	M.R.C.S.	[Membership	of	the	Royal	College	of	Surgeons][…].	Precisely	
similar	is	the	testimony	of	Dr.	Hey,	for	eighteen	years	physician	in	the	hospital	in	
Leeds:		
"Diseases	of	the	spine	amongst	people	employed	in	factories	presented	
themselves	very	frequently.	[…].	The	deformities	of	the	limbs	appear	to	be	more	
frequent	than	the	spinal	diseases...	the	bending	in	of	the	knees,	relaxation	of	the	
ligaments	of	the	ankles	was	very	frequent,	and	the	bending	of	the	large	bones.	
The	heads	of	the	large	bones	have	especially	been	increased	and	twisted	to	a	
considerable	extent;	and	these	cases	I	have	found	to	have	come	from	those	mills	
and	factories	where	long	hours	have	been	said	to	be	common."	 	7
No	doubt	not	 least	on	the	basis	of	Engels’	 gindings,	Marx	completed	the	 latter’s	
physiological	progile	of	industrialization’s	barbarian	with	economic,	political	and	
social	 attributes:	 “valueless”,	 “unworthy”,	 “deformed”,	 “powerless”,	 “cretinous”	–	
		Die	Lage	der	arbeitenden	Klasse	in	England,	Leipzig,	1845.	In	Marx/Engels,	Werke	Bd.	2,	Berlin	6
1972	
	Ibid.	pp.	376-377,	English	translation	at	http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/7
condition-working-class/ch08.htm.	Retrieved	on	May,	30th,	2013.	
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“barbarous”. 	It	was	precisely	from	these	“conditions”	(Engels)	and	“according	to	8
the[se]	 economic	 laws”	 (Marx)	 that	 Marx	 and	 Engels	 advanced	 their	 political-
economic	 critique	 of	modern	 progress	 and	 rationalization	 to	 the	 ends	 of	 their	
“Manifesto	of	the	Communist	Party”	(1848).	Therein	the	barbaric	equally	applied	
once	 again	 to	 the	 periphery,	which	 in	 this	 case	meant	 the	 entire	 Non-Western	
world	 (e.g.	China,	 India	etc.),	now	simply	 conceived	as	one	giant	global	market	
forced	 into	 becoming	 a	 trading	 partner	 by	 and	 with	 a	 “modern	 bourgeois	
society”;	 one	 which	 in	 turn	 also	 forced	 “the	 barbarians’	 intensely	 obstinate	
hatred	of	 foreigners	 to	capitulate”	 to	global	capital	as	 the	paradigm	of	Western	
“civilization”.	Marx	and	Engels	did,	however,	give	“modern	society”	credit	 for	at	
least	having	“[…]	rescued	a	considerable	part	of	the	population	from	the	idiocy	of	
rural	life”	 .	9
According	to	Theodor	Adorno	this	was	a	nineteenth-century	rescue	operation	far	
from	 having	 seen	 completion	with	 the	 “modern	 bourgeois	 society”	 –	 now	 less	
understood	in	its	economic	than	in	its	cultural	and	social	facilities	–	having	failed	
t o	 a c h i e v e	 o n e	 o f	 i t s	 m o s t	 p e r s u a s i v e	 p u r p o s e s :	
“debarbarization”	 [“Entbarbarisierung”].	 Debarbarization	 was	 especially	
required	of	the	“open	[“platt”]	countryside”,	tarnished	as	it	was	for	Adorno	since	
	Karl	Marx,	Ökonomisch-philosophische	Manuskripte	aus	dem	Jahre	1844,	Paris	1844.	In	Classical	8
Sociological	Theory	(Second	Edition),	eds.	Craig	Calhoun,	Gerteis,	Moody,	Pfaff,	Virk,	Oxford,	
Malden/MA,	2007,	p.	88.	The	sequence	of	these	adjectives	has	been	slightly	altered	from	the	
original.	
	Ibid,	p.99.		9
	8
it	 had	 produced	 the	 “tormentors	 [“Quälgeister”]	 of	 the	 concentration	 camp”	 ;	10
those	 receiving	 orders,	 doing	 the	 dirty	work,	 “torturers”	 [Folterknechte]	 doing	
what	 “servants	 [Knechte]”	 do,	 “through	 which	 they	 perpetuate	 their	 own	
servitude	[Knechtschaft]” .	The	“cultural	difference	between	city	and	country	is	11
one	of	the	conditions	–	though	certainly	not	the	sole	and	most	important	–	of	the	
horror	 [Grausamkeit]”,	 claimed	 Adorno.	 “Debarbarization	 of	 the	 countryside”	
was	to	be	“one	of	the	most	important	goals	of	education”	 ,	albeit	with	Adorno	in	12
the	same	breath	doubting	its	actual	effectiveness.		
Adorno’s	objective	 for	culture	was	of	course	 trivial	compared	to	his	 (in)famous	
objection	 to	 culture	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 camp,	 mandating	 that	 the	 proven	
possibility	 of	 a	 “barbaric	 regime” 	 therefore	 also	 meant	 any	 artistic	 form	13
addressing	 it	 was	 preposterous	 at	 best	 and,	 as	 has	 often	 since	 been	 quoted,	
“barbaric”	at	worst .	This	had	little	to	do	with	any	particular	discussion	of	form	14
	Adorno,	“Kulturkritik	und	Gesellschaft	II”.	Gesammelte	Schriften	Bd.	10.2,		p.	680,	Frankfurt	10
a.M.,	1977.	Translated	as	Critical	Models:	Interventions	and	Catchwords,	transl.	H.W.	Pickford,	New	
York	1998.	
	Ibid,	p.	690.	“Folterknecht”	is	the	term	used	by	Walter	Benjamin	in	a	conversation	with	11
Adorno.	
	Ibid.,	p.	680	12
	Adorno,	“Die	auferstandene	Kultur”,	Gesammelte	Schriften	Bd.	20.2,	Frankfurt	a.M.	1986,	p.	453.		13
	The	famous	line	is	contained	in	a	much	more	expansive	complex	from	which	an	excerpt	reads:	14
“[…]	Cultural	criticism	ginds	itself	faced	with	the	ginal	stage	of	the	dialectic	of	culture	and	
barbarism.	To	write	poetry	after	Auschwitz	is	barbaric.	And	this	corrodes	even	the	knowledge	of	
why	it	has	become	impossible	to	write	poetry	today.	Absolute	reigication,	which	presupposed	
intellectual	progress	as	one	of	its	elements,	is	now	preparing	to	absorb	the	mind	entirely	[…].”	
“Kulturkritik	und	Gesellschaft”,	1951.	In	Prisms.	Transl.	by	Shiery	Nicholsen	Weber,	Samuel	
Weber.	Cambridge/Mass.,	1981,	p.	34		
	9
and	 medium	 specigicity 	 but	 was	 levied	 by	 his	 assessment	 that:	 “Barbarism	15
continues	 as	 long	 as	 the	 fundamental	 conditions	 that	 favored	 that	 relapse	
[Auschwitz]	 continue	 largely	 unchanged”. 	 Thus,	 “barbarous”	 and	 “barbarism”	16
are	 liberally	 applied	 and	 sprinkled	 throughout	 Adorno’s	 writing	 which,	
intentionally	 or	 not,	 renders	 these	 notions	 signigicantly	 bereft	 of	 their	 force	 as	
rhetorical	 provocation,	 as	which	 they	 have	 since	 been	 discussed .	 Not	 only	 is	17
Auschwitz	barbaric	as	much	as	any	composing	of	verses	addressing	 it,	but	also	
the	preceding	“barbarism	of	the	culture	industry” 	–	indiscriminatingly	applied	18
to	a	Weimar	Republic	of	“Berlin	tabloid	culture”	and	“Bomben	auf	Monte	Carlo” 	19
and	 to	 that	 industry’s	 deginitive	 relocation	 to	 Hollywood.	 An	 “industry”	 -	 by	
deginition	 naturally	 tuned	 in	 to	 the	 “progressing	 barbarism	 of	 economy’s	
supremacy” 	-	played	out	in	the	screen	competitions	between	“Betty	Boop”	and	20
	As	which	this	discussion	has	been	“reignited”	by	Jacques	Rancière	where	the	either-or	15
dilemma	of	sappy	Holocaust	(1978)	or	sober	Shoah	(1985)	–	not	to	mention	that	Spielberg	
shower	scene	–	is	ginally	solved	by	the	“meaningless	of	the	secret”;	in	this	case	coming	courtesy	
of	Citizen	Kane	(1941):	“the	snow	that	falls	in	the	miniature	glass	dome,	and	a	name	on	a	
children’s	sleigh”.	Adorno	probably	would	have	shivered	at	this	yuletide	theme.		Aesthetics	and	its	
Discontents,	transl.	Steven	Corcoran,	Cambridge	2011	[2004],	p.126	
	Adorno,	1977,	p.674	16
	For	an	elaborate	discussion	of	the	semantic	trajectory	employed	by	Adorno	in	the	context	of	17
critique	and	post-War	public	discourse	in	the	Federal	Republic	see	especially	Sven	Kramer:	
“’Wahr	sind	die	Sätze	als	Impuls…’	Begriffsarbeit	und	sprachliche	Darstellung	in	Adornos	
Reglexion	auf	Auschwitz”.	Deutsche	Vierteljahrsschrift	für	Literatur	und	Geistesgeschichte,	Vol.	70	
No.3,	1996,	pp.500-523.	Kramer	sees	this	generous	usage	of	barbarism	by	Adorno	as	indicative	of	
an	intentional	“liquefaction	of	the	notion”	which	“refuses	the	ascription	of	evil	to	the	past	and	
emphasizes	the	Nachleben	of	barbarism”.	p.	513	(Transl.	by	the	author).	
	Horkheimer,	Adorno,	1969,	p.	140	18
	Adorno,	Minima	Moralia,	Frankfurt	a.M.	1973	[1946],	p.	35.	Bomben	auf	Monte	Carlo	(Monte	19
Carlo	Madness,	U.S.-title)	is	a	UFA-studio	musical	comedy	gilm	from	1931.	
	Adorno,	“Prismen”.	Gesammelte	Schriften	Bd.	10.1,	Frankfurt	a.M.,	1997	[1949],	p.17	20
	10
“Donald	Duck” 	was	beheld	and	dismissed	on	location	by	Adorno.	Only	to	return	21
to	the	“complacent	cultural	barbarism” 	of	a	post-War	Germany’s	“Otto-Normal-22
Verbraucher”	 investment/escape	 into	 Die	 Fischerin	 vom	 Bodensee 	 et	 al.	 No	23
wonder	that,	as	far	as	Adorno	was	concerned,	this	meant:	“If	barbarism	itself	is	
inscribed	in	the	principle	of	civilization,	then	there	is	something	desperate	in	the	
attempt	to	rise	up	against	it.” 	24
Then	 again,	 “to	 rise	 up	 against	 it”,	 whether	 through	 a	 confrontational	
“Manifesto”	 or	 a	 distancing	 “Critical	 Theory”,	 only	 presents	 a	 part	 of	 the	 story,	
albeit	 the	 prominent	 and	 arguably	 persistent	 part.	 Differently	 put,	 before	 and	
after	 an	 against,	 barbarism	 may	 be	 historically	 revisited	 interjacent	 with:	
anticipating	the	resultant	desperate-ness	to	be	perhaps	only	marginally	different.	
Heeding	 the	 advice	 of	 one	 of	 post-War	 Germany’s	 notable	 protectionists	
concerning	 art	 and	 culture’s	 across-the-board	 despair	 (or	 ineffectuality)	 “[…]	
every	historically	contextual	theory	must	check	the	development	of	its	topic	at	a	
certain	point	in	time	to	construe	it.” 	25
	Horkheimer,	Adorno,	1969,	p.	142	21
	Adorno,	1997[1951],	p.	14		22
	A	gilm	from	1956	and	a	prominent	example	of	the	Heimatgilm	genre	popular	in	post-War	23
Germany	around	the	early	1950s.	
	Adorno,	1977,	p.674,	Translation	from	Critical	Models:	Interventions	and	catchwords,	transl.	24
H.W.	Pickford,	New	York	1998	
	Peter	Bürger,	Theorie	der	Avantgarde,	Frankfurt	a.M.	1974,	Nachwort	zur	zweiten	Auglage,	25
p.135	
	11
And	given	the	“topic[‘s]”	inherent	contradictions	and	malleability,	why	not	
“check”	its	“development”	at	a	point	at	which	to	“compare	the	incomparable” 	,	26
as	 Benjamin	 Buchloh	 not	 long	 ago	 introduced	 his	 discussion	 departing	 from	 a	
juxtaposition	 of	 two	 formative	 exhibitions:	 the	 “Große	 Deutsche	
Kunstausstellung”	 (1937)	organized	by	 the	artist	 and	educator	Adolf	Ziegler	 at	
the	Haus	der	Deutschen	Kunst	in	Munich	and	the	“Exposition	Internationale	du	
Surréalisme”	 in	 Paris	 realized	 by	 Andre	 Bréton,	 Marcel	 Duchamp	 and	 Paul	
Elouard	 at	 dealer	 Georges	 Wildenstein’s	 Galerie	 Beaux-Arts.	 The	 exhibitions	
were	 formative	 in	 that	 the	Munich	exhibition	once	 and	 for	 all	 inaugurated	and	
prescribed	the	artistic	ideal	of	the	regime,	while	the	Paris	exhibition	marked	the	
cessation	of	the	European	avant-garde	just	before	the	occupation,	aware	as	it	was	
of	 its	 imminent	 expiration	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 this	 new	 political	 reality	 intent	 to	
prosecute	on	the	grounds	of	“degeneration”.	
A	question	arose	at	the	end	of	Buchloh’s	presentation	as	to	whether	such	
a	 juxtaposition	 of	 incomparabilities	 could	 have	 been	 conceived	 at	 that	 very	
moment	in	time.	It	was	answered	by	the	suggestion	that	the	Collège	de	Sociologie	
(1937-39),	 principally	 founded	 by	 George	 Bataille,	 Michel	 Leiris	 and	 Roger	
Caillois,	 essentially	 engaged	 in	 precisely	 these	 improbable	 comparisons :	27
debating,	in	“real	time”,	modern	fascism’s	awesome	radiance	stunning	a	Western	
	Benjamin	Buchloh,	“Dialectics	of	Annihilation”.	Lecture,	Haus	der	Kunst,	Munich,	June	10th	26
2012.	
	A	question/commentary	by	Georges	Didi-Huberman.	27
	12
bourgeois	modernity	perceived	as	entirely	corrupted	and	spiritually	desolate	 .	28
As	much	as	 this	 conclusion	along	with	 the	 think-tank’s	neutral	 sounding	name	
suggests	a	 likeness	 to	 the	concurrent	 Institut	 für	Sozialforschung	–	 then	 led	by	
Max	 Horkheimer	 based	 at	 Columbia	 University	 –	 their	 respective	 trajectories	
were	 marked	 by	 their	 increasing	 irreconcilability,	 to	 which	 German	 fascism	
proved	to	be	pivotal	 .	 	The	Collège’s	investment	in	myth,	in	archaisms,	in	non-29
Marxist	 political	 models,	 perhaps	 even	 in	 a	 heterogeneous	 fascism,	 met	 with	
bewilderment	 at	 best:	 “You	 are	 working	 for	 fascism” .	 	 This	 was	 somewhat	30
acknowledged	 in	 retrospect	 on	 both	 sides,	 with	 Bataille	 stating	 in	 the	 third	
person	in	1958:	“La	tendance	pro-fasciste	pretendue	de	certains	amis	de	Bataille,	
de	 Bataille	 lui-même	 à	 un	 moin	 dégree.”	 Bataille	 further	 pondered	 that	 the	
Collège	de	Sociologie	displayed	a:	 “paradoxical	 fascist	 tendency	 […]	despite	 the	
radically	 contrary	 intention” .	 The	 drifting	 apart	 of	 the	 Institut	 für	31
Sozialforschung	 and	 the	 Collège	 de	 Sociologie	 was	 imminent	 not	 least	 due	 to	
their	 diverging	 treatment	 of	 myths,	 no	 doubt	 including	 those	 of	 a	 barbaric	
	Siegfried	Kracauer,	Ernst	Bloch	and	Wilhelm	Reich	all	offered	far-reaching	contemporaneous	28
analyses	of	the	pull	of	nascent	National	Socialism;	as	did	Walter	Benjamin,	although	less	
deginitively	so.	The	difference	of	all	these	theorizations	to	the	debates	of	the	Collège	is	discussed	
above.	
	Both	Caillois	and	Bataille	contributed	to	Horkeimer’s	Zeitschrift	für	Sozialforschung	though.	In	29
fact	in	a	letter	by	Adorno	to	Benjamin	the	former	put	in	a	request:	“to	look	for	highly	qualigied	
French	contributors.	[…]	I	mentioned	Caillois	and	Bataille	(?)”.	July,	2nd,	1937.	Adorno/Benjamin,	
Briefwechsel	1928-40,	ed.	Henri	Lonitz,	Frankfurt	a.M.	1995,	p.	257	(Translation	by	the	author).	A	
difgicult	request	as	it	turned	out,	with	Benjamin	replying:	”to	having	to	deal	on	the	one	hand	with	
the	paralyzed	orthodox	intelligentsia	[French	Stalinists]	and	the	often	unconscious	sympathies	
for	fascism	of	the	free	[“der	freien”;	i.e.	the	members	of	the	Collège]	on	the	other	hand.”	Ibid.,	p.	
264	
	Apparently	a	remark	by	Benjamin	to	members	of	the	College,	according	to	Pierre	Klossowski.	30
Quoted	in	Giorgio	Agamben:	Homo	Sacer.	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life.	Transl.	Daniel	Heller-
Roazen.	Stanford/CA,	1998	[1995],	p.	113
	Georges	Bataille,	Oeuvres	Complètes	VII,	Paris	1976,	p.	461	(Transl.	by	the	author).	31
	13
“nature”,	 reglected	 in	 the	 assertion,	 again	 by	 Adorno,	 that:	 “Caillois	 does	 not	
resolve	myths	 into	 immanence	of	consciousness,	does	not	 glatten	them	through	
‘symbolism’,	 but	 on	 the	 contrary	 appeals	 to	 their	 reality.”	 As	 “materialism”,	
according	 to	 Adorno,	 “and	 unfortunately	 more	 than	 that.	 Namely	 the	 anti-
historical	 and	 indeed	 crypto-fascist	 belief	 in	 nature,	 as	 such	 adverse	 to	 an	
analysis	 of	 society	 and	 eventually	 leading	 to	 a	 Volksgemeinschaft	 based	 on	
biology	 and	 the	 imagination.” 	 “The	 indicators	 of	 a	 pathological	 cruelty	32
[Grausamkeit]”	which	 Benjamin	 in	 turn	 stated	 the	 central	 intellectual-spiritual	
concerns	of	at	least	Caillois	to	be. 	To	which	one	may	again	look	to	Bataille,	who	33
some	 twenty	 years	 later	 wrote	 of	 those	 years:	 “Il	 est	 certain	 que	 le	 monde	
bourgeois	tel	qu’il	est	est	une	provocation	à	la	violence	et	que,	dans	ce	monde,	les	
formes	extérieurs	de	la	violence	sont	fascinantes.” 	34
At	 that	 moment,	 contemporary	 art	 was	 no	 longer	 at	 stake	 for	 the	
discussions	 of	 the	 Collège,	 while	 these	 “exterior	 instances	 of	 violence”	 only	
became	all	 the	more	 “fascinating”	 (and	during	which	 the	aesthetic	paradigm	of	
contemporary	 Fascist	 art	 was	 properly	 and	 unmistakably	 ginalized) .	35
	Adorno/Benjamin,	1995,	pp.	276-277	32
	Ibid.,	1995,	p.	357	(In	a	letter	to	Horkheimer	from	1938).	33
	Bataille,	1977,	p.	46134
	For	a	recent	discussion	on	the	disappearance	of	the	visual	arts	as	a	critical	domain	for	the	35
Collège	as	much	as	its	relationship	to	fascism	as	a	social	viability	see	Georges	Didi-Huberman:	“La	
colère	oubliée”,	in	Critique	No.	788-789,	January/February	2013,	pp.	22-29,	that	essentially	
presents	an	expanded	follow-up	to	his	preceding	remark	above.	
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“Occidental	reason”,	meanwhile,	in	all	of	these	cases,	was	already	well	on	its	way	
to	being	assigned	“its	place	on	the	junkyard	of	history“ .		36
												The	following	study,	by	contrast,	departs	from	concurrent	developments	in	
Germany	and	France	a	decade	earlier.	From	“Those	Twenties”,	as	the	short	text	by	
Adorno	 is	 titled,	 where	 he	 states	 that:	 “those	 phenomena	 of	 regression,	 of	
neutralization,	 […]	 usually	 ascribed	 to	 the	 beginning	 pressure	 exerted	 by	
national	 socialist	 terror	 already	 developed	 […]	 in	 the	 liberal	 continental-
European	 society.	 […]	 The	 catastrophe	 that	 succeeded	 the	 1920s	was	 bred	 by	
their	 own	 social	 conglicts,	 including	 the	 sphere	 one	 habitually	 calls	 culture.” 	37
Perhaps	not	 least	due	 to	 this	overall	 sense	of	 “regression”	and	 “neutralization”,	
barbarism	was	both	 implicitly	and	explicitly	adopted	as	an	aesthetic	anti-ideal,	
linked	to	visions	of	social	models	seemingly	embracing	barbaric	aspects	by	quite	
“incomparable”	 “spheres”.	 Reexamining	 Bataille’s	 short-lived	 yet	
comprehensively	 discussed	 avant-garde	 journal	 Documents	 (1929-30) ,	38
together	 with	 largely	 forgotten,	 even	 then	 rather	 marginal	 and	 specialized	
völkisch-fascist	 art	 and	 culture	 journals	 from	 the	 period	 alongside	 archival	
	Kramer,	1996,	p.	509.	He	uses	this	verdict	in	connection	with	Adorno’s	post-Auschwitz	debate	36
while	in	his	context	here	Kantian	“reason”	[Vernunft]	may	be	positioned	not	only	against	fascism	
but	also	vis-à-vis	the	critique	of	reason	and	modernity	as	leveled	by	the	Collège.	One	–	again	–	
certainly	attuned	to	the	myth	of	enlightenment	argued	by	Adorno	and	Horkheimer	albeit	with	
vastly	divergent	analyses	drawn.	
	Adorno,	1977	[1962],	p.499,	502	37
	The	foremost	studies	being	Georges	Didi-Huberman’s	La	resemblance	d’Informe,	Paris	1995,	38
(Formlose	Ähnlichkeit,	Munich	2010),	no	English	translation	available	to	date,	and	the	1996	
publication	and	catalogue	by	Rosalind	Krauss	and	Yve-Alain	Bois:		L’Informe:	mode	d’emploi	
(Paris,	1996	/	Formless:	A	User’s	Guide,	New	York	1997)	preceded	by	Denis	Hollier	La	prise	de	la	
Concorde,	Paris	1974	which	however	does	not	discuss	exclusively	Documents.	Furthermore	see	
the	comprehensive	exhibition	catalogue	Undercover	Surrealism:	Georges	Bataille	and	Documents,	
eds.	Dawn	Ades,	Simon	Baker,	London	Hayward	Gallery	2006.
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material	 held	 at	 the	 Bundesarchiv	 in	 Berlin 	 provided	 the	 initial	 context;	 at	39
times	 merely	 by	 producing	 banal	 correlations	 caused	 by	 overlapping	 imagery	
and	 somewhat	 unforeseen	 mutual	 points	 of	 interests	 and	 discussions	 further	
yielding	 non-exclusive	 lines	 of	 arguments	 in	 making	 the	 case	 for	 collective	
cultural	models,	each	of	them	anti-bourgeois,	to	a	degree.	(On	this	note,	the	study	
thereby	 further	 seeks	 to	 revisit,	 differentiate	 and	 amend	 art	 historically	
established	dualistic	narratives	of	avant-garde	and	fascism ).	40
The	girst	give	chapters	seek	to	exhaust	these	relations	over	a	wide	range,	
tracing	 and	 analyzing	 these	 parallel	 evolving	 discussions	 along	 their	 art	
historical,	aesthetic,	 cultural	and	social	aspects.	This	section	 includes	a	chapter	
that	 extends	 this	 dual	 context	 to	 contemporaneous	 ideas	 about	 barbarism	 by	
Walter	Benjmamin	–	himself	being	in	direct	conversation	with	Bataille	not	much	
later	 (see	 above).	 The	 sixth	 chapter	 continues	 this	 discussion,	 focusing	 on	 the	
tangent	 aspect	 as	 provided	by	 Freud’s	 system	unconscious:	 highly	 ingluential	 to	
the	 dissident-Surrealist	 discourse	 of	Documents	 (as	much	 as	 to	 various	 avant-
garde	 positions	 in	 general);	 recognized	 and	 reformulated	 by	 these	 “dissident”	
fascist-spiritualist	 aspirations	 to	 git	 their	 ideological	mold,	 thus	 performing	 an	
act	of	textbook	sublimation	for	the	cause	of	a	pure,	spiritually	and	aesthetically	
“enlightening”	barbarity	reconceived	as	the	pinnacle	reconciling	community	and	
culture.	
	Predominantly	the	collection	giled	under	BArch	NS	21	held	at	the	Berlin-Lichterfelde	branch.	39
	“Thus	if	the	surrealists	embraced	the	primitive,	the	fascists	abjected	it,	aggressed	against	it.	40
For	the	surrealists	the	primitive	could	not	be	close	enough;	for	the	fascists	it	was	always	too	
close.”	Hal	Foster,	The	Return	of	the	Real,	Cambridge/Mass.	1996,	p.	213.
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The	seventh	chapter	reconsiders	Bataille’s	reception	by	postmodernist	art	
historical	and	theoretical	discourse	beginning	 in	the	mid	1980s,	signigicantly	 in	
the	context	of	the	journal	October	and,	in	connection	to	it,	Rosalind	Krauss’s	and	
Yve-Alain	 Bois’s	 ingluential	 exhibition	 project	 and	 publication	 L’informe:	 Mode	
d’emploi,	presented	in	1995	at	the	Centre	Pompidou.	The	aim	here	is	to	employ	a	
contextual	 “exhibition	 review”	 to	 the	 ends	 of	 a	 discussion	 about	 modern	 and	
contemporary	 art’s	 capability	 to	 perform	 the	 rigorous	 aesthetic	 and	 social	
agencies	 requested	of	 it	by	Bataille	and	Documents	 –	 recognized	yet	 somewhat	
elided	by	Krauss’s	and	Bois’s	project	for	the	sake	of	presenting	a	quasi-barbaric	
formalism	and	classigication	system	which	“formlessness”	by	deginition	annulled.	
The	 last	 chapter	 departs	 again	 from	 a	 postmodernist	 art-theoretical	
discussion	 through	 a	 revisiting	 of	 the	 “anti-aesthetic”,	 as	 a	 term	 afforded	
renewed	 acuity	 by	 the	 eponymous	 publication	 edited	 by	 Hal	 Foster	 in	 1983.	
These	 former	discussions,	 renegotiating	and	rejecting	certain	key	avant-gardist	
models	and	strategies	having	to	do	with	transgression	as	a	defunct	attribute	and	
teleology	 of	 visual	 praxis	 and	 critical	 theory,	 leads	 into	 a	 ginal	 comparative	
analysis	of	 two	recent	practices	known	to	deploy	content	marked	as	barbaric	–	
indeed	as	the	discussion	shows	identical	content	–	in	quite	divergent	ways.	Both	
the	work	of	Seth	Price	and	Thomas	Hirschhorn	have	been	frequently	discussed	
over	the	last	decade	in	their	art	historical	and	conceptual	extrapolation	of	Andy	
Warhol’s	work	 that	presented	 similar	 content	of	 everyday	media	 consumption,	
already	liquegied	in	an	image	economy	of	an	insatiable	recycling,	updating	and	an	
exchangeability	 virtually	 indiscriminate	 on	 the	 level	 of	 content.	 Both	 artists	
address	the	contemporary	modes	of	consumption	and	exchangeability	that	have	
emerged	with	 the	digitalization	of	 image	production,	 circulation	and	reception,	
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albeit	by	different	formal	means	that	betray	a	rift	revealing	the	aforementioned	
discussions	 of	 the	mid	 1980s	 to	 be	 of	 enduring	 relevance.	 (If	 only	 by	 thinking	
through	 their	 irrelevance	 set	 by	 art’s	 shifted	 structural	 integration	 into	media	
culture	at	large	and	its	rising	value	as	a	global	capital	asset.)	
Two	recent	and	incomplete	observations	in	closing:		
I	
This	 year’s	 forthcoming	 Istanbul	 Biennial	 under	 the	 heading	 “Mom,	 am	 I	
Barbarian?”	 sets	 out	 to	 critically	 and	 aesthetically	 draw	 on	 the	 notion	 of	
barbarism	 to	 address	 various	 global	 and	 local	 discontents.	 From	 the	 local	
biopolitical	 gentrigication	 of	 Istanbul’s	 center	 to	 the	 meta	 frame	 of	 the	 global	
dynamics	of	neo-liberal	political	 interest	and	acquisition	over	public	 space	and	
assets	by	means	of	minoritarian	privatization,	in	the	course	of	which,	as	the	term	
already	denotes,	majoritarian	privation	is	never	far.	
As	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 highest	 form	 of	 civilization	 and	 rationality,	 which	 has	
produced	 a	 world	 of	 barbarity	 in	 its	 negative	 sense	 […]	 many	 artists	 of	 the	
Western	tradition	have	advocated	historically	for	what	was	primordial,	primitive	
and	 irrational	 (Romanticism,	 Primitivism,	 Fauve,	 Dada	 and	 Surrealism	 for	
example).	 This	 is	 also	 true	 of	 today.	 In	 the	 face	 of	 excessive	 production,	
connectivity	 and	 complexity	 in	 the	 world,	 the	 simple	 and	 direct	 (and	 the	
opposites,	the	over-complicated	and	convoluted)	are	espoused	as	an	expression	
of	the	desire	to	start	anew.	 	41
	Online	at	http://bienal.iksv.org/en/press/pressreleases/2013	41
Retrieved	May	5th	2013	
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The	 curatorial	 statement’s	 resurrection	 of	 a	 Benjaminian	 artistic	 “positive	
barbarity”	 is	 further	 funneled	 through	 Rancière’s	 Hatred	 for	 Democracy	 and	
Dissensus	while	updating	the	latter’s	partition	of	the	sensible	–	equipped	with	the	
advances	of	an	unspoiled	Edenic	Silicon	Valley	spirit	–	with	 the	Atmospheres	of	
Democracy:	making	things	public.		
Together	with	transformations	in	governance	and	ideology	globally,	the	concept	
of	 ‘public’,	 and	 alongside,	 the	 role	 of	 art	 and	 its	 institutions	 has	 shifted	
drastically.	The	public	programs	of	the	Biennial	will	focus	on	this	shift,	especially	
on	 the	 notion	 of	 “making	 [things]	 publics”,	 and	will	 pose	 the	 question	 of	 “one	
common	world”	in	a	contemporary	context,	as	raised	by	Bruno	Latour.		
The	 prostitution	 universelle	 (Benjamin	 Buchloh),	 exerted	 by	 Marx’s	 fetish	
character	of	the	commodity	and	exhibited	in	1938	at	the	International	Surrealist	
Exhibition,	 has	 apparently	 ginally	 run	 its	 course	 to	 be	 ransomed	 in	 universal	
agency	–	notably	here	under	a	paradigm	of	barbarism.	
Current	 artistic	 practices	 expand	 from	 hybrid	 trials	 to	 radical	 extremes,	
experimenting	with	unorthodox	(even	barbaric)	languages,	forms	and	processes	
sometimes	 acting	 as	 “oxygen	 bubbles”	 in	 reality	 or	 as	 inter-subjective	 agents	
acting	 in	 the	 symbolic	 realm.	 Many	 aim	 to	 create	 critical	 hubs	 in	 society.	
However	there	are	no	ready-made	formulations.	In	each	case,	a	new	alchemy	is	
needed.	The	Biennial	will	be	the	site	for	such	experimentations.	
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What	 is	omitted	 from	 this	oxygen-abuzz	script	 is	 that	 these	hazy	 “unorthodox”	
and	“barbaric”	“languages”	and	“forms”	have	long	become	the	lingua	franca	not	
in	 the	 “symbolic	 realm”	 but	 proliferating	 in	 the	 24-hour	 realm	 of	 social	media	
“hubs”	 “feeds”	 and	 “tweets”	 if	 you	 must:	 #obamasukkksa$$	 cuz	 he	 a	
commyniggaLOL.	Which	is	indeed	formally	derived	from	said	“Western	tradition”,	
hatching	as	 these	 “languages”	do	 from	“the	embryos	of	violet	crocodiles”	while	
they	 implement	 the	 gibberish	 of	 “Gadji	 beri	 bimba”	 ;	 yesteryear’s	42
“untruthfulness	on	style” 	of	the	Cabaret	Voltaire.	The	language	engaged	here	is	43
itself	 reminiscent	 of	 the	 very	 same	 neo-eco	 innovative	 entrepreneurial	
managerial	 tune	 accompanying	 the	 drastic	 purchases	 on	 the	 threatened	
“commons”	under	discussion,	not	least	in	the	Middle	East	and	Turkey	itself	as	the	
recent	developments 	in	Istanbul	make	all	too	clear.	It	is	a	language	again	in	turn	44
partly	tapped	from	the	discursive	ventures	of	1960s	Land	Art.		
	From	Richard	Hülsenbeck/Tristan	Tzara	Dialogue	entre	un	cocher	et	une	alouette,	1917.	Hugo	42
Ball	Gadji	beri	bimba,	1916	
	“What	Expressionists	and	Dadaists	meant	polemically,	the	untruthfulness	on	style	as	such,	43
today	triumphs	in	the	crooner’s	song	jargon	[…].”	Horkheimer/Adorno,	1969,	p.	138.	Translation	
by	the	author	
	“As	the	violence	exercised	by	the	police	is	getting	wilder,	the	masses	are	pouring	down	the	44
streets	against	the	repressive	governance	of	the	state.	I	wholeheartedly	support	the	resistance	
where	hundreds	of	protesters	were	seriously	injured	and	condemn	the	violence	exercise	by	the	
police.	Against	the	barbarians!”	Fulya	Erdemci,	curator	of	the	Istanbul	Biennial.	Artforum	
International	News	Digest,	June,	7th,	2013
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Robert	Smithson,	Spiral	Jetty	(1970)	
	
Palm	Jumeirah	Island,	Dubai	(2006)	
II	
At	 the	 time	 of	 completion	 of	 this	 book	 two	 new	 alpha	 blue-chip	 spaces	 have	
opened	 on	 the	 outskirts	 of	 Paris:	 Gagosian	 Gallery’s	 2000-square	 meter	
construction	 designed	 by	 Jean	 Nouvel	 in	 Le	 Bourget	 and	 Thaddeus	 Ropac’s	
second	 Paris	 space	 in	 Pantin,	 no	 less	 expansive.	 Alpha	 and	 blue-chip	 do	 not	
merely	 connote	 the	 cachet	 of	 the	 stable	 of	 artists	 shown	 and	 their	 respective	
value	 as	 reglected	 in	 prices	 and	 auction	 records;	 they	moreover	 designate	 the	
audience	that	these	spaces	are	designed	to	welcome.	Barely	reachable	by	public	
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transport,	 Gagosian	 Le	 Bourget	 is	 instead	 adjacent	 to	 the	 eponymous	 small	
airport	 predominantly	 used	 by	 corporate	 and	 private	 jets.	 (Both	 spaces’	
peripheral	geography	reiterates	criteria	that	have	long	become	the	architectural	
standards	 of	 this	 caste	 elsewhere:	 closed-off	 islands	 only	 reachable	 by	 private	
boat	 or	 helicopter).	 Both	 galleries	 inaugurated	 their	 white	 mega	 cubes	 with	
Anselm	 Kiefer’s	 spectacular-contemplative	 large-scale	 earthy	 paintings	 and	
installations,	 inferring	 signposts	 of	 historical	 trauma	 and	 barbarity;	 an	 artist	
known	 not	 least	 for	 literally	 applying	 precisely	 the	 kind	 of	 poetry	 refuted	 by	
Adorno	due	to	its	 irreconcilability	with	the	persistence	of	conditions	diagnosed	
as	barbaric.	Here	the	“boon	of	barbarism”	is	not	merely	in	form	of	an	aesthetic	or	
symbolic	quality,	or	in	terms	of	regaining	curatorial	or	discursive	actuality,	but	it	
is	deginitely	quantigiable	–	in	real	estate	and	hard	currency	
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I	Distraction	no	more	
In	 1929	 the	 American	 journalist,	 World	 War	 I	 veteran,	 lay-ethnographer	 and	
practicing	 occultist	 W.B.	 Seabrook	 published	 The	 Magic	 Island,	 a	 diary-style	
extensive	 account	 of	 contemporary	 Haiti .	 A	 large	 section	 of	 the	 book	 was	45
devoted	 to	 the	 island’s	 religious-animistic	 practice,	 referred	 to	 as	 “Vaudou”.	
Perhaps	unbeknown	to	Seabrook,	the	subject	was	surely	of	fashionable	interest	
to	contemporaneous	urbanite	circles,	and	 thus	commercially	viable.	 In	 fact,	 the	
attraction	Vaudou	held	was	 fully	 capitalized	upon	by	 retailing	 it	 as	 sensational	
“Black	 Magic”,	 which	 the	 book	 was	 touted	 as	 revealing	 to	 a	 curious	 –	 and	
expanding	 –	 target	 group. .	 (Allegedly,	 the	 book	 further	 introduced	 the	 term	46
“zombie”	to	a	Western	audience).		
																				Seabrook’s	fascination	with	non-Western,	pagan	and	–	in	view	of	a	by	
then	 late-stage	 colonialism	 –	 increasingly	 extinct	 customs	 and	 artifacts,	 in	
conjunction	with	a	personal	longing	for	alternative,	arguably	more	gratifying	and	
authentic	models	 of	 individual	 experience	within	 a	 collective	 framework	were,	
while	certainly	 idiosyncratically	pursued,	emblematic	 for	 the	enlarged	spiritual	
reorientations	 and	 searches	 of	 post-War	Western	Europe .	 If	 the	 latter	 half	 of	47
	The	book	became	rather	popular	among	metropolitan	circles,	evinced	by	its	fairly	soon	after	45
translation	and	publication	under	the	titles	L’Ile	Magique	(Paris,	1929)	and	Geheimnisvolles	Haiti.	
Rätsel	und	Symbolik	des	Wodu-Kultes	(Berlin,	1931)	respectively.		
	The	book’s	subtitle	promised:	“The	adventures	and	emotional	experiences	of	an	American	46
author	who	went	to	Haiti	to	see	for	himself	the	mysteries	of	Black	Magic.”		
	In	addition	to	his	exploration	of	Haitian	Vaudou	in	The	Magic	Island,	Seabrook	wrote	books	on	47
Bedouin	tribes	of	Northern	Africa	as	well	as	on	cannibalism	among	West	African	tribes,	a	practice	
he	had	participated	in	himself.	These	are	Adventures	in	Arabia	(1927)	and	Jungle	Ways	(1930)	
respectively.	
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the	19th	century	had	already	seen	the	emergence	of	various	bohemian	and	anti-
rationalist	 movements,	 especially	 but	 not	 exclusively	 in	 German-speaking	
countries,	 the	 1920s	 saw	 a	 fully-gledged	 revival	 of	 these	 former	 ideas,	 now	
however	in	a	cultural	environment	of	increased	access	to	and	circulation	of	mass	
media.	Within	Germany	in	particular,	the	rapid	phase	of	modernization	since	the	
latter	half	of	the	19th	century	towards	a	predominantly	industrial	and	bourgeois	
society	during	the	course	of	the	Wilhelminian	Era	also	meant	that	these	former	
niche	 interests	were	 now	more	widely	 disseminated.	 And	 received	 by	 a	 larger,	
less	 class-specigic	 audience	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 properly	 bohemian	 initiate	 and	
secret	 societies	 that	 had	 conceived	 of	 these	 alternatives	 in	 the	 girst	 place.	
Comprising,	 for	 example,	 the	 “Kosmiker”	 group	 around	 Ludwig	Klages	 and	 the	
circle	 around	 Stefan	George	 in	Munich ,	 both	 invested	 in	Dionysian	 ritual	 and	48
vitalistic	 Matriarchal	 myth	 countering	 Apollonian	 rational	 organization;	 the	
retreat	 to	 meditative	 artistic	 communal	 life	 seeking	 bodily	 and	 mental	 de-
constriction	in	nature	at	the	Monte	Verita	colony,	the	archetype	of	a	more	or	less	
self-sufgicient	 art-eco	 tourism;	 Madame	 Blavatsky’s	 Theosophical	 movement	
claiming	knowledge	production	 from	psychic	 facilities	 and	 categories	opposing	
the	 normative	 ones	 prescribed	 by	 empirical	 and	 materialist	 natural	 science;	
Rudolf	 Steiner’s	 anthroposophy	 with	 its	 alternative	 pedagogies	 valuing	 the	
investment	 in	 the	 supernatural	 etc.	 The	 interests	 and	 propositions	 of	 these	
groups	arrived	in	the	mainstream	by	the	1920s	as	watered-down	–	popularized	–	
alternative	 concepts	 of	 living	 and	 value	 systems.	 The	 decimation	 of	 hitherto	
unimaginable	numbers	of	lives	in	the	First	World	War	presumably	furthered	the	
	For	an	insightful	and	satirical	account	of	both	of	these	circles	see	Franziska	zu	Reventlow,	48
Herrn	Dames	Aufzeichnungnen	oder	Begebenheiten	aus	einem	merkwürdigen	Stadtteil,	Munich	
2008	[1913].
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susceptibility	 to	 the	 various	 counter-models	 on	 offer	 to	 the	 by	 then	 certainly	
reigning	and	increasingly	conglicted	form	of	coexistence:	society.		
One	of	the	classic	studies	on	the	development	of	industrialization	and	the	
subsequently	urbanized	 forms	of	 coexistence	 –	 society	on	 its	way	 to	becoming	
permeated	by	mass	media	and	commodity	culture,	as	it	was	by	the	1920s	–	had	
already	 been	 carried	 out	 in	 1887	 by	 Ferdinand	 Tönnies’	 Gemeinschaft	 and	
Gesellschaft	 [Community	and	Society].	 It	 is	 telling	 in	 this	context	 that	 this	book	
really	received	wider	exposure	and	prominence	retroactively:	from	1920	to	1926	
alone	 this	 title	 saw	 give	 reprints,	 four	of	which	were	 reissued	 twice	during	 the	
same	year	(1922	and	1926	respectively),	indeed	becoming	something	of	a	best-
seller;	 naturally	 in	 Germany	 but	 also	 translated	 and	 discussed,	 for	 example,	 in	
Britain	at	the	time.	Tönnies’	“objective”	retracing	of	this	shift	from	community	to	
society,	which	–	as	he	himself	as	 late	as	1935	clearly	 frustratedly	stressed,	was	
never	 conceived	 as	 an	 “ethical	 or	political	 tract” 	 –	 resurfaced	 as	 a	 shift	more	49
and	more	 openly	 alleged	 to	 be	 fatal	 and	 dissatisfying.	 The	 various	 discontents	
voiced	 resorted	 to	 the	 binary	 deginitions	 Tönnies	 had	 devised	 in	 order	 to	
differentiate	community	from	society.	Now	his	deginitions	of	an	abstract	such	as	
community	were	upheld	as	forsaken	and	desirable	values	to	be	regained.		
Tönnies	 spoke	 of	 “relations”	 and	 “connections”	 as	 the	 processes	
structuring	each	of	 these	 two	 terms,	 that	 in	 turn	were	characterized	by	him	as	
follows:	 the	 community’s	 inherent	 relations	 were	 experienced	 as	 “real	 and	
organic	life”,	while	society’s	notion	of	relation	and	thus	life	he	determined	to	be	
“ideational	 and	mechanical”.	 Furthermore,	 the	 “permanence”	of	 the	 community	
	Ferdinand	Tönnies,	Gemeinschaft	und	Gesellschaft,	“Vorwort	zur	achten	Auglage”,	Leipzig	1935,	49
p.	III	
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“dissolved”	[“sich	auglösen”]	in	society,	which	by	his	deginition	was	“temporary”	
and	 “ostensive”	 [“scheinbar”]	 –	 community	 was	 “a	 living	 organism”	 whereas	
society	was	“a	mechanical	aggregation	and	an	artifact”. 	50
“Alles	 Wirkliche	 ist	 organisch”	 –	 “all	 that	 is	 real	 is	 organic”	 –	 stated	
Tönnies,	 by	which	 he	 did	 not	 intend	 to	 conjure	 a	 spiritual-autochthonous	 real	
emanating	 from	 a	 chosen	 soil,	 rather	 this	 was	 an	 assertion	 he	 deduced	 from	
historically	changing	economic	and	social	conditions:	that	of	more	self-contained	
communities,	where	labor	and	the	production	of	goods	took	place	and	departed	
directly	from	the	lands	being	worked	or	built	on	and	exploited.	The	subsequent	
transactions,	 exchange	 and	 communication	 thus	 equally	 related	 to	 this	 clearly	
delineated	sphere.	Whether	one	wanted	to	be	or	not,	as	a	member	of	this	feudal-
to-pre-industrial	 community,	 one	was	 locked	 into	 a	 rather	 hermetic	 social	 and	
economic	 reality,	 certainly	 divided	 by	 a	 clear	 and	 barely	 permeable	 hierarchy,	
safe	perhaps	 for	 travelling	merchants	 and	 the	 less	 appealing	prospect	 of	 being	
expelled	from	the	community	as	an	outlaw.	(The	latter	chirpy	German	notion	of	
“vogelfrei”	 –	 “free	 as	 a	 bird”	 –	 is	 rather	 deceptive	 here,	 since	 the	 Freiheit/
freedom	attained	by	being	outlawed	essentially	not	only	meant	the	privation	of	
the	limited	rights	one	may	have	had	but	furthermore	exposure	to	precariousness	
and	arbitrary	homicide	at	worst. )	Tönnies’	notion	of	“Auglösung”	(dissolution/51
disintegration),	by	contrast,	was	degined	by	him	not	as	negatively	connoted	per	
se	 but	 merely	 described	 a	 socio-economic	 process	 affecting	 the	 citizenry’s	
	Ibid.,	pp.	3,	5,	6	(Transl.	by	the	author).	50
	On	the	biopolitical	notion	of	the	“ban”	producing	the	non-subject	of	the	“outlaw”	(outside	the	51
law)	in	late	and	post-Medieval	society	as	one	stage	within	a	Western	evolution	of	juridical	–	and	
terminal	–	expulsion	see	also	Giorgio	Agamben,	1998.	
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“connection”	 to	 one	 another,	 a	 process	 inseparable	 from	 a	 developing	 society,	
most	clearly	discernable	in	the	late	19th-century	metropolis	(Paris,	Berlin,	Vienna	
etc.)	 where	 capital	 and	 commerce	 hypertrophied	 into	 hitherto	 non-existent	
dimensions	and	which	therefore	also	made	them	the	concentrated	hubs	for	new	
scientigic,	 cultural	 and	 political	 knowledge	 production	 (as	 opposed	 to	 15th-
century	 Renaissance	 aristocratic	 patronage,	 say	 (eg	 Venice,	 Florence),	 or	 late	
18th-century	“enlightened”	courts	like	Weimar).	“Auglösung”	would	pose	a	threat,	
according	 to	 Tönnies,	 once	 the	 State	 –	 as	 the	 non-communal	 foreign	 body	 as	
which	 it	 was	 perceived,	 holding	 a	 supposed	 Hobbesian	 state	 of	 homo	 hominis	
lupus	 in	check	–	would	openly	become	the	subject	of	hitherto	“frequently	–	and	
more	 often	hypocritically	 –	 concealed	hatred	 and	 contemptuous	 sentiment”	 by	
the	 people,	 “depending	 on	 the	 degree	 by	 which	 they	 [the	 people]	 become	
detached	[abgelöst]	and	estranged	[entfremdet]	from	it	[the	State].” 	52
This	 conclusion	 was	made	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 a	 pompous	 federal-
monarchical	 German	 Empire	 increasingly	 perceived	 as	 alienating	 by	 an	
urbanized	 constituency.	 Marx’s	 notions	 of	 “estrangement”	 [Entfremdung]	 and	
“alienation”	 [Entäußerung]	 from	some	forty	years	earlier	meanwhile	addressed	
less	a	concrete	political	(German)	State	(due	to	the	lack	of	one),	but	signaled	an	
economic	state	to	which	the	worker	served	as	the	material	and	asset	of	the	least	
value:	 “the	 most	 wretched	 commodity”;	 his/her	 “devaluation	 […]	 in	 direct	
proportion	 to	 the	 increasing	 value	 of	 the	world	of	 things”;	 this	 “economic	 law”	
being	 responsible	 for	 his/her	 “alienation”	 in	 view	 of	 actual	 economic	 access	
alongside	 the	 bodily	 and	 mental	 “estrangement”	 from	 the	 objects	 he/she	
	Ibid.	p.	242	52
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produced	. 	Which,	adding	insult	to	injury,	Marx	claimed	to	lead	to	the	workers’	53
“self-estrangement”	 since	 one’s	 “life”	 was	 disowned	 of	 the	 “activity” 	 he/she	54
could	have	engaged	in	to	the	benegit	of	one’s	own	improvement	and	creation	of	
any	 kind,	 wasted	 instead	 by	 the	 unsparing	 production	 requirements	 of	 the	
factory.	 	 Logically,	 following	 from	 these	 mass	 individual	 fates,	 society	 was	55
united	 only	 in	 its	miserable	 “estrangement	 of	man	 from	man”.	 	 If	Marx’s	 and	56
Engels’s	 rational	 economic	 analyses	 mandating	 revolutionary	 (re)action	
historically	 still	 coincided	 with	 the	 very	 last	 sighs	 of	 anti-Napoleonic	 and	 the	
more	 irrational	 imaginations	 of	 German	 Romanticism,	 by	 the	 time	 Tönnies	
amended	the	1922	reprint	of	his	study	these	irrational	investments	appeared	to	
have	returned	more	empowered	 than	ever;	yet	 simultaneously	 less	clear	about	
their	specigic	intent	and	application.	In	his	added	interjacent	“Appendix	to	social	
relations”,	 Tönnies	 pinpointed	 the	 longing	 for	 a	 notion	 of	 community,	 as	
originally	degined	by	him,	while	raising	concern	for	misguided	ambitions	drawn	
from	said	perceived	deprivation:	
If	 the	 capitalist-social	 world	 system	 after	 having	 experienced	 horrible	
devastations	[WW	I],	from	thereon	enacts	its	disintegrative	[auglösenden]	forces	
all	 the	more	forcefully;	 if,	 in	 light	of	 these	phenomena,	 the	call	 for	 ‘community’	
	Marx,	[1844],	Oxford	2007,	p.	86	53
	Ibid.,	p.90	54
	For	a	differing	narrative	–	based	on	archival	material	–	to	Marx’s	image	of	the	proletarian	55
barbarian	engaged	in	no	activity	other	than	industrial	drudgery	see	Jacques	Rancière:	Proletarian	
Nights:	The	Worker’s	Dream	in	Nineteenth-Century	France,	London	2012	[Paris,	1981].		
	Marx,	Oxford	2007,	p.91	56
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has	grown	louder	and	louder	[…]	then	this	call	will	be	all	the	more	trustworthy,	
the	less	it	unfolds	as	messianic	hope	based	on	the	“sprit”	[Geist]	alone;	because	
the	 spirit	 as	 a	 distinct	 being	 is	 only	 real	 within	 the	 belief	 in	 ghosts	
[Gespensterglauben];	[…] 	57
Just	 as	Marx	 and	 Engels	 sought	 to	 deglate	 the	 efforts	 of	 their	 adversaries	who	
sought	to	obscure	their	rationale	through	conjuring	a	“spectre	of	Communism”	–	
instead	presenting	a	solid	and	infusible	Manifesto	–	as	far	as	consequences	to	be	
drawn	 from	 the	 sentiment	 of	 “Auglösung”	 were	 concerned,	 Tönnies	
recommended	 	 “principles”	 of	 “collective	 [genossenschaftliche]	 self-
sufgiciency” .	 A	 recommendation	 whose	 principled	 temperateness	 already	58
betrayed	 its	 presumable	 insufgiciency,	 in	 1922,	 to	 stir	 or	 satisfy	 said	 society’s	
enthusiasm	and	elation	for	a	return	to	a	community	of	one	kind	or	another .		59
Instead	 of	 countering	 “Auglösung”	 with	 Tönnies’s	 communitarian	
pragmatism,	 it	 seemed	 to	be	more	promising	 and	 inciting	 to	 invest	 in	pre-War	
spiritual,	 transcendental	 “Auglösungen”	 instead.	 Towards	 the	 kind	 of	 states	
Sigmund	 Freud	 in	 1929	 called	 “oceanic”,	 a	 term	 he,	 despite	 voicing	 suspicion,	
adopted	 in	 the	 girst	 page	 of	 Civilization	 and	 its	 Discontents,	 derived	 from	 his	
	Tönnies,	1935	[1922],	p.	203	(Transl.	by	the	author)	57
	Ibid.	58
	And	which	despite	Tönnies	rational-scientigic	outlook	was	nevertheless	criticized	in	his	day	for	59
catering	to	mythological	leanings:	“The	theory	of	an	organic	community,	elevating	a	natural	
[natürlich]	organism	to	a	model	of	social	formation,	is	no	less	mythological	than	nationalism,	
which	can	conceive	of	no	higher	unity	than	the	fateful	form	of	the	nation.”	Siegfried	Kracauer,	Das	
Ornament	der	Masse,	Frankfurt	a.M.	1977	[1927]	p.	55	(Transl.	by	the	author)	
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penfriend,	writer	Romain	Rolland:	“[…]	a	sense	of	eternity,	a	feeling	of	something	
limitless,	unbounded	[…]”	 .	60
If,	as	Tönnies	had	posited,	“one	enters	society	like	one	does	a	strange	land	
[wie	 die	 Fremde]” ,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 during	 this	 period,	 various	 other	61
“strange	lands”	were	obversely	sought	out	to	at	least	temporarily	provide	a	break	
from	 Tönnies’s	 –	 and	 Marx’s	 –	 glumly	 painted,	 anonymous	 yet	 stigling	 	 “self-
estranged”	 “society”.	 Freud,	 in	 1929,	 claimed	 this	 society’s	 “‘cultural	
frustration’” 	 to	 be	 reglective	 of	 not	 only	 general	 and	 blurry	 “discontent”	 but	62
furthermore	linked	to	“[…]	this	strange	attitude	of	hostility	to	civilization”.	In	fact	
Freud,	 while	 declaring	 himself	 to	 be	 “not	 sufgiciently	 erudite”	 to	 historically	
“trace	 the	 causal	 chain”	 for	 such	 “hostility”	 did	 so	 regardless,	 retracing	 two	
historical	 excursions,	 one	 more	 geographically	 and	 the	 other	 more	
chronologically:	
Some	such	hostility	to	civilization	must	have	been	involved	already	in	the	victory	
of	 Christianity	 over	 paganism.	 After	 all,	 this	 hostility	 was	 very	 close	 to	 the	
devaluation	 of	 earthly	 life	 that	 came	 about	 through	 Christian	 teaching.	 The	
penultimate	cause	arose	when	voyages	of	discovery	brought	us	into	contact	with	
primitive	 peoples	 and	 tribes.	 Owing	 to	 inadequate	 observation	 and	 the	
misinterpretation	 of	 their	 manners	 and	 customs,	 they	 appeared	 to	 the	
	Sigmund	Freud,	Civilizations	and	its	Discontents.	Transl.	David	McLintock,	London	2004	60
[Vienna,	1929],	pp.	1-2	
	Tönnies	1934,	p.	3	61
	Freud,	2004,	p.44	62
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Europeans	to	 lead	a	simple,	happy	 life,	 involving	 few	needs,	which	was	beyond	
the	reach	of	their	culturally	superior	visitors 	63
The	 difference	 now	 being	 that	 these	 excursions	 embarked	 on	 –	 according	 to	
Freud,	simultaneously	assuaging	and	propelling	said	“hostility”	and	“frustration”	
–	were	increasingly	available	to	an	expanding	audience.	An	audience	that	did	not	
require	to	embark	on	exciting	–	and	costly	–	voyages	to	the	remnants	of	Paradise	
and	untamed	wilderness	that	 the	19th-century	venturesome	artist-dropout	(e.g.	
Gauguin)	 shared	 with	 the	 aristocratic-afgluent	 globetrotter	 (the	 quasi-	
descendants	of	Freud’s	 “superior	visitors”,	 the	 latter	a	very	 gine	nomination	 for	
the	colonizers	he	essentially	was	referring	to).	 	The	marketing	of	exotic	 images	
from	around	the	world,	proliferating	representations	of	objects	and	people	from	
markedly	 different	 times	 and	 places	 appeared	 –	 seemingly	 congirming	 Freud’s	
hunch	 –	 to	 look	 not	 only	 agield	 for	 its	 material	 but	 also	 back-	 and	 inwards;	
towards	 the	 ancient,	 believed	 to	 be	 lost,	 spiritual	 and	 cultural	 roots	 of	 a	 less	
constrained	 and	 fragmented	 origin.	 Unsurprisingly,	 both	 of	 these	 spheres	 –	
faraway	and	archaic	dominions	–	offered	plenty	of	visually	more	or	less	engaging	
material.	 Equally	 unsurprising,	 this	 material	 was	 therefore	 incorporated	 by	 a	
nascent	popular	media	culture	catering	to	this	growing	public	appetite.	Basically	
nothing	but	an	early	instance	of	co-optation	and	mainstreaming	of	the	intriguing	
strangeness	which	both	exotic	and	pagan	“authenticity”	could	lay	claim	to	and	be	
mobilized	as,	 reglected	as	 such	 for	example	 in	 the	 then	newly	 founded	popular	
German	 magazine	 Die	 Koralle	 (1925-44).	 A	 “Bilderzeitung”	 (illustrated	
magazine),	advertising	on	its	cover	not	only	“Kultur	und	Sport”	but	furthermore	
	Ibid.	p.3063
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“Natur	 und	 Reisen”	 [nature	 and	 travel];	 and	 indeed	 “Heimat	 und	 Ferne”	 [the	
homeland	 and	 the	 faraway].	 	 	 (And	 thus	 not	 untypical	 of	 Adorno’s	 disdained	64
“Berlin	 tabloid	 culture”,	 not	 least	 since	 Die	 Koralle	 was	 a	 product	 of	 the	 very	
Ullstein	publishing	house	he	disparaged	on	numerous	occasions	for	epitomizing	
Weimar	Republic’s	aforementioned	“cultural	barbarism”	[“Kulturbarbarei”].)	
		
	 Die	 Koralle	 –	 Bilderzeitung	 für	 Kultur	 und	 Sport,	 Natur	 und	 Reisen,	 Heimat	 und	 Ferne	64
(1925-1944).	The	broad	appeal	of	exotica	and	ancient	arcana	as	a	 commercial	 resource	of	 late	
colonialism	in	Weimar	Republic	Germany	likewise	left	its	mark	on	the	gilm	industry	that,	just	like	
the	magazine	 above,	 actually	 continued	 in	Nazi	 Germany.	 See	 for	 example	 Jörg	 Schöning	 (ed.),	
Triviale	Tropen.	Exotische	Reise-	und	AbenteuerIilme	aus	Deutschland	1919-1939,	Munich	1997.		
	33
	
Clipping	 from	 the	 German	 weekly	 magazine	 Die	 Koralle	 (1926).	 The	 caption	 for	 the	
carnival	image	on	the	bottom	right	reads:	“Fight	the	sorrows!”		
This	clipping	from	Die	Koralle	illustrates	this	conglation	of	the	two	meta	spheres	
circumscribed	by	Freud	as	discussed	above.	The	four	images	are	laid	out	so	as	to	
emphasize	 formal	 analogies	 across	 otherwise	 very	 distinct	 areas	 and	 indeed	
cultures,	 ranging	 from	 the	 zoological	 to	 modern	 day	 variants	 of	 European	
pageantry.	 Difference	 and	 curiosity	 are	 juxtaposed	 morphologically,	 becoming	
logically	relational	and	available	for	easy	and	quick	diverting	consumption	of	the	
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“new”	 aged:	 a	 tropical	 bird’s	 prominent	 head	 feathering	 is	 placed	 next	 to	 its	
human	adaptation	of	a	tribal	warrior’s	headdress.	A	ceremonial	“exotic”	costume	
exaggerating	 the	 human	 anatomy	 ginds	 its	 analogous	 variation	 in	 the	 equally	
bodily	 exaggerating	 outgits	worn	 at	 a	modern-day	 carnival	 parade,	 turning	 the	
anonymous	wearer	into	a	totemic	and	mythological	gigure	respectively.	Which	is	
to	say	the	images	were,	despite	their	compacting	presentation,	quite	all	over	the	
place.	 Their	 contexts	 were	 “zerstreut”	 [scattered],	 to	 use	 an	 expression	 both	
Siegfried	 Kracauer	 and,	 somewhat	 later,	 Walter	 Benjamin	 frequently	 drew	 on	
around	 the	 time	 of	 said	 example,	 their	 usage	 of	 the	 term	 however	 largely	
pertaining	to	mean	distraction.		
“Man	schilt	die	Berliner	zerstreeungssüchtig”	–	 “One	chides	Berliners	 for	
being	addicted	to	distraction”	–	Kracauer	wrote	in	a	newspaper	article	titled	“The	
cult	of	distraction”	(1926).	Which	to	him	actually	presented	nothing	cultic	at	all	
but	 a	 perfectly	 rational	 conclusion,	 and	who	 thus	 thought	 this	 scolding	 “petit-
bourgeois”,	uttered	by	society’s	more	provincial	or	suburban	segments	who	had	
not	yet	fully	grasped	“distraction”	[Zerstreuung];	not	merely	due	to	their	cultural	
lag	 but	 more	 importantly	 since	 their	 “days”	 were	 not	 yet	 “gilled”	 with	 the	
“stress”	 [“Anspannung”]	endured	by	 the	“working	masses”. 	A	“stress”	 that,	 for	65
all	 its	 pervasive	 claim	 on	 every	 minute	 and	 second,	 “gilled	 one’s	 day	 without	
fulgilling	 it”.	 Distraction	 therefore	 directly	 complied	with	 stress	 in	 that	 both	 of	
these	 modern	 conditions’	 chief	 “sphere”	 of	 actual	 impression	 was	 that	 of	 the	
	Siegfried	Kracauer,	“Kult	der	Zerstreuung”,	Frankfurter	Zeitung,	March	4th,	1926.	In	Kracauer,	65
1977,	p.	313	
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“surface”	 [“Oberglächensphäre”] .	 This	 supergicial	 sphere,	 Kracauer	 claimed,	66
here	resorting	to	Marx	and	Engels	while	portending	Adorno,	logically	informed	a	
culture	 industry	formally	 in	tune	with	respective	economic	principles,	 famously	
given	 shape	 to	 by	 his	 example	 of	 the	 “Tiller-Girls”	 whose	 tightly	 arranged	
numbers	 to	Kracauer	 “resounded	Business,	Business”. 	Their	 “[…]	 legs	matched	67
[Engels’s	documented	barbarous	and	deformed]	factory-hands” 	which	as	such	68
set	the	rule	according	to	which	Adorno’s	and	Horkheimer’s	later	drastic	notion	of	
“Kulturbarbarei”	operated .	69
By	having	become	incorporated	into	the	surface	of	the	magazine	page	in	
order	 to	 serve	 as	 supergicial	 “Zerstreuung”,	 the	 aforementioned	 exotic	 and	
obsolescent	 depictions	 had	 themselves	 become	 a	 lucrative	 part	 of	 surface	
culture.	 More	 importantly	 though,	 snippets	 of	 the	 critiques,	 resentments	 and	
lamentations	over	modern	society	outlined	thus	far	had	equally	been	taken	up	by	
	Ibid.	66
	Most	frequently	associated	with	his	“The	Mass	Ornament”	essay	from	1927,	this	quote	is	67
actually	from	a	later	newspaper	article	titled	“Girls	und	Krise”,	published	in	1931;	at	which	time	
the	Girls’	rousing	productivity	had	become	depressed.	Kracauer,	1977,	p.	342	
	Ibid.	p.54	68
	For	an	entirely	different	“appreciation”	of	the	Girls	see	Agamben,	who	exhumes	them	as	the	69
prototypes	for	capitalistic	self-objectigication,	freeing	oneself	from	parochial	rule	of	one	kind	or	
another,	instead	investing	and	regining	the	self	according	to	one’s	projective-identigicatory	
rationale:	“The	commodigication	of	the	human	body,	while	subjecting	it	to	the	iron	laws	of	
massigication	and	exchange	value,	seemed	at	the	same	time	to	redeem	the	body	from	the	stigma	
of	ineffability	that	had	marked	it	for	millennia.	Breaking	away	from	the	double	chains	of	
biological	destiny	and	individual	biography,	it	took	its	leave	of	both	the	inarticulate	cry	of	the	
tragic	body	and	the	dumb	silence	of	the	comic	body,	and	thus	appeared	for	the	girst	time	perfectly	
communicable,	entirely	illuminated.	The	epochal	process	of	the	emancipation	of	the	human	body	
from	its	theological	foundations	was	thus	accomplished	in	the	dances	of	the	“girls”,	in	the	
advertising	images,	and	in	the	gait	of	fashion	models”.	Agamben,	The	Coming	Community,	trans.	
Michael	Hardt,	Minneapolis,	1993,	p.	48.	(Thus,	it	is	only	logical	that	Agamben	is	the	champion	of	
the	artist	Vanessa	Beecroft.)
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said	 instantaneous	 surface	 culture,	 in	 this	 case	 pasted	 in	 as	 a	 digestibly	 cut	
caption:			
The	carnival	masks,	that	because	of	their	grotesque	exaggeration	are	more	uncanny	than	
comical,	 present	 perhaps	 the	 ginal,	 almost	 unrecognizable	 denouement	 of	 those	 older	
scary	masks	–	now	however	the	evil	demons	being	fought	are	the	boredom	and	sorrows	
of	dull	everyday	life.		
The	 accelerated	 pacing	 and	 fragmentary	 sensations	 affecting	 modern,	
urban	 experience	 seemed	 to	 have	 forfeited	 their	 larger	 appeal	 and	 cause	 for	
aesthetic	 celebration	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 former	 embrace	 of	 any	 such	 facets	 of	
modernity;	 starting	 with	 Baudelaire’s	 Painter	 of	 Modern	 Life	 indulging	 the	
“transient,	the	gleeting	and	the	contingent” ;	continuing	through	to	avant-gardes	70
such	 as	 Futurism	 and	 Constructivism,	 then	 either	 indulging	 in	 eroticizing	 the	
fusion	of	man	and	machine	into	techno-virility	or	in	a	translation	of	machinated	
production	 into	 a	 transformative	 collective	 aesthetic.	 In	 the	 example	 here,	 all	
these	 advances	 and	 excitations	 had	 been	 declared	 “dull”:	modern	 day’s	 “evils”	
and	“demons”,	quasi-religious	denouncements.		
Kracauer	once	assigned	that	majority	voice	of	dissatisfaction	the	comatose	title	
of	 “the	 waiting”	 [“Die	Wartenden”];	 waiting,	 searching	 and	 gleetingly	 engaging	
with	 diversions	 from	 the	 realm	 featured	 in	 the	 clipping	 above	 to	 skirt	 the	
“spiritual	realm’s”	general	“depletion”	[“Entleerung”]	–	ubiquitous	“horror	vacui”.	
While	minoritarian	factions	either	met	this	state	of	discontent	further	hounded	
by	a	“horror	vacui”	as	adamantly	nihilistic	“principal	skeptics”	or,	on	the	contrary,	
	Charles	Baudelaire,	“Le	peintre	de	la	vie	moderne”,	(1859).	In	Sämtliche	Werke.	Bd.	5.	Ed.	and	70
transl.	by	Friedhelm	Kemp,	Vienna,	Munich	1989,	p.	286.	(Transl.	by	the	author)
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a s	 f ana t i c a l l y	 “ un i nh i b i t ed ”	 [ “ h emmungs l o s ” ]	 “ s ho r t - c i r c u i t	
people”	 [“Kurzschluss-Menschen”]	 the	 majority	 hovered	 somewhere	 amidst	
these	poles:	“as	isolated	beings	[“Vereinzelte”]	they	traverse	the	endless	diversity	
of	 spiritual	 phenomena	 […]	 their	 spirit	 [Geist]	 drifting	 on	 rudderlessly	
[steuerlos],	at	home	everywhere	and	nowhere” 	(This	wholesale	assessment	of	71
spiritual	 displacements,	 by	 Kracauer,	 ironically	 –	 or	 tellingly	 –	 being	
commensurate	with	the	then	solidifying	stereotype	of	the	cosmopolitan	rootless	
(German)	 Jew’s	 busy	 itinerary;	 the	 difference	 being	 that	 his/her	 displacement	
was	of	 a	 foremost	physical	nature	 instead).	Exotica,	 folklore	 and	anachronisms	
meanwhile	were	 commercially	 produced	 and	disseminated,	 serving	 temporary,	
supergicial	and	 inconsequential	Zerstreuungen	–	disposable	 gillers	so	 to	speak	–	
maybe	not	 to	an	all-encompassing	 “horror	vacui”,	but	 to	alleviate	plain	 fatigue:	
“boredom	is	everywhere” .	72
		 Employing	 the	 imagery	 and	 customs	 of	 the	 pre-modern	 and	 the	 exotic	
merely	 for	Zerstreuung	 –	as	 opposed	 to	 confronting,	 and	 further	 excavating	 its	
underlying	 currents	 as	 much	 as	 those	 of	 Freudian	 “discontent”,	 “hostility	 to	
civilization”	 and	 Kracauer’s	 stated	 spiritual	 “Entleerung”	 –	 would	 not	 have	
sufgiced	for	George	Bataille	at	the	time	he	launched	the	rather	short-lived	but	to	
	Ibid.	p.	106,	108,	109,	116.	All	quotes	by	Kracauer	in	this	section	are	from	his	article	“	Die	71
Wartenden”,	Frankfurter	Zeitung,	March	12th,	1922.	
	Michel	Leiris,	“Civilisation”,	Documents	4,	1929.	In	Alistair	Brotchie	(ed.),	Encyclopaedia	72
Acephalica,	London	1995,	p.96	
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date	 repercussive	 avant-garde	 journal	 Documents	 in	 Paris	 in	 1929 .	 While	73
Documents	 certainly	 did	 not	 present	 a	 mere	 Bilderzeitung,	 it	 was	 also	 too	
particular	 in	 its	 features	 and	 visuals	 to	 be	 retailed	 as	 yet	 another	 highbrow	
glossy	 art	 magazine	 hyping	 exotic	 objects	 and	 modern	 art	 for	 their	 sheer	 –	
superIicial	 –	 novelty.	 From	 the	perspective	of	European	 intellectual	 history,	 the	
small	group	surrounding	Bataille	in	this	publication,	after	having	broken	off	from	
Andre	Bréton’s	 predominant	 Surrealist	 circle,	 presents	 a	 curious	 instance	with	
regard	 to	 Kracauer’s	 1920s	 social	 typologies	 above.	 While	 more	 than	 a	 few	
contributions	certainly	betray	at	 least	 the	desire	 towards	 intense	absorption	 in	
specigic	 ideas	 and	 cultural	 realms	 in	 the	 vein	 of	 Kracauer’s	 uninhibited	 if	 not	
unhinged	 “short-circuit	 people”,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 the	 frequently	 academic	
contributions	struck	a	counter-balancing	note;	maybe	not	as	outright	“skeptics”	
but	 certainly	 as	 representatives	 of	 research-based	 scholarship	 expressing	 little	
tolerance	or	actual	concern	for	spiritual	and	irrational	extrapolations.		
Seabrook’s	 aforementioned	 The	 Magic	 Island,	 due	 both	 to	 its	 timely	 subject	
matter	and	due	to	the	motivations	behind	the	writing	of	it,	in	a	sense	presented	a	
converging	of	 both:	 a	 detailed,	 quasi-ethnographic	 gield	 study	 and	 an	 eccentric	
leap	 of	 the	 fatigued	 and	 discontent	 Western	 white	 man	 into	 mysterious	 and	
exhilarating	 “strange	 lands”.	 Its	 eclectic	 approach,	 with	 the	 book	 besides	 dark	
	One	of	the	earliest	studies	pertaining	to	Bataille’s	writing	in	the	context	of	Documents	73
specigically	is	Denis	Hollier’s	La	prise	de	la	Concorde	(1974),	which	however	saw	its	English	
translation	as	late	as	1992	(Against	Architecture).	A	lot	of	seminal	texts	by	Bataille,	from	
Documents	and	his	subsequent	journal	Acéphale,	appeared	under	the	title	Visions	of	Excess,	edited	
and	translated	by	Allan	Stoekl	in	1985.	The	journal	October	can	be	considered	one	of	the	earliest	
art	theoretical/historical	contexts	to	have	revived	Bataille	for	contemporary	criticism,	notably	by	
Rosalind	Krauss	and	Denis	Hollier	around	the	same	moment.	Georges	Didi-Huberman	published	
his	extensive	study	of	Documents	in	1995,	the	same	year	the	Encyclopaedia	Acephalica	was	
published	which,	despite	its	title,	is	basically	an	annotated	English	translation	of	the	
“Dictionnaire	critique”	segment	of	Documents.	Ed.	Alastair	Brotchie,	transl.	Iain	White,	London	
1995.		Krauss’	and	Bois’	publication	L’Informe;	mode	d’emploi	followed	shortly	after	in	1996.	
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“Vaudou”	 equally	 featuring	 “modern”	 graphic	 illustrations	 of	 contemporary	
Haitian	performing	 artists,	 thus	 answered	 to	 the	 converging	 of	 disciplines	 that	
Documents	 aimed	 for:	 Doctrines,	 Archeology,	 Fine	 Arts,	 Ethnography;	 as	 was	
stated	 on	 its	 cover.	Doctrines	was	 dropped	 from	 the	 fourth	 issue	 onwards	 and	
replaced	by	the	less	resolute,	at	girst	glance arbitrary	Varietés	–	which	turned	out	
not	 to	 serve	 airy	 Zerstreuung	 but	 on	 the	 contrary	 sought	 to	 further	 pull	 the	
myriad	of	visual	sundries	down	from	its	elevated	state	of	commodigication	and	
sublimation,	 pointing	 to	 a	 material	 base	 subjected	 to	 inevitable	 decay.	 As	
Benjamin	 would	 pun	 some	 years	 later:	 “Distraction	 and	 destruction	 as	 the	
subjective	and	objective	sides,	respectively,	of	one	and	the	same	process”. 	74
	 Not	 least	 against	 this	 backdrop,	 The	 Magic	 Island,	 shortly	 following	 its	
French	publication,	thus	became	the	subject	of	a	review	by	Surrealist	poet,	writer	
and	soon	to	be	ethnographer	in	his	own	right ,	Michel	Leiris,	who	from	the	start	75
contributed	 extensively	 to	 Documents,	 acting	 as	 an	 associate	 editor	 alongside	
Bataille. 	Titled	“L’Ile	Magique”,	the	review	credits	Seabrook’s	work	with	ginally	76
	In	the	original	German	“Zerstreeung	und	Zerstörung”.	“Theory	of	Distraction”,	ca.	1935/36.	In	74
Jennings,	Doherty,	Levin	eds.	.	Walter	Benjmamin.	The	Work	of	Art	in	the	Age	of	its	Technological	
Reproducibility	and	other	Writings	on	Media.	Cambridge/Mass.	2008,	p.56	
	Or	at	least	at	the	time	a	budding	one,	with	Denis	Hollier	quoting	Leiris’	apparently	felt	need	at	75
the	time	“to	brush	up	a	little	on	ethnographic	and	sociological	questions”.	Hollier,	“The	Question	
of	Lay	Ethnography”,	in	Undercover	Surrealism,	2006,	p.	59.		
	Documents	was	conceived	by	Bataille	and	fellow	numismatic	Pierre	d’Espezel,	a	colleague	of	76
his	at	the	Coin	and	Stamp	Collection	at	the	Bibliotheque	Nationale	in	Paris.	It	was	backed	by	the	
art	dealer,	collector	and	art	historian	Georges	Wildenstein,	who	was	also	the	publisher	of	a	
leading	art	magazine,	the	Gazette	des	Beaux-Arts.	For	a	concise	and	interpretative	account	of	the	
magazine’s	genesis	and	its	trajectory	see	Denis	Hollier	“La	valeur	d’usage	de	
l’impossible”(foreword	to	the	Documents	reprint,	Paris	1991,	an	alternate	version	of	which	
appeared	as	“The	Use-Value	of	the	Impossible”,	October	Vol.	60,	1992,	pp.	3-24)	as	well	as	the	
Hayward	Gallery	exhibition	catalogue	Undercover	Surrealism,	eds.	Simon	Baker/Dawn	Ades,	
London	2006.	
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doing	 “justice”	 to	 the	 hitherto	 supergicial	 treatment	 of	 occult	 practices	 such	 as	
“Vaudou”.	A	treatment	he	blamed	for	largely	being	based	on	hearsay	and	giction,	
“spiritualist	blather”	as	Leiris	called	it,	dumbed	down	to	entertain	the	minds	of	
ladies	who	 lunch	 [“...divagation	 spiritualiste…de	bonne	 femme…”] .	Aside	 from	77
being	esteemed	as	“a	serious	writer”	and	“conscientious	observer”,	Seabrook	was	
also	 hailed	 as	 the	 “girst	 man	 of	 the	 white	 race	 initiated	 in	 the	 mysteries	 of	
Vaudou”	and	able	therefore	to	recognize	it	for	what	it	was:	“[…]	a	religion	like	all	
the	 others,	 […]	 of	 African	 origin	 mixed	 with	 Christian	 [Catholic]	 beliefs”,	 the	
occasional	 animal	 sacrigice	 alone	 “[…]	 conferring	 on	 it,	 if	 one	 wishes	 to,	 a	
barbaric	 character” .	Which	was	 to	 say	 that	 to	 “confer”	 a	 “barbaric	 character”	78
upon	 Non-Western	 cultures	 and	 their	 aesthetics	 here	 and	 elsewhere	 was	
ultimately	a	matter	either	born	of	the	kind	of	gickle	“relativism”	gaining	traction	
around	 that	 time,	 according	 to	 Kracauer ,	 or	 instead	 of	 course	 good	 old-79
fashioned	colonialist	judgment	–	if	not	outright	“spiritualist	blather”.	
Initially	attacking	what	 in	Leiris’s	view	amounted	 to	an	haute-bourgeois	
profanation	 of	 sacrigicial	 occult	 practices	 and	 attendant	 fetishes	 to	 the	 stuff	 of	
dinner	 party	 conversation	 –	 complete	 with	 matching	 interior	 design,	 which	
Rosalind	Krauss	once	dubbed	“Black	Deco” 	–	the	article	proceeds	to	admonish	80
	Michel	Leiris,	“L’Ile	Magique”,	Documents	I	3,	1929,	p.	334.	Translation	by	the	author,	resorting	77
partly	to	a	German	translation,	“Die	Magische	Insel”,	published	in	Elan	Vital	oder	das	Auge	des	
Eros,	Exh.	Cat.,	ed.	Hubertus	Gaßner,	Haus	der	Kunst,	Munich,	1994,	p.	503	
	Ibid.	78
	Kracauer,	1977,	p.108	79
	Rosalind	Krauss,	The	Originality	of	the	Avant-Garde	and	Other	Modernist	Myths,	Cambridge/80
Mass.	1985,	p.	48	
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the	entire	cultural	system	of	“the	Occident”.	The	praised	and	longed	for	“Occult”	
and	 “Magic”,	 which	 apparently	 still	 gigured	 unimpeded	 in	 Seabrook’s	 everyday	
Haiti	was,	 according	 to	 Leiris,	 “eclipsed”	 in	 the	 civilized	West,	 the	 latter	 being	
spiritually	“eclipsed”	tout	court,	since	it	was	“[…]	hardly	possible	to	expect	great	
results	 in	 these	 countries”	 i.e.,	 France,	 and	 by	 extension	Western	 Europe.	 (His	
vague	prognostication	would	be	proven	right,	 to	say	 the	 least,	only	a	 few	years	
later).	And	somewhat	differently	this	eclipse	further	applied	to	the	United	States,	
which	could	however	lay	claim	to	the	emergent	ersatz	“magic”	of	Hollywood	–	a	
subject	 frequently	 giguring	 within	 the	 magazine	 via	 the	 occasional	 set	
photograph	 or	 gilm	 still	 showing	 some	 young	 platinum	blonde	 striking	 a	 pose.	
(Then	a	still	 fairly	novel	 “subject”,	clearly	catching	the	eye	of	 the	editorial	 team	
while	 being	 simultaneously	 –	 if	 not	 outright	 ridiculed	 –	 unhinged	 by	 being	
surrounded	with	images	of	hardly	gracious	animals	and	facially	contorted	tribal	
masks).	 The	 natural	 integration	 of	 magic	 occurrences,	 which	 because	 of	 their	
obsolescence	 within	 a	 modern	 society	 were	 posthumously	 labeled	 and	
experienced	as	 literally	 “supernatural”,	had	been	abandoned;	 the	 causes	of	 this	
dilemma,	according	to	Leiris,	were	the	increasing	mechanization	of	both	life	and	
work	 [“le	 machinisme”]	 in	 conjunction	 with	 subscribing	 to	 a	 concept	 of	
civilization	 completely	 tied	 to	 a	 utilitarian	 rationale	 [“liens	 étroits	 d’une	
	42
civilization	purement	utilitaire”] .	Leiris’	bemoaning	of	the	eradication	of	magic,	81
without	mentioning	it,	in	principal	presented,	a	decade	later,	an	offshoot	to	Max	
Weber’s	frequently	checked	enquiry	as	to	whether	the	sole	emphasis	on	rational	
protocols	in	modern	knowledge	production	serving	Leiris’	“civilization	purement	
utilitaire”	 actually	 “carried	 a	 further	 purpose	 beyond	 the	 purely	 practical	 and	
technological	 ones” 	 According	 to	 Weber,	 the	 long	 “occidental”	 “process	 of	82
disenchantment”	 [“Entzauberungsprozess”]	 had	 yielded	 complete	
“disenchantment	 of	 the	world”.	 (For	Weber,	 essentially	 personifying	Kracauer’s	
“principal	 skeptic”,	 this	 also	 meant	 that	 precisely	 because	 formerly	 commonly	
understood	 non-rational	 social	 customs	 and	 occurrences	 had	 been	 made	
redundant	 they	 now	 only	 resurfaced	 in	 “the	 remote	 and	 secluded	
[hinterweltlich]	realm	of	mystic	life”,	“[…]	producing	only	fanatic	sects	but	never	
a	true	community”.) .	 In	 fact,	by	being	 labeled	as	“eclipsed”	Leiris	 insinuated	a	83
ruined	if	not	malign	notion	of	enlightenment	that	corresponded	to	the	critiques	
	In	view	of	Leiris’s	notion	of	“eclipse”	to	the	ends	of	a	critique	of	Western	culture	note	that	81
Michelangelo	Antonioni’s	gilm	L’Eclisse	(1962)	may	be	considered	here	to	resume	this	critique	
transposed	to	the	Italian	middle-class.	One	scene	has	has	Monica	Vitti’s	character	enter	a	kind	of	
trance	while	playing	“African”	drum	music	records	in	her	friend’s	apartment	which	is	decorated	
with	presumably	popular	60’s	interior	features	like	a	zebra	rug	and	black	and	white	photographs	
of	the	savanna	(read,	department	store	“Black	Deco”).	Dark	make-up,	golden	chokers	and	hoops	
temporarily	turn	her	into	an	Italo-fashion	version	of	a	Masai	woman.	More	than	thirty	years	later,	
this	juxtaposition	of	exoticism	vis-a-vis	the	perceived	emotional-spiritual	emptiness	of	modernity	
as	a	whole	appearing	throughout	L’Eclisse	(uniform	housing,	leisure,	work	–	Alain	Delon	is	a	mid-
level	stock	broker	–,	lacking	community,	casual	relationships)	as	a	formal	device	of	cultural	
critique,	is	used	almost	identically	to	that	of	Leiris’s	
.
	Max	Weber,	“Wissenschaft	als	Beruf”	[Science	as	Profession],	1919.	Online	at	http://82
www.zeno.org/Soziologie/M/Weber,+Max/Schriften+zur+Wissenschaftslehre/
Wissenschaft+als+Beruf.	Retrieved	on	June,	2nd,	2013.	
“Hat	denn	aber	nun	dieser	in	der	okzidentalen	Kultur	durch	Jahrtausende	fortgesetzte	
Entzauberungsprozeß	und	überhaupt:	dieser	‘Fortschritt’,	dem	die	Wissenschaft	als	Glied	und	
Triebkraft	mit	angehört,	irgendeinen	über	dies	rein	Praktische	und	Technische	hinausgehenden	
Sinn?”	
	Ibid.	83
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of	 humanist	 reason	 and	 progress	 already	 leveled	 by	 Marx’s	 and	 Engels’s	
historical	materialism	and	 the	resultant	 threat	of	a	Western	capitalist	principle	
spiraling	 out	 of	 control,	 ultimately	 becoming	 self-destructive	 and	 devouring	
itself.	Which	 for	 them	 thus	meant	 that:	 “society	 [would]	 suddenly	 gind[s]	 itself	
put	 back	 in	 [a]	 state[s]	 of	 momentary	 barbarism”.	 “Too	 much	 civilization,	 too	
much	means	 of	 subsistence,	 too	much	 industry,	 to	much	 commerce“	was	 their	
projection .	 Whose	 critiques	 and	 warnings	 presaging	 Leiris’	 felt	 “eclipse”	 of	84
civilization	 subsequently	 also	 led	 to	debates	on	 a	Western	 culture	 in	 conglict	 if	
not	crisis	as	 the	positions	discussed	above	show.	Which	also	goes	 to	show	that	
Documents	not	only	betrayed	“the	strange	look	of	a	German	journal	published	in	
French” 	 but,	 more	 importantly,	 circulated	 ideas	 and	 critiques	 that	 whether	85
consciously	or	not	reverberated	with	evaluations	of	society	already	undertaken	
at	the	turn	of	the	century	and	informing	the	cultural	commentary	of	a	Kracauer	
and	others	 in	Germany	around	 the	 early	1920s,	 if	 not	before.	And	 if	 the	 grand	
term	 of	 civilization	 was	 decidedly	 negatively	 connoted	 within	 Documents,	
accommodating	 as	 chronologically	 and	 historically	 disparate	 events	 as	 the	
Christianization	 of	 pagan	 Western	 and	 Northern	 Europe	 and	 the	 societal	
consequences	 of	 industrial	 capitalist	 production	 and	 global	 “primitive	
accumulation”	 (Marx),	 Leiris	 at	 least	 unmistakably	 exhibited	 that	 “strange	
attitude”	Freud	had	concomitantly	diagnosed	as	that	“hostility	to	civilization”.		
	Marx,	Engels,	2004	[1848],	p.100	84
	Hollier,	2006,	p.	59.	He	further	states	that	because	of,	most	notably,	Carl	Einstein’s	input	to	the	85
overall	content,	along	with	individuals	of	German	academia,	Documents	imported	an	“art	
historical	reglection	on	primitivism	that	was	considerably	more	developed	in	his	[Einstein’s]	
native	country	than	in	France”.	
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In	 his	 one-page	 book	 review-cum-lamentation	 of	 the	 spiritual	
shortcomings	of	modern	 living,	 Leiris	 further	 reglected	 the	 tendencies	outlined	
above	 –	 of	 a	 cultural,	 even	 populist	 trend	 reaching,	 simultaneously,	
geographically	 outwards,	 historically	 and	 anthropologically	 backwards	 and	
fantastically	inwards	–	towards	distant,	archaic	and	autochthonous	cultures	and	
values	 deemed	 more	 authentic,	 immediate	 and	 thus	 more	 fulgilling;	
“ausfüllend”	 (Kracauer).	 To	 be	 “short-circuited”	 with	 the	 charge	 of	 untamed	
nature	 thus	 required	 following	 Seabrook’s	 daring	 path.	He	 “had	 acknowledged	
the	intense	desire	to	break	through	one’s	barriers”	and	accordingly	acted	upon	it,	
“risking	 to	 melt	 with	 animals,	 plants	 and	 stones”	 in	 a	 reverse	 process	 of	
anthropomorphization	 that	 repositioned	 the	 human	 animal	 if	 not	 lower	 than,	
then	 at	 least	 on	 equal	 footing	 with,	 other	 organic	 and	 inorganic	 life.	 An	 act	
necessary	to	fuse	with	an	“outside”	that	was	here	yearningly	claimed	to	“be	more	
real	and	alive	than	oneself”. 	86
“Real”	and	“Alive”	–	fundamental	sensations	Western	culture	at	that	point	
had	apparently	largely	forsaken	to	initiate,	its	participants	stuck	–	“waiting”	–	in	
denial	or	 in	 “lazy	 tranquility” .	Hence	Leiris	 called	his	 fellow	urbanites,	 (likely	87
very	 much	 self-reglexively),	 out	 on	 their	 two-facedness	 vis-à-vis	 the	 genuinely	
“orgiastic	 character”	 as	 imparted	 by	 “Vaudou”,	 a	 ritual	 which:	 “[…]	 shouldn’t	
really	need	 to	 scare	 the	 average	European	 if	 one	 thinks	of	 all	 the	 sensual	 rites	
celebrated	more	or	less	hypocritically	every	night	by	people	in	the	large	capitals,	
	Leiris,	1929,	p.	334	86
	Michel	Leiris,	“Civilisation”,	Documents	I,	Vol.	4,	1929,	in	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.	96	87
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that	 don’t	 raise	 any	 mystical	 delirium” .	 Instead,	 as	 Leiris	 put	 it	 in	 another	88
article	entitled	“Civilisation”	from	the	same	issue,	to	overcome	this	desolate	state	
of	 modern	 isolated	 coexistence	 perpetually	 drowning	 in	 “distraction”	 one	 was	
instead:	“[…]	to	get	closer	to	our	primitive	ancestry”,	to	be	put	“stripped	naked,	in	
a	 more	 immediate	 and	 newer	 world.”	 	 This	 very	 language	 again	 actually	89
resounded	with	Georg	Simmel’s	perceived	“Crisis	of	Culture”	from	1916,	as	much	
as	Leiris	seemed	to	congirm	him.	Simmel	posited	that	precisely	these	perceived	
spiritual	shortcomings	of	modern	society	found	an	outlet	in	“supra-confessional	
[überkonfessionell]	mysticism”:	
Because	it	is	within	it	[this	supra-confessional	mysticism]	that	the	religious	soul	
wants	 to	 act	 out	 its	 life	 in	 complete	 immediacy	 [ganz	 unmittelbar	 ausleben],	
devoid	 of	 any	 mediation	 [Vermittlung]	 by	 some	 dogma	 formed	 one	 way	 or	
another,	 to	 essentially	 stand	 naked	 and	 alone	 before	 its	 God,	 if	 not	 already	
conceiving	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 any	 God	 as	 rigidity	 [Starrheit]	 and	 constraint	
[Hemmung]	 in	 itself,	 and	 the	 soul	 thus	only	 considering	 its	 own,	metaphysical	
life,	not	molded	into	one	respective	belief	system	or	another,	as	truly	religious. 	90
Leiris’	 indictment	of	civilization	though	conveyed	not	only	Simmel’s	recognized	
desire	for	a	real-ity	that	only	counted	for	such	if	permitting	immediacy	and	non-
mediation	but	a	more	direct	politico-historical	sentiment.	One	that	had:	“[…]	little	
respect	 remaining	 for	 anything	 that	 does	 not	 annihilate	 the	 succession	 of	
	Leiris,	1929,	p.	334	88
	Michel	Leiris,	“Civilisation”,	in	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.	9489
	Georg	Simmel,	Gesamtausgabe	Bd.	16,	ed.	Otthein	Rammstedt.	Frankfurt	a.M.	1999,	p.44.	90
(Translation	by	the	author)	
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centuries	 in	 one	 stroke	 […]”.	 Civilization,	 around	 the	 late	 1920s,	was	 for	 Leiris	
and	 his	 cohorts	 at	 Documents,	 little	 more	 than	 what	 he	 described	 as	 “a	 thin	
greenish	layer	–	[…]	–	that	forms	on	the	surface	of	calm	water	and	occasionally	
solidigies	 into	 a	 crust,	 until	 broken	 up	 by	 some	 eddy.” 	 In	 other	 words,	91
civilization	 was	 wearing	 “thin”,	 stuck	 in	 a	 state	 of	 stagnation	 and	 prone	 to	
complete	ossigication	 (i.e.,	 to	 turning	 into	 that	dead	 “crust”).	 	 Exactly	what	 the	
“eddies”	 breaking	 up	 this	 bankrupt	 notion	 of	 civilization	 would	 be	 or	 entail	
remained	rather	vague,	described	by	Leiris	as	the	“coarseness	of	our	dangerous	
instincts	 […]	 our	 horrifying	 savageness“,	 for	which	 culture,	 here	 equitable	with	
civilization ,	 merely	 served	 as	 a	 “delightfully	 colored	 cloak	 that	 veils”	 the	92
“premonitory	sign[s]	of	catastrophe” .	What	exactly	these	“signs	of	catastrophe”	93
were	premonitions	of	(economic	crises?	nascent	Fascism?	looming	war?)	was	left	
unaddressed.	 	 “Savageness”	 and	 “coarseness”	 served	 less	 as	 the	 inculpatory	
descriptions	 of	 modernity’s	 miseries	 than	 as	 barbaric	 obstreperous	 qualities	
challenging	stagnation;	qualities	to	strive	for	in	devising	a	concept	of	culture	that	
certainly	 had	 as	 little	 to	 do	 with	 civilization	 as	 with	 culture	 as	 Zerstreuung	 –	
whether	high-	or	lowbrow.	
	Leiris,	1929,	in	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.	93	91
	Whose	historically	and	nationally	differing	origins	and	trajectory	are	elaborated	in	detail	by	92
Norbert	Elias	(Der	Prozess	der	Zivilisation,	Zürich,	1939),	retracing	German	Kultur	and	French	
Civilité	as	two	historically	entwined	yet	socially	distinct	processes	leading	to	separate	notions	of	
culture,	their	respective	cultural	creations/works	of	art	and	their	socio-political	implications	for	
a	French	bourgeoisie	vis-a-vis	a	German	Bildungsbürgertum.	Which	may	in	fact	further	underline	
the	particular	theoretical	and	esthetic	concern	of	Documents	as	an	intellectual-artistic	group,	i.e.	
the	demand	for	culture	to	be	powerfully	transformative	and	genuine	in	relaying	the	inner	states	
shaped	by	outside	realities,	which	pertains	to	Elias’	notion	of	German	Kultur	at	least	since	the	
18th	century.	To	which	culture	as	a	mere	component	to	civilite	obviously	would	not	live	up	to.	
		Leiris,	1929,	in	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.93	93
	47
		 Returning	 to	 the	 here	 quasi-desirable	 destructive	 “eddies”,	 it	 appeared	
that	 these	 veered	 off	 from	 the	 coordinated	 organization	 of	 a	 proletarian	
revolution	 to	 redistribute	 the	 means	 of	 production	 as	 proposed	 by	 Marx	 and	
Engels.	 Neither	 an	 embrace	 of	 the	 machine	 and	 technology	 as	 modern	 day	
creatures	of	 libidinous	violence	and	destruction	as	envisioned	by	Marinetti	and	
his	 cohorts,	 what	 with	 Leiris’s	 disparagement	 of	 machined	 production	 and	
technological	 advances	 that	 seemed	 to	 only	 further	 estrangement.	 (Bataille	
spoke	 of	 the	 “contemptible	 ‘beauty’	 of	 the	 factory”,	 here	 betraying	 a	 certain	
Romantic	 streak	 tinged	 with	 paranoia,	 the	 smoke	 emitting	 chimney	 in	 reality	
presenting	 “the	 oracle	 of	 all	 that	 is	 most	 violent	 in	 our	 present-day	 world”;	
“revolting	 tentacles”	 as	 well	 as	 “giant	 scarecrows”. ).	 If	 modern	 life	 and	94
civilization	as	a	whole	was	barbaric,	this	clearly	here	had	less	to	do	with	either	
economic	 conditions	 or	 a	 critique	 of	 culture	 predominantly	 derived	 from	 a	
transposition	of	Marxist	economic	analysis	to	the	culture	industry.	Instead	of	all	
these	deductions	and	analyses,	Leiris	raved	about	“the	thick	blood	of	mammoths	
killed	 by	 our	 grandfathers	 [that]	 often	 rushes	 to	 our	 heads	 again	 in	 billows	 of	
dark	 malice”.	 Except	 that	 this	 kind	 of	 primal	 gore	 merely	 existed	 “above	 our	
passive	spectators’	heads”	–	mediated,	a	performance	one	paid	to	see	and	derive	
temporary	 and	 safe	 thrills	 from,	 “sit[ting]	 comfortably	 back	 in	 our	 chairs.”	 	95
“Cavemen”	were	still	 “cavemen”	 in	Leiris’	 “Civilization”,	 “the	only	difference	 […]	
[that]	 today	 we	 hire	 dozens	 of	 scapegoats	 whose	 task	 is	 to	 perform	 for	 us	
everything	we	are	too	cowardly	to	perform	for	ourselves”.	Which	included	the	act	
	Bataille,	“Factory	Chimney”,	1929	(Documents	I).	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.	51	94
	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.	95	95
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of	 murder,	 since	 aforementioned	 mediated	 visceral	 violence	 and	 spectacular	
excess	was:	
[…]	 the	 precise	 reason	 that	murderers	 are	 so	 popular:	 a	 beautiful	 crime	 is	 no	
doubt	 terrible,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 it	 is	unconsciously	 satisfying	 to	 everyone,	
and	 the	murderer	 becomes	 a	 kind	 of	 sorcerer	who	 has	 ritually	 performed	 the	
most	horrigic	of	sacrigices. 	96
In	 other	 words	 Documents,	 as	 a	 meeting	 point	 of	 contemporary	 artistic	 and	
scientigic	 interests	 at	 least	 by	 way	 of	 the	 contributions	 of	 Leiris	 and	 Bataille,	
recognized	early	on	not	only	culture	industry’s	low	bar	of	inhibition	in	offering	–	
mediating	 –	 even	 highly	 atrocious	 and	 revulsive	 content,	 but	 furthermore	 a	
perpetual	exchangeability	seemingly	regardless	of	content	due	to	the	industry’s	
shrewd	 grasp	 of	 consumers’	 increasing	 desires	 and	 obsessions	 for	
“transgressive”	 content,	 always	 eager	 to	 tap	 the	 latest	 market:	 “the	 imminent	
triumph	of	Occidental	entropy”. 			97
Within	the	same	text,	Leiris	turned	to	a	feature	of	contemporary	culture	worthy	
of	 attention	 closer	 to	 home:	 “Lew	 Leslie’s	 Black	 Birds”,	 a	 Broadway	 troupe	
	Ibid.	p.96.	This	notion	of	crime	as	the	riveting	content	for	consumption	as	a	capitalist	surrogate	96
for	communal	sacrigicial	acts	is	portrayed	in	Documents	by	the	reproduced	covers	of	the	pulp	
giction	series	Fantomas	featuring	illustrations	of	severed	heads	and	hands,	and	furthermore	the	
kind	of	forerunner	to	contemporary	cop	shows,	the	“true	crime”	magazine	L’Oeil	de	la	Police.	Also	
see	Ades,	Baker	eds.,	2006,	pp.	102/103	
	Denis	Hollier,	in	Ades/Baker	ed.,	2006,	p.	63	He	further	mentions	the	more	general	tendency	at	97
the	end	of	the	1920s	and	the	early	1930s	for	literature	to	increasingly	strive	for	graphic	
depictions	of	extremes	and	violence,	“[…]	as	if	dissimilarities	had	to	be	heightened	so	intensely	
because	they	were	on	the	verge	of	disappearing”.	
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performing	the	Moulin	Rouge	in	Paris .	Given	Leiris’s	dismissiveness	of		(haute-)	98
bourgeois	 indiscriminate	purchase	on	all	 things	exotic	and	primitive,	his	raving	
account	of	this	show	as	an	act	of	unspoiled	“simple	and	beautiful	expression”	is	
contradictory,	 exemplifying	 the	 journal’s	 ambition	 to	 salvage	 what	 they	
considered	cultural	and	aesthetic	potencies	from	being	sucked	up	and	traded	as	
commercial	 exoticisms,	 equivalent	 with	 any	 other	 commodity.	 	 Thus	 Leiris	
afforded	 the	 “Black	 Birds”	 the	 kind	 of	 raw	 immediacy	 the	 Western	 social	
apparently	had	 long	ago	 traded	 in,	never	mind	 that	 the	 “Black	Birds”	were	not	
some	 tribe	 performing	 their	 rites	 as	 primitive	 spectacle.	 They	 were	 an	
embodiment	 of	 an	 increasingly	 professional	 segment	 of	 the	 entertainment	
industry:	 proto-Afro-American	 popular	 culture	 catering	 to	 the	 particularly	
French	 vogue	 of	 “art	 nègre”,	 epitomized	 by	 its	 star,	 the	 dancer	 and	 actress	
Josephine	Baker.	It	didn’t	matter	–	for	Leiris	“[…]	this	modernism	is	[was]	simply	
coincidental” .	99
Tellingly,	 Leiris	 divested	 the	 “Black	 Birds”	 of	 belonging	 to	 the	 realm	 of	
“Art”,	 in	 keeping	 with	 Documents’	 overall	 dismissal	 of	 a	 concept	 of	 high	 art	
clinging	 to	 cultural	 and	 aesthetic	 superiority.	 If	 one	 insisted	 on	 art,	 the	 “Black	
Birds”	were	to	“take	us	to	a	point	on	the	other	side	of	art”,	with	their	art	being	the	
“bastard	son	of	the	illegitimate	love	of	magic	and	free	play	[…]”.	The	“Black	Birds”	
	Called	Lew	Leslie’s	Black	Birds,	this	dance	revue	ran	at	the	Moulin	Rouge	from	June-September	98
1929.	Brotchie	(ed.)	London,	1995,	p.166.		
	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.95.	Simon	Baker	makes	the	different	and	somewhat	contradictory	99
argument	that	Leiris	valued	the	show	since	it	“[…]	reveals	the	failure	of	the	concept	of	art	to	cross	
continents	and	remain	intact”,	by,	in	his	view,	essentially	spoiling	the	already	highly	
compromised,	exploited	Parisian	institution	of	“art	nègre”.		Ades/Baker	(eds.),	2006,	p.67.	Leiris’	
writing	about	the	performance	nevertheless	divulges	Western	objectigication	and	projection	that	
cohere	to	those	“art	nègre”	thrived	on.	
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did	 seem	 to	 be	 better	 able	 –	 although	not	 completely	 –	 to	 provide	 satisfaction	
that	no	imperative	“Art”	at	this	point	in	time	could	come	close	to:	
What	 is	beautiful	about	such	art	 [the	Black	Birds	show]	 is	not	 its	exotic	aspect	
nor	even	its	highly	modern	content	(this	modernism	is	simply	coincidental),	but	
the	 fact	 that	 it	 doesn’t	 really	 constitute	 an	 Art	 at	 all.	 Actually	 it	 seems	 quite	
absurd	 to	 inglict	 upon	 these	 lucid	 and	 spontaneous	 productions	 a	 frightful	
capitalized	 word	 that	 one	 should	 only	 write	 with	 a	 pen	 gilled	 with	 spiders’	
webs. 	100
Yet,	for	Leiris,	the	exhilarating	numbers	of	the	“Black	Birds”	nevertheless	“fail	to	
overcome	 our	 spinelessness”	 or	 “to	 create	 a	 hysteria	 of	 such	 intensity	 that	 it	
would	 immediately	 induce	 the	 audience	 to	 commit	 sordid	 acts	 or	 indulge	 in	
extravagant	 debauches” 	 (which,	 to	 recall	 the	 Magic	 Island	 text,	 would	101
presumably	hardly	transgress	those	“[…]	mere	sensual	rites	celebrated	more	or	
less	hypocritically	every	night	[…]).	Once	again,	they	were	nothing	but	“hired	
	Ibid.	100
	Ibid.	101
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scapegoats” .	“Expressive”	acts	like	the	”Black	Birds”	did,	however,	according	to	102
Leiris,	work	to	ginally	open	up	a	path	to	the	aforementioned,	much	sought	after,	
“mystical	delirium”,	 the	 “mystical	we	are	no	 longer	open	enough	 to”	and	which	
the	legacy	of	Western	art	at	least	after	Medieval	times	had	closed	off .	Which	is	103
to	 say,	 they	presented	 the	direct	anti-thesis	 to	Kracauer’s	Tiller-Girls,	 the	 leggy	
PR-reps	 of	 the	 “distraction	 factory”	 [Zerstreuungsfabrik].	 (While	 not	 explicitly	
mentioned	 anywhere	 in	 Documents,	 the	 reiterate	 inclusion	 of	 reproductions	
picturing	 chorus-lines	 –	 “Hollywood	 Revues”	 –	 is	 telling	 in	 this	 context).	 By	
contrast,	the	“delirium”	induced	by	the	“Black	Birds’”	was	reached	by	unleashing	
or	resuscitating	believed	to	be	dead	primal	forces	in	the	audience,	as:	
	[…]	this	music	and	these	dances	do	not	linger	on	the	surface,	[but]	they	plunge	
deep	organic	roots	 into	us,	roots	whose	thousand	ramigications	penetrate	us;	a	
painful	surgery	that	nevertheless	quickens	our	blood.	 	104
	Or,	as	Bataille	saw	it,	who	devoted	an	eponymous	entry	of	his	“Critical	Dictionary”	to	the	102
“Black	Birds”	in	the	same	issue,	they	actually	took	on	an	avant-garde	rebellious	role,	vociferously	
expressing	discontent	with	spiritual	decay:	“[…]	the	blacks	who	(in	America	or	elsewhere)	are	
civilised	along	with	us,	and	who,	today,	dance	and	cry	out,	are	marshy	emanations	of	the	
decomposition	who	are	set	aglame	above	this	immense	cemetery	[modern	society/civilization]:	
so,	in	a	vaguely	lunar	Negro	night,	we	are	witnessing	an	intoxicating	dementia	[…]”.		Documents	4,	
1929,	in	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.36.	This	of	course,	as	an	aside,	was	a	wholly	different	reading	and	
crediting	of	Afro-American	popular	music	(e.g.	Jazz)	than	Adorno’s	later	(in)famous	take	on	the	
matter.	Documents	early	on	exported	its	discussion	directly	to	that	other	culture;	precisely	by	not	
treating	it	as	such,	as	interviews	with	Duke	Ellington	illustrate.	(Documents	6,	1930).	Which	
doesn’t	mean	that	this	didn’t	open	up	another	avenue	of	(positive)	fetishization	by	idolization.	
(And	in	view	of	Ellington,	the	ignored	suspicion	that	his	black	music	were	“[…]	‘fantasies’	
confected	to	appeal	to	white	tastes”.	Ades/Baker,	2006,	p.	67.)	For	a	further	side-by-side	reading	
informing	this	here	barely	scraped	complex	also	see	Diedrich	Diederichsen.	
“Zeichenangemessenheit:	Adorno	gegen	Jazz	und	Pop”,	in	Schaghausen/Müller/Hirsch	ed.,	Adorno	
–	Die	Möglichkeit	des	Unmöglichen,	New	York/Berlin,	2003,	especially	pp.	36-40.		
	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.95	103
	Ibid.	104
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The	opposite	 to	 the	desired	but	abandoned	object	of	 the	“root”	 is,	once	more	–	
Kracauer,	Simmel	and	even	Tönnies	echo	–	“surface”.	“Surface”	is	complicit	with	
the	 shortcomings	 of	 culture:	 it	 is	 an	 allegory	 thereof.	 “Surface”	 is	 further	
negatively	 differentiated	 from	 roots	 as	 exhausted	 phenomena	 (“linger[ing]”),	
something	 falsely	 comforting.	 The	 resurging	 roots,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 are	
described	 as	 “painful	 surgery”,	 that	 “penetrate[s]”,	 “that	 quickens	 our	 blood”,	
further	baring	quasi-masochistic	libidinal	undertones. 			105
	 “Roots”,	 that	 literally	 down-to-earth	 symbol	 raising	 abstract	 concepts	 of	
identity	 such	 as	 a	 hereditary	 belonging,	 authenticity	 and	 connectedness	 was	
taken	up	in	the	same	year	by	a	socially	and	intellectually	undoubtedly	different	
grouping	 in	 the	 North-western	 German	 town	 of	 Detmold.	 Calling	 itself	 the	
“Verein	der	Freunde	Germanischer	Vorgeschichte”	(“The	Society	of	the	Fellows	of	
Germanic	Prehistory”),	this	group,	like	Bataille’s	circle,	founded	a	publication	in	
which	to	voice	their	cultural	interests	and	their	aesthetic	and	ideological	critique.	
The	publication	was	to	 lay	out	their	discontent	and	hostility	 to	modern	society,	
not	 to	mention	 to	one	of	 its	hallmarks:	 cheap	 Zerstreuung.	This	publication,	by	
the	 name	 of	 Germanien,	 was	 founded	 by	 the	 local	 lay	 archeologist	 and	
anthropologist	 Wilhelm	 Teudt,	 the	 author	 of	 the	 (within	 Germany)	 fairly	
successful	book	Germanische	Heiligtümer	(Germanic	Sanctums)	 in	1929,	 its	 title	
as	well	as	its	cover	art	not	unlike	Seabrook’s	Magic	Island	of	the	same	year.	Both	
titles	–	Magic	Island	and	Germanische	Heiligtümer	–	were	evocative	of	adventure,	
of	hidden	and	unexplored	territory.	Both	cover	arts	likewise	displayed	a	scene	of	
mystery	in	the	center	of	the	potential	reader’s	gaze	–	a	gaze	in	search	for	Leiris’	
“mystical”	(with	which	he	credited	the	“Black	Birds”’	captivating	stage	presence).	
	Ibid.105
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In	the	cover	art	of	Magic	Island	the	mystical	promise	was	invited	by	a	greenly	lit	
rock	islet,	alien	and	otherworldly,	not	unlike	the	famous	painting	“Die	Toteninsel”	
(1880)	 by	 the	 Romantic	 Swiss	 painter	 Arnold	 Böcklin.	 Or,	 for	 that	matter,	 the	
more	 than	 a	 century	 later	 kitschy	 movie	 poster	 for	 the	 gilm	 adaption	 of	 H.G.	
Wells’	sci-gi	dystopian	classic	“The	Island	of	Dr.	Moreau”	(1896),	a	1996	version,	
with	the	related	poster	plausibly	a	rehashing	of	“The	Magic	Island”,	picking	up	on	
the	 extra-terrestrial	 green	 “aura”	 of	 the	 island	 already	 applied	 in	 Seabrook’s	
cover	 art.	 Teudt’s	 book,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 featured	 a	 purple	 colored,	 graphic	
rather	than	photographic,	image	of	an	arc	opening	onto	a	vista	of	a	column,	the	
legendary	Irminsul,	an	allegedly	sacred	but	never	actually	discovered	monument	
of	Nordic	pagan	mythology,	 lit	 here	by	a	 full	moon	vaguely	 invoking	a	 trope	of	
German	 Romanticism.	 While	 lacking	 the	 archival	 evidence	 to	 back	 up	 the	
following	 argument,	 it	 appears	 rather	 obvious	 that	 the	 decision	 to	 typeset	 the	
book	in	Gothic	font 	–	surely	already	obsolete	at	the	time	–	as	well	as	for	most	106
part	 occluding	 any	 photographic	material	 in	 favor	 of	 hand-drawn	 illustrations	
depicting	 those	 “sanctums”	 in	 the	 year	1929,	 derived	 from	a	 clear	 intention	 to	
push	towards	anti-modern	aesthetics,	rejecting	the	contemporary	techniques	of	
mechanical	 reproduction	 –	 i.e.,	 an	 aesthetic	 that	 was	 consciously,	 proudly	
regressive.	 Regressive	 structurally,	 furthermore,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 these	
sanctums,	 of	 which	 there	 mostly	 remained	 only	 a	 few	 stone	 foundations,	
necessitated	 this	 hand-drawn	 simulation	 for	 sheer	 lack	 of	 alternatives	 of	
satisfying	 depiction,	 since	 the	 photographic	 evidence	 of	 the	 mostly	 “formless”	
rubble	sharply	contrasted	with	the	elevated	imaginations	of	the	sanctums.	
	Note	that	both	Germanien	and	Das	Bild	were	set	in	Gothic	type,	the	preferred	typeface	of	106
choice	it	would	seem	for	völkisch-fascist	publications	of	the	late	1920s:	a	“retro-look”	so	to	speak,	
one	in	this	case	heavily	politically	colored.
	54
	 With	regard	to	the	signigicant	social	and	aesthetic	concept	of	the	“root”	as	
taken	 up	 by	 Germanien,	 one	 need	 look	 no	 further	 than	 the	 foreword	 of	 the	
journal’s	girst	issue,	which	contained	the	following	words:	
“Eine	 Nation,	 die	 nicht	 den	 lebendigen	 Zusammenhang	 mit	 ihrem	 Ursprung	
bewahrt,	 ist	dem	Verdorren	nahe,	so	sicher	wie	ein	Baum,	den	man	von	seinen	
Wurzeln	getrennt	hat.	[…]	Dieser	Zusammenhang	ist	uns	zerissen.“	 	107
“A	 nation	 that	 does	 not	 preserve	 a	 lively	 connection	 with	 its	 origin	 is	 close	 to	
withering,	as	certain	as	a	tree	severed	from	its	roots.	 […]	This	connection	of	ours	
has	been	torn.”	
The	 similarity	 of	 metaphors	 and,	 more	 importantly,	 the	 critique	 these	 served	
both	 here	 and	 in	Documents	 –	 e.g.	 via	 Leiris’	 texts	 –	 is	 striking,	 if	 only	 for	 the	
otherwise	stark	contrast	between	these	two	groups:	a	metropolitan	avant-garde	
journal	and	an	 initially	provincial,	völkisch-fascist	 journal .	The	connection	to	108
the	ancestral	as	 imagined	here	 -	called	“organic”	 in	Leiris,	 (as	 it	already	was	 in	
Tönnies),	 associated	 with	 “origin”	 in	 Germanien	 –	 was	 that	 of	 a	 source	 of	
endangered	 invigoration	 sought	 to	 be	 revived	 by	 a	 culturally,	 socially	 and	 of	
course	ultimately	politically	radical	turn.	Abandoning	the	“roots”	led	to	death	of	
	“Zum	Geleit”,	Germanien	Heft	1,	1929,	girst	page.	Only	the	author’s	last	name	–	Plaß	–	is	given.	107
(Transl.	by	the	author)	
	Germanien.	Blätter	für	Freunde	germanischer	Vorgeschichte	was	from	1934	onwards	108
incorporated	into	the	publishing	output	of	the	SS-Ahnenerbe	Forschungsgemeinschaft,	whose	
chief	publication	it	became	until	it	folded	in	1944.	Once	incorporated,	now	under	the	title	
Germanien.	Monatshefte	für	Germanenkunde	zur	Erkenntnis	deutschen	Wesens,	it	was	edited	by	
Hermann	Wirth	and	later	Walther	Wüst,	a	rector	of	the	University	of	Munich,	under	the	auspices	
of	Heinrich	Himmler,	who	was	the	director	and	founder	of	the	Ahnenerbe	think-tank.	This	further	
meant	that	the	editorial	headquarters	were	now	based	in	Berlin,	with	Detmold	relegated	to	a	
kind	of	gield-ofgice	outpost.	The	deginitive	study	on	the	Ahnenerbe,	including	some	if	not	much	
information	on	Germanien	as	such,	remains	Michael	H.	Kater	Das	’Ahnenerbe’	der	SS	1935–1945.	
Ein	Beitrag	zur	Kulturpolitik	des	Dritten	Reiches.	Munich,	1998.	
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the	 “organic”	 (“withering”),	 of	 the	 “tree”,	 the	 latter	 a	 symbol	 for	 the	 German	
“nation”,	with	the	image	of	and	allusion	to	the	tree	occupying	a	prominent	place	
in	German	art	history	and	national	identity	(while	Leiris	actually	referred	to	the	
“Black	 Birds”	 as	 “creatures	 […]	 touching	 as	 trees” ).	 Culture,	 in	 both	 of	 the	109
examples	above,	gigured	as	a	realm	originally	thought	to	emanate	from	nature,	in	
particular	 from	 the	 (under)ground,	 i.e.,	 from	 said	 network	 of	 roots	 as	 an	
autochthonous	force.	Likewise,	in	both	passages	a	culture	before	a	split	between	
the	 spiritual	 and	 the	 concrete	 was	 called	 forth,	 to	 manifest	 as	 the	 kind	 of	
unmediated	ecstatic	charge	to	which	Simmel	had	circumscribed	the	desire	of	the	
modern	subject	for	immediate	quasi-religious	experience	detached	from	specigic	
denominations	and	institutions.		
A	 side-by-side	 reading	 of	Documents	 with	 not	 only	 Germanien	 but	 also	
another	 völkisch	 and	more	 properly	 Fascist	 publication,	 the	 1934-founded	 art	
journal	 Das	 Bild ,	 frequently	 reveals	 similar,	 at	 times	 identical,	 topics	 and	110
objects	 of	 discussion.	 There	 are	 articles	 on	 the	 study	 of	 pre-history	 in	 each	 of	
these	 three	 publications,	 especially	 as	 they	 relate	 to	 a	 wider	 discussion	 on	
necessary	 academic	 interdisciplinarity,	 or	 rather	 the	 bemoaned	 lack	 thereof.	
There	 are	 texts	 and	 corresponding	 imagery	 on	 pagan	 archeological	 sites	 and	
related	artefacts,	local	histories	and	customs,	on	carnevalistic	and	more	primitive	
rites	 of	 alien	 mimicry	 and	 camouglage,	 on	 formerly	 ceremonial	 now	 largely	
	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.	95	109
	 Das	Bild.	Monatsschrift	 für	das	Deutsche	Kunstschaffen	 in	Vergangenheit	und	Gegenwart	was	110
girst	published	in	1934	and	ran	until	1944.	It	was	edited	by	Hans	Adolf	Bühler,	the	rector	of	and	a	
professor	at	the	Art	Academy	Karlsruhe,	which	was	also	the	journal’s	publisher.		
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decorative	functions	and	variations	of	the	mask,	on	the	often	crude	and	populist	
–	uncensored	–	tropes	of	early	Medieval	Western-European	art	at	the	transitional	
phase	between	paganism	and	Christianization	etc.		
	 To	not	only	provide	a	concrete	example	of	 this	 topical	correlation	but	to	
further	give	an	example	of	even	attuned	arguments	accompanying	the	promotion	
of	 this	 material	 one	 can	 draw	 on	 a	 discussion	 in	 Das	 Bild	 and	 Documents	
concerning	the	Oseberg	excavation	of	1905	in	Norway.	The	Oseberg	ship,	as	it	is	
commonly	referred	to,	was	a	wooden	Viking	vessel	constituting	a	sacred	tomb	for	
Viking	 nobility,	 dated	 around	 800AD	 (it	 can	 still	 be	 seen	 at	 the	 Viking	 Ship	
Museum	 in	 Bygdoy,	 Norway).	 Oseberg	 was	 thus	 exemplary	 of	 a	 technically	
sophisticated	 pagan	 art	 already	 showing	 imports	 of	 proto-Christian	 elements	
such	 as	 the	 cross,	 which	 here	 appeared	 together	 with	 the	 pagan	 “supra-
confessional”	 Indo-Germanic	 symbol	 of	 the	 swastika.	 It	 contained	 intricately	
carved	 wooden	 elements	 depicting	 animal-like	 mythological	 gigures	 of	 Nordic	
culture,	 such	 as	 the	 “animal	 heads”	 or	 “lion	 heads”,	 as	 they	 were	 labeled	 in	
Documents,	heads	that	in	fact	bore	more	resemblance	to	a	dragon	or	serpent	and	
that	 merged	 giguration	 with	 abstract	 ornamentation,	 with	 the	 latter	 entirely	
covering	the	fantastic	creatures.	Because	of	this,	the	Oseberg	gind	presented	one	
of	 the	 more	 successful	 and	 persuasive	 cases	 of	 a	 non-representational,	 “anti-
humanist”	art,	achieved	by	prioritizing	abstraction	and	non-human	subjects	over	
mimetic,	 identigiable	 representation.	This	particular	 archeological	 treasure	 lent	
itself,	 as	 few	 other	 remnants	 did,	 to	 an	 art-historical	 revision	 of	 the	 argument	
that	by	and	 large	considered	the	aesthetic	achievements	of	not	 just	 the	Vikings	
but	 of	 pagan	 pre-Christian	 artefacts	 in	 general	 as	 low	 and	 abject;	 of	 barbaric	
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origin	 and	 quality,	 the	 barbaric	 for	 the	 most	 part	 unambiguously	 used	 in	 the	
deprecatory	sense.	It	was	“unique	from	the	standpoint	of	the	history	of	art” 	by	111
countering	 hitherto	 art	 historical	 classigications	 of	 barbarism,	 not	 least	 due	 to	
the	 ship’s	 well-preserved	 condition	 that	 certigied	 it	 as	 hard	 evidence	 –	
exceptionally	rare	for	these	kind	of	artefacts,	given	that	many	of	them	were	made	
from	 perishable	 wood	 rather	 than	 stone	 and	 many	 had	 been	 destroyed	 by	
various	 invading	 powers.	 The	 ethnologist	 F.	 Adama	 van	 Scheltema,	 discussing	
this	gind	in	the	third	issue	of	Documents	in	1929,	considered	it	nothing	less	than	
“illustrative	of	an	extremely	civilized	and	monumental	art”.	 Importantly	though,	
this	“civilized”	quality	bore	traits	incongruous	with	those	of	accepted	ideas	about	
aesthetic	sophistication	usually	rendered	 in	 legible	representation.	 Instead,	van	
Scheltema	praised	 the	artefact	 for	evincing	 “free	 imagination”,	 regarding	 it	 as	a	
proof	 of	 the	 Vikings’	 “aesthetic	 and	 psychological	 originality”,	 thus	 positing	 a	
novel	 art	 historical	 argument	 that	 attributed	 to	 these	 objects	 qualities	 they	
would	not	conventionally	have	been	granted,	neither	in	terms	of	the	“aesthetic”	
nor	 of	 the	 “psychological”.	 Rather,	 barbaric	 “creativity”	was	 historically	 usually	
deemed	either	inept	or	irrelevant,	since	their	main	“creative”	act	was	thought	to	
come	in	the	form	of	material	destruction	(i.e.	vandalism,	the	word	deriving	from	
the	Vandals,	another	pagan	tribe)	while	the	nomadic	nature	of	the	tribe,	whose	
economic	model	was	sustained	by	moving	cattle	herds	and	hunting	rather	than	
by	advanced	agriculture	and	permanent	settling,	likewise	made	a	lasting	cultural	
or	 architectural	 legacy	 of	 their	 own	 unlikely.	 I.e.,	 barbaric	 aesthetics	 were	 no	
match	 for	 the	higher	 “creations”	of	 civilized	powers.	Worse	 though,	 even	when	
	F.	Adama	van	Scheltema.	“La	trouvaille	d’Oseberg”.	Documents	3,	1929	(‘English	111
Supplement’,	unpaginated.)
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creativity	was	attempted	by	the	barbarians,	it	merely	brought	forth	derivatives	of	
their	 colonizers’	 aesthetic	 paradigms,	 such	 as	 the	 Gaulish	 coins	 examined	 by	
Bataille	 in	Documents’	 girst	 issue,	making	 them	not	 just	 politically	 and	 socially	
but	 also	 artistically	 inferior	 –	 the	 common	 feature	 inherent	 to	 colonial	 rule	 in	
general.	 This	 upgrading	 of	 the	 barbaric	 was	 expounded	 by	 van	 Scheltema	 as	
follows:		
History	 depicts	 them	 [the	 Vikings]	 for	 us	 as	 barbarians	 capable	 only	 of	
destroying	the	treasures	of	civilization	created	by	others.	The	art	of	the	ship	of	
Oseberg	suddenly	brings	to	light	the	reginement	of	these	later	pagans,	and	shows	
their	souls	in	all	their	complex	and	problematical	nature.	 	112
	Ibid.112
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Corresponding	illustrations	of	an	artefact	from	the	Oseberg	tomb	as	featured	in	articles	
in	 Das	 Bild	 (H.A.	 Bühler:	 “Frühgermansiche	 Kunst”,	 Issue	 01,	 1934,	 p.	 311)	 and	
Documents	(F.	Adama	Van	Scheltema:	“La	Trouvaille	d’Oseberg”,	Issue	03,	1929,	p.	127).		
Van	Scheltema	essentially	argued	for	this	art	as	being	powerfully	affective	
by	 embodying	 the	 spiritual	 expressions	 of	 its	 creators,	 the	 artefacts	 in	 a	 sense	
manifesting	 as	 opposed	 to	 representing	 their	 makers’	 “soul”.	 He	 suggested	 an	
unimpeded	 creative	 process	 yielding	 objects	 that	 were	 not	 deferments	 or	
transpositions	 of	 inner	 drives	 to	 aesthetic	 creation,	 but	 concretized	 these	 as	
unmediated,	 an	 attribute	 frequently	 found	 in	 both	 avant-garde	 and	 fascist-
völkisch	expositions	on	 the	 challenges	and	demands	of	 a	 trailblazing	aesthetic.	
Van	 Scheltema’s	 argument	 was	 book-ended	 by	 the	 thematically	 corresponding	
article	in	Das	Bild	written	by	Hans-Adolf	Bühler	himself,	its	founder	and	editor-
in-chief,	 discussing	 the	 very	 same	 objects	 in	 the	 girst	 issue	 (albeit	 in	 1934,	
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somewhat	 belated	 compared	 to	 the	 deginitely	 “avant-garde”	Documents,	 which	
had	taken	up	the	topic	give	years	earlier).	However,	by	being	featured	under	the	
title	 “Frühgermanische	 Kunst” 	 (“Early	 Germanic	 Art”),	 the	 Oseberg	 objects	113
were	unduly	credited	as	proof	of	the	artistic	sophistication	of	a	hitherto	deemed	
poor	 Teutonic	 artistic	 heritage,	 which	 in	 this	 case	 was	 not	 even	 properly	
“Germanic”	but	rather	of	Viking	cultural	provenance,	 i.e.	 located	 in	present	day	
Scandinavia.	(These	factual	distortions	in	dating	and	locating	works	to	serve	the	
ideological	 cause	of	nationalistic	 valorization	were	not	 an	 exception	but	pretty	
much	the	rule	in	Das	Bild.	They	frequently	informed	otherwise	“scholarly”	texts,	
alongside	 rather	 out	 of	 context	 diatribes	 against	 (bourgeois)	 taste	 and	 elitism,	
which	Das	Bild	never	failed	to	associate	with	the	artistic	and	intellectual	legacy	of	
the	 preceding	Weimar	 Republic.)	What	 resonated	 in	 Bühler’s	 take	 on	 Oseberg	
with	the	argument	put	forward	by	van	Scheltema	was	conceiving	the	works	“as	
the	 expression	 of	 longing	 of	 the	 Northern	 soul”,	 which	 in	 Bühler’s	 view	 was	
another	 proof	 of	 the	 objects’	 “intertwining	 with	 the	 divine	 world” ,	 thus	114
conceiving	of	nature	as	directly	impacting	on	artistic	expression	through	a	kind	
of	 telepathic	 process,	 unperturbed	by	 external	 –	worldly	 –	mediating	 forces	 or	
reglexivity,	 indeed	suggesting	animistic	qualities	not	unlike	those	characterizing	
faraway	tribal	art	and	customs.	
	 The	mutual	investment	in	this	barbaric	or	rather	an	alternative	“civilized”	
art	of	 inverted	value	distinctions,	which	now	ginally	gained	visibility	due	to	van	
Scheltema’s	 “art	 of	 discovery”,	 were	 two	 strands	 of	 thought	 central	 to	 the	
	Hans	Adolf	Bühler,	“Frühgermanische	Kunst”,	Das	Bild,	1934,	p.	311	113
	Ibid.114
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Austrian	 art	 historian	 and	 academic	 Josef	 Strzygowski.	 As	 late	 as	 1940	 he	
reminisced	about	the	Oseberg	gind	as	being:	
		
[…]	an	art	that	is	treated	by	the	academic	art	history	as	inferior	[minderwertig]	
as	 it	 hardly	 shows	 the	human	 gigure,	meaning	 it	 doesn’t	 represent	 giguratively,	
but	merely	expresses	spiritual	contents	through	its	Sinnbilder. 	115
Spiritual	“Sinnbilder”	[literally,	sense/soul	image]	and	an	“academic	art	history”	
appallingly	 ignorant	 of	 these	 “Sinnbilder”	 were	 two	 essential	 tenets	 of	
Strzygowski’s	 overall	 theoretical	 agenda,	 underlying	 his	 career-long	 call	 for	 a	
revision	 and	 indeed	 replacement	 of	 said	 “art	 history”	 by	 the	 more	 hands-on	
method	of	“Vergleichende	Kunstforschung”	–	 	“comparative	art	research”	–	that	
entailed	the	“art	of	discovery”	that	van	Scheltema	lauded	in	his	Oseberg	article.	
Strzygowski’s	proposition	of	 this	 comparative	art	 research	was	put	 forward	by	
him	 –	 a	 profoundly	 fascist	 writer	 and	 theorist	 –	 in	 the	 very	 girst	 issue	 of	
Documents.	
	Josef	Strzygowski,	Das	indogermanische	Ahnenerbe	des	deutschen	Volkes	und	die	115
Kunstgeschichte	der	Zukunft,	Vienna	1940,	p.	113.	(This	publication,	while	published	only	in	1940	
comprises	various	texts	that	stem	from	previous	essays	in	journals	or	preceding	publications,	
many	of	which	go	back	to	the	1920s.	This	is	true	of	most	of	his	works	from	the	early	1940s	
(Strzygowski	died	in	1941))
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II	Documents	and	“Comparative	Art	Research”		
II.1	Josef	Strzygowski,	or	the	academic	as	barbarian	 	116
Before	discussing	Strzygowski’s	actual	text	in	Documents,	I	want	to	expound	his	
profuse	 yet	 increasingly	 repetitious	 and	 irrational	 work	 in	 more	 depth.	 This	
serves	 to	 elucidate	 the	 underlying	 premise	 for	 unlikely	 parallels	 –	 in	 this	 case	
collaboration	even	–	between	actors	as	seemingly	disparate	as	those	introduced	
in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 (illustrated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 not	 only	 did	 Strzygwoski	
contribute	to	Documents	as	well	as	later	to	Germanien,	he	was	furthermore	listed	
as	part	of	Documents’	editorial	board).		
A	 discussion	 of	 this,	 however	 brief,	 contact	 between	 an	 early	 völkisch-
fascist	 art	 theory	 and	 the	 avant-garde,	 in	 this	 case	 represented	 by	Documents,	
therefore	 necessitates	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 key	 terms	 making	 up	 Strzygowki’s	
approach	 to	 art	 history	 and	 that	 gield’s	 function	 for	 a	 wider	 socio-cultural	
analysis	towards	political	ends	that	entailed	the	valorization	of	the	barbaric:	an	
aesthetic	 valorization	 to	 begin	with,	 in	 both	 of	 these	 groups,	 through	which	 to	
diminish	the	very	notion	of	Western	or	civilized	“aesthetics”	and	the	theoretical	
underpinnings	 historically	 upholding	 these.	 Strzygowski’s	 central	 scholarly	
	Christoper	S.	Wood	has	written	that:”Strzygowski	was	unable	to	take	in	the	great	drama	of		116
barbarism	versus	civilization,	because	he	insisted	on	playing	the	role	of	barbarian	himself.”	(He	
further	paints	a	picture	of	Strzygowski	that	seems	to	have	sprung	directly	from	Adorno’s	
aforementioned	barbaric	countryside:	“He	was	a	clumsy	provincial,	jarred	by	class	hatred	and	
poisoned	by	bloody	ethno-geographic	fantasies;	he	was	the	raw	material	national	socialism	was	
made	of”).	“Strzygowski	und	Riegl	in	den	Vereinigten	Staaten”,	in	Wiener	Jahrbuch	für	
Kunstgeschichte	53,	2004,	p.	229.	I’m	not	sure	as	to	whether	this	last	point	is	actually	defensible:	
Strzygowski’s	undeniable	early	on	academic	career	and	peer	recognition	(at	least	abroad)	
preceding	the	regime,	added	by	his	intellectual	eccentricity,	don’t	adhere	in	any	aspect	to	a	
typology	of	the	bureaucratic,	inarticulate	and	bland	public	servant	suddenly	endowed	with	
enormous	authority	as	suggested	by	Hannah	Arendt.	(Which	is	not	to	say	that	hers	is	the	deginite	
one).
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concerns	turned	obsessions	are	already	discernible	in	the	trajectory	of	the	titles	
of	 his	 books:	 from	 the	 comparatively	 clear-cut	 1923	 title	 Die	 Krisis	 der	
Geisteswissenschaften	 (Vorgeführt	 am	 Beispiele	 der	 Forschung	 über	 bildende	
Kunst)	 (The	Crisis	of	 the	Humanities,	 (As	exempliIied	by	the	Research	on	the	Fine	
Arts))	to	the	paranoia-tinged	title	of	his	posthumously	published	magnum	opus	
from	 1943:	 Europas	 Machtkunst	 im	 Rahmen	 des	 Erdkreises.	 Eine	 grundlegende	
Auseinandersetzung	 über	 Wesen	 und	 Entwicklung	 des	 zehntausendjährigen	
Wahnes.	(Europe’s	Power	Art 	within	the	World’s	Orbit.	A	fundamental	debate	on	117
the	nature	and	development	of	ten	thousand	years	of	delusion) .		While	Die	Krisis	118
der	 Geisteswissenschaften	 presents	 Strzygowki’s	 girst	 major	 work 	 tying	 his	119
archeological	 case	 studies	 to	 a	 propagandistic	 teleology	 that	 would	 gain	 the	
upper	 hand	 in	 his	 writing	 to	 come,	 a	 contemporaneous	 anthology	 titled	 Die	
Kunstwissenschaft	der	Gegenwart	in	Selbstdarstellungen 	(1923)	contextualizes	120
Strzygwoski’s	art	historical	scheme	vis-à-vis	the	gield’s	leading	voices	in	German	
speaking	 academia	 of	 the	 time.	 This	 collection	 presented	 manifesto-like	
	I	am	resorting	to	Suzanne	F.	Marchand’s	English	translation	of	“Machtkunst”,	if	for	the	sole	117
reason	that	hers	is	the	single	instance	I	could	gind	in	which	this	term	is	taken	up	in	a	
corresponding	Anglo-Saxon	context.	To	better	convey	the	meaning	of	“Machtkunst”	one	could	
also	translate	it	by	the	less	reader-friendly	“art	of/serving	political	power”	to	account	for	the	
circular	nature	of	Strzygowskis	term.	Machtkunst	is	essentially	the	art	enforced	by	those	in	
power	throughout	history	while	simultaneously	being	an	art	that	consciously	strives	for	an	
elevated	representation	of	those	in	power:	it	is	subservient	and	oppressive	at	the	same	time	in	
this	schema.	
	The	title	further	rambles	on:	Gewaltmacht	von	Gottes	Gnaden	statt	völkischer	Ordnung,	Kirche	118
statt	Glaube,	Bildung	statt	Begabung;	vom	Nordstandpunkt	planmässig	in	die	volksdeutsche	
Bewegung	eingestellt..	Vienna,	1943.	
	Which	according	to	Wood	he	wrote	in	the	United	States	while	on	a	lecture	tour	following	an	119
invitation	by	the	Lowell	Institute	in	Boston.	This	explains	why	he	dedicated	the	book	to	“his	
professional	observers	in	Princeton	and	Harvard”.	Wood,	2004,	p.	218	
	Die	Kunstwissenschaft	der	Gegenwart	in	Selbstdarstellungen,	ed.	Joahnnes	Jahn,	Leipzig	1924.		120
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contributions	from	members	of	the	ingluential	Vienna	School	of	Art	History	such	
as	Carl	Neuman,	Hans	Tietze	and	Julius	von	Schlosser.	As	evinced	by	his	inclusion	
in	 that	anthology,	Strzygowski	certainly	belonged	 to,	yet	 sharply	diverged	 from	
and	critiqued	this	“School”.	Fashioning	himself	as	a	kind	of	institutional	renegade	
–	a	“	‘Grub	Street’	academic” 	–	on	the	very	margins	of	this	institution,	including	121
its	 retrospective	 historiography ,	 he	 was	 nevertheless	 the	 co-chair	 of	 the	122
University	 of	 Vienna’s	 then	 prestigious	 art	 historical	 faculty.	 Representative	 of	
this	 rift,	 the	 faculty	 was	 split	 into	 two	 departments	 headed	 respectively	 by	
Strzygowski	 and	 von	 Schlosser,	 the	 latter	 an	 establishment	 gigure	 and	 art	
historian	who	particularly	emphasized	a	traditional	philological	methodology	in	
aesthetically	evaluating	the	history	of	Western	art.	The	aristocratic	and,	literally,	
textbook	scholar	thus	acted	as	a	perfect	 in-house	 	nemesis	to	Strzygwoksi,	who	
hailed	 from	 a	 provincial	 lower	middle-class	 background,	 and	 his	 –	 apparently	
numerous	–	core	audience,	which	cultural	historian	Suzanne	L.	Marchand	degines	
	Suzanne	F.	Marchand:	“The	Rhetoric	of	Artifacts	and	the	Decline	of	Classical	Humanism:	The	121
Case	of	Josef	Strzygowski”.In,	History	&	Theory	Vol.3	No.	4,	1994	p.	110.	Marchand	points	out	that	
this	expression	stems	from	Robert	Darnton,	p.107	f2.	Her	text	further	provides	seldom	found	
biographical	information	on	Strzygowski.			
	Strzygowski	appears	as	a	mere	footnote	in	Christopher	S.	Wood’s	deginitive	English	language	122
anthology	The	Vienna	School	Reader.	Politics	and	Art	Historical	Method	in	the	1930s	(Cambridge/
Mass.	1999).	On	the	other	hand	Wood	has	elsewhere	specigically	discussed	Strzygowski’s	legacy,	
arguing	his	retroactive	import	for	interdisciplinary	postmodern	scholarship	distancing	itself	
from	a	Western-centric	outlook.	He	considers	his	work	as	an	indispensable	example	of	foresight	
that	“enabled	notions	of	‘hybridity’	and	‘marginality’	to	become	cogitable”.p	226.		
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as	 “partly,	 but	 not	 solely	 [comprised	 of]	 radical,	 pan-German	 students	 and	
sycophants.” .		123
Speaking	 of	 nemeses:	 the	 subtitle	 to	 Strzygowski’s	 aforementioned	
Europas	 Machtkunst	 publication	 clearly	 divulged	 the	 prime	 targets	 of	
Strzygowski’s	 diatribe,	 thinly	 veiled	 by	 “objective”	 science,	 against	 his	 own	
discipline:	 the	 triumvirate	 of	 “Kirche,	 Hof	 und	 Bildung”	 –	 “Church,	 Court	 and	
Academia”	 –	 the	 latter	 in	 the	 sense	of	 humanist,	 enlightened	 “Bildung”	 (higher	
education) .	In	his	self-presentation-cum-contribution	to	the	Kunstwissenschaft	124
der	 Gegenwart	 (Contemporary	 Art	 Theory)	 anthology,	 Strzygowski	 designated	
these	three	man-made	institutions	as	the	“Kräfte	des	Willens”	(forces	of	the	will)	
in	 opposition	 to	 ancient,	 not	man-made	 “beharrende	Kräfte”	 (enduring	 forces)	
that	 manifested	 themselves	 in	 a	 counter	 triad	 opposite	 “Church,	 State	 and	
Academia”:	 	 “Blut;	 Boden;	 Lage”	 (blood,	 soil	 and	 territory) .	 Blood,	 soil	 and	125
territory	 here	 constituted	 unchanging,	 i.e.	 timeless,	 thus	 ahistorical	 and	
furthermore	 quasi-metaphysical	 forces,	 which	 in	 Strzygowski’s	 schema	 were	
however	historically	subject	to	suppression	by	the	institutions	of	the	powers	of	
will	 named	above	 (especially,	 of	 course,	 in	 view	of	 the	 turbulent	history	of	 the	
	Marchand,	1994,	p.121,	f51.	based	on	girst-hand	information	according	to	Marchand.	It	should	123
be	noted	that	while	Strzygowski’s	pugnacious	to	erratic	manner	in	presenting	his	theory	partly	
satisgies	the	frequently	inferred	type	of	the	völkisch-fascist	“outré	thinker”-cum-“frustrated	
private	scholar”	(George	L.	Mosse)	representing	the	“provincial	intelligentsia”	(Nicholas	
Goodrick-Clarke),	what	signigicantly	sets	him	apart	again	from	preceding	zealots	such	as	Julius	
Langbehn,	Paul	de	Lagarde	not	to	mention	a	Lanz	von	Liebenfels,	is	his	undeniably	solid	career	(if	
frowned	upon	by	many)	in	the	establishment,	both	in	Europe	and	abroad.	(Apparently	he	was	
even	recommended	for	the	Nobel	Peace	Prize	by	a	Swedish	art	historian	at	some	point.	See	Wood,	
2004,	p.	219).	
	See	f2	in	this	chapter	124
	Jahn	(ed.),	1924,	pp.	15-18.	125
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various	 attempts	 at	 a	 clearly	 delineated	 and	 politically	 unigied	 German	 nation	
state	subjected	to	various	 foreign	power	 interests,	be	that	 in	 form	of	Roman	or	
Napoleonic	occupation).		
In	 the	Krisis	 der	 Geisteswissenschaften,	 these	 oppositional	 factions	 were	
identigied	 as	 more	 concrete	 processes	 to	 be	 evaluated	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 what	
Strzygowski	 called	 a	 progressive	 “comparative	 art	 research” .	 This	 choice	 of	126
terms	 alone	 implied	 a	 rebuttal	 to	 a	 largely	 textual	 source-based	 art	 history	 as	
advocated	 and	 taught	 by	 von	 Schlosser,	 that	 in	 Strzygowski’s	 view	 did	 not	 so	
much	 objectively	 compare	 artifacts	 as	 place	 them	 into	 hierarchies	 (with	 the	
cultures	and	objects	favoured	by	him	essentially	at	the	bottom	or	omitted).	These	
processes	 were	 what	 Strzygowski	 alternately	 termed	 the	 three	
“instances”	 (“Instanzen”)/“forces”	 (“Kräfte”)/“factors”	 (“Faktoren”)	 of	 “place	
[Ort]”,	“time”,	and	“society”,	constituting	a	triangular	gield	of	conglict	to	which	any	
artistic	production	was	exposed,	alternately	aligned	with	or	claimed	by	either	of	
these	 three	 “forces”	 (It	 seems	 imperative	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 “society”	 was	
throughout	 his	 argument	 employed	 as	 a	 (negative)	 “force”,	while	 “community”	
appeared	 unspoken	 as	 the	 aspired	 formation	 arising	 from	 “enduring	 forces”	
which	structurally	speaking	complied	with	Tönnies’	criteria	of	“permanence”).		
Place,	time	and	society	in	turn	corresponded	to	aforementioned	insistence,	
movement	 and	 will	 respectively.	 Territory	 meanwhile	 not	 only	 concerned	
geographical	 location,	 but	 a	 specigic	 blood	 and	 soil,	 (thus	 in	 line	 with	 19th-
	Strzygowski,	1922,	p.200	(The	term	is	introduced	here	by	heading	a	following	chapter	126
entitled	“The	Schema	of	Comparative	Art	Research”)	
	68
century	pan-Germanic	 ideas	that	saw	an	extensive	comeback	at	 the	time ).	 In	127
Strzygowski’s	 history	 of	 art,	 territory	 was	 the	 deciding	 factor	 (“formbildende	
Kräfte	ersten	Ranges” )	 in	bringing	 forth	 the	ultimate	artistic	 “form”:	 the	 less	128
time	 and,	 even	 more	 so,	 the	 less	 society	 intervened,	 the	 more	 genuine	 and	
powerful	this	form’s	“expression”	(“Ausdruck”)	would	be.	The	true	form	thus	also	
contradicted	 society’s,	 or	 rather,	 its	 ruling	 hegemony’s	 ideals	 and	 agendas	
regarding	the	demands	for	and	subsequent	creation	of	works	of	art,	which	in	this	
diagram	 were	 by	 deginition	 subject	 to	 historical	 changes	 and	 events	 –	
“temporary”,	 to	 consult	 Tönnies	 one	 more	 time.	 In	 Strzygowski’s	 theory	 of	
art(ifacts),	 genuine	 excitation	 (“Erregung”),	 but	 furthermore	 a	 quasi-political	
drive	was	conserved	in	the	soil	of	a	specigic	place	from	where	it	devolved	to	its	
native	 inhabitants	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 authochthonous	 charge	 in	 immediate	
(“unmittelbar”)	 fashion:	 “Place	 [Ort]	 becomes	 the	 being	 causing	 excitation	
[erregende].” 	129
	For	detailed	historical	discussions	on	the	evolution	of	the	pan-German	idea	since	the	early	127
19th	century	and	the	various	groupings	of	the	völkisch	movement	in	German	and	Austrian	
territories	see	George	L.	Mosse	The	Crisis	of	German	Ideology,	New	York	1964,	and	Nicholas	
Goodrick-Clarke,	The	Occult	Roots	of	Nazism,	London	2004	[1985].	While	Goodrick-Clarke’s	study	
does	not	really	take	art	historical	or	theoretical	aspects	into	consideration,	Mosse’s	profuse	work	
on	fascist	art	largely	focuses	on	the	clearly	degined	agenda	as	instated	from	at	least	1937	
onwards.		
	Strzygowksi,	1922,	p.202	128
	“Der	Ort	wird	zum	erregenden	Wesen,	die	Natur	selbst	in	ihrem	Weiterwirken	im	Menschen	129
zum	Gegenstand	der	Untersuchung.”	Strzygowski,	1922,	p.201.	Bataille	had	actually	commented	
on	this	ideological	impregnation	of	a	chosen	soil,	offering	a	psycho-analytically	derived	
explanation:	“[…]	Condensation	of	superiority,	evidently	related	to	a	latent	inferiority	complex:	
such	a	complex	has	equally	strong	roots	in	both	Italy	and	Germany;	this	is	why,	even	if	fascism	
develops	subsequently	in	regions	having	attained	complete	sovereignty	and	the	awareness	of	
sovereignty,	it	is	inconceivable	that	it	could	ever	have	been	the	autochthonous	and	specigic	
product	of	such	countries.”	“The	psychological	structure	of	fascism”	originally	published	in	the	
journal	La	Critique	sociale	(Published	in	two	parts	in	number	10,	November	1933	and	11,	March	
1934)	In	Visions	of	Excess,	ed.	Allan	Stoekl,	Minneapolis	1985,	p.160	f14.	
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While	 time	 (implying	 historical	 shift)	 was	 acknowledged	 as	 a	 factor	 in	
artistic	 development,	 Strzygowksi	 demoted	 it	 to	 “mittelbare	 Kraft”	 –	 “mediate	
force”	 -,	 clearly	 inferior	 to	 the	 “unmittelbare	 Kraft”	 –	 “immediate	 force”	 –	 he	
reserved	 for	 terrestrial	 constants	 (thus	 conceptually	 presenting	 the	 complete	
opposite	to	the	im-pressive	yet	fugacious	immediacies	of	Baudelarian	modernist	
perception). .	 Regarding	 time	 and	 thus	 by	 extension	 dating	 and	 chronology	130
being	 critical	 to	 art	 historical	 valuation	 Strzygowski	 stated	 :	 “Values	 of	 time	
[Zeitwerte]	 are	 only	 of	 contextual	 [beziehungsweise]	 signigicance.	 The	 master	
time	 [Hauptzeit]	we	 have	 to	 employ	 is	 not	 the	 historical	 one	 but	 the	 eternally	
longer	 pre-historic	 one” .	 Disruptions	 to	 this	 force	 of	 territory	 came	 in	 the	131
guise	of	society	and	its	will,	presumably	in	this	case	meaning	society’s	gluctuating	
tastes,	 obsessions	 and	 vogues,	 Strzygowski	 essentially	 negating	 an	 everyday	
modernity	 shaped	 by	 and	 contingent	 upon	 glux	 and	 (self)reglexivity.	 On	 the	
contrary,	 for	 him:	 “society	 […]	 inserted	 itself	 between	 territory	 and	 time,	
affecting	 [artistic]	 development	 yet	 also	 raping	 [vergewaltigt]	 it” .	Time,	 and	132
more	 signigicantly,	 society	 thus	 bore	 forth	 the	 ingredients	 responsible	 for	
Strzygowski’s	concept	of	art	history	as	obliging	a	kind	of	primal	sin	encroaching	
upon	culture,	to	which	he	gave	the	name	“Machtkunst”	(“power	art”)		
	The	ideological	separation	between	“mittelbar”	and	“unmittelbar”	is	somewhat	difgicult	to	130
translate	since	“unmittelbar”	here	-	as	the	phenomenologically	superior	state		-	equally	implies	
an	unmediated	experience	and	act	of	artistic	creation	as	much	as	an	immediate	one	in	the	sense	
of	a	sensorial	and	not	intellectual	process.	
	Strzygowski,	1922,	p.250.	And	furthermore:	“Die	Zeit	als	Ganzes,	ohne	Anfang	und	Ende	ist	in	131
Entwicklungsfragen	deshalb	notwendig,	weil	sie	dadurch	von	vornerein	in	dem	Wesenszuge	
erscheint,	der	nie	vergessen	werden	darf,	nämlich	eins	zu	sein	mit	der	endlosen	Bewegung	an	
sich,	ihr	Hauptträger“.	I.e.	time	“freed“	from	any	historical,	social,	economic,	cultural	purchase,	
instead	giguring	as	uncontainable,	uncorrupted	cosmic	time.	
	Ibid.,	p.	201132
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Following	from	his	rebuttal	of	the	criteria	of	a	(con-)textual	art	historical	
evaluation	of	material	culture,	Strzygowksi	concluded:		
Art	History	had	made	a	more	applied	research	an	easy	task	for	itself	by	simply	
departing	 from	the	supposition	of	 the	divine	 in	 the	beautiful,	 the	good	and	the	
true,	deducing	from	it	a	notion	of	the	gine	arts	that	unfortunately	had	little	to	do	
with	the	foundation	of	its	development.	It	[art	history]	prescribed	to	humanity	a	
moralist	 aim	 according	 to	 which	 it	 judged,	 based	 on	 the	 art	 it	 was	 familiar	
with. 		133
This	 summed	 up	 the	Crisis	 of	 the	Humanities,	 a	 “crisis”	 that	 Bataille	 and	 other	
contributors	 would	 address	 –	 and	 savor	 to	 a	 degree	 –	 in	 Documents.	
Strzygowski’s	 early	 critical	writing	 and	 his	 rather	 idiosyncratic	 scholarship,	 as	
introduced	above,	may	further	explain	his	initial	interest	in	a	publication	such	as	
Documents,	which	he	called	“an	independent	organ	[…]	indispensable	for	the	free	
expression	of	those	who	belong	to	no	school”	 	(a	barely	veiled	sneer	towards	134
his	despised	“Vienna	School”).	His	dissenting	attitude	was	similarly	 in	dialogue	
though	with	the	political	agenda	behind	Germanien	which	considered	itself	to	be	
“living	protest” .		135
	Strzygowski,	1922,	p.138	133
	Documents	1,	1929,	(unpaginated	‘English	Supplement’)	134
	“Vom	Kampf	um	die	deutsche	Seele”,	Germanien	Heft	4	1934,	p.68	(unauthored	text).	135
“Germanien	protestiert,	aber	es	protestiert	nicht	mit	dem	einen	Dogma	gegen	das	andere	–	es	ist	
selbst	lebendiger	Protest,	und	darum	ewig	jenen	verhaßt,	die	ein	totes	Gerüst	für	vollkommener	
halten	als	einen	gewachsenen	Baum.”	
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II.2	Barbaric	 remnants	 in	Documents:	Between	cultural	history’s	 “positive	
extravagance”	and	the	lost	object	underlying	“Comparative	Art	Research”	
Aside	 from	 the	 plausible	 motivation	 outlined	 above,	 there	 exists	 barely	 any	
supplemental	 information	 on	 Strzygowski’s	 involvement	 with	 Documents	 and	
virtually	 none	 (to	my	 knowledge)	 indicating	 how	 this	 unlikely	 afgiliation	 came	
about	 in	 the	 girst	place,	 neither	 in	Bataille’s	nor	 Strzygowski’s	 other	writing	of	
the	time. .	136
Precisely	 his	 academic	 idiosyncrasy	 though	 would	 have	 made	 him	 a	
prospective	 contributor,	 complementing	 what	 Leiris	 would	 later	 call	 “[…]	 the	
impossible	 mix	 of	 Documents	 […]”	 its	 “diversity	 of	 disciplines	 –	 and	 of	
indisciplines”. 	 Representatives	 from	 the	 academic	 and	 institutional	137
establishment,	(e.g.	the	Musée	de	l’Homme’s	director	Paul	Rivet	and	frequently	of	
German	academia)	 found	themselves	 in	 the	company	of	Carl	Einstein,	 the	main	
contributor	besides	Bataille	and	a	staunchly	communist	intellectual	active	on	the	
institutional	 fringes	 at	 best,	 despite	 his	 magnum	 opus	 Die	 Kunst	 des	 20.	
	Furthermore	Strzygowski	is	not	mentioned	once	in	Georges	Didi-Huberman’s	La	resemblance	136
informe.	He	is	solely	mentioned	as	part	of	a	list	of	names	in	Bernd	Mattheus	meticulous	account	
of	Bataille’s	biography:	Georges	Bataille:	Eine	Thanatographie,	Munich,	1986,	p.132.	In	the	2006	
Hayward	Gallery’s	exhibition	catalogue	surveying	Documents		Strzygowski	is	briegly	described:	
“In	Josef	Strzygowski	Documents	gave	platform	to	an	art-historical	race-theorist	with	extreme	
anti-Roman-centric	archaeological	beliefs	about	late	antiquity	and	the	middle	ages	,	which	he	saw	
as	determined		by	Eastern	ethno-cultural	factors.”.	Ades/Baker	(eds.),	2006,	p.48		
	Quotes	in	Julia	Kelly,”Discipline	and	Indiscipline:	the	ethnographies	of	Documents”,	in	Papers	137
of	Surrealism,	7,	2007,	p.2.	Online	at	http://www.surrealismcentre.ac.uk/papersofsurrealism/
journal7/index.htm.	Retrieved	on	November,	12th,	2011..	
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Jahrhundert	 (1926);	 as	 well	 as	 the	 aforementioned	 Seabrook,	 a	 sorcerer	 and	
sometime	creator	of	S/M-leather	masks	covered	in	Documents. 		138
Strzygowski’s	 acknowledged	expertise	 in	 early	Oriental	 and	Eastern	art,	
his	 unorthodox	 research	 methods,	 which	 had	 included	 various	 archeological	
excursions	 off	 the	 beaten	 path	 in	 Iran	 and	 Armenia	 and	 his	 audacious	
proclamations,	must	have	further	appealed	to	both	Wildenstein	and	Bataille	for	
these	 respective	 reasons.	 Strzygowski	 in	 fact	 contributed	 only	 one	 article	 to	
Documents	 though.	Thus	 the	question	 regarding	his	 level	of	 involvement	 in	 the	
journal’s	 editorial	 decisions	 remains	 essentially	 unanswered.	 With	 regard	 to	
these	 editorial	 decisions,	 Georges	 Didi-Huberman,	 early	 on	 in	 his	 expansive	
trajectory	on	 the	development	of	 themes	within	Documents,	maintains	 that	 the	
overall	 content	 of	 the	 issues	 needs	 to	 be	 looked	 at	 as	 an	 inter-related,	 larger	
project	that	systematically	pursued	a	deginitive	rather	than	arbitrary	agenda .	139
The,	at	girst	sight,	random,	occasionally	grotesque	and	repellent	visual	elements	
and	thematically	loosely	related	texts	were	not	merely	encouraged	–	or	forced	–	
to	 bleed	 into	 one	 another.	 Rather,	 it	 was	 precisely	 this,	 at	 girst	 impression,	
thematic	discrepancy	characterizing	the	progression	of	articles	that	advanced	a	
complete	 reconsideration	 or	 outright	 dismissal	 and	 derision	 of	 accepted	
methodologies	of	hierarchic	classigication,	be	 they	 in	 the	 gield	of	science	or	art,	
	Didi-Huberman,	points	out	that	other	prominent	members	of	the	Vienna	School	were	138
intended	to	be	approached	as	contributors	to	future	issues,	namely	Erwin	Panofsky	and	Fritz	
Saxl.	p.369	(f2)		
Strzygowkis	is	curiously	still	featured	in	the	list	of	‘collaborators’	as	late	as	in	Documents’	second	
volume,	here	issues	5,	6,	and	7	(1930).	
	In	his	reading,	a	dialectic	of	the	Informe	(1995)	as	opposed	to	a	negation	through	it	as	argued	139
by	Krauss/Bois	(1996,	and	in	Krauss	1985),	seemingly	different	conceptions	of	the	term	serving	
clearly	different	critical	projects.	(See	chapter	seven)	
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canonical	 or	 contemporary.	 If	 Strzygowski	 indeed	 “[…]	 had	 no	 respect	 for	 the	
category	 “artwork”,	 only	 conceiving	 artifacts	 […]” 	 this	 would	 have	 been	 an	140
attitude	 and	 a	 resultant	 manner	 to	 engage	 in	 any	 art	 historical	 or	 cultural	
discussion	particularly	 relevant	 to	Bataille’s	 impetus	 in	 founding	Documents	 in	
the	 girst	 place.	 Didi-Huberman	 points	 out	 that	 while	 the	 selection	 and	
presentation	 of	 image	 and	 text	 featured	 in	 the	 journal	 could	 certainly	 be	
perceived	 as	 extravagant,	 their	 ultimate	 contextualization	 was	 anything	 but	
“eclectic” .	 Documents	 here	 thus	 also	 signigicantly	 diverged	 from	 Der	141
Querschnitt,	a	German	 lifestyle	magazine	 founded	by	 another	major	 art	 dealer,	
Alfred	 Flechtheim,	 in	 1921	which	 enjoyed	 popularity	 amongst	 certain	 “liberal”	
German	 and	 European	 high(er)	 society	 circles.	Der	Querschnitt’s	 visual	 themes	
and	 layout	 decisions	 were	 at	 times	 rather	 similar	 to	 Documents’;	 it	 visibly	
indulged	 in	 anthropomorphic	 juxtapositions	 that	 occasionally	 produced	 visual	
puns,	 by	 mixing	 news	 items	 and	 entertainment	 industry	 imagery	 with	 avant-
garde	 and	 primitive	 art,	 all	 kinds	 of	 curio,	 without	 however	 really	 placing	 the	
	Wood,	2004,	p.	226	140
	Speaking	specigically	about	the	plethora	of	images	showing	masks	and	heads	frequently	141
featured	in	Documents	Didi-Huberman	writes:	“When	one	sees	how	persistently	this	relation	
continuously	appears,	it	becomes	logical	that	the	heterogeneity	of	the	photographed	objects	in	
the	magazine	–	its	somewhat	peculiar	‘corpus’	–	essentially	wasn’t	at	all	of	an	eclectic	nature.	It	
would	have	been	eclectic	to	gather	objects	considered	to	be	inginitely	diverse	and	in	no	relation	to	
each	other.	But	it	is	on	the	contrary	the	always	perceptive	and	precise	problematization	of	the	
images’	relations	to	each	other	that	ensures	a	cohesive	discourse	running	through	the	entire	
journal.”	Didi-Huberman,	2010	[1995],	pp.	113-114.	He	considers	Documents’	“discourse”	to	
essentially	bear	“structuralist	thinking”	avant	la	lettre	(also	see	p.114	f2).	
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resulting	dialogue	within	a	wider	historical	and	theoretical	discussion	(It,	by	and	
large,	did	not	exceed	Haute	Zerstreuung) .		142
Documents’	 presentation	 suggested	 connoisseurship,	 sophistication	 and	
professional	authority	of	some	kind	(doubtless	helped	by	the	cachet	of	some	of	
its	 contributors),	 which	 was,	 of	 course,	 intentional:	 so	 as	 to	 provide	 a	 formal	
counterpoint	 to	 the	 play,	 or	 rather	 the	 assault	 it	 committed	 on	 unquestioned	
value	 relations	 informing	 visual	 culture	 and	 the	 discourses	 that	 established	
them.	The	connections	between	conventionally	conglicting	banks	of	imagery	and	
themes	 unsurprisingly	 produced	 the	 occasional	 clash	 by	 setting	 up	 the	 low	
against	the	high,	the	profane	against	the	sacred.	In	this	way,	Documents	was	akin	
to	preceding	Dada	publications,	with	their	proclivity	for	imagery	culled	from	an	
undiscriminating	range	of	sources:	from	tabloid,	news	and	commercial	material	
to	 pulp	 and	 oddities,	 from	 high	 art	 both	 classical	 and	modern,	 to	 exotica	 and	
folklore.	 Both	Documents	 and	 comparable,	 predominantly	 German	 art	 journals	
before	it,	followed	an	editorial	logic	which	by	way	of	this	clashing	layout	and	the	
attendant	 content	 sought	 to	 de-sublimate	 and	 provoke	 in	what	 has	 since	 been	
canonized	 as	 hallmarks	 of	 avant-garde	 anti-aesthetic	 procedures.	 The	 main	
difference	 between	 these	 formats,	 I	 would	 argue,	 may	 be	 due	 to	
Documents’	(be)late(ed)	appearance	with	regard	to	these	critical	strategies.		
	The	art	historians	Dawn	Ades	and	Fiona	Bradley	who	also	discuss	Der	Querschnitt	further	142
mention	Documents’	parallels	with	the	Belgian	magazine	Varietés	as	well	as	with	the	Parisian	
Jazz;	the	girst	they	consider	to	have	more	or	less	surveyed	similar	novel	aesthetics	in	architecture,	
art,	the	performing	arts/music,	design	etc.	without	however	delving	into	the	kind	of	
philosophical	or	political	analyses	found	in	Documents	.	The	second	they	point	out	published	
controversial	graphic	content	such	as	the	Chinese	execution	by	“thousand	pieces”,	interestingly	
an	image	Bataille	would	time	and	again	return	to	(he	was	in	possession	of	a	print	of	it	preceding	
the	publication).	Nevertheless	it	appears	Jazz	covered	this	kind	of	content	as	‘shocking	news	of	
the	world’	without	extrapolating	a	further	discussion	from	it	in	the	fashion	of	Bataille.	See	the	
“Introduction”,	in	Baker/Ades,	2006,	especially	pp.13-14.
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If	 according	 to	Ernst	Bloch,	who	 girst	and	 foremost	 spoke	 to	and	 from	a	
German	 context,	 “Zerstreuung	had	 already	 been	 over	 by	 1929”,	 superseded	 by	
“Berauschung	 [intoxication]”	 (in	 his	 view	 the	 next	 stage	 besetting	 the	
“bourgeoisie	of	decay	 [Zerfalls-Bürgertum]”)	 this	may	be	an	assessment	 that	 is	
revealing	 for	 the	 concerns	 of	Documents	at	 that	moment	 in	Western	 European	
thought	and	modern	art .	If	the	journal’s	appearance	indeed	coincided	with	the	143
ginal	stages	of	Zerstreuung	–	the	latter	condition	Bataille	formally	appropriated	in	
order	to	make	it	 impossible,	spoiling	easy	consumption	by	interjecting	material	
that	 in	 its	corporeal	extreme	spectacularly	upstaged	its	contrived	derivatives	of	
commercial	culture	featured	adjacently	–	Berauschung	registers	of	course	much	
more	ambiguously .	If	an	avant-garde	critique	of	Zerstreuung	had	been	devised	144
in	 works	 as	 late	 as	 Hannah	 Höch’s	 series	 of	 collages	 “Aus	 einem	
ethnographischen	 Museum”	 (1926),	 that	 blended	 cut-outs	 from	 fashion	
advertising	 with	 those	 of	 primitive	 “art	 objects”	 to	 yield	 hybrid	 mannequins	
presenting	both	the	very	latest	and	the	most	peripheral,	underlining	their	literal	
conglation	and	equivalence	 following	 the	rule	of	commodity	culture,	 the	way	 in	
which	contemporary	art	was	discussed	in	Documents	could	not	have	been	more	
different.	 This	 is	 already	 evinced	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 works	 in	 this	 (“German”)	
manner,	made	really	only	a	few	years	preceding	Documents,	were	conspicuously	
absent	 from	 the	 discussion	 as	 far	 as	 its	 section	 “Beaux-Arts”	 was	 concerned.	
	Ernst	Bloch,	Erbschaft	dieser	Zeit,	Frankfurt	a.	M.	1985	[Zurich	1935]	(In	his	foreword	to	the	143
expanded	edition,	p.18)	
	As	much	as	it	does	both	aesthetically	and	politically	if	one	were	to	substitute	Bloch’s	144
Berauschung	with	Bataille’s	actual	terminology	of	“frénésie”:	what	the	“frenzy	of	forms”	would	
enact	aesthetically	via	the	depictions	on	the	Gaulish	coins	discussed	in	1929	would	resurface	in	
the	“Popular	Front	in	the	Street”	(1936),	as	“a	contagious	emotion	[…]	[that]	turns	a	hesitating	
man	into	a	frenzied	being”.	Bataille,	1985,	p.162	
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Which	very	likely	was	a	decision	attributable	to	Einstein	more	so	than	to	Bataille,	
and	 which	 further	 relates	 back	 to	 the	 (anti-aesthetic)	 Berauschung	 favored	
instead ;	 certainly	 not	 denoting	 an	 alarming	 condition	 for	 either	 of	 them,	 at	145
least	in	1929.	 .	In	fact	Berauschung	may	be	considered	the	very	quality	a	select	146
contemporary	art	was	anticipated	to	deliver .	(It	should	be	stressed	that	while	147
the	 same	 thing	 could	 safely	 be	 stated	 of	 Bréton’s	 properly	 Surrealist	 project	
“intoxication”	here	bifurcated	 into,	roughly	speaking,	high	and	 low	intoxication.	
Where	 Bataille	 throughout	 Documents	 linked	 intoxicating	 ecstasy	 and	
transgression	to	that	“wholly	other”	 	state	afforded	by	complete	admission	of	148
the	 (political	 as	much	 as	physical)	 body	 to	 various	deformations,	 debasements	
and	 destructions	 for	 Bréton	 this	 is	 what	 certigied	 Bataille	 as	 the	 “excremental	
	Einstein,	throughout	his	Die	Kunst	des	20.	Jahrhunderts,	never	affords	German	Expressionism	145
or	later	Berlin	Dada	the	same	impact	and	quality	as	his	unsurpassable	ingenious	protégés	Braque	
and	Picasso.	It	is	both	telling	and	indicative	of	Einstein’s	very	specigic	expectation	of	modern	art	
when	he	wrote:	“The	art	of	the	Germans	is	unable	to	conceive	of	collective	signs”.	Carl	Einstein,	
Werke.	Berliner	Ausgabe	Bd.	5.	Eds.	Uwe	Fleckner,	Hermann	Haarmann,	Berlin	1996,	p.844	
.		Not	least	in	view	of	the	timing	of	Bloch’s	statement	(and	of	course	Benjamin’s	famous	146
remark	about	fascism’	“aestheticizing	of	politics”	two	years	later)	any	mutual	investment	in	this	
notion	Einstein	and	Bataille	may	have	shared	would	subsequently	become	inconceivable.	Whence	
Einstein	played	no	part	–	and	presumably	would	not	have	even	considered	as	much	–	in	the	later	
Collège,	where	Berauschung,	now	detached	from	any	(anti-)aesthetic	project,	seems	more	than	
admissible	to	have	been	a	vital	concern.		
	Leiris	would	actually	take	up	the	term	in	his	later	L’âge	d’homme	(1939)	here	not	linking	it	to	147
aesthetics	but	to	the	quasi-religious	context	that	had	clearly	gained	priority	following	the	Collège:	
“I	had	the	distinct	sense	–	not	at	all	literary,	but	truly	spontaneous	–	that	I	had	offered	a	sacrigice,	
with	all	that	this	word	implies	of	the	mystical	and	intoxicating.”	Quoted	in	Ades/Baker	(eds.),	
2006,	p.	106	
	A	term	he	would	use	several	times,	e.g.	in	“The	Use	Value	of	D.A.F.	de	Sade”,	[…]	das	ganz	148
Anderes	[sic]”	Bataille	keeping	the	original	if	grammatically	slightly	incorrect	German	expression	
he	derived	from	Rudolf	Otto’s	book	Das	Heilige:	Über	das	Irrationale	in	der	Idee	des	Göttlichen	und	
sein	Verhältnis	zum	Rationalen.,	Breslau	1917.	In	Bataille,	1985,	p.	94	
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philosopher”	as	which	he	had	called	him	 .	Breton,	instead,	sought	aesthetically	149
intoxicating	 states	 from	 the	 quasi	 dis-incorporated	 states	 of	 dreams,	 reverie,	
automatic	writing	etc.)		
In	 this	 light	 Bataille’s	 contribution	 to	Documents’	 girst	 issue,	 titled	 “The	
Academic	Horse”	and	 located	 just	 after	Strzygowski’s	 article	 	 “Research	on	 the	
‘Plastic	Arts’	and	‘Art	History’”	(both	1929)	presents	not	only	an	instance	of	the	
conceptual	 interrelations	between	singular	articles	Didi-Huberman	discusses	in	
his	book.	Given	that	this	was	Bataille’s	opening	statement	so	to	speak,	it	further	
underlines	 not	 only	 the	 aspired	 cultural	 and	 categorial	 de-hierarchization	
(commensurate	with	Strzygowski)	but	betrays	Bataille’s	 intent	 in	 the	 choice	of	
artifacts	 and	 their	 respective	 aesthetic	 idiosyncrasies.	 They	 (to	 him)	 served	 as	
the	 evidence	 and	 vessels	 –	 documents	 –	 attesting	 to	 a	 primal	 state	 such	 as	
Berauschung	having	historically	informed	the	creation	and	(collective)	use-value	
of	the	object.		
Whether	 the	 particular	 sequencing	 of	 these	 two	 texts	 was	 a	 conscious	
decision	by	Bataille	is	subject	to	speculation,	but	appears	likely	given	his	overall	
dominant	hand	in	the	editorial	process.	The	side-by-side	reading	of	the	two	texts	
illustrates	the	central	aspects	of	a	nexus	of	image/form,	cultural	history	and	the	
(academic)	treatment	thereof,	thus	providing	a	kind	of	case	study	of	proto-fascist	
art	theory	intersecting	with	a	key	avant-garde	position	such	as	Bataille’s.	
	Andre	Bréton,	“Second	Surrealist	Manifesto”,	1929,	where	he	further	disparaged	Bataille	for	149
his	“vulgar	materialism”.	Also	quoted	in	Bataille,	1985,	p.	xi	
	78
Strzygowski’s	text,	his	girst	and	last	for	Documents ,	may	be	considered	150
his	intellectual	Paris	debut,	through	which	he	regurgitated	his	tirade	against	the	
conventions	of	academic	art	history,	and,	by	extension,	offered	an	outline	of	his	
signature	art	historical	trajectory-in-reverse	in	which	the	South/West	of	Europe	
(i.e.	 Rome,	 and	 later	 Christianized	 Western	 Europe	 under	 Charles	 the	 Great)	
supposedly	 owed	 its	 cultural,	 artistic	 and	 architectural	 debt	 to	 ancient	 and	
vanished	 or	 concurrent	 yet	 suppressed	Kulturkreise	 located	 in	 the	 East/North	
axis	(roughly	speaking,	spreading	from	Northern	India	via	Iran	to	Northern	and	
Central	Europe).	This	argument	is	concretized	in	the	slightly	dry	middle	part	of	
the	 text	 that	 juxtaposes	 three	 loosely	 corresponding	 architectural	 plans	 of	 a	
French	Romanesque	church	(800),	a	presumably	early	German	church	in	Eastern	
German	 Brandenburg	 (medieval	 12th	 century)	 and	 the	 remnants	 of	 an	 early	
Byzantine	 church	 in	 Armenia	 (624).	 The	 juxtapositioning	 suggests	 that	 rather	
than	the	German	medieval	church’s	principal	architecture	being	derived	from	its	
French	predecessor,	the	latter	in	turn	actually	derived	from	the	Armenian	(here	
further	designated	“Indo-Germanic”)	church:	Strzygowski	posits,	 therefore,	 that	
this	 less	 developed,	 ignored	 and	 vanished	 culture	 is	 the	 origin	 of	 lauded	
Romanesque	 architecture.	 These	 architectural	 iterations	 are	 presented	 in	 the	
text	as	a	progression	in	which	the	modest	remnants	of	the	Armenian	church	are	
evidently	 trumped	by	 the	pompous	yet	 spiritually	hollow	Merowingian	church,	
the	 latter	 presented	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 larcenous	 architecture,	 as	 such	 typical	 of	
	According	to	Bernd	Mattheus,	the	last	issue	of	Documents	(Number	8,	appearing	belatedly	in	150
1931)	was	at	one	point	to	feature	an	article	titled	“Oeuvres	Indo-héllenistiques”	which	drew	on	
Strzygowski’s	excavation	in	Afghanistan	with	André	Malraux	.	Mattheus,	1984,	pp.191-192
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Strzygowksi’s	 aforementioned	 notion	 of	 a	 cunning,	 exploitative	 “power	 art” .	151
This	 side-by-side	 tracing	 of	 formal	 progressions,	 from	 which	 was	 deduced	 an	
anthropological	 and	 indeed	 politico-historical	 argument,	 resonated	 with	 what	
Bataille	 would	 describe	 as	 “successions”	 and,	 more	 poignantly,	 by	 the	 initial	
“alternations	 of	 plastic	 forms”	 that	 reappear	 at	 the	 end	 of	 his	 ostensibly	
numismatic	study	as	“alterations	of	plastic	forms” 	–	mere	Varietés	undergoing	152
discomposing	transformations,	caused	here	by	a	discreet	“petit	objet	n”.	Bataille	
employed	 this	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 altered	 forms	 in	 a	 somewhat	 opposite	
fashion	by	discussing	 the	 increasingly	abstracted	and	disgigured	horse	and	 idol	
depictions	on	Gaulish	coins	from	the	5th	century	B.C.,	which,	as	he	wrote,	initially	
sought	 to	 “mint”	 the	 sophisticated	 Greek	 coins	 displaying	 faultless	 “academic”	
renderings	of	the	horse .	This	unencumbered	process	of	minting	by	the	Gauls,	153
purportedly	 oblivious	 to	 the	 Greek	 prototype,	 produced	 a	 “frenzy	 of	 forms”	
according	 to	 Bataille:	 “nightmares	 with	 geometrical	 traces”.	 (This	 latter	
	Cf	Strzygowski	later	in	Germanien:	“Finally	it	becomes	fathomable	why	the	old	kind	of	art	151
history	emphasizes	formal	concerns	and	sticks	to	the	humanist	aesthetic:	Power	heightens	the	
means	of	expression,	i.e.	the	form;	it	at	no	given	time	had	created	spiritual	values.	Which	is	what	
ultimately	counts	for	the	core	of	all	art.”	“Volkskunst,	nicht	Machtkunst	[als]	Grundlage	von	
Forschung	und	Museum	der	Bildenden	Kunst.”	Germanien	Heft	4,	1937,	p.99	(Transl.	by	the	
author)	
	In	Ades/Baker,	2006,	pp.237,	239.	Alteration	is	a	central	notion	in	Bataille’s	terminology.	152
Applied	in	the	formal	analysis	of	artefacts	and	artworks,	and	as	both	Krauss	and	Didi-Huberman	
explain,	it	usually	implies	not	mere	variation	or	modigication	on	a	given	theme.	More	signigicantly	
it	suggests	decay/deterioration	of	some	kind,	in	view	of	the	various	French	meanings	of	
altération,	including	that	of	a	physiological	symptom	of	degeneration.	“Alteration	is	regressive,	
aggressive	and	transgressive”	Didi-Huberman,	2010,	p.265.	Krauss	adopts	Bataille’s	almost-
homonymy	in	her	discussion	of	Giacometti’s	Suspended	Ball	sculpture	to	denote	sexual	
ambivalence	(1930):	“Although	the	alter(n)ation	of	Suspended	Ball	is	constant,	it	is	nonetheless	
regulated	in	a	way	that	is	entirely	structued	[sic]	by	the	possibilities	of	metaphorical	expansion	of	
its	two	elements	–	wedge	and	sphere	–	and	the	oscillations	of	their	sexual	values.”	Krauss,	1986,	
p.	62	
	Ibid.	153
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description	 evocative	 of	 the	 contemporaneous	 bourgeois	 scorn	 leveled	 against	
the	work	of	the	avant-garde,	say	Picasso,	which	he	insinuated	in	closing ).	It	is	154
this	movement,	or	 “succession”	of	 forms,	at	 the	base	of	both	Strzygowski’s	and	
Bataille’s	 respective	 arguments	 that	 provides	 insight	 into	 the	 larger	 discussion	
surrounding	 their	 mutually	 contested	 notion	 of	 progress,	 a	 key	 feature	 of	
modernity	and,	by	extension,	Western	civilization,	which	as	an	ideal	harked	back	
to	 humanism	 (which	 was	 unsurprisingly	 a	 period	 and	 mindset	 equally	
renounced	 both	 within	 Documents	 and	 by	 Strzygowski’s	 self-proclaimed	 anti-
humanist	standpoint). 		155
In	 Strzygowski’s	 case,	 progress,	 not	 least	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 continuity,	
asserting	linear	reginement	and	sophistication	(in	art	and	architecture),	suddenly	
attained	a	problematic	note	and	was	therefore	to	be	critiqued.	The	painstakingly	
excavated	 or	 re-envisioned	 barbaric	 remnants	 served	 as	 the	 roughly	 hewn	
vehicles	 for	 transporting	 this	 critique.	 Throughout	 Western	 art	 history’s	 and	
generally	academia’s	neglect	regarding	the	achievements	of	non-Western	or	non-
Greco-Roman	 cultures,	 what	 was	 equally	 neglected	 was	 that	 any	 notion	 of	
progress	 had	most	 likely	 been	 carried	 out	 “over	 the	 backs	 of	 others”,	 entailing	
	“There	is	no	reason	to	forget	[…]	that	this	recent	negation	[e.g.	Picasso]	has	provoked	the	154
most	violent	rage,	as	if	the	very	bases	of	existence	had	been	brought	into	question”.	Ibid.,	p.239.	
Cf.	Bataille,	“Architecture”,	“[…]	a	path	–	traced	by	the	painters	–	opens	up	toward	bestial	
monstrosity,	as	if	there	were	no	other	way	of	escaping	the	architectural	straitjacket.”	Documents	I	
2,	1929.	In	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.	36	
	In	Rosalind	Krauss’	discussion	of	Bataille’s	base	materialism	as	the	philosophical-aesthetic	155
foundation	to	Documents	she	speaks	of	a	“hard	primitivism”	employed	by	Bataille,	one	which	
“embed[s]	art	in	a	network	that,	in	its	philosophical	dimension,	is	violently	anti-idealist	and	
antihumanist”.1985,	p.64.	Simon	Baker	speaks	of	“Documents’	anti-humanist	editorial	strategy”.	
Ades/Baker	(eds.),	2006,	p.	121	
For	the	general	role	of	the	“primitive”,	or	in	fact	Krauss’	idea	of	a	“hard	primitivism”	as	opposed	to	
the	”barbaric”	arguably	offering	a	more	useful	category	to	discuss	the	overlay	of	aesthetic	and	
ideological	concerns	of	Documents	and	fascist	art	theory,	see	Chapter	7.		
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domination,	exploitation	and	force,	 thereby	denting	the	humanist-ideal	concept	
of	linear	progress,	and	by	extension	history	as	an	idealizing	construct .		156
Similarly,	 with	 regard	 to	 this	 essential	 paradigm	 shift	 concerning	 the	
classic	dichotomy	of	civilization/barbarity,	high/low,	center/periphery	and	lastly	
value	with	 regard	 to	 both	 to	 content	 and	 form,	 the	 political	 and	 the	 aesthetic,	
Bataille,	 in	 his	 “Academic	Horse”	 essay	 and	 similarly	 to	 Strzygowski’s	 revision,	
posited	that	rather	than	the	Gauls’	attempts	at	artistic	creation	being	“the	usual	
barbarian	 imitations	 resulting	 from	 [the]	 clumsiness	 […]”,	 the	 aforementioned	
coins	yielded	a	 starkly	divergent,	nevertheless	genuine	aesthetic	 that	 “revealed	
not	 so	 much	 a	 technical	 fault	 as	 a	 positive	 extravagance.” 	 This	 “’positive	157
extravagance”,	 understood	 here	 primarily	 as	 that	 of	 an	 aesthetic	 kind,	 Bataille	
sought	to	link	to	an	irrational,	or	anti-enlightened,	indeed	barbarous	impulse 	158
stemming	 from	their	unsophisticated	creators,	an	 impulse	or	mindset	certainly	
conferred	 upon	 those	 “barbarians”	 by	 their	 respective	 “spokesmen”	 (and	 less	
	With	regard	to	the	latter	point,	Strzygowski’s	quasi-postcolonial	critique	avant	la	lettre	156
invokes	one	of	Walter	Benjamin’s	most	often	drawn	on	quotes:	“There	is	no	document	of	culture	
that	is	not	at	the	same	time	a	document	of	barbarism.”	(My	emphasis).	In	“Eduard	Fuchs,	Collector	
and	Historian”,	1937,	in	Jennings/Doherty/Levin,	Walter	Benjamin.	The	Work	of	Art	in	the	Age	of	
Its	Mechanical	Reproducibility	and	other	Writings	on	Media,	Cambridge/Mass.,	2008,	p.124		
	Ades/Baker,	2006,	pp.237-239.		157
	This	association	of	barbarism	with	artistic	and	societal	impulse	is	one	actually	also	employed	158
by	Walter	Benjamin	in	his	artwork	essay:	A	“Dadaism	brimming	[gestrotzt]	with	barbarisms”	is	
precisely	what	generates	“its	impulse”	according	to	Benjamin,	signaling	a	fundamental	aesthetic	
rift	between	the	work	of	the	avant-garde	and	mass	media	culture	in	the	context	of	socio-
technological	change	of	Weimar	Republic	Germany.	See	XIV	girst	paragraph	(Third	version!)	
Transl.	by	the	author		
	82
frequently	 “spokeswomen”) .	 The	 difference	 in	 both	 Bataille’s	 and	159
Strzygowski’s	narrative	of	the	barbaric	subject	however	was	that	this	paradigm	
shift	did	not	aim	to	somehow	legitimize	the	non-enlightened	subject	and	his/her	
creations	 through	a	 taming	assimilation,	 through	a	 form	of	 cultural	 “tolerance”,	
i.e.,	 a	 pluralistic	 notion	 of	 accommodating	 diversity	 (to	 the	 same	 degree	 of	 an	
economy	 gladly	 accommodating	 and	 supplying	 Variétés).	 Rather,	 both	
Strzygowksi	 and	 Bataille	 endorsed	 and	 propagated	 this	 (alleged)	 brutish,	
positively	 ignoble	 ignorance	 towards	 the	 culturally	 superior;	 the	 free	
alter(n)ation	 of	 a	 humanist	 or	 ideal	 set	 of	 values	 and	 aesthetics	 became	 a	
celebrated	act	of	aggression	or	at	least	resilience,	further	serving	as	proof	of	not	
merely	 a	 “positive	 extravagance”,	 since	 Bataille	 went	 on	 to	 credit	 the	 Gauls	
hereby	 with	 supplying	 a	 “veritable	 antithesis	 to	 civilization” .	 Both	 his	 and	160
Strzygowski’s	reevaluation	of	cultural	history	thus	credited	the	as	yet	ill-degined	
barbaric	 aesthetic	 with	 posing	 a	 deliberate	 challenge	 to	 the	 logic	 of	 so-called	
ideal	form	and	the	philosophical	foundations	from	which	it	derived.	They	equally	
	Who,	in	Gayatri	Spivak’s	case,	would	retort	with	the	inquiry:	“Can	The	Subaltern	[actually]	159
Speak?”,	in	Nelson/Grossberg	(eds.)	Marxism	and	the	Interpretation	of	Culture,	Urbana/Chicago,	
1988,	pp.	271-316.	
Which	is	to	further	say	that	this	up-valuation	of	the	other	(barbarian,	savage	etc,,)	did	certainly	
not	occur	girst	with	Bataille.	The	genesis	of	said	noble	savagery	(Rousseau)	or	at	least	a	
reassessment	of	the	classic	dichotomy	between	colonizer	(civilized)	and	colonized	(barbarous)	
leads	back	to	Tacitus’	eminent	travelogue	Germania	(89	A.D.),	which	would	experience	a	full-
blown	if	“revised”	comeback	in	fascist	propaganda,	(see	especially	Allan	A.	Lund	
“Germanenideologie	im	Nationalsozialismus.	Zur	Rezeption	der	‘Germania’	des	Tacitus	im	
‘Dritten	Reich’”,	Heidelberg,	1995).	What	did	however	mark	a	sea	change	in	that	discussion	is	the	
attention	and	genuine	research	devoted	to	those	‘savages’’	actual	material	and	spiritual	culture,	
elevating	it	to	a	model	anti-aesthetic	that	would	soon	–	and	disputably	–	come	to	be	equated	with	
various	tropes	of	avant-garde	art	(and	in	Benjamin’s	case	even	with	those	of	modernist	
architecture	of	the	Bauhaus,	i.e.	historically	one	of	architecture’s	most	“rational”	canons)	(See	his	
essay	“Erfahrung	und	Armut”,	(1933),	Gesammelte	Schriften	Bd.	II.2	(ed.	R.	Tiedemann.),	
Frankfurt	a.M.	1989,	p.	213	ff.	
	Ades/Baker	(eds.),	2006,	p.	237	160
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conceived	of	this	barbaric	“other’s”	(anti-)aesthetic 	as	more	powerful	because	161
more	 free	 from	 not	 only	 from	 an	 abstract	 ideality’s	 but	 moreover	 a	 society’s	
concrete	constraints,	and	hence	more	authentic,	again	by	way	of	an	unconsidered	
immediacy,	a	key	attribute	lamented	to	have	been	lost	at	the	onset	of	modernity	,	
already	 invoked	 by	 avant-garde	 manifestos	 preceding	 both	 Documents	 and	
völkisch-fascist	 art	 theory	 by	 over	 two	 decades. 	 This	 so-called	 “positive	162
extravagance”	thus	resulted	from	a	barbaric	(here	meaning	ignorant	of	aesthetic	
and	cultural	norms)	agency	vis-à-vis	socio-cultural	and	aesthetic	dictates).	
Everything	 that	 can	 make	 disciplined	 people	 aware	 of	 values	 and	 ofgicial	
organization	 (architecture,	 statue	 law,	 secular	 science	 and	 the	 literature	 of	
lettered	 peoples)	 remained	 outside	 the	 consciousness	 of	 the	 Gauls	 who	
calculated	nothing,	conceiving	of	no	progress	and	giving	free	rein	to	immediate	
suggestions	and	violent	sentiment. 	163
Bataille	had	little	trouble	in	the	same	text	–	enacting	Freud’s	charted	Ur-scenes	of	
discontent	–	to	essentially	lump	together	both	chronologically	and	geographically	
diverse	cultures	into	one	imaginary,	degiant	constituency	populating	the	pages	of	
Documents,	 one	 presenting	 an	 alternative	 model	 of	 community	 devoid	 of	 a	
	I	use	this	notion	here	not	in	the	sense	Hal	Foster	would	employ	it:	as	an	artistic	strategy	161
contesting	latter	avant-garde	heroisms	of	transgression,	shock	and	the	like	increasingly	perceived	
as	inconsequential	in	view	of	postmodern	commodigication	and	spectacle	culture;	long	having	
succeeded	Debord’s	of	1967,	fully	integrated	and	diffused	within	a	booming	1980s	New	York	art	
market.		
	For	example,	“Unmittelbarkeit”	served	as	the	“terms	of	admission”	to	various	(German)	avant-162
gardes	such	as	the	Dresden	group	Die	Brücke	(Schmidt-Rotluff,	Ernst-Ludwig	Kirchner,	Emil	
Nolde	etc.)	whose	manifesto	states:	“Jeder	gehört	zu	uns	der	unmittelbar	und	unverfälscht	das	
wiedergibt	was	ihn	zum	Schaffen	drängt.”	(1906).	For	a	discerning	analysis	of	the	essentially	
political	legacy	of	these	groups	in	view	of	an	embryonic	Weimar	Republic	see	Georg	Simmel	“Der	
Konglikt	der	Kultur”	(1918),	as	well	as	his	already	mentioned	“Die	Krisis	der	Kultur”	(1916).	
	Ades/Baker	(eds.),	2006,	p.	237	163
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civilized	–	impotent	–	society’s	malaises:	“Gaulish	civilization	was	comparable	to	
the	current	peoples	of	central	Africa	[…].” 		164
This	 identigication	of	a	“new”	or	rather	until	 then	occluded	constituency	
spanning	 distant	 locales	 and	 times	 informed	 Strzygowski’s	 approach	 to	
overcoming	the	“Crisis	of	the	Humanities”,	which	basically	entailed	a	disbanding	
with	humanism,	 its	values	and	 its	methods	of	knowledge	production.	 It	 is	 from	
this	position	that	an	art	historian	like	Strzygowski	would	demand	that	the	traces	
of	 ethnography	 and	 pre-history	 upend	 aesthetic	 judgment.	 This	 critical-
ideological	 overlap	 with	Documents’	 premise	 to	 probe	 aesthetics	 by	 means	 of	
“ethnography”,	 “archeology”	 and,	 last	 but	 certainly	 not	 least,	 “doctrine”	 had	
preceded	his	one-time	contribution,	Strzygowski	asserting	in	1922	that:	
Humanism’s	inherent	limited	focus	on	European	society,	that	is,	on	people	who	
made	 their	 histories	 accessible	 by	 means	 of	 the	 written	 word	 is	 untenable.	
Individual	subject	areas	have	thus	long	begun	to	draw	on	ethnography	for	their	
actual	 research	material.	 But	 just	 as	 in	 the	 time	 question,	 the	 social	 question	
does	not	only	 involve	 the	distant,	 in	 the	appropriate	case	 the	primitive	people,	
but	also	the	local,	the	immediately	lying	in	front	of	us. 	165
	In	this	context	it	is	also	noteworthy	to	point	to	the	similar	qualitative	attributes	of	both	the	164
Gauls	and	those	“Black	Birds”	again:	their	performance	is	of	an	“incongruous	extravagance”,	very	
much	equaling	the	Gaul’s	“positive	extravagance”.	(Bataille,	“Black	Birds”,	in	Brotchie	(ed.)	1995,	
p.36).	
	Strzygowski,	1922,	p.	17	(Trans.	by	the	author)	165
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The	“individual	subject	area”	of	choice	for	Strzygowski	(as	much	as	it	essentially	
was	for	Documents)	was	of	course	no	other	than	the	neologism	of	“comparative	
art	research”:	
													The	science	which	girst	conceives	the	entirety	of	the	world’s	orbit,	mankind	in	its													
															entire	process	of	existence	and	in	all	its	social	strata,	and	which	further	explores			
the		inner	values	and	their	consistency	will	shine	a	light	for	the	other		
humanities.That	science	could	[...]	in	fact	be	the	research	about	the	gine	arts.	 	166
Thus	 this	 was	 very	 much	 in	 dialogue	 with	 Bataille’s	 idea	 put	 forward	 in	 the	
“Academic	Horse”	 essay	where	 the	 “immediately	 local”	 –	 i.e.	 the	 homegrown	 –	
that	 Strzygowski	 spoke	 about	 was	 represented	 by	 Gaulish	 (read	 indigenous	
proto-French)	 culture.	 This	 as	 opposed	 to,	 say,	 a	 Teutonic	 legacy,	 the	 one	
celebrated	 over	 at	 Germanien,	 especially	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 kind	 of	 “barbaric	
sublime”	conjured	by	Wilhelm	Teudt’s	travelogues-cum-treatises	covering	those	
“Germanic	 Sanctums”	 that	 lay	 at	 his	 doorstep	 in	 Lower	 Saxony,	 including	 the	
(in)famous	Externsteine .				167
	Ibid.,	pp.	30-31	166
	The	Externsteine	are	a	group	of	prominent	solitary	rock	formations	outside	the	small	town	of	167
Horn,	close	to	Detmold.	Declared	a	principal	national	monument	by	the	Ahnenerbe	under	
Himmler	since	they	were	believed	to	be	a	pagan	sacred	site	originally	storing	that	legendary	
Irminsul,	the	Externsteine	were	outgitted	with	stairs	and	walkways	interconnecting	the	rocks.	
They	served	as	a	prime	location	for	various	SS	celebrations	and	rallies	while	becoming	a	popular	
destination	for	a	kind	of	völkisch	tourism	spurring	on	economic	development	for	this	rather	
remote	area	of	Germany.	Parts	of	Kenneth	Anger’s	1967	gilm	“Lucifer	Rising”	were	gilmed	at	the	
Externsteine	featuring	a	fairy-like	Marianne	Faithfull	wandering	the	rocks	(according	to	anecdote	
while	high	on	heroin)	wearing	a	“medieval”	cape	set	to	a	dark	electronic	score	by	Bobby	
Beausoleil,	an	erstwhile	member	of	Charles	Manson’s	“family”.	The	Externsteine	to	this	day	serve	
as	the	setting	for	tribal	rave	parties	coinciding	with	solstice	as	well	as	an	occasional	social	
gathering	point	for	Germany’s	Neo-Nazi	scene,	i.e.,	they	continue	to	appeal	to	various	audiences,	
providing	the	setting	for	respective	projections.	
	86
With	regard	to	that	“comparative	art	research”	addressing	said	aesthetic	
discourse,	 Strzygowski	 girmly	 disavowed	 the	 latter	 as	 the	 pivotal	 normative	
category	 of	 art	 historical	 scholarship	 of	 the	 time.	 Consequently,	 as	 bold	 –	 and	
ludicrous	–	as	it	must	have	already	sounded	when	girst	published	in	Documents,	
this	 for	him	meant	 that,	 “[…]	 art	 research	 […]	belongs	 in	 the	domain	of	purely	
objective	research	and	must	not	be	confounded	with	aesthetic	research” .	This	168
critique	 was	 shared	 by	 institutional	 gigures	 such	 as	 Paul	 Rivet,	 a	 prominent	
ethnologist	and	the	founder	of	the	famous	Musée	de	l’Homme	which	housed	the	
former	 Trocadero’s	 ethnological	 collections.	 (The	 Trocadero	 served	 as	 an	
important	place	for	the	Parisian	avant-garde	seeking	inspiration	from	the	mostly	
African	 and	 Oceanic	 objects	 and	 artworks	 taken	 from	 the	 colonies	 on	 display	
there.	 Rivet’s	 vision	 for	 the	 newly	 Musée	 de	 l’Homme,	 as	 the	 name	 already	
suggests,	 was	 at	 pains	 to	 revise	 the	 preceding	 institutional	 othering	 complete	
with	 a	 Zoo-like	 exhibition	 format,	 proposing	 that	 for	 all	 the	 objects’	 formal	
extravagance	 these	 were	 still	 artefacts/objects	 created	 by	 “men”	 (human	
beings)).	
As	such	Rivet	responded	to	the	debate	on	art	historical	methodology	with	
a	 critique	 of	 the	 former	 museum	 premise	 of	 singling	 out	 artifacts	 worthy	 of	
representing	 a	 civilization.	 Rivet	 explicitly	 tied	 this	 critique	 to	 an	 argument	
implicating	 class	 and	 economic	 conditions	 as	 factors	 unjustly	 determining	 the	
writing	 of	 cultural	 history	 past	 and	 present	 which,	 as	 will	 be	 seen	 shortly,	
resonated	with	Strzygowski’s	direct	implication	of	class	in	the	context	of	“power	
art”.		
	Documents	I	1,	1929	“English	Supplement”	(unpaginated)168
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Rivet:	 […]	 the	essential	point	 is	 to	know	all	 the	aspects,	or	at	 least	 the	normal	
aspects	 of	 a	 civilization,	 and	 not	 its	 exceptional	 aspects,	 as	 revealed	 by	 the	
privileged	 classes.	 For	 the	 ethnologist	 the	 poor	man’s	 dwelling	 is	 as	 fruitful	 a	
study	as	the	rich	man’s	castle,	if	it	is	not	more	so	 .	169
Thus,	 compared	 to	 Bataille,	 who	 certainly	 devoted	 more	 attention	 to	 (anti-)	
civilization’s	 “positive	 extravagances”	 (a	 kind	 of	 base	 “exceptional”)	 than	 its	
“normal	aspects”,	Rivet’s	position	presented	a	more	moderate	attitude.	His	stance	
did	however	correspond	to	the	critiqued	to	be	narrow	and	exclusive	conception	
of	 the	study	of	art	and	by	extension	culture(s)	which,	according	to	Strzygowski	
led	 “the	 consequence	 of	 a	 partition	 between	 a	 pre-history	 and	 a	 historical	
time” 	 (which	 as	 shown	 in	 the	 preceding	 chapter	 II.1	 was	 a	 “partition”	 in	170
Strzygowski’s	art	 research	 that	was	 faulty	 in	 itself	 since	 time,	and	 thus	history,	
were	 secondary	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 art	 which	 developed	 along	 that	 fantastic	
“Hauptzeit”,	 in	 this	 schema	 rendering	 history	 more	 or	 less	 irrelevant	 for	 art’s	
evolution.) 		171
Rivet	 took	 up	 Strzygowski’s	 notion	 of	 “partition”,	 calling	 it	 ”absolutely	
artigicial”	in	his	text.	By	this	he	was	referring	more	specigically	to	the	separations	
between	 the	 then	 young	 science	 ethnography,	 the	 emergence	 of	 pre-historical	
studies	 at	 the	 gin-de-siècle	 and,	 lastly,	 traditional	 archeology,	 being	 the	 oldest	
father	 discipline	 so	 to	 speak,	 and	 thus	 the	 most	 contested	 one.	 In	 line	 with	
	Paul	Rivet:	“A	Study	of	Material	Civilization;	Ethnography;	Archaeology;	Prehistory”.	169
Documents	I	3,	1929.	(English	Supplement,	unpaginated)		
	Strzygowski,	1929	(Documents	I	1)	English	Supplement	170
	Strzygowski,	1922,	p.5		171
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Strzygowski’s	 call	 for	 that	 “comparative	 art	 research”	 Rivet	 demanded	 that:	
”ethnography	 should	 no	 longer	 be	 anything	 but	 comparative”,	 endorsing	
academic	 interdisciplinarity	 long	 before	 it	 became	 an	 institutional	mantra	 and	
eventually	a	rule.	
The	 mere	 classigication	 and	 cataloguing	 of	 a	 select	 group	 of	 esteemed	
artefacts	was	commonly	considered	within	Documents	to	no	longer	be	adequate	
to	 produce	 useful	 knowledge	 in	 the	 humanities	 (especially	 for	 contemporary	
artistic	concerns	seeking	to	 fulgill	a	mandate	as	an	avant-garde).	 “It	would	be	a	
mistake	 not	 do	 more	 and	 better”	 writes	 Rivet.	 “Ethnography	 has	 been	
handicapped	 by	 errors	 of	 method”,	 he	 continues,	 echoing	 Strzygowski’s	
characteristically	 confrontational	 diction. 	 Meanwhile,	 the	 girst	 issue	 of	 the	172
publication	 Germanien	 in	 the	 same	 year	 of	 1929	 saw	 a	 similar	 call	 for	
interdisciplinarity:		
It	 is	a	 further	demand	that	one	branch	of	science	shall	not	be	constructed	as	a	
self-contained	idea,	but	that	it	sufgiciently	considers	its	neighboring	sciences	to	
form	a	logical	general	knowledge	of	mankind.	 .	173
This	 –	 while	 roughly	 obliging	 Rivet’s	 revised	 Musée	 de	 l’Homme	 –	 somewhat	
hazy	 “logical	 general	 knowledge	 of	 mankind”	 as	 Wilhelm	 Teudt	 grandiosely	
	For	yet	another	“verbal	form”	of	this	“aggressive	anti-Western	stance	of	the	visual	avant-172
garde”	as	Rosalind	Krauss	puts	it,	see	her	reference	to	Georges-Henri	Riviere’s	essay	
“Archaeologism”	in	“Cahiers	d’art”	no.	7	(1926),	Krauss,	1985,	p.49f16.	(Riviere	was	an	assistant	
director	at	the	Trocadero,	the	preceding	institution	of	the	Musée	de	l’Homme	and	closely	
associated	with	Documents.)	
“Eine	weitere	Forderung	ist,	daß	eine	Wissenschaft	nicht	als	ein	für	sich	allein	bestehendes	173
Gedankengebilde	aufgebaut	sein	darf,	sondern	sich	mit	ausreichender	Berücksichtigung	der	
Nachbarwissenschaften	in	ein	logisches	System	des	Gesamtwissens	der	Menschen	einfügt.”	
Wilhlem	Teudt,	“Germanische	Vorgeschichte	und	Wissenschaft”,	Germanien	Heft	1,	1929,	p.	5
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named	 it	 would	 basically	 be	 provided	 by	 Strzygowski’s	 “comparative	 art	
research”,	declared	by	him	in	Documents	to	be	an	“intellectual	science	which	does	
not	solely	depend	upon	written	sources”,	promoting	the	visual	and	the	unregined	
remnants	over	the	textual	and	sophisticated.		
Needless	 to	 say	 it	 was	 not	 quite	 the	 case	 that	 this	 “comparative	 art	
research”	presented	such	a	groundbreaking,	advanced	method	towards	the	study	
of	art	that	it	could	just	skip	textual	source	material	for	the	purpose	of	chronology	
and	 provenance	 classigication.	 Rather,	 that	 obliviousness	 to	 textual	 source	
material	was	borne	of	an	ideological	agenda,	which	sought	to	not	only	recognize	
“barbaric”	 culture	 but	 furthermore	 to	 establish	 it	 as	 the	 new	 ideal.	 The	
aggressive	 depreciation	 of	 the	 textual	 and	 thus	 conventional	 art	 historical	
methodology	also	arose	simply	out	of	a	factual	necessity	since,	as	already	noted,	
a	lot	of	these	barbaric	remnants	and	cultures	were	hardly	existing	or	preserved	
anymore,	 let	 alone	 recorded	 in	 any	 kind	 of	 historical	 chronicle	 (the	 few	
exceptions	coming	courtesy	of	Roman	chroniclers	such	as	Tacitus	“Germania”,	i.e.	
from	the	perspective	of	the	oppressors	–	of	“power	art”).	“Art	research”	therefore	
invited	 at	 times	 heavily	 speculative	 accounts	 and	 methods	 in	 securing	 this	
underappreciated	 material,	 the	 qualitatively	 poor	 leftovers	 of	 low	 cultures	
suffused	with	mythical	and	 folkloric	 information,	unearthed	as	 they	often	were	
by	 self-proclaimed	 experts	 who	 were	 in	 fact	 frequently	 decidedly	 lay-
ethnographers,	 characterized	 by	 individuals	 like	 Teudt.	 That	 formally	 and	
historically	rather	heterogeneous	barbaric	legacy,	the	lost	object	to	be	recovered	
by	 (fascist)	 “art	 research”,	 was	 to	 be	 solidly	 united	 through	 some	 ancient,	
unchanging	 and	 higher	 nexus	 of	 blood,	 race	 and	 territory	 that	 was	 not	 be	
perturbed	by	textual	sources	suggesting	otherwise.	Strzygowski	neatly	provided	
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the	conceptual	framework	to	this	novel	barbaric	aesthetic,	not	failing	to	couch	it	
in	a	populist	language	of	class	struggle:	
												History	sticks	to	written	sources.	For	the	art	researcher	there	exist	relics	of	an								
												underclass	that	doesn’t	resort	to	writing	and	certainly	not	the	word	to	express		
												what	is	at	stake	for	them,	but	to	the	image. 	174
Promoting	the	visual	over	the	textual	as	an	act	of	more	genuine	expression	and	
denouncing	 fact-based	 contextualization	 in	 general,	 hesitancies	 about	 the	
legitimacy	of	 that	barbaric	up-valuation	were	 sought	 to	be	pre-empted.	Rather	
than	posing	complications	to	the	kind	of	sublimation	of	the	barbaric	as	advanced	
by	 Strzygowski	 and	 völkisch-fascist	 art	 theory	 of	 the	 time,	 the	 unorthodox,	 at	
times	 dicey	 methodology	 of	 “art	 research”	 was	 acknowledged,	 albeit	 by	
conveniently	 turning	 it	 into	 an	 actual	 faculty,	 evinced	 by	 Strzygowksi	 who	 in	
Documents	claimed	that	”Plastic	art	research	has	discovered	methods	superior	to	
those	 employed	 by	 ‘Art	 History’	 which	 permits	 of	 rendering	 actual	 even	 that	
which	has	not	been	conserved” .	Which	is	to	say	that	this	quite	fantastic	idea	of	175
“rendering	actual”	implicitly	admitted	to	a	resurrecting,	supernatural	component	
lying	at	the	heart	of	“art	research”.	
While	 these	 ideas	were	presented	within	Documents,	 it	 should	be	noted	
that	there	likely	existed	reservations,	to	put	it	mildly,	about	the	projective	nature	
of	 Strzygowski’s	 “art	 research”,	 if	 not	 by	 Bataille	 then	 certainly	 by	 the	 equally	
	“Geschichte	hält	sich	an	die	geschriebenen	Quellen:	Für	den	Kunstforscher	gibt	es	Zeugnisse	174
aus	seiner	Unterschicht,	sie	sich	nicht	in	der	Schrift	und	überhaupt	nicht	in	erster	Reihe	des	
Wortes	bedient,	um	auszudrücken,	worauf	es	ihr	ankommt,	sondern	des	Bildes”.	Strzygowski,	
Nordischer	Schicksalshain,	Heidelberg	1937,	p.	vi	(Transl.	by	the	author).		
	Strzygowski,	1929,	unpaginated	“English	Supplement”	175
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nongeneric	 art	 historian	 Carl	 Einstein.	 It	 was	 Einstein	 who	 in	 his	 essay	
“Negerplastik”	[Negro	Sculpture]	as	early	as	1915	voiced	doubts	about	a	notion	
such	 as	 art	 research,	 or	 in	 fact	 art	 itself	 “shining	 a	 light”	 (Strzygowski)	 for	
academic	disciplines:	
	To	view	art	as	a	means	to	anthropological	and	ethnographic	insights	seems	to			
																me	dubious,	since	artistic	representations	hardly	reveal	anything	about	the		
															facts	upon		which	this	kind	of	scholarly	knowledge	is	based .	176
More	 directly	 in	 the	 face	 of	 Strzygowski’s	 thundering	 proclamations	 are	
Einstein’s	critiques	of	what	I	have	called	a	sublimation	of	the	barbaric,	contained	
in	his	1920	text	“Afrikanische	Plastik”	[African	Sculpture]	and	thus	more	or	less	
contemporaneous	with	Strzygowski’s	“Crisis	of	the	Humanities”	(1922)	
By	way	of	phony	 [hochstaplerisch]	emotion	and	newly	stenciled	 [schabloniert]	
ideologies	that	have	a	desperate	similarity	to	illusions,	nothing	is	to	be	gained .	177
No	 doubt	 Einstein	 was	 here	 directly	 disputing	 the	 concurrent	 vogue	 for	 an	
escapist	–	and	 indiscriminate	–	primitivism	within	artistic	 circles	 from	Paris	 to	
Berlin,	 the	 art	 market	 and	 the	 criticism	 substantiating	 it,	 rather	 than	 the	
simultaneous	 passion	 for	 Germanic	 or	 Nordic	 remnants	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	
	Einstein,	“Negerplastik”,	Leipzig	1915.		“Negro	Sculpture”,	translated	by	Charles	Haxthausen	176
and	Sebastian	Zeidler	in	October	107,	2004,	p.	125	
	“Afrikanische	Plastik”,	Berlin	1920.	“Mit	hochstapelndem	Gefühl	und	neu	schablonierten	177
Ideologien,	die	eine	verzweifelte	A| hnlichkeit	mit	Einbildungen	besitzen,	ist	nichts	gewonnen.”,	p.	
6	(Transl.	by	the	author).	
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völkisch	movement .	 	His	critique	however	of	a	conception	of	a	prehistoric	or	178
primitive	 culture	 as	 somehow	 timeless	 and	 ahistorical	 and	 thus	 unspoiled	 and	
immune	 to	 external	 ingluences	 seems	 especially	 valid	 in	 the	 context	 of	 “art	
research”.	
When	looking	at	African	art	we	miss	the	support	of	a	clear	history,	or	gixed	time.	
[…]	Much	of	what	is	told	about	Africa	resembles	a	beautiful,	fathomless	story.	
Time	and	space	remain	dubiously	gixed	in	the	uncertain	slumber	of	the	
mythological.” 	179
Yet	 what	 was	 early	 on	 recognized	 by	 Einstein	 to	 pose	 a	 problem	 in	 terms	 of	
appropriately	 introducing	and	studying	artifacts	outside	 the	Western	canon	 for	
the	 purpose	 of	 an	 academic,	 art	 historical	 and	 aesthetic	 expansion	 and	 de-
hierarchization,	 was	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 elevated	 by	 Strzygowski	 to	 a	 model	
attribute	 of	 primal,	 unspoiled	 cultural	 heritage	 to	 be	 unleashed	 and	 tapped	by	
the	 community	 (i.e.,	 the	 “Volksgemeinschaft”).	 A	 similar	 hopeful	 expectation	
from	 these	 last	 contingents	 of	 unspoiled	 genuine	 “culture”	 is	 discernible	 in	
Michel	 Leiris’	 elaboration	 on	 Haitian	 culture	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 girst	 chapter.	
However,	 the	 giction	 of	 such	 an	 unspoiled	 primitivist	 purity	was	 certainly	 also	
exposed	 in	 Documents,	 most	 eloquently	 perhaps	 in	 Marcel	 Griaule’s	 text	
“Gunshot”	 in	 which	 he	 humorously	 pinpointed	 –	 with	 regard	 to	 Ethiopia	 then	
	That	Einstein	was	very	well	aware	of	the	latter	though	and	even	put	it	into	a	relation	with	the	178
concurrent	popularity	of	the	primitive	and	the	exotic	discussed	here	is	evident	in	his	writing	on	
German	expressionists	such	as	Emil	Nolde,	whose	work	in	his	Die	Kunst	des	20.	Jarhunderts	he	
described	as	“barbaric	magic”.	
	Einstein,	1922.	p.	5.	Transl.	by	the	author.	“Bei	dem	Betrachten	afrikanischer	Kunst	missen	wir	179
den	Anhalt	eindeutiger	Geschichte,	gixierte	Zeit	[…]	Vieles	über	Afrika	mitgeteilte	ähnelt	einer	
schönen,	bodenlosen	Erzählung.	Zeit	und	Raum	verharren	fragwürdig	im	ungewissen	Schlummer	
des	Mythologischen.”	Translation	quoted	(slightly	altered	in	keeping	with	the	original	German	
text)	from	David	Quigley,	Carl	Einstein:	A	Defense	of	the	Real,	Vienna	2007,	p.78	
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under	Italian	rule	–	the	ingiltration	of	the	natives’	art	and	architecture	by	colonial	
residues;	 basically	 the	 junk	 of	 industrialized	 mass	 production	 (“railway	 gish-
plates”,	 “Chianti	 bottles”)	 left	 behind	 creatively	 incorporated	 into	 “indigenous”	
local	craft .	180
What	Einstein	in	“Afrikanische	Plastik”	rightfully	probed	as	being	passive	
“fragwürdig[es]	 verharren”	 [dubious	 gixity]	 concerning	 the	 status	 of	 time	 and	
place	of	 this	other	artistic	production,	Strzygowski	concomitantly	moved	to	 the	
top	of	his	art	theoretical	tripartite	schema	in	the	form	of	now	active,	empowering	
“beharrende[n]	 Kräfte”,	 [insistant	 forces],	 tellingly	 unaffected	 by	 time.	
Strzygowski	 thus	 turned	 that	 “mythological	 slumber”	 Einstein	 objected	 to	 into	
the	chief	asset	of	a	resistance	to	the	dominant	cultural	idea	of	linear	progress.	In	
fact,	later	on	in	his	now	fully	phantasmagorical	oeuvre,	the	notion	of	ahistoricity	
and	the	overall	mythic	nature	of	cultural	heritage	as	the	foundation	of	a	radically	
renewed	 socio-cultural	 –	 or	 rather	 national-socialist	 –	 consciousness	 was	
explicitly	embraced:	
In	reality	this	ahistoricity	is	one	of	the	most	important	features	of	the	Nordic	
spirit;	not	actual	history,	but	what	is	turned	thereof	into	myth	and	fairy	tale	
through	the	Sinnbild,	proliferated	orally	from	generation	to	generation	–	that	is	
the	spiritual	heritage	of	the	North	[as	a	cultural-ethnic	zone],	as	such	
															artistically	valuable	above	all. 	181
	Marcel	Griaule,	“Gunshot”	Documents	II	1,	1930,	In	Brotchie	(ed.)	1995,	p.	98180
	Strzygowski,	1943,	p.	175	(Transl.	by	the	author)	181
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III	Double	Visions		
The	 reappraisal	 of	 barbaric	 (anti-)culture,	 its	 particular	 social	 features	 and	
customs,	 culled	 from	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 historical	 sources	 and	 epochs	 deviating	
from	–	transgressing	–	Western	values,	did	not	solely	take	place	in	the	realm	of	
aesthetics.	 In	 both	Documents	 and	 in	 the	 thematically	 corresponding	 essays	 of	
völkisch-fascist	literature,	one	comes	across	treatises	on	ritualistic	acts,	at	times	
viscerally	gruesome	from	a	“Western”	moral	standpoint,	along	with,	especially	in	
Documents,	images	that	formed	a	kind	of	collection	of	objects	evincing	“barbaric”	
treatments	 and	 modes	 of	 production.	 Bataille’s	 earliest	 example,	 one	 which	
divulges	his	pretty	much	 life-long	 investment	 into	macabre	cultural	and	 indeed	
political	 phenomena,	 can	 be	 found	 in	 a	 text	 he	 published	 a	 year	 ahead	 of	
Documents,	 entitled	 “L’Amérique	 disparue”	 (1928).	 Here,	 Bataille	 indulged	 in	 a	
graphic	 description	 of	 violent	 acts	 of	 sacrigice	 set	within	 the	 otherwise	 rather	
sophisticated	culture	of	the	Aztecs,	their	capital	re-envisioned	by	him	as	a	place	
of	dazzling	wealth	 and	beauty,	 turning	 the	 rigid	notion	of	 “civilization”	upside-
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down	 by	 way	 of	 this	 jarring	 contrast .	 This	 was	 Bataille’s	 girst	 foray	 and	182
theoretical	investment	into	extinct	and	anti-modern	socio-cultural	rituals	(in	this	
case,	the	purported	Aztec	priests’	custom	of	tearing	out	a	living	person’s	heart),	
the	 explicit	 atrocities/sacrigices	 occluded	 from	 western	 socio-political	 life	 .	183
Except	 that,	 at	 a	 second	 look,	 they	were	not	 so	occluded:	 especially	not	within	
Documents,	 whose	 selection	 of	 images	 at	 times	 unearth	 rather mundane	
instances	 of	 the	modern	 social	 and	 its	modes	 of	 production	 and	 consumption	
that	 did	 in	 fact	 contain	 traces	 of,	 if	 not	 barbarous	 atrocity,	 certainly	 a	 mass	
production	of	death.	Or,	differently	again,	Documents	disclosed	“barbaric”	aspects	
reemerging	 here	 and	 there	 as	 the	 raw	 material	 assimilated	 by	 a	 bourgeois-
capitalist	circuit	of	demand	and	supply,	the	various	disasters	and	acts	of	violence	
sold	as	shocking	news	items	to	the	public	(such	as	the	sensationalist	photo	book	
X	 Marks	 The	 Spot,	 documenting	 the	 gang	 wars	 amongst	 Chicago’s	 magia,	
	“Mexico	[City]	was	not	only	the	most	streaming	of	the	human	slaughterhouses,	it	was	also	a	182
rich	city,	a	veritable	Venice	of	canals	and	bridges,	of	decorated	temples	and	beautiful	glower	
gardens	over	all.[…]	Doubtless,	a	bloodier	eccentricity	was	never	conceived	by	human	
madness.”(Translation	by	Krauss,	1985,	p.55).	Georges	Bataille,	“L’Amérique	Disparue”,	in	Jean	
Babelon	(ed.)	L’Art	précolumbien	,	Paris	1930	(A	later	catalogue	to	accompany	the	1928	exhibition	
“Exposition	de	l’art	de	l’amérique”	at	the	Pavillon	de	Marsan,	Paris.	Bataille	did	not	provide	
references	to	historical	documents	or	scientigic	studies	in	support	of	the	picture	he	painted	of	
Aztec	culture.	Bernd	Mattheus	criticizes	this	text	as	a	“populist-scientigic”	one,	a	“hack	job”,	that	
fails	to	discuss	important	elements	of	Aztec	human	sacrigice	such	as	the	role	of	hallucinogenic	
drugs,	the	“sacral	character	of	the	sacrigiced”	etc.	all	of	which	leads	the	reader	to	misunderstand	
the	sacrigice	as	a	“stunning	yet	senseless	spectacle”.	Mattheus,	1986,	p.130.	Interestingly	enough	
though,	Bataille	makes	an	argument	with	regard	to	the	Aztecs’	art	that	reverberates	with	the	
critiques	of	a	high	art	emphasizing	mimetic	representation	as	critiqued	by	Strzygowski	et	al.	The	
Aztecs’	depictions	of	their	deities	are	described	by	Bataille	as:	“less	a	clumsy	attempt	to	represent	
nature	but	a	symbolism	to	express	an	idea”.	Again,	not	only	do	the	Aztecs’	preference	for	
idiosyncratic	expressiveness	over	clear-cut	representation	echo	the	Gauls	willfully	diverging	
animal	depictions,	but	it	furthermore	aligns	with	the	qualities	ascribed	to	the	fascist-völkisch	
Sinnbild.		
	In	this	context	it	is	worth	mentioning	Foucault’s	spectacularly	gruesome	opening	passage	of	183
Surveiller	et	punir	(1975),	detailing	an	execution	by	drawn-and-quartering	in	18th	century	France	
as	the	last	instance	of	public	execution	serving	collective	spectacle/experience	(of	power).	Jean	
Baudrillard	would,	not	much	later,	make	a	similar	historical	argument	in	L’Échange	symbolique	et	
la	mort	(1976)	there	discussing	the	social	function	of	public	execution,	a	performance	of	
sovereign	power	integral	to	–	not	isolated	from	–	medieval	society.
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discussed	in	an	eponymous	article	by	Bataille). Signigicantly,	these	items	tended	
to	stem	from	a	civilization’s,	or	rather	from	the	citizenry’s,	underbelly,	which	is	to	
say	 from	 the	 criminal	 subset	 that	 Bataille	 conceived	 of	 as	 agents	 of	 a	 not	 yet	
rationalized,	law-abiding	constituency.	These	defectors	from	civility	and	from	the	
law	Bataille	basically	presented	as	the	genuine	heirs	to	the	equally	noncompliant	
barbarians	as	represented	by	the	Gauls	in	Bataille’s	“Academic	Horse”	essay.	This	
equation,	or	identigication,	of	the	historically	barbaric,	principally	understood	by	
Bataille	 as	 an	 anti-sovereign	 aesthetic	 unruliness	 or	 deviation,	with	 the	 actual	
lawlessness	 of	 modern-day	 interest	 groups	 such	 as	 the	 clan	 or	 the	 gang,	 was	
made	 explicit	 in	 this	 text,	with	 Bataille	 stating	 that:	 “[…]	 a	 perfect	 casting	 and	
intelligibility	 [of	 the	 classical	 style	 characterizing	 Greek	 coins],	 implying	 the	
impossibility	of	 introducing	absurd	elements,	were	as	 little	to	their	[the	Gauls’]	
taste	as	police	regulations	are	to	the	criminal	classes.” 	(A	narrative	somewhat	184
short	on	the	fact	that	for	all	its	hardnosed	brutality	the	gang	was	nevertheless	a	
community	 founded	upon	 shrewd	economic	 interests,	 i.e.	 following	 a	 capitalist	
rationale	 of	 progiting	 from	 precarious	 demand-and-supply,	 any	 deviancy	 thus	
concentrated	girst	and	foremost	 in	the	 illegal	goods	trafgicked.)	This	connection	
did	serve	a	larger	argument,	in	which	he	deduced	this	polarization	of	civilized	vs.	
barbaric	 from	 a	 clashing	 of	 aesthetics,	 (and	 vice	 versa),	 which	 he	 had	 already	
formulated	in	the	beginning	of	this	text:	
Thus	 since	 an	 academic	 or	 classical	 style	 is	 opposed	 to	 everything	 baroque,	
fantastic	 and	 barbarous,	 these	 two	 radically	 different	 categories	 sometimes	
	Bataille,	1929.	In	Ades/Baker	(eds.),	2006,	p.	238	184
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correspond	 to	 contradictory	 social	 states.	 Styles	 could	 thus	 be	 considered	 the	
expression	or	symptom	of	an	essential	state	of	things. 	185
Whence	it	would	appear	all	 the	more	logical	 for	Bataille	to	 likewise	deduce	the	
“dément”	 renderings	 of	 Aztec	 deities	 from	 their	 indeed	 “contradictory	 social	
state”;	 a	 state/State	 terrifying	 the	 Spanish	 conquerors	 under	 Cortez	 beholding	
the	Aztec’s	“eccentricity	of	human	madness”,	as	Roger	Hervé	phrased	in	his	text	
for	Documents	 entitled	 “Sacrigices	Humaines	 du	 Centre-Amérique” .	 Bataille’s	186
agenda	to	cover	just	these	“contradictory	social	states”	in	the	pages	of	Documents	
found	its	equivalent	in	a	reconsideration	turned	redemption	of	barbaric	customs	
in	Germanien.	Here,	one	can	gind	articles	such	as	“Das	Roßopfer	bei	den	Indern	
und	Germanen”	(“The	horse	sacrigice	of	the	Indians	and	the	Teutons”)	as	well	as	
“Die	 ‘Menschenopfer’	 nach	 der	 Varusschlacht”	 (“‘Human	 Sacrigices’	 after	 the	
Battle	of	the	Teutoburg	Forest”).	These	two	texts	in	fact	thematically	correspond	
to	three	entries	to	Documetns’	“Critical	Dictionary”	section,	entitled	“Kali”,	“Man”	
and	 “Slaughterhouse”,	 all	 by	 Bataille,	 as	 well	 as	 with	 Roger	 Hervé’s	previously	
mentioned	article.	
In	“Das	Roßopfer	bei	den	Indern	und	Germanen”	its	author,	Hans	im	Uhl,	
proposes	 a	 direct	 cultural	 afgiliation	 between	 ancient	 Teutonic	 and	 ancient	
Indian	culture	(the	“Vedas”),	exempligied	by	their	apparently	mutual	practice	of	
	Ibid.,	p.	237.	It	should	be	noted	that	what	here	has	been	translated	as	“fantastic”	in	the	185
original	French	text	is	called	“dément”	by	Bataille;	which	is	more	opportune	towards	the	linkage	
of	aforementioned	processes	of	material	alteration	yielding	allegedly	barbaric	properties.	And	
which	furthermore	allows	for	Bataillean	wordplays:	monnayer	(to	mint)	becomes	démenté	and	
thus	de-monnayé	(demented,	de-minted	and	de-moneyed),	ruining	the	monetary	glow.
	In	Documents	II	4,	1930		186
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sacrigicing	and	consuming	the	noble	animal	of	the	horse.	The	author	lays	out	the	
following	scene:	
The	[horse]	sacrigice	was	carried	out	in	holy	places.	The	glesh,	after	having	been	
presented	to	the	deity	for	consumption,	was	dined	on	at	the	sacrigicial	meal,	with	
the	 [horses’]	 skulls	 hefted	 onto	 trees.	 The	 horse	 sacrigice	 was	 probably	 only	
performed	on	special	occasions. 	187
Im	 Uhl	 goes	 on	 to	 posit	 that	 “despite	 the	 destruction	 of	 our	 own	 culture”,	
(presumably	here	meaning	 the	Teutonic	 tribes’	Christianization	at	 the	hands	of	
the	 Roman	 colonizers)	 a	 study	 of	 the	 ancient	 Vedas’	 scriptures	 provided	 the	
evidence	 for	 the	 sacrigicial	 role	 of	 the	 horse	 to	 be	 directly	 related	 to	 Teutonic	
customs.	(This	since,	according	to	the	proto-Fascist	geo-ethnic	model,	the	“Aryan	
race”	linked	ancient	Indian	and	Persian	cultures	with	the	Nordic-type	inhabitants	
of	Central	and	Northern	Europe. )	Leaving	aside	 this	doubtlessly	problematic	188
premise,	 what	 is	 signigicant	 here,	 is	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 article’s	 “closing	
arguments”	 introduce	an	ethical	dimension	 to	 this	barbaric	 consumption	of	 an	
animal	 as	 valued	 as	 the	 horse	 (I.e.,	 considering	 the	 horse’s	 esteemed	
representation	 in	 the	Western	 aesthetic	 tradition,	 being	 “the	most	 perfect	 and	
academic	of	 forms”	and	hence	“the	most	accomplished	expressions	of	the	 idea”,	
as	 Bataille	 maintained	 “The	 Academic	 Horse”.)	 There	 surely	 existed	 a	
“contradiction	 of	 social	 states”	 or,	 indeed,	 of	 symbolic	 application	 between	
	Hans	im	Uhl,	“Das	Roßopfer	bei	den	Indern	und	Germanen”,	Germanien,	Heft	5/6,	1930,	p.	86	187
	For	a	detailed	account	primarily	responsible	for	this	theory	and	spawning	many	thereafter	188
see	Arthur	de	Gobineau,	Essai	sur	l'inégalité	des	races	humaines	(1853-55)	(An	Essay	on	the	
Inequality	of	the	Human	Races).
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embossing	coins	–	monetary	value	–	with	horses	and	adorning	trees	with	their	
craniums.	The	abstract	realm	of	a	barbaric	sacred	(Aztec,	Teutonic	etc.)	came	up	
against	 an	 ideal	 concept	 of	 beauty	 applied	 to	 abstractions	 like	 prestige,	 power	
etc.	as	promised	by	money.	
To	return	to	the	reconsideration	of	the	barbaric	on	the	level	of	culture,	im	
Uhl	asserted:	
From	these	accounts	we	can	conclude	that	the	horse	sacrigice	also	had	the	same	
symbolic	meaning	 [Sinn]	as	 the	 Indian	one.	Hence	 the	Teutonic	horse	 sacrigice	
was	as	 little	a	raw,	barbaric	blood	 feast	as	 the	 Indian	one,	but	a	holy,	 symbolic	
act.	
This	 kind	 of	 proto-postcolonial	 critique	 towards	 a	 colonialist,	 moral	 judgment	
and	consequently	discrimination	of	the	colonized	subjects’	customs	–	perceived	
as	 contrary	 to	 the	 colonizer’s	 ethics	 and	 culture	 and	 thus	 bizarre	 –	 was	
something	that	very	much	reverberated	within	Documents.	To	this	end,	Bataille,	
curiously	 enough,	 likewise	 turned	 to	 Indian	 culture	 as	 an	 example	 of	 a	 non-
Western	 culture	 subjected	 to	 a	 colonizer’s	 agenda	 of	 seeking	 to	 paint	 foreign	
customs	as	a	“raw,	barbaric	blood	feast”	(im	Uhl).	Bataille	did	so	by	quoting	from	
a	 sensationalist	 and	 racist	 Indian	 travelogue	 by	 the	 American	 journalist	
Katherine	Mayo,	entitled	Mother	India	(1927).	Bataille,	crediting	Mayo	with	“the	
avowed	intention	of	disgusting	her	readers	with	an	ignoble	barbarity”, 	quotes	189
generously	 from	 this	 work,	 surely	 in	 order	 to	 bolster	 his	 hypothesis	 of	 a	
transformation	of	cultic	acts	 into	sensational	material	within	a	nascent	modern	
	“Kali”,	Documents	II	6,	1930,	in	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.	54		189
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consumer	 culture,	 i.e.	 into	 bloody	 spectacle	 –	 an	 ersatz	 experience	 of	 sacrigice	
turned	 gictive	 gore ,	 the	 remaining	 format	 to	 engage	 otherwise	 abolished	190
customs	of	that	nature	in	secularized	society.	
The	 blood	 glows	 over	 the	 glagstones,	 the	 drums	 and	 gongs	 before	 the	 goddess	
ring	out	 in	 a	 frenzy.	 ‘Kali,	Kali,	Kali’,	 cry	 the	priests	 and	 suppliants	 in	 a	 chorus	
[…].	 A	 woman	 rushes	 forward	 and,	 on	 all	 fours,	 laps	 up	 the	 blood	 with	 her	
tongue…Half	a	dozen	hairless	and	mangy	dogs,	horribly	disgigured	by	nameless	
diseases,	plunge	their	avid	muzzles	into	the	spreading	tide	of	blood. 	191
Note	that,	while	 this	material	would	have	appealed	to	Bataille	 in	 the	 girst	place	
due	to	its	graphic	and	revolting	narrative,	it	would	seem	that	it	further	served	his	
purposes	 in	 providing	 “base	 terminology”	 to	 draw	 on	 –	 “…frenzy,	 disgigured,	
diseases…”	–	for	his	own	writing,	such	as	the	“frenzy	of	forms”	Bataille	ascribed	
to	the	creations	of	the	barbarous	Gauls.	
This	 example	of	 a	 spectacularization	of	 barbaric	 customs	 to	 the	 ends	of	
value	creation	–	a	trajectory	found	frequently	within	Documents	as	a	whole	–	is	
followed	 just	 two	 entries	 later	 by	 the	 article	 “Man”,	 shifting	 the	 focus	 to	mass	
production	 thus	 further	 emphasizing	 the	 economic	 dimension	 of	 Bataille’s	
analysis.	 This	 entry	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 photograph	 of	 a	 made	 up	 woman	
	And	from	gore	to	the	most	“extreme”	variant	thereof:	snuff,	i.e.	the	niche	genre	evolving	in	the	190
1970s	with	B-movies	such	as	the	Italian	Mondo	Cane	gilms	where	the	on-screen	slayings	of	both	
animals	and	of	humans	are	accused	of	being	authentic	and	not	staged.	See	here	especially	the	
legal	controversies	surrounding	the	gilm	Zombie	Holocaust	(Italy	1980,	directed	by	Frank	Martin	
a.k.a.	Marino	Girolami).	(On	a	historical	trajectory	of	snuff	in	the	moving	image	see	David	Slater,	
David	Kerekes,	Killing	for	Culture:	An	illustrated	History	of	Death	Film	from	Mondo	to	Snuff,	
London	1994).	
	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.	55	191
	102
sporting	a	 fur	coat,	seated	in	front	of	a	row	of	hanging	skinned	foxes	at	a	1928	
Berlin	 fur	 exhibition.	 The	 German	word	 “Zurichterei” 	 is	 displayed	 on	 top	 of	192
this	 in	 equal	 parts	 mundane	 and	 unsightly	 composition.	 This	 kind	 of	 casual	
snapshot	 of	 modern-day	 barbarity	 supplements	 Bataille’s	 text,	 in	 which	 he	
shares	with	the	reader	his	recent	reading	of	a	book	entitled	The	Blood-Guiltiness	
of	Christendom.	(May	We	Slay	for	Food?)	(1922)	by	Sir	William	Earnshaw	Cooper.	
(Cooper	was	apparently	a	member	of	the	“The	Order	of	the	Golden	Age”,	a	“group	
of	 militant	 nationalist	 vegetarians”	 and	 thus	 not	 entirely	 remote	 from	 an	
idiosyncratic	 grouping	 such	 as	 the	 “Freunde	 Germanischer	 Vorgeschichte”,	
presenting	 yet	 another	 peculiar	 intersection	 of	 “alternative”,	 “progressive”	
agendas	such	as	vegetarianism	with	politically	reactionary	aspirations.)	
In	 the	 entry	 “Man”,	 just	 as	 in	 “Kali”,	 blood	 again	 glows	 and	 gushes	
copiously;	 this	 time,	 however,	 not	 in	 a	 faraway	 demonic	 Calcutta	 temple	 but	
closer	 to	 home,	 in	 the	 “Christian’s	 bloody	 slaughterhouses”,	 the	 concrete	
manifestation	for	Bataille	of	the	apparently	“well	known	fact	that	not	one	of	the	
	This	expression	alone	-	“Zurichterei”	-	would	have	certainly	appealed	to	Bataille,	assuming	his	192
familiarity	with	the	multiple	meaning	it	carries	in	the	German.	Used	as	it	is	here	it	describes	a	
manufacturing	process	(of	skinning),	i.e.	a	production	technique.	Zurichterei	however	possesses	
a	verb	form	of	“zurichten”,	denoting	an	act	of	disgigurement,	mutilation,	marring	etc.	“Jemanden	
zurichten”	denotes	abuse	or	violence	committed	to	a	subject	which	is	actually	present	in	the	
image	spread	that	contains	the	photo	of	the	fur	exhibition,	by	way	of	a	bizarre	image	of	the	
“murderer	Crépin”	in	court,	his	face	bandaged	to	conceal	defacement,	the	entry	it	pertains	to	
entitled	“Malheur”	i.e.	very	much	pointing	to	Crépin	being	“zugerichtet”	(and	furthermore	“vor	
Gericht”	[before	the	judge])	making	his	“Hinrichtung”	[execution]	plausible).	The	products	of	this	
secular	sacrigice	of	“Zurichterei”	come	in	from	of	a	photograph	showing	a	cinema	actress	clad	in	
fur:	“Betty	Compson	dans	le	gilm	parlant	[talkie]	‘Weary	River’”,	i.e.	the	fur	gigures	as	a	modern	
relic	ironically	furnishing	these	“women	so	de-natured”	–	modernity’s	“saints”	(Batille).	See	his	
“Places	of	Pilgrimage:	Hollywood”	[Lieux	de	pelerinage:	Hollywood].Documents	I	5,	1929.	(Also	
see	Chapter	4).			
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millions	 of	 animals	 man	 massacres	 every	 year	 is	 necessary	 for	 his	
nourishment” .	193
Bataille’s	 transposition	of	 the	 “barbaric	blood	 feast”	 from	the	exotic	and	
barbaric	other	–	i.e.	the	Indians	(and	by	extension	the	Teutons)	–	onto	civilized,	
modern	 urbanity	 and	 mass	 production	 comes	 full	 circle	 in	 the	 entry	
“Slaughterhouse”,	 this	 entry	 in	 a	 way	 introduced	 by	 “Man”’s	 coda	 provided	 by	
Cooper:	
A	 calculation	 based	 on	 very	modest	 gigures	 shows	 the	 quantity	 of	 blood	 shed	
each	year	in	the	slaughterhouses	of	Chicago	is	more	than	sufgicient	to	gloat	give	
transatlantic	liners.	 		194
Traversing	this	ocean	of	blood,	the	“transatlantic	liner”,	carrying	bloodshed	as	a	
by-product	 of	 voracious	 consumption,	 arrives	 at	 the	 relatively	 new	
slaughterhouses	erected	at	Paris’	periphery,	in	the	area	known	as	La	Villette,	the	
actual	 subject	 in	 question	 of	 “Slaughterhouse”.	 The	 “liner”	 of	 “Man”	 –	 on	 its	
passage	both	across	 the	Atlantic	and	the	Critical	Dictionary	–	arrives	 in	 the	old	
world	as	a	“plague-ridden	ship” .	Presumably	seeking	to	amplify	the	barbarous	195
nuances	of	 a	 term	 like	 “slaughterhouse”,	 the	 article	 features	photographs	of	 La	
Villette	 taken	 by	 Eli	 Lotar,	 depicting	 –	 similar	 to	 the	 image	 of	 the	 Berlin	 fur	
exhibition	–	a	bland	but,	again,	also	unsightly	setting:	in	this	case	interior	shots	of	
	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.	57	193
	Ibid.,	p.	58	194
	Bataille	“Slaughterhouse”	(“Abattoir”),	Documents	I	6,	1929.	In	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.73	195
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a	 slaughterhouse,	 its	 gloors	 covered	 in	 blood,	 as	 well	 as	 an	 image	 of	 a	 row	 of	
neatly	 lined	up	severed	cows’	 feet.	 In	her	discussion	of	“Slaughterhouse”,	Dawn	
Ades	 points	 out	 that	 these	 images	 starkly	 contrasted	with	 only	 slightly	 earlier	
features	on	La	Villette	in	one	of	the	major	art	publications	at	the	time,	the	Cahiers	
d’Art.	Here,	La	Vilette’s	outwardly	modern,	gleaming	and	sterile	 facade	made	of	
silvery	 steel	 was	 captured	 by	 an	 aestheticizing	 architectural	 photography	 that	
portrayed	 it	 as	 an	 epitome	 of	 modern,	 sanitized	 manufacturing .	 This	196
ennobling	representation	of	 the	slaughterhouse	 through	photography	reglected,	
to	a	degree,	the	idea	of	slaughterhouse	as	a	modern	day	“temple”,	as	Bataille	put	
it,	a	sublimating	association	he	immediately	turned	upside	down	by	concluding	
that	this	therefore	also	rendered	the	slaughterhouse-cum-pagan-temple	as	“one	
of	those	places	in	which	blood	glows.” 	The	slaughterhouse	as	portrayed	here	is	197
	Ades/Baker	(eds.),	2006,	p.	14	196
	That	Bataille	did	not	embrace	an	aestheticizing	of	the	industrial	is	evident	in	his	entry	197
“Factory	Chimney”:	“Today	when	the	truly	wretched	aesthete,	at	a	loss	for	objects	of	admiration,	
has	invented	the	contemptible	‘beauty’	of	the	factory,	the	dire	gilth	of	those	enormous	tentacles	
appear	all	the	more	revolting”.	In	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.	51	
	105
the	manifestation	 of	 sacrigice	 turned	 into	 “curse”, 	 according	 to	 Bataille.	 The	198
industrialized	mass	shedding	of	blood	–	in	the	form	of	meat	and	aforementioned	
fur	production	–	and	the	sites	of	its	execution	are	to	be	moved	at	all	cost	to	the	
city’s	geographic	and	social	periphery,	out	of	sight	because	of	its	“unseemliness”.	
Communal	experience	of	sacrigice	is	ousted	from	a	population	that	was	at	pains	–	
or	condemned	–	“to	vegetate	as	far	as	possible	from	it” .	199
	 If	 sacrigice	 and	 its	 modern	 day	 variants	 in	 the	 above	 examples	 were	
limited	 to	horses,	 foxes	and	 livestock	 it	was	only	a	matter	of	 time	–	or	pages	–	
until	human	sacrigice	proper	would	be	addressed,	both	within	Documents	and	in	
contemporaneous	fascist	ponderings	on	the	matter.	In	the	Germanien	article	“Die	
‘Menschenopfer’	 nach	 der	 Varusschlacht”,	 Joseph	 Plaßmann,	 a	 high-ranking	
academic	 within	 the	 Ahnenerbe	 think-tank	 and	 one	 of	 the	 most	 frequent	
contributors	 to	 the	 journal,	 gives	 a	 speculative	 account	 of	 alleged	 human	
sacrigices	during	the	time	of	the	Roman	Empire’s	conquest	of	Northern	Europe.	
These	 sacrigices,	 according	 to	 Plaßmann,	 involved	 the	 execution	 of	 higher-
	An	analogy	which	would	actually	align	with	the	notion	of	the	sacred	as	theorized	by	Rudolf	198
Otto	in	Das	Heilige	(1917),	a	work	frequently	drawn	on	by	Bataille	later,	the	word	derived	as	it	is	
from	the	Latin	sacer:	holy	and	damned/cursed,	sacred	and	soiled/untouchable,	etc.	In	this	
connection,	see	Agamben’s	critique	of	Bataille’s	idea	of	the	sacred	who	had	right	up	until	the	
Tears	of	Eros	allied	torture	with	ecstasy	(as	transgression),	a	misguided	thought	according	to	
Agamben	for	Bataille	fails	to	recognize	the	biopolitical	paradigm	of	this	act:	in	which	the	subject	–	
by	Law	–	is	drawn-and-quartered	for	no	sacrigicial	or	civic	value	at	all	–	including	heterogeneous	
value	as	accursed	share	–	but	in	fact	presents	an	instance	of	bare	life	executed	–	sans	ecstasy.	
(Put	differently,	one	could	argue	that	the	heterogeneous	is	still	a	(central)	constant	in	Agamben	
but	it	is	devoid	of	any	philosophical,	spiritual,	psychological	etc	faculty	and	describes	a	juridical	
procedure	demarcating	sovereignty	and	bare	life	from	the	“law”,	which	is	the	one	crucial	status	
sovereignty	and	bare	life	have	in	common.)	See	Agamben,	1998,	pp.	112-115.	“If	Bataille’s	merit	
is	to	have	brought	to	light	the	hidden	link	between	bare	life	and	sovereignty,	albeit	unknowingly,	
in	his	thought	life	still	remains	entirely	bewitched	in	the	ambiguous	circle	of	the	sacred.	[…]	In	
modernity,	the	principle	of	the	sacredness	of	life	is	thus	completely	emancipated	from	sacrigicial	
ideology,	and	in	our	culture	the	meaning	of	the	term	‘sacred’	continues	the	semantic	history	of	
homo	sacer	and	not	that	of	sacrigice.”	
	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.	73199
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ranking	 ofgicers	 of	 the	 Roman	 army	 by	 Teutonic	 tribes	 of	 which	 the	 historical	
“Battle	 of	 the	 Teutoburg	 Forest”	 (fought	 in	 the	 north-Western	 German	 region	
known	as	the	Teutoburger	Wald)	provided	a	record,	again	by	Tacitus’	frequently	
referenced	 “Germania”.	 Plaßmann	 quotes	 Tacitus’	 actual	 passage	 dealing	 with	
human	sacrigice,	making	the	case	that	historical	chronicles	like	these	are	subject	
to	 inaccuracy	 and	 interpretation,	 due	 not	 least	 to	 translations	 that	 may	
ideologically	tweak	the	meaning	of	topics	such	as	the	sacrigicial	act	itself:	
After	 the	 victory	 the	 Teutons	 slaughtered	 the	 girst-ranking	 tribunes	 and	
centurions	 in	 order	 to	 subsequently	 attach	 their	 skulls	 onto	 tree	 trunks	 with	
nails.	 […]	 In	neighboring	wood	clearings	 stood	 the	altars	of	 the	barbarians,	on	
top	of	which	they	had	slaughtered	the	tribunes	and	centurions .	200
That	Plaßmann	seems	to	haven	taken	issue	with	the	very	notion	of	“slaughter”	as	
employed	by	Tacitus	(or	as	it	had	been	translated)	is	reglected	by	him	putting	the	
title’s	 “Menschenopfer”	 (“human	 sacrigices”)	 into	 quotation	 marks.	 “Opfer”	 in	
German	carries	a	two-fold	meaning:	the	ambivalence	of	a	sacrigicial	human	body	
on	the	one	hand,	and	the	body	as	a	subject	to	violent,	if	not	criminal	acts	on	the	
other.	“Opfer”	denotes	both	victim	and	sacrigice,	and	it	is	no	doubt	the	latter	and	
not	 the	 former	 that	Plaßmann	seeks	 to	 locate	 in	 this	ancestral	rite	of	barbarity	
chronicled	by	Tacitus.	The	odious	nature	of	the	Teutons’	act	is	to	be	purigied	by	
an	 argument	 that	 asks	 the	 reader	 to	 reconsider	 the	 differing	 notion	 of	
(sacrigicial)	death	in	barbaric	culture:	
	Joseph	Plaßmann,	“	Die	‘Menschenopfer’	nach	der	Varusschlacht”,	Germanien	Heft	1,	1933,	200
pp.110/111	(Transl.	by	the	author).	
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We	have	to	consider	that	 this	was	a	highly	cultic	occasion	 in	this	case,	because	
‘barbaric	 blood	 thirst’	 or	 ‘brutish	 vengeance’,	 which	 is	 how	 it	 used	 to	 be	
interpreted,	are	notions	too	worn	out	to	serve	as	scientigic	arguments. 	201
Without	 offering	much	 in	 terms	of	 “scientigic	 arguments”	 either,	 Plaßmann	did	
not	 seem	 satisgied	 with	 merely	 recasting	 alleged	 barbaric	 “slaughtering”	 as	 a	
holy,	 if	 archaic,	 sacrigice.	 Plaßmann	 actually	 proceeds	 to	 posit	 a	 connection	
between	the	sacrigicial,	i.e.,	religious	realm	and	the	juridical	realm,	a	connection	
which	 “leads	 us	 to	 a	 logical	 interpretation	 of	 this	 process	 as	 a	 legal	 act	
conditioned	 by	 the	 cultic.”	 And	 Plaßmann	 does	 indeed	 make	 the	 case	 for	 the	
aforementioned	reformulation	of	execution	into	sacrigice,	thus	turning	the	victim	
into	a	sacred	subject,	maintaining	that:	
[…]	every	form	of	execution	originally	represents	a	cultic	act,	thus,	in	the	proper	
sense,	a	sacrigice	[…] 	202
Plaßmann’s	 thinking,	 given	 the	 early	 (1933)	 Nazi-fascist	 context	 in	 which	 his	
ideas	 are	 presented,	 eerily	 presages	 the	 semantically	 fraught,	 in	 fact	
“biopolitical”	notion	of	the	holocaust	(originating	from	the	Latin	“holocaustum”,	a	
“burnt	offering”)	itself,	i.e.,	its	inherently	troubled	meaning,	denoting	sacrigice	on	
	Ibid.,	p.	111	201
	Ibid.	202
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the	 one	 hand	 and,	 historically	 speaking,	 plain	 extermination	 on	 the	 other	 .	203
(Plaßmann’s	assertions	on	the	other	hand,	 if	without	him	delving	deeper	into	a	
historical	and	philosophic	argument,	are	certainly	in	discussion	with	the	revised	
notion	of	the	sacred	that	would	become	Bataille’s	focal	point	after	Documents,	by	
way	of	his	publication	and	secret	society	Acéphale	and	of	course	the	Collège	de	
Sociologie).	 Plaßmann	 concludes	 by	 making	 the	 case	 for	 ethical	 relativism,	
writing:	
We	can	in	any	case	recognize	that	the	‘human	sacrigices’	of	the	Teutons	have	to	
be	 viewed	 entirely	 differently	 than	 is	 commonly	 done.	 The	 margin	 between	
“barbarity”	 and	 “higher	 culture”	 is	 as	 little	 to	 be	 sought	 for	 here	 as	 the	 one	
between	those	people	who	carry	out	the	death	sentence	and	those	who	disclaim	
it.	Only	a	humanitarian	[sic]	rationalism	has	invented	such	separations. 	204
It	 was	 exactly	 that	 “humanitarian	 [humanistic]	 rationalism”	 that	 Bataille	 and	
colleagues	 like	 Roger	 Caillois	 and	 Michel	 Leiris	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Collège	
would	assess	and	ultimately	seek	 to	refute	as	 the	paradigm	responsible	 for	 the	
ultimate	obliteration	of	the	sacred	within	the	modern	social.	Stephan	Moebius,	a	
	While	he	may	not	be	the	girst	one	to	point	out	this	ambivalence,	Agamben	summarizes	it	as	203
follows:	“The	wish	to	lend	a	sacrigicial	aura	to	the	extermination	of	the	Jews	by	means	of	the	term	
Holocaust	was	[…]	an	irresponsible	historical	blindness.	The	truth	–	which	is	difgicult	for	the	
victims	to	face,	but	which	we	must	have	the	courage	not	to	cover	with	sacrigicial	veils	–	is	that	the	
Jews	were	exterminated	not	in	a	mad	and	giant	holocaust	but	exactly	as	Hitler	had	announced,	‘as	
lice’,	which	is	to	say,	as	bare	life.	The	dimension	in	which	the	extermination	took	place	is	neither	
religion	nor	law,	but	biopolitics”	Agamben,	1998,	p.114.		
	Plaßmann,	1933,	p.	113	(Transl.	by	the	author.).	Plaßmann	speaks	of	a	“humanitärer	204
Rationalismus”	by	which	I	think	he	means	to	say	“humanistic	rationalism”	not	a	“humanitarian”	
one	(?).	
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historian	of	sociology	who	has	compiled	a	kind	of	interpretative	anthology	of	the	
Collège’s	three	years	of	activity	(1937-39)	proposes	as	much,	writing:	
The	 Collège	 de	 Sociologie	 departs	 from	 the	 assumption	 that	 collective	
phenomena	like	death	rituals,	or	festivals	and	collective	narratives	such	as	myths	
are	given	secondary	status	by	traditional	sociological	analyses,	compared	to	the	
rational	and	contractual	[Hobbes’?	Rousseau’s?]	conceptions	of	society .	205
Which,	 to	come	back	to	Plaßmann,	also	meant	that	while	 this	perceived	 loss	or	
deprecation	 of	 ritualistic	 and	 sacrigicial	 social	 acts	 –	 including out-and-out	
archaisms	like	human	sacrigices	–	was	bemoaned	by	Bataille	et	al,	it	was	not	only	
earlier	similarly	taken	up	by	völkisch-fascist	ideology	but,	theoretically,	in	1933,	
more	 properly	 “re-deemed”.	 Indeed,	 the	 spiritual	 value	 of	 the	 dead	 as	 not	 yet	
excluded	from	society	was	of	great	interest	to	this	branch	of	fascism,	turning	the	
kind	of	lay	historiography	on	barbarian	social	and	cultural	models	laid	out	in	the	
	Stephan	Moebius,	Die	Zauberlehrlinge.	Sozialgeschichte	des	Collège	de	Sociologie,	Konstanz	205
2006,	p.	135	(Transl.	by	the	author).	Moebius	in	his	take	on	the	Collège’s	principal	re-envisioning	
of	the	social	summarizes	this	the	following	way:	”The	aim	of	the	Collège	was	to	build	
communities	that	were	degined	by	an	aspect	of	free	choice,	and	to	differ	from	“blood-and-soil	
communities”	as	well	as	from	traditional	communities	while	bringing	order	and	unifying	
elements	into	a	disintegrating	society”.	The	crucial	point	to	differentiate	the	Collège	and	by	
extension	Bataille’s	notion	of	a	sacred	community	from	blood	and	soil	ideas	is	well	taken,	while	
to	speak	of	‘order’	as	a	key	principle	for	a	newly	sacred	social	seems	rather	debatable	a	notion	in	
this	context,	given	Bataille’s	predilection	for	precisely	dis-order	and	chaos	as	expressed	in	the	
“state(s)”	he	supported:	formlessness,	a	(phenomenological)	“frenzy	of	forms”	(1929)	that	
eventually	would	give	way	to	a	(socio-political)	“frenzied	being”	(1935/36)	engaged	in	acts	of	
perpetual	revolt.	It	may	be	more	apt	an	analysis	in	view	of	Roger	Caillois’	contributions	at	the	
time,	which	betray	parallels	to	the	writing	and	ideas	of	an	Ernst	Jünger.	
	110
preceding	 chapters	 into	 crucial	 research	 objectives	 with	 political	 ends 	 by	206
Himmler’s	“Ahnenerbe	Forschungsgesellschaft”,	exempligied	by	briegings	such	as	
the	following:	
Der	Reichsführer-SS	möchte	eine	ganz	kurze	Zusammenstellung	–	etwa	in	Form	
einer	Disposition	-	von	all	den	Bräuchen	haben	die	noch	in	der	Volkstumspglege	
lebendig	sind	und	die	den	Gedanken,	daß	die	Toten	noch	mit	teilhaben	am	Leben	
der	Sippe,	bis	in	unsere	heutige	Zeit	versinnbildlichen. 	207
To	 return	 to	 Documents,	 the	 historical	 and	 ethical	 question	 concerning	 the	
“margin	 between	 ‘barbarity’	 and	 ‘higher	 culture’”,	 between	 “slaughter”	 and	
“sacrigice”,	between	an	executed	corpse	and	a	sacrigicial	body	was	debated	not	by	
turning	to	the	colonial	scenario	of	choice	in	Germanien	(Romans	vs.	Barbarians).	
Rather,	the	topic	was	approached	via	the	slightly	more	recent	and	more	properly	
recorded	 colonial	 narrative	 of	 the	 Spanish	 conquest	 of	 Central	 America	 in	 the	
16th	century,	provided	by	the	accounts	of	one	of	Cortez’	soldiers,	Bernal	Diaz	del	
	In	this	context,	it	appears	all	the	more	logical	on	the	level	of	symbolic	signigication	that	the	206
caps	worn	by	the	SS	were	adorned	with	a	skull.	In	a	lecture	the	literary	theorist	Hans	Mayer	gave	
at	the	College	he	points	out	that	this	detail	was	in	turn	appropriated	from	a	German	secret	
society	from	1813	called	the	“blacks”	that	formed	in	the	circle	of	Ernst	Moritz	Arndt,	a	key	gigure	
preparing	for	a	Francophobe	19th	century	German	nationalist	movement.	In	Denis	Hollier	(ed),	
The	College	of	Sociology	(1937-39),	transl.	Betsy	Wing,	Minneapolis,1988,	p.	272.	Which,	even	if	
coincidental,	is	somewhat	stunning,	in	light	of	the	fact	that	Walter	Benjamin	was	supposed	to	
lecture	on	the	subject	of	“fashion”	instead,	presumably	in	the	manner	he	would	later	discuss	it	in	
his	“Theses	on	the	Philosophy	of	History”	(1940);	a	lecture	which	for	reasons	unknown	was	
cancelled/rescheduled	(and	never	presented)	and	replaced	by	Mayer’s	“The	Rituals	of	Political	
Associations	in	Germany	of	the	Romantic	Period.”	(April,	18th,	1939).	
	“The	Reichsführer-SS	requests	a	concise	exposé	of	all	the	customs	that	are	still	being	observed	207
in	preserved	folklore	culture	and	which	contain	Sinnbilder	that	to	this	day	relay	the	idea	of	the	
dead	as	continuing	to	partake	in	the	life	of	the	community	”.	Bundesarchiv	(BArch)	NS21/227.	
Document	dated	April	8th,	1942.	The	request	continues	to	state	that:	“Der	Reichsführer-SS	
interessiert	sich	vor	allen	Dingen,	wo	das	Allerseelenfest	mit	seinen	Lichtern	überall	noch	
gefeiert	wird.”	
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Castillo,	who	essentially	took	Tacitus’	role	of	the	witness	in	this	context .	Hervé	208
in	this	text	returns	to	the	site	of	a	spectacular	–	and	paradoxical	–	barbarity	that	
had	fascinated	Bataille	in	his	aforementioned	text	“L’Amérique	Disparue”:	that	of	
ancient	Mexico’s	Aztec	culture,	where	barbarity	was	allegedly	performed	by	an	
apparently	otherwise	highly	sophisticated	society.	Hervé	conjures	up	the	bloody	
rituals	 of	 the	 Aztecs	 for	 the	 reader	 by	 quoting	 passages	 from	 del	 Castillo’s	
detailed	testimony.	Of	importance	here,	again,	is	the	kind	of	revision	of	moral	and	
ethical	standards	 in	the	context	of	colonialism	on	the	one	hand	and	the	ghastly	
sacrigices	of	the	Aztecs	on	the	other	that,	according	to	Hervé,	 is	reglected	in	the	
Spaniards’	 “disgust”	 before	 the	 Aztecs’	 “stinking	 mass	 graves”,	 to	 their	
sentiments’	 gradual	 giving	 way	 to	 an	 “obsession”	 and,	 ultimately,	 to	 an	
“enchantment”	[emerveillement]	with	this	“strange	novelty	[…]	sacrigice”.	(Hervé	
speaks	of	the	Conquistadors’	“double	vision	of	wonders	and	horrors”) .	209
Once	again,	the	ambivalent	notion	of	the	barbaric	is	here	re-negotiated,	as	
much	as	it	is	in	Plaßmann’s	text,	as	girst	and	foremost	a	historically	conditioned	
category	 of	 ethics.	 Moreover,	 barbarity	 here	 gigures	 as	 a	 lynchpin	 ensnaring	
colonizer	and	colonized ,	the	abhorrent	yet	fascinating	and	socially	mandated	210
and	 valued	 killings	 by	 the	 Aztecs	 and	 the	 legal	 yet	 brutal	 exploitation	 and	
decimation	of	 the	 indigenous	 Indians	 at	 the	hands	of	 the	Conquistadors	 in	 the	
name	of	the	crown	(i.e.,	of	the	law	and	hence,	 in	this	case,	of	God).	“L’idée	de	la	
	Bernal	Diaz	del	Castillo,	Historia	verdadera	de	la	conquista	de	la	Nueva	España,	(written	208
around	1568,	posthumously	published	in	1632.)
	Hervé,	1930,	p.	206	(Transl.	by	the	author).	209
	
	Which	is	precisely	also	the	reason	that	the	barbaric	is	engaged	for	an	artistic	avant-garde	with	210
political	ambitions	in	Brazil	just	around	the	same	time:	the	movement	around	Oswald	de	
Andrade,	whose	“Manifesto	Antropófago”	(1928)	calls	for	the	consumption	of	the	colonizers.		
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‘barbarie’	 toute	 gratuite”,	 Hervé	 thus	 deliberates,	 with	 17th	 century	 Mexico	 a	
conundrum,	imagined	as	“une	civilisation	à	une	sorte	d’âge	d’or”	but	also	labeled	
“satanique”	 and	 ultimately	 “inexplicable” .	 Hervé’s	 text	 closes	 with	 an	211
illustration	from	the	Mesoamerican	collection	of	the	Codex	Vaticanus	picturing	a	
“tzompantli”	 (a	skull	 rack/palisade),	a	kind	of	architecture	of	 skulls	 that	would	
appear	 to	 be	 related	 to	 the	 Teutonic	 skull-trees	 discussed	 by	 Plaßmann.	 The	
“tzompantli”	 becomes	 less	 exotically	morbid	 though	when	 juxtaposed	with	 the	
photograph	of	the	ossuary	of	the	Santa	Maria	della	Concezione	church	in	Rome,	
found	 in	Bataille’s	 last	article	 in	Documents.	Here,	 the	ornate	 skull	 architecture	
(of	 death)	 registers	 as	 positively	 “baroque,	 fantastic	 [demented]	 or	
barbarous” ,	 especially	 when	 viewed	 alongside	 its	 New	 World	 counterpart/212
predecessor.	
III.2	Modernity	–	“Double-vision	of	wonders	and	horrors”	
Hervé’s	notion	of	a	“double-vision	of	wonders	and	horrors”	may	actually	serve	as	
a	useful	metonymy	of	the	various	skulls,	heads	and	masks	featured	in	Documents.	
Double	 vision	 and	 dualisms	 already	 formally	 constitute	 the	 various	 “Janus-
masks”	featured	in	Eckhart	von	Sydow’s	article	on	Cameroon	masks	(“Masques-
Janus	du	Cross-River	(Cameroun)”) .	While	von	Sydow’s	article	and	its	images	213
	Herve,	1930,	p.	209	211
	Bataille,	1929.	In	Ades/Baker	(eds.),	2006,	p.237	212
	Documents	II	6,	1930	213
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limit	themselves	to	this	culturally	specigic	category	of	masks,	the	various	possible	
“treatments”	 or	alterations	 of	 the	 human	 skull/face,	 subjecting	 it	 to	 seemingly	
myriad	 possibilities	 of	 contortions,	 mutilations	 and	 exaggerations	 is	 explicitly	
foregrounded	in	another	article	of	the	same	issue.	Ralph	von	Königswald’s	“Têtes	
et	Cranes” 	(Heads	and	Skulls)	assembles	a	variety	of	these	possible	alterations	214
to	 the	 human	 skull	 that	 are	 furthermore	 partly	 superimposed	 into	 a	 rough	
collage.	 It	 would	 seem	 that	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 collaging	 was	 to	 reinforce	 the	
cultural	 and	 historical	 dualisms	 discussed	 above:	 an	 Oceanic	 facemask	 with	
conches	 for	 eyes	 is	placed	 together	with	 a	 skull	whose	 remaining	 rudimentary	
facial	 features	 are	 re-accentuated	 –	 made-up	 –	 with	 paint,	 making	 for	 a	
grotesque,	 indeed	 clownish	 appearance.	 At	 the	 bottom	 of	 this	 collage	 are,	 yet	
again,	 rows	 upon	 rows	 of	 skulls	 that	 stem	 neither	 from	 Aztec	 nor	 Teutonic	
“tzompantlis”	 but	 depict	 the	 Roman-Catholic	 ossuary	 of	 Hallstatt,	 Austria.	 The	
article	goes	on	to	feature	not	only	human	remains	but	a	photograph	portraying	a	
“Central	 European	 obese	 woman”,	 more	 outrageously	 altered	 skulls,	 and	 a	
cropped	 section	 of	 a	 painting	 by	 Cranach	 the	 Elder	 showing	 a	 severed	 head	
(“Judith	 with	 the	 Head	 of	 Holophernes”	 1530).	 If	 the	 “primitives’”	 inventive	
mutations	of	the	head	may	still	register	as	a	sinister	celebration	of	the	wealth	of	
facial	 (human)	 expression	 (including	 unspeakable	 transmogrigication),	 its	
civilized	 counterparts	 veer	more	 to	 the	 side	 of	 a	 denigration	 of	 the	 head	 as	 a	
particularly	human	attribute,	leading	all	the	way	to	–	demanding	–	decapitation,	
as	performed	in	the	Cranach	painting.	As	with	almost	all	of	the	disgigurations	or	
attacks	on	the	body	within	Documents,	the	selection	of	images	suggest	Bataille’s	
aims	 to	 be	 ultimately	 political:	 if	 the	 unpleasant	 close-ups	 of	 big	 toes,	 and	 the	
	Documents	II	6,	1930214
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horror	of	a	sliced	eye	in	“Un	chien	andalou”	(1929) 	already	hint	at	this,	the	act	215
of	beheading	is	symbolic	not	only	for	the	denigration	of	the	intellect	and	the	idea	
but	the	decapitation	of	authority	(hence	the	“Acéphale”,	the	headless	idol	of	the	
coming	 sacred	 community	 envisioned	 by	 Bataille).	 This	 political	 notion	 of	 the	
deformed	and	debilitated	head	as	a	desirable	act/state	was	actually	congirmed	by	
Bataille	when,	in	the	journal	Acéphale,	he	wrote:	
To	be	free	means	not	to	be	a	function.	[…]	The	head,	conscious	authority	or	God	
represents	one	of	the	servile	functions	that	gives	itself	as,	and	takes	itself	to	be,	
an	end;	consequently	it	must	be	the	object	of	the	most	inveterate	aversion 	216
The	juxtaposition	of	the	mundanity	of	an	obese	woman’s	unappealing	face	mass	
with	 the	 “primitives’”	 transmogrigications	 of	 the	 human	 head	 such	 as	 the	
shrunken	heads	of	the	Jivaro-Indians	present	are,	according	to	von	Königswald,	
“[…]	equally	terrifying	and	droll	distortions”	(i.e.	an	instance	of	a	“double-vision	
of	 wonders	 and	 horrors”).	 All	 of	 these	 variants	 indeed	 register	 as	 “object	 of	
aversion”,	and	 in	particular	affecting	a	 feature	signigicantly	typifying	the	human	
species:	the	face,	or	more	precisely,	the	face’s	ability	to	form	various	expressions,	
an	aspect	that	sets	it	apart	it	from	the	animal’s	incapacity	for	facial	expressions.		
	Which	in	this	case	could	essentially	serve	as	a	quite	literal	allegory	of	a	de-enlightenment,	215
that,	given	the	Surrealist	context,	may	be	linked	to	an	erotic	act	rather	than	to	the	castration	
anxiety	the	scene	has	been	interpreted	as;	a	misogynistic	one	I	suppose,	from	a	feminist	
perspective,	since	the	(liberating?)	act	of	de-enlightenment	occurs	at	the	hand	of	a	male	
protagonist	(who	historically	speaking	is	of	course	also	the	protagonist	of	Enlightenment).	See	
also	Rosalind	Krauss,	“Antivision”,	October	Vol.	36,	1986,	pp.	147-155	for	a	further/different	idea	
of	“de-enlightement”,	here	called	“antivision”.	Also	see	chapter	7.
	Bataille,	“Propositions”,	Acéphale	2,	1937	(Bataille,	1985,	p.99)	216
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One	 social	 instance	 in	 which	 this	 celebration	 of	 facial	 expressiveness	 –	
including	 those	 expressions	 registering	 “extreme”	 states	 –	 was	 allowed	 to	
resurface	 in	modernity	was	 in	 the	 institutionally	 sanctioned	 space-time	 of	 the	
carnival .	 If	 representations	 of	 “alterations”,	 signifying	 various	 kinds	 of	217
horrors/ecstasies/jouissances	 of	 the	 human	 face,	 are	 banned	 from	 public	
representations	 and	 prohibited	 by	 social	 protocols,	 the	 carnival	 allows,	 briegly,	
these	deviations	and	exaggerations	to	not	only	resurface	but,	furthermore,	to	be	
paraded.	 The	 vacuous	 quality	 of	 this	 temporary	masquerading,	 complete	 with	
temporary	 	 “transgressions”	 of	 everyday	 social	 norms,	 is	 illustrated	 by	 the	
photographs	 of	 Jacques	 Boiffard	 that	 feature	 contemporary	 subjects	 wearing	
contemporary	and	somewhat	ridiculously	bland	carnival	masks.	
These	photographs	in	turn	introduce	an	article	by	Georges	Limbour	that	
interweaves	 the	 perceived	malaises	 of	 contemporary	Western	 society	with	 the	
more	 concrete	 ones	 of	 colonialism	 and	 the	 Greek	 tragic	 theatre	 of	 Aeschylus	
(“Aeschyle	 et	 les	 civiles”).	 	 The	 latter	 famously	 incorporates	masks	 portraying	
various	exaggerated,	stylized	expressions	such	as	grief,	elation,	awe,	horror	etc.	
for	dramatic	effect,	a	kind	of	special	effect	of	antiquity.	Limbour	concludes	that	
what	 is	 left	 for	a	Western	society	 that	has	banished	sacrigicial	 rites	 that	visibly	
	Which	has	been	elaborately	explored	by	Mikhail	Bakhtin	in	Rabelais	and	His	World	(1941).	It	217
should	be	noted	that	Giorgio	Agamben	designates	the	carnival	as	a	commonly	recognized,	
mundane	form	of	a	“state	of	exception”	(referring	to	Carl	Schmitt’s	notion	of	the	
“Ausnahmezustand”).	The	carnival,	while	being	a	temporary	“suspension	of	juridical	and	social	
hierarchies”,	is	only	an	“anomic	festival”	though	–	in	fact	a	“parody	of	anomie”.		Ausnahmezustand	
(Homo	sacer	II.1),	trans.	Ulrich	Müller-Schöll,	Frankfurt	a.M.	2004,	p.88	(Transl.	by	the	author).
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impart	 the	 breadth	 of	 human	 expression	 through	 the	 experience	 of	 various	
ecstasies	(i.e.	alterity),	is	the	gas	mask,	the	contemporary	modern	mask	 :	218
No	 question,	 this	 [the	 gas	 mask]	 is	 the	 authentic	 modern	 mask.	 Among	 the	
peoples	 of	 ancient	 times	 religion	 and	 worship	 of	 the	 dead	 and	 the	 feasts	 of	
Dionysus	 made	 the	 mask	 a	 sacred	 ritual	 adornment;	 and	 we	 too	 have	 our	
religion,	 our	 games,	 and	 as	 a	 result	 our	 masks.	 Except	 that	 our	 age’s	
standardisation	[sic]	forces	us	to	all	wear	the	same	one. 	219
Rosalind	Krauss,	 in	her	discussion	of	Limbour’s	text,	notes	that	the	gas	mask	at	
that	 moment	 in	 time	 represents	 both	 a	 “[…]	 horrigic	 image	 of	 brutality	 and	
industrialized	war”	 as	well	 as	 a	 “[…]	 fascination	 for	what	modern	 imagination	
has	dreamed	to	replace	the	head	of	man”,	arguing	that	both	of	these	takes	“had	
become	 widespread	 among	 the	 1920s	 avant-garde”	 (thus	 basically	 yet	 again	
presenting	 a	 “double-vision	 of	 horrors	 and	 wonders”). 	 To	 illustrate	 her	220
argument,	a	trio	of	photographs	taken	from	the	previously	mentioned	magazine	
Varietés	and	captioned	“Les	protections	des	hommes”	(The	protections	of	men)	
	Likewise,	if	the	gas	mask	may	be	the	emblem	of	WWI,	then	the	gas	chamber	seems	to	be	the	218
one	of	WWII	and	by	extension	for	civilization	for	Bataille;	as	a	“a	sign	of	man”	just	“like	the	
pyramids,	the	acropolis,	etc.	[…]	the	human	image	is	inseparable,	henceforth,	from	a	gas	
chamber.”	Quoted	in	Stuart	Kendell,	Introduction	to	Georges	Bataille,	The	Cradle	of	Humanity,	ed.	
and	trans.	Stuart	Kendell,	New	York,	2005,	p.23.		
	“I	imagine	a	meeting	in	Hell	between	Aeschylus’s	troupe,	a	dozen	shades	with	different,	219
terrifying	wooden	faces,	and	a	handful	of	ghosts	of	my	own	time,	their	faces	hidden	behind	
absolutely	identical,	utterly	dehumanized	gas	masks.”		“What	are	these	porcine	faces,	every	one	of	
them	the	same?”	Aeschylus	asks.	These	are	not	snouts,	dear	father	of	Tragedy,	these	are	gas	
masks.”		
“Aeschylus,	Carnival	and	the	Civilized”.	English	translation	online	at	
	http://www.latriennale.org/sites/default/giles/journal-pdf/le-journal-de-la-triennale--4--
you_do_not_stand_in_one_place_to_watch_a_masquerade--melaniebouteloup_ABM2.pdf	
Retrieved	October	5th,	2012.	
	Krauss,	1985,	p.68..	Didi-Huberman	frames	Limbour’s	trajectory	–	from	Aeschylus’	theatrical	220
masks	to	gas	masks	–	somewhat	differently,	calling	it	a	“moving	summary	of	myth	and	modernity,	
a	certain	way	to	crush	myth	by	way	of	modernity”	his	reading	betraying	an	import	of	Adorno’s	and	
Horkheimer’s	conception	of	myth	and	enlightenment.	2010,	p.127	(Transl.	by	the	author).	
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(1930)	 show	 not	 only	 a	 wearer	 of	 said	 gas-mask	 but	 furthermore	 some	 new-
fangled	 optical	 device	 covering	 the	 upper	 half	 of	 a	man’s	 face	 as	well	 as	what	
appears	to	be	a	diving	helmet	entirely	obscuring	a	standing	gigure’s	face.	Laying	
out	 this	 pivot	 of	 a	 (post-human)	 aesthetic	 and	 an	 (anti-human)	 technology	 in	
general	terms	–	“industrialized	war”,	“modern	imagination”	–	she	skips,	perhaps	
due	 to	 their	 obviousness	 or	 literalness,	 Berlin	 Dada’s	 arguably	 most	 famous	
heads	 pertaining	 to	 each	 of	 these	 terms:	 Raoul	 Hausman’s	 “Mechanischer	
Kopf”	 (1919),	 tellingly	 also	 called	 “Der	 Geist	 unserer	 Zeit”	 (The	 Spirit	 of	 Our	
Time),	a	wooden	dummy	head	onto	which	knob	and	antenna	like	parts	as	well	as	
bits	 of	 measuring	 tape	 are	 afgixed	 and	 Otto	 Dix’	 series	 of	 etchings	 titled	 “Der	
Krieg”	(War)	(1924) 	depicting	quasi-mummigied	soldiers,	anonymized	by	said	221
gas	 masks,	 indeed	 resembling	 “a	 handful	 of	 ghosts” .	 Krauss	 suggests	 that	222
Limbour’s	 symbolism	 of	 the	 gasmask	 as	 the	 “contemporary	 mask”	 aims	 to	
intimate	 not	 “higher	 stages	 in	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 species	 [man]”	 but	 “much	
lower	ones”,	such	as	an	“insect” .	Thus	her	association	of	the	gas-mask	with	a	223
quasi-alien,	 insectoid	subject	differs	from	Limbour’s	relation	of	the	gas	mask	to	
the	“dirtiest”	of	mammals	and	therefore	the	morally	“lowest”	of	the	human	traits:	
the	 swine,	 with	 Aeschylus	 calling	 the	 gas	masked	 soldiers	 “porcine	 faces”	 and	
	Another	contemporary	work	of	Berlin	Dada	featuring	the	gas	mask	would	be	George	Grosz’	221
caricaturist	drawing	of	a	crucigied	Jesus	wearing	a	gas	mask	from	1925	(1927?).	The	work’s	title	
is	 “Maul	 halten	 und	 weiter	 dienen”	 [Shut	 up	 and	 serve],	 presenting	 a	 more	 direct	 political	
commentary	 on	 the	 complicity	 of	 church	 (religion)	 and	 secular	 power	 (the	military,	 warfare),	
which	 seems	 peculiar	 given	 that	 WWI,	 for	 all	 its	 atrocity,	 is	 not	 usually	 considered	 a	 war	 of	
religion.	
	Or,	alternatively,	“an	embarrassing	allegory”	according	to	Carl	Einstein.	222
	Krauss,	1985,	p.	58	223
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“snouts”.	 Both	 of	 these	 readings	 –	 the	 contemporary	 mask	 signifying	
dehumanization	 and	 depravity	 -	 correspond	 to	 a	 short	 and	 somewhat	 cryptic	
text	 by	Bataille	 entitled	 “Le	Masque” .	Here,	Bataille	maintains	 that	 the	man-224
made	mask,	 by	 both	 resembling	 and	 obscuring	 the	 truly	 human	 faculty	 of	 the	
face	 (“the	 sole	 open	 window”),	 by	 literally	 closing	 this	 last	 window,	 initiates	
further	 isolation	 and	 alienation.	 Bataille	 writes:	 “When	 that	 which	 is	 human	
becomes	masked	there	remains	nothing	but	animality	and	death”. 	225
The	 man-made	 and	 human-resembling	 mask	 “is	 chaos	 become	 glesh”,	
because	 the	 mask	 proves	 and	 confronts	 the	 face	 encountering	 this	 human/-
nonhuman	 face	 with	 its	 ultimate	 “extermination	 and	 decay”,	 something	 that	
would	 normally	 be	 the	 task	 of	 external	 nature	 (disintegration).	 The	 mask	 is	
already	manifested	death,	 signigied	by	 the	petrigied	 expressions	of	 the	mask	of	
that	 last	 moment	 from	 life	 to	 death	 (i.e.	 the	 frozen	 facial	 contortions	 of	 pain,	
pleasure,	surprise	etc.).	For	Didi-Huberman,	the	parading	of	various	instances	of	
these	(anti)human	representations	–	“chaos	become	glesh”	–	underline	Bataille’s	
attempt	to	foreground	“decomposition”	(thus	also	spoiling	the	idea	of	a	life	after	
death	 in	a	higher	realm).	 Instead	of	celebrating	human	semblance	and	thus,	by	
extension,	“God’s	anthropomorphism” ,	the	various	takes	on	the	face	invoke	the	226
non-human,	 verging	 on	 an	 obstreperous	 formlessness.	 Not	 unlike	 Benjamin’s	
notion	 of	 barbarity	 that	 initially	 registers	 as	 decay,	 in	 his	 case	 specigically	 as	 a	
	In	Bataille,	Oeuvres	Complètes	II,	dated	from	presumably	1934,	and	in	German	in	Mattheus,	224
1986,	p.404ff.		Didi-Huberman	also	refers	to	this	text	in	2010,	pp.110/111.	While	discussing	both	
Bataille’s	and	Limbour’s	texts	he	does	not	put	them	into	a	dialogue	as	presented	here.	
	Quoted	in	Didi-Huberman,	2010,	p.	110	(Trans.	by	the	author).225
	Ibid.	226
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cultural	 and	 psychological	 one,	 only	 to	 be	 glipped	 by	 him	 into	 a	 positivity	 of	
renewal ,	 Bataille’s	 transitively	 decomposing	 mask	 and	 the	 ensuing	 “chaos	227
become	glesh”	are	not	negatively	connoted	per	se.		
Yet	the	mask	still	has	the	power	to	appear	as	the	dark	incarnation	of	chaos	at	the	
threshold	to	this	bright	and	pacifying	world	of	boredom.	 	228
It	 is	thus	not	only	an	empowering	of	the	mask	but	furthermore	of	chaos,	 in	the	
course	 of	which,	 despite	 chaos	 suggesting	 uselessness,	 it	 reemerges	 as	 agency	
(as	“expenditure”):	a	political	power	contra	sovereign	power,	as	Denis	Hollier	in	
his	discussion	of	the	text	suggests.	Hollier	surmises	that	this	text	may	have	been	
written	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 1938	 lecture	 held	 by	 Bataille	 at	 the	 College	 de	
Sociologie	 entitled	 “The	 Structure	 of	 Democracies”	 (which	 is	 somewhat	
ambiguous	 since	 “Le	 Masque”	 is	 elsewhere	 presumed	 to	 date	 from	 1934 ).	229
Despite	 signifying	 decay,	 Hollier	 suggests	 that,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 Bataille’s	
conception	 of	 the	 mask,	 and	 the	 carnival	 in	 general,	 serves	 as	 his	 model	 for	
democracy	 as	 an	 event	 of	 political	 renewal,	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 initiation	 of	 a	
heterogeneous	(“bi-	or	polyacephalic” )	body	politic:	230
The	use	of	the	mask	is	an	initial	version	of	two-headedness.	Through	this	the	blind	
beliefs	 [?]	 of	 the	 democratic	 world	 (not	 to	 be	 confused	 with	 the	 utilitarian	
	In	his	essay	“Erfahrung	und	Armut”,	1933.	See	Chapter	5	227
	Quoted	in	Didi-Huberman,	2010,	p.110	228
	As	an	article	for	the	journal	Minotaure,	where	it	was	rejected	for	publication.	See	Didi-229
Huberman,	2010,	p.111	
	Bataille,	quoted	in	Hollier,	1988,	p.	191	230
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rationalism	of	 the	bourgeoisie!)	and	 its	antimonarchical	Dionysianism	are	 linked	
in	part	to	the	world	of	the	carnival. 	231
Simply	put,	the	mask	offers	escape	from	the	rule,	from	hierarchy,	etc.	Wearing	it	
would	 seem	 to	 promise	 an	 instance	 of	 breaking	 with	 Limbour’s	 critiqued	
“standardisation”.	Instead,	it	functions	as	a	device	enabling	a	temporary	suspense	
of	 gixed	 identity	 and	 social	 position	 and	 thus	 of	 standards,	 that	 translates	 into	
liberated	chaotic	subjects,	prolonging,	extending	the	carnivalistic	chaos	into	the	
political	 realm	 –	 prolonging	 and	 extending	 a	 “state	 of	 exception”	 that	 holds	 a	
revolutionary	promise .	232
Strzygowski,	on	the	other	hand,	veered	more	towards	Limbour’s	direction	
in	his	allegorical	usage	of	the	mask,	denoting	a	social	protocol	that	was	not	only	
ubiquitous	 and	 bureaucratized	 –	 standardized	 –	 but	 that	 suggested	 repression.	
Hence	 the	mask	 essentially	 was	 a	 key	 attribute	 of	 the	 “Machtmensch”	 (power	
man ).	233
The	 mask,	 supposed	 to	 have	 evoked	 natural	 beings	 in	 the	 equatorial	 region,	
becomes	a	mask	of	society,	the	latter	hiding	its	true	nature	underneath	it.	If	the	
	In	italics	in	the	original.	Hollier,	1988,	p.191	231
	Thus,	to	repeat,	in	direct	opposition	to	Agamben’s	notion	of	the	carnival	as	merely	a	“parody	232
of	anomie”.	See	f	36	in	this	chapter.	Chaos	as	a	heterogeneous	state	serves	as	means	to	an	end	in	
fascism,	the	end	being	deginite	homogeneity	(as	determined	by	Bataille	in	“The	psychological	
structure	of	fascism”	1933/34).	A	fascist	revolt	expects	and	enables	a	powerful	head	(of	state),	a	
Führer,	to	emerge,	a	dynamism	diametrically	opposed	to	Bataille’s	vision	of	an	acephalic	
(headless)	community	equally	derived	from	heterogeneity,	with	the	goal	to	perpetuate	
heterogeneity.	
	Despite	the	fascist	ring	of	this	term,	Strzygwoski	conceived	it	as	an	unmistakably	glawed	233
subject.	See	chapter	4	
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mask	had	previously	been	an	exception,	it	has	now	become	the	rule,	worn	at	all	
times.	 	234
Strzygowski’s	 assessment	 of	 this	 repressively	 masked	 society	 further	
corresponded	with	Limbour’s	assertion	of	the	modern	mask’s	main	function	“to	
drive	 away	 certain	 invisible	 enemies”	 (i.e.	 again	 suggesting	 its	 purpose	 to	
conceal/repress/suppress).	
What	power	has	done	to	the	folkloric	[volkstümlich]	mask	originally	warding	off	
evil	spirits!	It	has	put	on	the	mask	in	the	everyday	of	the	court,	the	church	and	
the	academy;	society	cannot	miss	it	[the	mask]	without	feeling	insecure. 	235
External	 spirits	 have	 become	 internalized	 –	 “invisible	 enemies”	 –,	 directed	
against	 the	 self	 that	 therefore	 needs	 to	 be	 masked	 (suppressed),	 the	 mask	
conceived	 as	 an	 addictive	 veneer	 of	 everyday	 social	 relations.	 Responsible	 for	
this	 standardization	 and	 suppression,	 for	 this	 reversal	 of	 the	 mask	 towards	
masking	 internal	 discontent	 and	 decay	was,	 as	 always,	 “power”	 (Macht),	more	
precisely	 Strzygowski’s	 habitual	 culprits	 of	 “church,	 court	 and	 academia”.	
Unsurprisingly	 though,	 for	 the	 völkisch-fascist	 rumination	 on	 the	 political	
implications	of	the	mask	and	by	extension	the	carnival,	the	focus	was	less	on	the	
primitives’	 masks	 per	 se	 (Strzygowski’s	 “equatorial	 mask”	 would	 be	
geographically	 correct	 though	 in	 view	 of	 the	 predominantly	 West	 African,	
Mesoamerican	and	New	Guinean	masks	in	Documents);	neither	was	it	on	ancient	
	Strzygowski,	1943,	p.243.	Transl.	by	the	author.	In	this	light	Emil	Nolde’s	paintings’	frequent	234
depictions	of	Oceanic	masks	as	well	as	the	carnival	become	all	the	more	plausible	as	objects	of	
desire,	a	nostalgic	admission	of	the	inability	to	escape	internalized	evil	(discontent)	as	the	
consequence	of	the	eradication	of	the	spirits	from	a	Western	modern	social.	Thus	Einstein’s	
peculiar	labeling	of	the	work	as	“barbaric	magic”	becomes	more	comprehensible,	if	one	reads	
Nolde’s	work	as	a	painterly	conjuring	of	a	pre-modern	state/State	out	of	remnants.		
	Ibid.	p.	275235
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Greek	theatre,	nor	on	Bataille’s	interest	in	the	Mardi	Gras.	As	the	notion	“folkloric	
[volkstümlich]	 mask”	 already	 suggests,	 the	 cultural	 realm	 and	 its	 respective	
rituals	 subject	 to	 reconsideration	 and	 revalorization	were	 the	 pagan	 traditions	
and	myths	partly	surviving	in	rural	Southern	Germany,	Switzerland	and	Austria.	
Dismissive	of	the	function	of	the	carnival	as	touristic	sideshow	or	urban,	tamed	
working-/middle	 class	 Zerstreuung,	 the	 carnival	 as	 it	 is	 featured	 in	 völkisch	
publications	and	various	research	trips	ordered	by	Himmler’s	Ahnenerbe	on	the	
contrary	 sought	 to	 reveal	 its	 political	 potencies	 –	 and	 in	 fact	 its	 vivid,	 if	 not	
grotesque	 heterogeneity .	 What	 is	 rather	 striking	 in	 the	 illustrated	 texts	 on	236
these	 vernacular	 traditions,	 ones	 that	 feature	 outlandish	 characters	 and	
processions,	is	that	heterogeneity	was	deemed	culturally	and	politically	valuable,	
which	is	inconsistent	with	the	later	regime’s	strict	suppression	of	any	aspects	of	
chaos 	not	to	mention	identigicatory	ambiguity.	(The	various	characters	indeed	237
show	 aspects	 of	 not	 only	 a	 bizarre	 “formlessness”	 but,	 furthermore,	 in	 some	
cases	 approve	 of	 and	 enact	 a	 blurring	 of	 gender	 that	 is	 thus	 appreciated	 as	
	It	is	in	this	context	that	a	work	such	as	Cameron	Jamie’s	“Kranky	Klaus”	(2005)	video	could	be	236
discussed.	Jamie	captured	the	events	leading	up	to	and	the	actual	procession	of	the	“Krampus”	in	
rural	Austria,	a	pagan	creature		whose	outgit	includes	a	disgigured	mask	with	horns	and	a	fur	suit.	
The	anonymized,	inebriated	Krampusse	roam	the	village	as	a	group	during	St	Nicholas	Day,	
consisting	of	presumably	male	villagers,	and	explicit	violence	in	form	of	beatings	and	vandalizing	
is	permitted,	expected	and	certainly	carried	out.	Jamie	edited	and	combined	the	footage	with	
music	by	the	drone	metal/noise	band	The	Melvins,	resulting	in	a	music	video-cum-ethnographic	
study	suggesting	a	correlation	between	the	(subcultural)	forms	of	discord	invested	in/identigied	
with	by	a	largely	adolescent	male	(sub)urban	faction	and	the	Austrian	youths	out	of	bounds	
acting	out	(sanctioned)	aggression,	unsettling	the	“parodistic”	trait	of	Agamben’s	“anomie”;	at	
least	for	this	time-frame.		
	
	Unless	of	course	one	considers	an	event	such	as	the	pogrom/Reichskristallnacht	as	“chaos”	of	237
a	political	nature,	ecstatic	destruction,	which	would	be	valid,	yet	doesn’t	account	for	the	fact	that	
this	temporary	chaos/ecstasy	again	serves	as	a	means	to	an	end	that	interdicts	chaos/anarchy.		
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belonging	 to	an	“authentic”	völkisch	cultural	history ).	 Instead	of	 the	carnival	238
serving	 as	 “[…]	 an	 occasion	 conceived	 as	 lighthearted	 horseplay,	 as	 a	 joke,	 as	
tomfoolery,	and	a	 lust	 for	 life	[…]” 	the	carnival	 is	predominantly	reviewed	as	239
an	act	of	political	uprising	against	clerical	authority,	mostly	in	the	context	of	the	
peasant	uprisings	 in	16th	century	Southern	Germany	and	Austria .	Because	of	240
this,	 folkloric	 myths	 pertaining	 to	 the	 carnival	 –	 involving	 acts	 of	 “slain	 body	
parts	hung	on	house	entrances”,	 including	“half	a	corpse	of	a	child” 	etc.	–	are	241
renegotiated	less	as	acts	that	are	barbarous	and	grotesque	and	more	as	acts	that	
are	 culturally	 meaningful	 in	 reconnecting	 with	 a	 composite	 heritage	 that	
comprises	post-Medieval	class-struggle	(the	1500s)	as	much	as	a	Early	Medieval	
pagan	 resistance	 to	 Christianization.	 In	 this	 historical	 and	 political	
contextualization,	these	acts	register	less	as	eccentric	massacres	and,	rather,	are	
“put	 into	 perspective”	 as	 presenting	 cultic	 acts	 that	 are	 integral	 to	 the	
community’s	 narrative	 and	 values	 resisting	 power’s	 standardizing	 and	
rationalizing	dictates.	
	Fr.	Mötzinger	“Sommer-	und	Winter-Spiel”:	“[…]	the	egg-manikin,	a	lad	in	woman’s	clothes	238
[…]”.	Germanien	1939,	p.226	(Transl.	by	the	author).	
	Hermann	Busse	“Volksfastnacht	im	Oberrheinischen”,	Das	Bild	1938,	p.	50	239
	“Auch	das	deutsche	Volk	hat	seine	revolutionäre	Tradition.	Es	gab	eine	Zeit,	wo	Deutschland	240
Charaktere	hervorbrachte,	die	sich	den	besten	Leuten	der	Revolutionen	anderer	Länder	an	die	
Seite	stellen	können,	wo	das	deutsche	Volk	eine	Ausdauer	und	Energie	entwickelte,	die	bei	einer	
zentralisierteren	Nation	die	großartigsten	Resultate	erzeugt	hätte,	wo	deutsche	Bauern	und	
Plebejer	mit	Ideen	und	Plänen	schwanger	gingen,	vor	denen	ihre	Nachkommen	oft	genug	
zurückschaudern”	Friedrich	Engels,	Der	Deutsche	Bauernkrieg,	in	Marx/Engels,	Werke	Bd.	7,	
Berlin,	1960	[1850],	p.	329.	
	Hugo	Neugebauer	“Wild’gfahr	und	Wildmänner	in	Tirol”,	Germanien	1938,	p.480.	“Ein	ganz	241
besonders	charakteristischer	Zug	dieser	Sage	ist	der	von	zerrissenen	und	stückweise	an	die	
Haustüren	gehängten	Leiber	von	Menschen	[…]”,	“an	die	Tür	eines	Dritten	eine	halbe	
Kindesleiche	[…]”.	
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BArch	 NS21/442.	 Images	 of	 an	 undesignated	 and	 unlabeled	 set	 of	 photographs	 held	 by	 the	
Ahnenerbe.		
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IV	For	a	Collective,	Base	
IV.1	Machtkunst	–	“Power	Art”	
Initially,	as	discussed	in	the	preceding	chapter,	through	tracking	cultural	history’s	
formal	 deviations,	 its	 curious	 instances	 of	 altering	 appropriations	 such	 as	 the	
Gauls’	 “barbarous”	 coins,	 Bataille	 celebrated	 these	 apparently	 “immediate”	
expressions	 within	 Documents	 as	 civilization’s	 “anti-thesis”.	 Likewise,	 for	
Strzygwoski	 these	 alterations	 and	 deviations	 presented	material	 challenges	 to	
the	representations	sanctioned	by	the	historically	traditional	bodies	of	authority,	
his	 “powers	 of	 the	 will”:	 Church,	 State,	 Academia,	 surely	 very	 much	 with	
contemporaneous	powers	 in	mind,	advocating	a	revolutionary	call	 to	arms	that	
had	 permeated	 any	 blend	 of	 fascist	 art	 theory	 from	 the	 get-go,	 along	 with	 an	
aggressive	 anti-clerical	 agenda	 (both	 of	 which	 intensigied	 over	 the	 course	 of	
national-socialism’s	political	ascendancy,	only	to	eventually	adopt	and	submit	to	
the	Führer-cult	as	an	alternative	authority	and	proxy	religion,	basically	peddling	
shrewd,	political	“Willenskraft”	as	organic,	apolitical	“Beharrende	Kraft”	.)			
Strzygowski’s	anti-authoritarian	 train	of	 thought	was	shared	by	Bataille,	
who	in	the	“Critical	Dictionary”,	under	the	entry	“Architecture”,	wrote:	
[…]	It	is	in	the	form	of	cathedrals	and	palaces	that	Church	and	State	speak	to	and	
impose	 silence	 upon	 the	 crowds.	 Indeed,	 monuments	 obviously	 inspire	 good	
social	behavior	and	often	even	genuine	fear. 	242
	Bataille:	“Architecture”,	Documents	I	2,	1929.	In	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.35.242
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This	 name-calling	 of	 enemies	 (Feindbilder)	 seemed	 to	 neatly	 overlap	 both	
positions.	Even	the	relational	nature	of	these	institutions’	affective	faculties	were	
quite	 similarly	 conceived,	 with	 Strzygowski’s	 anti-authoritarian	 stance	 and	
Bataille’s	 attack	 on	 architecture	 as	 a	 central	 feature	 of	 a	dispositif	of	 authority	
and	order	holding	sway	over	everyday	experience.	Relational,	 in	 the	sense	 that	
the	 manifestations	 of	 power	 for	 Bataille	 (and	 for	 Strzygowski)	 acted	
paternalistically	 towards	 their	 citizens,	 whom	 they	 inculcated	 as	 much	 as	
controlled,	if	not	outright	oppressed.	Power	art	essentially	perpetuated	a	parent/
child	dialectic,	one	in	which	the	dominated	and	subservient	recipient	or	dutiful	
member	of	the	Church	and	the	State	(and	lesser	so	of	Academia)	sought	to	please	
authority,	 even	 (falsely)	 identifying	 with	 it	 as	 a	 model	 to	 aspire	 to,	 while	
remaining	 equally	 in	 awe	 of	 it,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 Bataille’s	 “genuine	 fear”	 (if	 not	
necessarily	a	 “fear”	of	punishment	 in	 form	of	death,	 then	certainly	of	discipline,	
including	 marginalization	 –	 or	 simply	 obliviousness).	 Strzygowski	 called	 this	
double-sided,	 quasi-schizoid	 subject	 “Machtmensch”:,	 “power	 man/man	 of	
power”.	 This	 subject	 was	 intentionally	 conceived	 by	 Strzygowski	 as	 being	
ambivalent,	 a	 subject	 fallaciously	 assuming	 to	 be	 in	 power	 but	 in	 actual	 fact	
subject	 to	 power:	 ultimately	 servile	 to	 power	 regardless	 of	 the	 hierarchical	
position	held	within	any	system	thereof,	i.e.,	whether	executing	a	certain	amount	
of	power	or	having	to	carry	out	someone	else’s	superior	mandate.	It	was	one	and	
the	 same	 in	 this	 conception:	 that	 of	 the	 “poor	European	who	either	 arrogantly	
raises	himself	 above	all	 [hubris?],	 or	who	has	 to	 let	himself	be	exploited	 in	his	
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suffering	as	 servant,	believer	or	 academically	 educated” .	 In	other	words,	 the	243
classical	 humanist	 goals	 –	 obtaining	 an	 education/knowledge	with	 the	 view	 to	
participating	in	the	political	system	as	an	enlightened	citizen,	etc.	–	were,	in	fact,	
the	 (self-)imposed	 manacles	 of	 civilization,	 since	 these	 institutions	 were	
considered	 corrupt	 or	 at	 least	 bankrupt	 in	 terms	 of	 fostering	 far-reaching	
societal	change	–	which	also	meant	that	any	investment	in	them	equaled	political	
agency	 squandered .	 Corresponding	 to	 this	 “power	 man”	 came	 “power	 art”,	244
which	 exerted	 the	 education/control	 over	 the	 former.	 For	 all	 of	 “power	 art”’s	
alleged	 evil	 the	 concept	 itself,	 throughout	 Strzygowki’s	writing,	 remains	 rather	
fuzzy,	 presumably	 intentionally	 so,	 since	 that	 allowed	 it	 to	 be	 ascribed	 to	 any	
artistic	 development	 or	 tradition	 that	 did	 not	 git	 his	 demand	 for	 a	 kind	 of	
völkisch	 avant-garde	 movement.	 Entire	 artistic	 periods	 and	 their	 respective	
works	or	architectures	 (especially	Roman	Antiquity	and	 the	Renaissance)	were	
regarded	solely	as	spectacular	yet	hollow	embellishments	and	representations	of	
those	 in	 power	 –“titillating	 means	 of	 power	 [die	 sinneskitzelnden	 Mittel	 der	
Macht]” 	 –	 whether	 clerical	 or	 secular	 in	 nature	 –	 “cathedrals”	 or	245
“palaces”	 (Bataille).	This	naturally	set	up	a	dichotomy	between	a	pompous	and	
manipulative	high	art	and	a	humble	yet	heroic	because	genuine	folk	art ,	which	246
	“Vorläugig	sei	nur	gesagt,	daß	ich	unter	[…]	Machtmensch	den	armen	Europäer	der	sich	243
entweder	tätig	selbst	überhebt	oder	als	Untertan,	Gläubiger	oder	Gebildeter	sich	leidend	
ausnutzen	lassen	muss	verstehe”.	Strzygowski,	1943,	p.	9	
	This	being	one	of	the	chief	arguments	posited	by	any	preliminary	anti-democratic,	extra-244
parliamentary	agenda,	including	fascism,	which	from	this	perspective	is	indeed	anti-bourgeois.	
	Strzygowski,	Spuren	indogermanischen	Glaubens	in	der	Kunst,	Heidelberg,	1936,	p.	98.	245
	With	Strzygowski	going	as	far	as	endowing	the	pensive-sensitive	barbarian	artist	with	246
somewhat	effeminate	aesthetic	faculties:	“[…]	die	bescheidene	Blumensprache	der	
indogermansichen	Seele	[…]”	Ibid.
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even	informed	a	kind	of	ideological	rift	regarding	the	material	used	to	create	art,	
i.e.	power	art’s	preference	for	(enduring)	stone	vs.	the	(perishable)	wood	used	by	
various	 lower	 cultures.	 It	was	precisely	 the	work	 and	 responsibility	 of	 his	 “art	
research”	 to	 ginally	 grant	 these	 “unpreserved”	 monuments	 of	 an	 alternative	
history	their	legitimate	status	(which	was	also	the	point	on	which	Strzygowski’s	
initial	 research	 questioning	 the	 cultural	 hierarchy	 and	 its	 underlying	 ideology	
was	valid	and,	indeed,	pioneering).	The	error	of	art	history	was	that:		
The	 claims	 of	 power	 art,	 adopted	 from	 the	 ancient	 Orient	 and	 Rome,	 were	
stipulated	 as	 laws	 for	 the	 gine	 arts	 in	 general,	 thereby	 forsaking	 the	 primal	
nature	 of	 art	 to	 be	 expression	 in	 favor	 of	 being	 intentionally	 stupefying	 effect	
attuned	to	power	 	247
“Power	art”	thus	enslaved	its	audience	(its	subjects),	who	were	literally	stupegied	
(i.e.	immobilized)	by	the	representations	power	prescribed	and	which	the	people	
in	 turn	 internalized,	 further	 feeding	 into	 upholding	 the	 status	 quo.	 A	 social	
schism	between	empowered	and	disenfranchised,	sophisticated	and	crude,	high	
and	low,	for	Strzygowski,	essentially	came	down	to	the	schism	between	the	false	
usage	 of	 art	 to	 the	 end	 of	 manipulative	 “effect”	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 genuine	
“expression”	of	a	free	subject,	one	previously	stamped	barbaric	now	warranting	
authority,	 leading	 the	 way.	 Art	 was	 thus	 deemed	 the	 battleground	 (of	 the	
representation)	of	 classes	and	cultures	 from	which	 to	 force	 through	a	barbaric	
aesthetic.	 Similarly,	 with	 regard	 to	 art	 and	 architecture’s	 roles	 in	 meekly	
	“Man	hat	die	Forderungen	der	vom	alten	Orient	und	Rom	übernommenen	Machtkunst	für	247
Gesetze	der	Bildenden	Kunst	überhaupt	ausgegeben	und	damit	das	eingentliche	Urwesen	der	
Kunst,	Ausdruck	zu	sein,	gegen	die	absicht	einer	im	Sinner	der	Macht	verblüffenden	Wirkung	
zurückgestellt”.	Strzygowski,	1937,	p.vi	
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reproducing	 and	 reinforcing	 societal	 power	 structures,	 Bataille	 bemoaned	 that	
“[…]	the	compositions	of	certain	painters	express	the	will	to	constrain	the	spirit	
within	an	ofgicial	idea.” 		248
As	 a	 concrete	 example	 of	 representations	 that	 ran	 counter	 to	 if	 not	
outright	undermined	the	“classical”	or	“academic”	representations	of	power	art,	
Bataille	 turned	 to	 the	 idiosyncratic	 carved	 gems	 he	 discovered	 at	 the	
Bibliothèque	nationale’s	coin	collection,	where	he	worked	as	an	archivist.	These	
gems	 were	 of	 Manichean	 provenance,	 i.e.	 of	 the	 Mesopotamian	 location	 and	
historical	 period	 Strzygowksi	 frequently	 drew	 upon	 to	 source	 artifacts	
challenging	 those	 of	 Greco-Roman	 heritage.	 In	 his	 text	 “Base	 Materialism	 and	
Gnosticism”	in	Documents,	Bataille	endowed	these	gnostic	(anti)representations	
with	 liberating	 capacities	 for	 the	 humanist	 inculcated	 master/slave	
“Machtmensch”:	
The	interest	of	this	juxtaposition	[idealism	and	base	matter]	is	augmented	by	the	
fact	 that	the	specigic	reactions	of	Gnosticism	led	to	the	representation	of	 forms	
radically	contrary	to	the	ancient	academic	style,	to	the	representation	of	forms	in	
which	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 see	 the	 image	 of	 this	 base	 matter	 that	 alone,	 by	 its	
incongruity	 and	 by	 an	 overwhelming	 lack	 of	 respect,	 permits	 the	 intellect	 to	
escape	from	the	constraints	of	idealism. 	249
Instead	 of	 a	 Western	 tradition	 of	 depicting	 deity	 and	 beauty	 through	
immaculately	 divine	 renderings	 of	 an	 ultimately	 unattainable	 ideality	 the	
	Bataille,	1929,	in	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	pp.	35-36.		248
	Documents	II	1,	1930.	In	Bataille,	1985,	(ed.	transl.	Stoekl),	p.	51	249
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Gnostics’	 fantastic	 “archontes”	 presented	 essentially	 a	 kind	 of	 negative	
anthropomorphism	 out	 of	 bounds,	 producing	 anti-deities,	 creatures	 with	 odd	
animal	heads	and	extremities	(e.g.	“Figure	8.	God	with	the	legs	of	a	man,	the	body	
of	a	serpent,	and	the	head	of	a	cock”) .	Bataille	 lauded	the	Gnostics’	gems	for	250
visualizing	 “materialism’s	 most	 virulent	 manifestations”,	 and	 considered	 their	
period	as	a	time	“[…]	when	metaphysics	could	still	be	associated	with	the	most	
monstrous	dualistic	and	therefore	strangely	abased	cosmogonies”.	 	251
This	 unusual	 (arguably	 “abased”)	 legacy	 of	 certain	 religious	 or	 spiritual	
“metaphysical”	expressions,	which	 in	Western	thought	and	aesthetics	remained	
intentionally	 unsolicited	 (i.e.,	 suppressed;	 buried	 deep	 in	 archives),	 due	 to	 the	
fact	 of	 its	 “monstrous”	 or	 at	 least	 non-intelligible	 and	 abject	 (and	 thus	
importantly	non-identigicatory)	character,	more	or	less	provided	the	bulk	of	the	
material	 to	 which	 the	 scholarship	 and	 ideological	 investment	 was	 devoted	 in	
Germanien,	Das	Bild	and	Strzygowski’s	own	writing.	This	was	also	the	case	with	
the	hefty	tome	Der	Aufgang	der	Menschheit	(The	Rise	of	Mankind)	1928,	penned	
by	 Hermann	 Wirth,	 a	 völkisch	 “para-academic”	 (Marchand)	 specializing	 in	
Nordic	 philology	 who	 was	 instated	 as	 the	 director	 of	 Heinrich	 Himmler’s	
“Ahnenerbe	Forschungsgesellschaft”	as	well	as	being	Germanien’s	 initial	editor-
in-chief.	 The	 book	was	widely	 discussed	 in	 the	 journal’s	 girst	 issues	 (where	 it	
was,	unsurprisingly,	deemed	a	masterwork,	whereas	in	most	academic	circles	of	
the	 time	 it	was	 considered	 a	 product	 of	 fantasy	based	on	phony	 science).	 This	
almost	 one	 thousand	 paged	 study	 is	 a	 wide-ranging	 if	 factually	 unsound	
	Ibid.	250
	Ibid.,	p.46251
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genealogy	of	various	pre-historic	and	tribal	cultures’	signs	and	symbol	systems,	
corresponding	 to	 their	 respective	 natural	 religions.	 Wirth	 analyzed	 this	 both	
geographically	and	periodically	highly	diverse	material	 in	order	to	prove	a	kind	
of	 Ur-Sinnbild	 language	 of	 a	 gictitious,	 ancient	 Aryan	 civilization	 of	 sunken	
Atlantis;	 the	 respective	material	 often	 dated	much	 further	 back	 than	 its	 actual	
origin.	 All	 these	 various	 cultures,	 whose	 visual	 systems	 he	 united	 into	 a	
heterogeneous	 pool	 of	 runic	 and	 hieroglyphic	 depictions,	 he	 rather	
condescendingly	 labeled	 “’Konservenbüchsen-Völker” ,	 “can-peoples”.	 (He	252
called	them	this	because	they	had	literally	“conserved”	the	ancient	visual	legacies	
of	mankind	due	 to	 their	apparent	non-exposure	 to	modernity	and	civilization).	
While	 the	 content	 of	 the	 Rise	 of	 Mankind	 is	 too	 hermetic	 and	 absurd	 for	 the	
purpose	of	this	discussion,	the	formal	overlap	of	Wirth’s	idiosyncratic	collection	
of	 artifacts	 reproduced	 in	 the	 book	with	 the	 kind	 featured	 in	 Bataille’s	 Gnosis	
text	 is	 noteworthy .	 Particularly	 some	 of	 the	 Native	 American	 Hopi’s	 visual	253
renderings	 of	 deities,	 again	 featuring	 counter-anthropomorphic	 idiosyncrasies	
such	as	bird-like	heads,	a	snake	 for	an	arm	etc.	came	close	enough	to	Bataille’s	
“strangely	abased	cosmogonies”	of	the	“archontes”;	in	the	context	of	Wirth,	and	
by	 extension	 völkisch-fascist	 art	 theory,	 these	 would	 here	 constitute	 distant	
variations	–	conserved	residues	–	of	the	aforementioned	pagan	“Sinnbilder”	–	the	
	Herman	Wirth,	Aufgang	der	Menschheit,	Jena	1928,	p.	20.	(Transl.	by	the	author).	252
	Interestingly	enough,	the	Hopi	Indians’	artifacts	in	Wirth’s	book	are	just	the	ones	discussed	253
and	seen	girst-hand	by	Aby	Warburg	during	his	research	trip	across	the	American	South-West,	
which	later	provided	the	content	to	his	study	Das	Schlangenritual	–	albeit	already	in	1897.	The	
tapping	of	folk	as	well	as	exotic	culture	by	various	European	avant-gardes	can	of	course	be	
already	discerned	during	the	1910s,	in	for	example	the	Blaue	Reiter’s	embrace	of	Bavarian	folk	
craft	(woodcuts	etc.)	as	well	as	Emil	Nolde’s	interest	in	Oceanic	masks	and	the	like.
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principal	model	aesthetic	 from	which	an	anti-modern	yet	progressive	völkisch-
fascist	supra-aesthetic	was	supposed	to	derive	from.	
IV.2	“Sinnbild”,	or	the	base	of	völkisch-fascist	art	theory	
Wirth’s	 broadly	 accumulative	 approach	 presented	 above	 already	 indicates	 the	
rather	eclectic,	in	fact	uncertain	nature	of	this	“new”	groundbreaking	category	of	
the	 fascist	 “Sinnbild”.	 It	 essentially	 consisted	 of	 at	 times	 rather	 abstracted,	
rudimentary,	formally	rather	poor	runic	symbols,	hieroglyphic	and	mythological-
gigurative	 elements	 and	 artefacts	 that	 were	 liberally	 drawn	 from	 a	 range	 of	
periods	 and	 places:	 pre-history	 proper,	 i.e.	 the	 cave	 art	 uncovered	 at	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 century	 at	 Altamira	 but	 also	 from	 sites	 such	 as	 the	
aforementioned	 Externsteine,	 which	 contained	 traces	 of	 rock	 inscriptions	 that	
völkisch-fascist	 research	 claimed	 were	 the	 sacred	 symbols	 of	 pagan	 Germanic	
tribes	 (but	 which	 were	 more	 likely	 of	 early	 Roman	 origin).	 The	 majority	 of	
material	covered	in	Germanien	and	Das	Bild,	however,	was	of	Northern	or	Middle	
European	origin,	from	the	proto-Christian	period	and	the	Early	Middle	Ages;	this	
fact	 alone	 therefore	 responsible	 for	 the	 overlap	 with	 the	 kind	 of	 artifacts	
discussed	in	Documents	 	(as	exempligied	by	the	already	discussed	Oseberg	gind,	
but	 further	 illustrated	 by,	 for	 example,	 the	 striking	 formal	 correspondences	
between	 artifacts	 from	 Luristan	 (Northern	 Iran),	 discussed	 in	Documents,	 and	
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those	 found	 in	 Denmark,	 discussed	 in	 Das	 Bild) .	 For	 this	 hence	 quite	254
heterogenous	 realm	 of	 Sinnbilder,	 the	 deginitions	 and	 quasi-philosophical	
underpinnings	 identifying	 them	 as	 such,	 was	 what	 was	 really	 at	 stake	 for	
völkisch-fascist	 art	 research,	 since	 the	 study	 and	 investment	 into	 this	 oblique	
material	 was	 believed	 to	 transmit	 a	 spiritual	 charge	 for	 a	 people	 arguably	
alienated	by	both	modernity	in	general	and	the	historical	patronizing	yielded	by	
power	art	specigically.	This	wanting,	or	indeed	barbaric,	aesthetic	of	the	Sinnbild,	
was	in	line	with	foregoing	“effect”	(power	art)	for	the	benegit	of	“expression”	as	
Strzygowksi	 had	 laid	 it	 out,	 even	 though	 the	 sought	 after	 high	 efgicacy	 of	
expression	had	to	derive	largely	from	projective	interpretation:	an	interpretation	
that,	 ultimately,	 did	not	 entail	 an	analytical	 formal	 interpretation	 so	much	as	 a	
certain	 precursory	 attitude	 or	 “mentality”	 which,	 once	 attained,	 would	 quasi-
automatically	 facilitate	 the	 appreciation	 and,	 more	 importantly,	 the	 alleged	
mobilizing	energy	imparted	by	the	Sinnbild.		
Essentially	belonging	to	the	interpretation	of	a	Sinnbild	is	a	mentality,	one	that	is	
similar	to	the	one	that	conceived	of	the	Sinnbild	in	the	girst	place. 	255
A	 “mentality”	which,	 therefore,	had	 to	be	 regained	and	resuscitated	 from	some	
deeper	 pre-modern	 level;	 that	 was	 ancient	 but	 also	 new,	 since	 it	 promised	 to	
	See	here	William	Anderson,	“Die	Enstehung	der	Nordischen	Kunst”	in	Das	Bild,	1935	254
pp.133-138,	“[…]	Diese	feinen	Formen	[Objekte	des	“Faardal”	Funds	in	Dänemark]	erinnern	an	
die	skythisch-sybirische	Tierornamentik	und	besonders	an	die	Bronzefunde	aus	Luristan	[an	
area	in	present	day	Iran]”,	p.134.	Cf,	Georges	Bataille,	“Les	Trouvailles	Du	Louristan”,	Documents	II	
6,	1930,	pp.	372-373.	“[…]	le	style	de	ces	objets	les	apparente	[..,]	à	l’ensemble	des	bronzes	
“scythes”	ou	“siberiens”	d’autre	part.”	Thus	both	authors	presumably	here	drew	on	similar	source	
material.
	Dr.	R.F.	Viergutz,	“Zur	Erkenntnis	des	deutschen	Wesens:	Gedanken	zur	Sinnbildforschung”,	255
Germanien,	Heft	5,	1937,	p.130
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provide	the	solution	to	the	mental	dilemma	of	modern	experience.	This	remedial,	
indeed	 anti-humanist	 yet	 nevertheless	 enlightening	 function	 of	 the	 Sinnbild	
aesthetic	 vis-à-vis	 a	 critique	 of	 modernity	 is	 an	 argument	 frequently	 found	 in	
both	of	the	publications	under	discussion.	As	Herman	Wirth	put	it	in	Germanien:	
[…]	the	excavation	and	study	of	the	ancient	past	reveal	spiritual	legacies	whose	
recognition	 and	 understanding	 was	 [is]	 destined	 to	 provide	 clarity	 to	
inextricable	problematic	of	the	presence. 	256
Consequently,	this	meant	that	engaging	with	the	Sinnbilder	was	not,	according	to	
Wirth,	 considered	 to	 entertain	 mere	 academic	 problems:	 because	 it	 involved	
these	both	clarifying	and	spiritual	assets	it	was	of	“public	interest” .	Which	is	to	257
say	 that	 a	 formal,	 aesthetic	 or	 even	 purely	 art	 historical	 engagement	with	 this	
outsider	 aesthetics	 would	 not	 do:	 what	 was	 called	 for	 was	 a	 wider	 reaching	
social	 and	 political	 deployment.	 Again,	 this	was	 also	 argued	 by	 redirecting	 the	
analysis	 of	 these	 Sinnbilder	 from	 a	 materialist	 and	 formal	 perspective	 to	 an	
aforementioned	 political,	 philosophical	 and	 (as	 will	 be	 taken	 up	 in	 the	 next	
chapter)	psychological	discussion	and	contextualization.	Herein	the	very	notion	
of	 materialism,	 as	 a	 dogma	 to	 disprove,	 was	 employed	 and	 repudiated	 in	 its	
double	 meaning.	 The	 poor,	 uncertain	 nature	 and	 historical	 recording	 of	 the	
Sinnbild	 artifacts	 made	 an	 evidence-based,	 materialistic	 “just	 the	 facts”	
evaluation	problematic,	a	material	weakness	that	was	however	fashioned	into	an	
	Wirth,	“Deutsche	Vorgeschichte	und	deutsche	Geistesgeschichte”,	Germanien,	Heft	1,	1929,	p.	256
34	
	Ibid.		257
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apparently	 intentional	 methodology	 that	 downgraded	 material	 and	 formal	
criteria	to	the	shallow	concerns	of	materialist	science	–	as	well	as	to	belonging	to	
the	realm	of	modern	materialism,	i.e.,	to	the	enslaving	mandate	of	use-value	and	
value	creation	that	also	was	the	domain	of	power	art. 	As	far	as	the	Sinnbild’s	258
overall	abject	aesthetics	were	concerned,	this	had	to	be	solved	likewise	were	it	to	
appeal	 to	 that	 “wider	 public	 interest”	 Wirth	 intended	 to	 reach.	 The	 following	
statement	 actually	 combined	 these	 anti-materialistic	 and	 anti-aesthetic	
sentiments,	 again	 in	 order	 to	 pre-empt	 doubts	 or	 attacks	 leveled	 against	 this	
anything	 but	 conventionally	 visually	 impressive	 or	 heroic	 fascist	 aesthetic	 (i.e.	
very	much	in	contrast	to	what	would	later	degine	a	properly	fascist	art	endorsed	
by	the	regime):	
Of	course,	he	who	does	not	believe	in	divine-creative	powers	[meant	here	those	
of	a	pagan	religion,	not	Christianity]	and	in	the	possibility	to	temporarily	enter	
into	immediate	[unmittelbar]	contact	with	them,	must	conceive	of	all	Sinnbilder	
as	 random	 [unverbindliche]	 spawns	 [Ausgeburten]	 of	 fantasy,	 that	 can	 only	
become	meaningful	[sinnvoll]	when	they	can	be	put	into	a	utilitarian	relation 	259
Of	 signigicance	 here	 is	 the	 actual	 admission	 of	 the	 aesthetically	 fantastic,	
potentially	alien	nature	of	these	“divine-creative”	entities	called	“spawns”,	which	
	Cf.	Wilhelm	Teudt	“Germanische	Vorgeschichte	und	Wissenschaft”,	Germanien,	Heft	1,	1929:		258
“[…]	das	materialisitische	Zeitalter	mit	seiner	ausschließlichen	Berücksichtigung	des	sinnlich	
Erfaßbaren	[…]”,	“[…]	ein	ebenso	öder	wie	verderblicher	Materialismus	[…]”,	pp.	3,	5
	Viergutz,	Germanien	1937,	p.131	,.	This	also	meant	again	that	the	reception	of	the	Sinnbild	by	259
the	beholder	didn’t	call	for	the	learned	or	handed-down	formal-analytical	criteria	of	power	art	
(personigied,	say,	by	the	“elitist”	critic,	the	patrician	or	aristocratic	collector/connoisseur,	the	
haughty	academic	etc.).	It	was	an	anti-intellectual	reception	supplied	by	a	mentality	
[Geisteshaltung]	that	however	rather	than	being	considered	primitive	was	elevated	above	
intellectual	faculties,	a	spiritual	–	but	under	no	circumstances	spiritualist		–	faculty	surpassing	
analytical	reason.	
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is	 in	essence	what	 the	Gnostic	gems	were	 lauded	as	by	Bataille	when	he	called	
them	 “abased	 cosmogonies”,	 undermining	 reason,	 utility,	 ideality,	 immaculate	
form.	
And	with	 regard	 to	 the	 socio-political	 argument	 for	 this	 fascist-völkisch	
anti-aesthetic,	 Bataille	 equally	 linked	 a	 reconsideration	 if	 not	 replacement	 of	
ideal	aesthetics	and	academicism	(both	intrinsic	to	power	art	from	a	fascist	point	
of	 view)	 to	 a	 political	 and	 social	 necessity	 of	 change,	 these	 “virulent	
manifestations”	or	“spawns”	[Ausgeburten]	as	much	a	symptom	thereof	as	well	as	
providing	a	possible	new	aesthetic	of	the	base :	260
But	 is	 difgicult	 today	 [1930]	 to	 remain	 indifferent	 even	 to	 partly	 falsigied	
solutions	brought,	at	the	beginning	of	the	Christian	era,	to	problems	that	do	not	
appear	noticeably	different	 from	our	own	 (which	are	 those	of	 a	 society	whose	
original	 principles	 have	 become,	 in	 a	 very	 precise	 sense,	 the	 dead	 letter	 of	 a	
society	that	must	put	itself	in	question	and	overturn	itself	in	order	to	rediscover	
motifs	of	force	and	violent	agitation.) 	261
Bataille’s	 “dead	 letter”	 of	 course	meant	 the	 (in	 his	 view)	 stagnant,	 reactionary	
state	 of	 Western	 civilization	 at	 the	 very	 end	 of	 the	 1920s,	 i.e.	 the	 accrued	
knowledge	 regurgitated	 via	 an	 academic	 canon.	 This	 was	 again	 in	 line	 with	
Strzygowski’s	anti-textual	stance	towards	knowledge	production	(now	achieved	
by	 “art	 research”)	 and	 a	 corresponding	 aesthetic	 of	 choice	 (a	 pre-lingual,	 anti-
lingual	Sinnbild).		
	Which,	to	repeat,	would	be	recognized	by	vökisch-fascist	art	theory,	for	that	too,	yet	260
sublimated,	to	serve	the	“coming	community’s”	(Agamben)	future	aesthetic,	arguing	that	the	both	
historical	and	aesthetic	notion	of	the	barbaric	was	disproven	and	misplaced	whereas	precisely	
what	made	them	“barbaric”	was	of	course	what	was	embraced	by	Bataille	and	within	Documents	
in	general.	
	Bataille,	1985,	p.	46261
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IV.3	Between	the	symptom	and	the	sublime:	“Formlessness”	and	“Sinnbild”		
In	 so	 far	as	 fascist	art	 theory	of	 the	kind	outlined	above	prioritized	expression	
over	 effect,	 interior	 spiritual	 assets	 (“roots”)	 over	 exterior	 representational	
(“surface”)	ones,	it	compelled	a	shift	from	ideal	depictions	or	the	life-like	towards	
abstraction,	 risking	 non-intelligibility	 and	 possibly	 even	 deformation	 along	 the	
way,	since	to	once	more	consult	Strzygowski	on	the	matter,	 the	Sinnbild	clearly	
constituted	 “a	 thing	 without	 representation,	 or	 at	 least	 devoid	 of	 human	
representation”	 .	 Thus	 this	 would	 almost	 tie	 in	 with	 Bataille’s	 concise	262
deginition	 of	 “formlessness”,	 as	 an	 entity	 basically	 serving	 as	 the	 core	 of	 the	
“Critical	 Dictionary”,	within	which	 he	 purported	 it	 to	 “resemble	 nothing”.	 I	 say	
almost	because	Bataille	went	on	to	book-end	this	 idea	with	the	coda	that	 if	 the	
formless	 resembled	 anything	 at	 all	 it	 would	 be	 something	 like	 “a	 spider	 or	
spit” 	 –	devoid	 of	 human	 representation	 to	be	 sure	but	 by	way	of	 this	wicked	263
promotion	 of	 not	 only	 arguably	 formless	 (i.e.	 uncontainable)	 but	 moreover	
abominable	 entities	 the	 formless	 was	 rendered	 also	 incompatible	 with	
Strzygowski	 et	 al,	 since	 the	 Sinnbild’s	 sliding	 towards	 abjectness	 and	baseness	
was	precisely	what	was	to	be	averted	at	all	costs.	Which	is	not	to	say	that	these	
negative	 associations	 of	 non-semblance,	 of	 a	 kind	 of	 formlessness,	 were	 left	
unconsidered;	 it	 was	 indeed	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 Sinnbild	 possibly	 may	 be	
received	as:	
	Strzygowksy,	1936,	p.98.	(Transl.	by	the	author).	262
	“L’Informe”,	Documents	I	7,	1929.	In	Bataille,	1985,	p.	31	263
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[…]	Something	indecipherable	and	therefore	something	uncanny	[unheimlich]	to	
that	[rationalist-scientigic]	mindset. 	264
Importantly	however,	the	function	of	the	Sinnbild	would	not	settle	for	an	alleged	
obscure	 “indecipherability”,	 i.e.	 as	 passive	 entity,	 unclassigiable	 maybe,	 yet	
ultimately	insignigicant	vis-à-vis	enlightened	reason	and	high	art.	Rather,	the	aim	
was	 for	 the	 Sinnbild	 to	 assume	 degiant	 agency	 or	 value	 precisely	 via	 a	
quintessentially	Bataillean	modus	operandi,	which,	with	regard	to	formlessness,	
meant	 “it	 is	 [was]	not	an	adjective	having	such	and	such	a	meaning	but	a	 term	
serving	to	declass.” 	The	target	of	such	declassing,	of	destabilization	by	way	of	265
the	 contestations	 leveled	 by	 formlessness	 against	 ideality,	 so-called	 objective	
science/materialism	etc.	would	resonate	with	the	proactive,	aggressive	function	
ascribed	to	the	Sinnbild:	
The	 Sinnbild	 is	 the	 eternal	 contrary	 versus	 the	 attempt	 to	 force	 life	 into	 a	
deginitive	form,	which	we	commonly	call	dogma 	266
From	 this	perspective,	 it	 seemed	genuine	 for	völkisch-fascist	 cultural	 theory	 to	
make	the	congident	assertion	that	“Germanien	is	living	protest”,	which	was	also	in	
	“Der	Kampf	um	die	deutsche	Seele”,	Germanien	1936	p.	68,	unauthored.	264
	Bataille,	1985,	p.	31	265
	“Das	Sinnbild	aber	ist	das	ewige	Widerspiel	gegen	den	Versuch,	das	Leben	in	eine	266
begriffsbestimmte	Form	zu	zwängen,	die	wir	gemeiniglich	Dogma	nennen.	,	“Der	Kampf	um	die	
deutsche	Seele”,	Germanien	1936	p.	68,
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keeping	with	the	aspired	to	mandate	for	an	unmediated	non-bookishness	in	both	
politics	 and	 aesthetics	 (that,	 for	 all	 its	 insurgent	 noise,	 in	 this	 particular	
constellation	can	safely	be	called	reactionary	though).	
It	 was,	 further,	 a	 protest,	 which	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 publishing	 project	
demanding	 such	 a	 high	 task	 of	 itself	 meant	 the	 presentation	 of	 thoughts	 in	
tandem	 with	 specigic	 visual	 material	 that	 together	 were	 to	 thwart	 materialist	
science	 and	 normative	 aesthetics.	 In	 this	 regard	 formlessness,	 according	 to	
Bataille	 –	 and	 herein	 much	 like	 the	 conception	 of	 the	 Sinnbild	 –	 posed	 a	
perpetual	affront	to	“academic	men”,	since	for:		
[…]	them	to	be	happy,	the	universe	would	have	to	take	shape.	All	of	philosophy	
has	no	other	goal:	it	is	a	matter	of	giving	a	frock	coat	to	what	is,	a	mathematical	
frock	coat. 	267
And	the	Sinnbild	accordingly	should	pose	no	less	such	an	affront	or	obstacle	to	
these	“academic	men”	for:	
[…]	 It	belongs	 to	 the	very	nature	of	 the	Sinnbild	 that	 it	 cannot	be	grasped	and	
comprehended	through	 the	 intellectual	means	of	 ‘exact	sciences’	–	all	of	which	
are	 modeled	 on	 the	 ideal	 [Vorbild]	 of	 the	 ‘exact	 sciences’,	 that	 is	 the	
mathematical	natural	sciences. 	268
While	 categorically	 disinclined	 to	 allegory	 and	 metaphor,	 not	 unlike	 Bataille’s	
own	probing	of	these,	especially	by	way	of	the	entries	to	the	Critical	Dictionary,	
	Bataille,	1986,	p.	31	267
	Viergutz,	Germanien	1936,	p.130268
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Germanien’s	 persistent	 renunciation	 of	 modernity’s	 rationalizing	 processes	 –	
wielded	 against	 it	 by	 way	 of	 the	 written	 word	 as	 it	 was	 –	 nevertheless	
occasionally	required	resorting	to	metaphor	in	order	to	drive	home	its	point:	
Thus	not	everything	can	be	caught	in	the	nets	of	terms! 	269
The	metaphorical	intimation	at	immaterial	reason,	i.e.,	ideality	and	rationality	as	
tangible	and	moreover	strapping	structures	represented	by	everyday	things	such	
as	 said	 “net”	 pops	 up	 frequently	 in	 Documents	 (in	 the	 aforementioned	 “frock	
coat”,	 for	 example).	 For	 this	 as	 yet	 still	 civilized,	 academic	 frock	 coat,	 literally	
hemming	in	matter	(the	body,	its	glesh),	constricting	it,	Bataille	suspected	would	
soon	 enough	 corral	 entire	 groups	 of	 bodies	 –	 everybody	 –	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	
“architectural	 straitjacket”;	 yet	 another	 metaphor	 for	 the	 perceived	
rationalization	 of	 everyday	 life	 that	 gave	 rise	 to	 respective,	 ideologically	
contradictory,	critiques	thereof.	
IV.4	“Sinnbild”	and	“Formlessness”	vs.	Allegory	and	Ornament	
What	 placed	 the	 Sinnbild	 in	 further	 agreement	 with	 Formlessness	 was	 their	
mutual	 contestation	 of	 not	 only	 a	 rationalist	 doctrine,	 as	 both	 expounded	 in	
Documents	and	Germanien,	but	essentially	of	the	three	formal	devices,	the	three	
tropes	 key	 to	 a	 Western	 canon	 of	 (high)	 art,	 be	 it	 literature,	 the	 gine	 arts	 or	
architecture:	 	metaphor,	allegory	and	ornament.	This	contestation	derived	from	
	Ibid.	“Es	lässt	sich	eben	nicht	alles	in	den	Netzen	der	Begriffe	auffangen!”269
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the	 assumption	 that	 all	 these	 entities	 could	 only	 ever	 be,	 or	 had	 become,	
spiritually	 emptied	 out,	 turned	 into	misguided	 vehicles	 of	 identigication,	 either	
because	 of	 power	 art’s	 exclusive	 say	 regarding	 the	 message	 they	 were	 to	
transport,	or,	as	in	the	case	of	ornament,	because	of	its	perceived	fake,	superIicial	
and	thus	ineffective	collective	binding	power.	Allegory	in	particular	was	assailed	
for	 purposely	 instilling	 certain	 rules	 levied	 by	 power	 in	 the	 form	 of	 social	
stratigication,	i.e.	for	its	objective,	pursued	by	formal	means,	to	assign	a	set	place	
to	each	and	every	thing	through	a	mirroring	of	these	power	relations.	Thus,	for	
Strzygowksi,	 allegory	 simply	 presented	 “any	 power-political	 [machtpolitische]	
and	humanist	deception” .	Or,	as	one	author	writing	in	Germanien	put	it:	270
We	 cannot	 believe	 that	 our	 ancestor’s	 religious	 Sinnbilder	 are	 poor	 imitations	
[Abklatsch]	of	external	events,	allegories,	‘embodiments’	of	terms,	or	in	the	best-
c a s e	 s c ena r i o	 a re	 d e r ived	 f rom	 t h e	 imag i na t i on	 and	 ‘ s e l f -
delusion’	[Selbstäuschung]. 	271
So	a	völkisch-fascist	aesthetic	not	only	renounced	the	faculty	of	mediation,	but	it	
further	 claimed	 the	 supported	 aesthetic	 to	 be	 relaying,	 indeed	 manifesting	
genuine	values	for	a	social	reality.	This	was	so	the	aspired	(anti-)aesthetic	ideal	
would	 precisely	 not	 come	 across	 as	 a	 “positive	 extravagance”	 –	 one	 in	 for	
example	 Viergutz’	 view	 congined	 to	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 imaginary,	 or	 worse,	
pathological	 “self-delusion”.	 Just	 as	 Bataille	 did	 not	 simply	 conceive	 of	 the	
diverging	 aesthetic	 he	 endorsed	 by,	 say,	 the	 gnostic	 gems	 as	 fantastical	 but	
	Strzygowksi,	1940,	p.7	270
	Viergutz,	Germanien	1937,	p.	131271
	143
precisely	as	a	“base	materialism”,	(therefore	locating	its	origin	in	a	messy	realm	
of	 actual,	 physical	 phenomena),	 the	 Sinnbild	was	 to	 be	 “real”.	 It	was	 therefore	
also	 claimed	 to	 be	 that	 very	 “veritable	 anti-thesis”,	 one	 in	 this	 case	 directed	
towards	the	three	tropes	mentioned	above,	trumping	–	exposing	–	these	through	
its	 spiritual	depth	and	ahistorical,	 timeless	quality.	Which	again,	 to	 take	up	 the	
passage	above,	meant	for	this	fascist	faction	to	also	accept	or	even	embrace	the	
frequently	 raw	 aesthetic	 quality	 of	 the	 Sinnbild	 if	 it	 guaranteed	 precluding	 its	
utilization	 and	 incorporation	 as	 “Abklatsch”	 (i.e.,	 allegory	 viewed	 as	 solely	
mimetic	 and	 in	 this	 context	 thus	 as	 inauthentic)	 or	 as	 mere	 “embodiment	 of	
terms”	(i.e.,	the	transposition	of	ideas	onto	objects	of	the	concrete	world,	which	
in	this	reading	were	made	servile	to	the	idea	rather	than	generating	it).	Bataille’s	
anti-thesis	 to	 allegory	 and	metaphor	 can	be	 seen	 to	 come	 courtesy	of	what	he	
approvingly	 degined	 as	 “raw	 phenomena”,	 those	 instances	 of	 a	 non-ideational	
base	materialism	of	which	the	formless	was	the	ultimate	expression .		272
Art,	“real”	art	that	is,	as	strived	for	by	this	branch	of	avant-garde	thought	
as	well	as	 the	branch	of	 fascist	aesthetic	 theory	under	discussion	here,	did	not	
need	 to	 resort	 to	 either	 of	 these	 deglecting	 gigments	 or	 supergicial	 décors	
concealing	unmediated	visual	potency.	 In	other	words,	 the	visual	was	not	to	be	
mere	–	dead	–	representation	perpetuating	the	status	quo;	on	the	contrary,	it	was	
	The	term	“raw	phenomena”	is	girst	employed	by	Bataille	within	the	Critical	Dictionary	entry	272
“Materialism”,	Documents	I	3,	1929.		Allan	Stoekl	in	his	introduction	to	Visions	of	Excess	writes	
that:	“Bataille	precisely	recognizes	that	the	fall	of	the	elevated	and	the	noble	threatens	the	
coherent	theory	of	allegory	itself.	This	is	not	to	imply	that	allegory	is	simply	done	away	with	in	
Bataille	–	[…]	–	but	rather,	that	what	Bataille	works	out	is	a	kind	of	headless	allegory,	in	which	the	
process	of	signigication	and	reference	associated	with	allegory	continues,	but	leads	to	the	
terminal	subversion	of	the	pseudostable	references	that	had	made	allegory	and	its	hierarchies	
seem	possible”.	p.	xiv,.	Note	in	this	connection	Stoekl’s	notion	of	the	“pseudostable”	underlying,	
guaranteeing	a	hierarchy	(in	this	context	here	one	of,	say,	“power	art”),	which	aligns	with	the	
contestation	of	allegory’s	and	metaphor’s	claim	to	“embody”	social	reality	leveled	by	the	
Germanien	quote.		
	144
to	disrupt	this	status	quo	(“state	of	things”)	as	either	“violent	force”	(Bataille)	or	
to	no	less	forcefully	invigorate	as	deeper	spiritual	meaning .	273
As	far	as	metaphor	was	concerned	Bataille	basically	sought	to	deglate	this	
term	 ad	 absurdum,	 which	 was	 essentially	 the	 Critical	 Dictionary’s	 foremost	
ambition,	with	Bataille	suggesting	that	“[…]	to	see	a	dog	running”	could	be	“just	
as	much	the	run	that	is	dogging”. 		274
This	mischievous	stirring	up	of	object-subject	relations	and,	by	extension,	
of	 signigier	 and	 signigied	 as	 played	 out	 within	 the	 “Critical	 Dictionary”	 did	
however	 serve	 a	 quite	 pointed	 agenda	 of	 de-aestheticizing	 and	 social	 de-
regulation	 drawn	 from	 that	 base	materialism:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 from	 the	 “raw	
phenomena”	 of	 the	 human	 body	 –	 “spittle”,	 a	 “big	 toe”	 etc.	 –	 all	 of	 which	
compromised	 idealized	 conceptions	 of	 a	 purigied	 body,	 and	 from	 the	 “raw	
phenomena”	of	 the	social	on	 the	other	hand,	subverting	 the	administered	body	
politic	 so	 to	 speak	 –	 “cults”,	 criminals,	 rejects	 –	 i.e.	 the	 subversive	 subjects	 of	
Bataille’s	version	of	Marx’s	“Lumpenproletariat” .		275
	An	example	of	this	fascist-vökisch	rebuke	to	allegory	as	a	key	trope	of	especially	Renaissance	273
painting	is	offered	by	Strzygowski.	Discussing	Albrecht	Dürer’s	etching	“Melencolia”	(1514),	
traditionally	discussed	as	exemplary	for	its	use	of	allegory	in	is	coded	arrangement	of	various	
symbols	surrounding	a	brooding	female	gigure	which	together	may	present	an	allegory	of	artistic	
melancholy/depression.	Strzygowski	writes:	”In	the	Melancholie	[sic]	Dürer	is	wholly	rooted	in	
place,	blood	and	soil	of	his	Nordic	homeland,	humanism	has	no	part	in	it.”.	“It	is	all	spirit,	the	
intellect	has	no	right	to	it.”.	“Dürer’s	soul	images	represent	“original	Europe”	which	had	a	
different	ethos	than	present	day’s	Europe	which	is	aligned	with	power,	wealth	and	the	history	of	
the	two.”	Strzygowski,	1937,	pp.	88,	vi	(Transl.	by	the	author)	
	Bataille,	“Metaphor”,	Documents	I	3,	in	Brotchie	(ed.),	p.	61	274
	“Spittle”	(twice	by	Griaule	and	Leiris),	“Cults”,	“Big	Toe”	(Bataille)	are	all	entries	to	the	Critical	275
Dictionary,	“Misfortune”	featuring	the	bizarre	character	of	‘the	murderer	Crepin”.	In	essence	all	
these	serve	to	pervert	Bataille’s	principal	deginition	of	metaphor:	“An	abstract	word	is	formed	by	
the	sublimation	of	a	concrete	word”.	Ibid.	On	the	notion	of	the	(a)social	lumpen	and	how	this	
category	structurally	gigures	in	Bataille’s	particular	idea	of	democracy	see	Chapter	7
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	 In	 Carl	 Einstein’s	 view,	 allegory’s	 “soul”	 –	 whose	 concepts	 he	 likewise	
interrogated	via	an	entry	in	the	Critical	Dictionary	–	 	“[…]	is	[was]	for	the	most	
part	a	museum	of	meaningless	signs”.	(I.e.	to	in	turn	dissect	the	allegorical	tropes	
at	 play	 here,	 allegory	 was	 dead	 (“museum”)	 while	 the	 verdict	 of	 it	 being	
“meaningless”	 indeed	 corresponds	with	 the	 negative	 view	 of	 allegory	 as	 being	
only	“Abklatsch”	[a	poor	 imitation]).	From	this	 imagined	“museum’s”	collection,	
Einstein	singled	out	 the	“Nightingale” ,	using	 this	example	 to	 tear	up	allegory	276
altogether.	Einstein	declared	the	nightingale	to	be	that	“eternal	prop,	star	of	the	
lyrical	 repertory”,	 albeit	 one	 in	 the	 “repertory	 of	 bourgeois	 diversions”	 and	
“among	 those	 ideals	 devoid	 of	meaning”.	 The	nightingale	 employed	 as	 allegory	
was	“cheap	utopia	that	obscures	misery”,	“an	ornamental	motif”,	its	real	purpose	
to	 “hide	 the	 failure	 and	 ugliness	 of	 man”	 while	 committing	 “a	 form	 of	
assassination	 because	 it	 disposed	 of	 the	 object,	 robbing	 it	 of	 its	 literal	
meaning” .	 Einstein’s	 attack	 on	 allegory	 is	 quoted	 more	 extensively	 here	 in	277
order	 to	 convey	 how	 his	 linguistic	 incrimination	 of	 allegory	 (“assassination”,	
“robbing”),	 that	had	turned	it	 into	the	“ornamental	motif”	devoid	of	veracity	or	
progressive	 faculty,	 reverberates	not	only	with	 the	rebuff	 to	allegory	as	echoed	
by	Bataille	and	informing	the	writing	in	Germanien.	This	strong	wording	further	
invokes	 the	no	 less	 gierce	 language	used	by	 architect	Adolf	 Loos	 in	 his	 famous	
incrimination	 of	 ornament	 from	 some	 twenty	 years	 earlier,	 his	Ornament	 and	
Crime	 (Ornament	und	Verbrechen)	(1908).	Loos’	 tirade	however	concerned	the	
built	environment	and,	shall	we	say,	 industrial	design	proper.	 It	was	due	 to	 the	
	Which	is	also	the	title	of	this	entry	discussing	allegory.		276
	“Nightingale”	Documents	I	2,	1929.	All	quotes	by	Einstein	in	this	passage	are	from	Brotchie	277
(ed.),	1995,	p.	66
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course	 of	modernity,	 including	 a	 (positive)	 process	 of	 industrialization	 at	 that	
point	in	time,	that	Western	man,	so	Loos	stated,	“had	outgrown	ornament”.	The	
rationalizing	aspects	of	modernity	 to	Loos	 served	as	 the	 reason	and	 the	quasi-
evolutionary	 evidence	 that	 “we	 have	 fought	 our	 way	 through	 to	 freedom	 of	
ornament”,	 which	 thus	 had	 descended	 for	 him	 to	 a	 reprehensible	 emblem	
marking	“the	criminal	and	the	degenerate”.	In	other	words	ornament	was	banned	
to	the	lowest	realm	in	the	guise	of	its	in	this	case	lowest	form:	as	tattoo,	marking	
both	the	“prisoner”	and	the	no	less	abominable	“degenerate	aristocrat” .		278
This	demoted,	indeed	decayed	nature	of	ornament	as	illustrated	by	the	tattoo	in	
Loos	 vis-à-vis	 a	 denigration	 of	 ornament	 some	 twenty	 years	 later	 by	 völkisch	
Fascism	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 was	 at	 one	 point	 taken	 up	 by	 the	 Munich	 based	
physicist	and	scientigic	philosopher	Hugo	Dingler.	For	Dingler,	 the	obsolescence	
and	decay	of	ornament	was	 the	consequence	of	 “the	distortion	 [Verzerrung]	of	
the	 spiritual	 relation	 towards	 ornament” .	 Ornament,	 and	 especially	 the	279
process	of	ornamentation,	that	is	the	application	of	specigic	signs	onto	surfaces,	
be	they	artefacts,	architecture	or	indeed	the	body,	in	the	form	of	the	tattoo,	was	
(correctly)	 assumed	 by	 him	 to	 present	 a	 symbolically	 determined	 act	 in	 tribal	
societies.	The	various	motifs	circulating	within	a	tribe	were	not	interchangeable	
and	 randomly	 applied	 but	 visual	 expressions	 of	 specigic	 value	 relations	 of	 a	
reality	 system	as	yet	undivided	by	dualistic	Cartesian	 thought	 (res	 cogitans/res	
	These	two	outcast	gigures	in	a	way	perfectly	merged	in	the	character	of	the	Marquis	de	Sade,	278
whose	writing	was	so	ingluential	to	Bataille.	Adolf	Loos,	Ornament	und	Verbrechen,	Vienna	1908.	
English	translation	online	at	http://www.gwu.edu/~art/Temporary_SL/177/pdfs/Loos.pdf.	
Retrieved	September,	12th,	2011	
	Hugo	Dingler,	“Wege	und	Grundlagen	der	Sinnbildforschung”,	Germanien	Heft	3,	1936,	pp.	279
36-40,	Heft	4,	1936,	pp.	69-76.	All	quotes	by	Dingler	are	from	this	article.	Transl.	by	the	author.	
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extensa).	 By,	 again,	 the	 questionable	 practice	 of	 transposing	 ethnological	
research	of	 the	 time	regarding	primitive	cultures	onto	 far	 less	conceivable	pre-
historic	 society	 generally,	 Dingler	 considered	 it	 “improbable	 that	 early	 Man	
would	 have	 arbitrarily	 covered	 surface	 with	 ornaments	 that	 had	 no	 inner	
relation	to	the	respective	object	they	covered” .	In	other	words,	ornamentation	280
was	precisely	not	decoration,	 that	 latter	mode	again	being	exactly	what	 turned	
ornament	 into	 “crime”	 for	 Loos,	 but	 the	 result	 of	 a	 religious	 act	 and	
corresponding	 symbol	 system	 that	was	 hermetic	 and	 set.	 Therefore,	 ornament	
originally	 could	 not	 be	 aligned	 with	 concepts	 of	 (commercial)	 utilization	 or	
aestheticization	 since	 ornamentation	 belonged	 to	 that	 strictly	 magic	 and	 later	
religious	 function	 of	 art	 that	 Einstein	 had	 already	 accorded	 to	 the	 primitive	
artwork	 in	 his	 previously	 drawn	 upon	 “Negerplastik”	 (1915).	 In	 this	 text	 he	
maintained,	that	“the	art	of	the	Negro	[i.e.	primitive	art]	is	determined	above	all	
by	 religion”.	 Therefore	 it	 “possesses	 an	 unequivocal	 deginition”	 whose	 “formal	
reasons”	derived	exclusively	from	its	religious	function	too,	which	was	not	open	
to	the	“formal	or	emotional	interpretation	the	European	artwork	was	subjected	
to”.	 Rather,	 the	 primitive	 artwork	 was	 “[…]	 god,	 who	 preserves	 his	 hermetic	
mythical	reality,	into	which	he	draws	the	worshipper,	transforming	him,	too,	into	
a	 mythic	 being	 and	 dissolving	 [augheben]	 his	 human	 existence” ,	 which	281
basically	corresponded	with	the	assessment	of	the	prehistoric	work	of	art	in	Das	
	Ibid.	280
	Einstein,	1915,	translation	by	Sebastian	Zeidler/Charles	Haxthausen	in	October	107,	2004,	pp.	281
130-131.	Note	that	Einstein	speaks	of	the	primitive	artwork’s	“[…]	exhaustive,	total,	and	
unfragmented	space	that	must	be	given	and	guaranteed.	Here	the	isolation	of	the	space	does	not	
amount	to	abstraction	but	is	rather	unmediated	sensation.”,	p.	129.	This,	it	seems,	would	be	the	
ideal	case	scenario	of	Sinnbild	creation	and	reception.	
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Bild,	 according	 to	 which	 “the	 pre-historic	 art	 object	 attained	 its	 highest	
expressive	value	as	a	cultic	device	[Kultgerät]” .	(This	overriding	endeavor	on	282
the	side	of	völkisch-fascist	art	theory	to	steer	art	back	towards	regaining	its	lost	
cultic	 function	 preceding	 both	 (Christian)	 religious	 “use-value”	 and	 exchange-
value	through	commodigication,	was	of	course	in	the	former’s	case	spurred	on	by	
political	considerations,	since	if	successful,	it	would	generate	a	dynamic	between	
the	 collective	group	and	 its	 cultural	heritage	 to	produce	a	worldview	based	on	
the	 questionable	 values	 ascribed	 to	 the	 Sinnbild.	 Not	 dissimilar	 at	 all	 to	
aspirations	 of	 Bataille	 and	 Caillois	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 Collège,	 albeit	 without	 a	
nationalist	component	in	the	latter	case )		283
In	 this	 connection	 it	 further	 seems	 more	 than	 plausible	 that	 Einstein’s	
notion	 of	 “interpretation”	 [Deutung]	 as	 being	 absent	 from	 the	 reception	 (or	
rather	 experience,	 since	 reception	 presupposes	 reglexivity)	 of	 the	 primitive	
artwork	certainly	would	have	appealed	to	völkisch-fascist	art	theory	in	that	the	
Sinnbild	 equally	was	 conceived	 as	 being	beyond	 interpretation.	 The	 very	 act	 of	
interpretation	was	framed	by	fascist	art	theory	to	be	an	intellectual	 investment	
	Dr.	W.	Schleiermacher,	“Das	vorgeschichtliche	Kunstwerk”,	in	Das	Bild,	1934,	p.	6	282
	Caillois	certainly	openly	indulged	the	idea	that	a	chosen,	(physically,	spiritually)	strong	(male)	283
minority	could	and	should	claim	leadership,	(precisely	due	to	the	inferiority	of	the	masses,	both	
physically	but	more	importantly	intellectually),	complete	with	all	kinds	of	barbaric	debauchery	
on	the	side,	serving,	well,	not	the	greater	good	but	history’s	greatest;	See	his	“Brotherhoods,	
Orders,	Secret	Societies,	Churches”	as	well	as	“The	Winter	Wind”,	in	Hollier	(ed.),	1988,	Hollier:	
“Caillois	obviously	aspires,	by	banding	together	the	intellectual	ivory	towers	in	this	manner,	to	
build	a	wall	of	fortigications	[…]	a	feudal	system	whose	center	would	no	longer	be	the	pope	or	the	
emperor,	but	the	sages	of	the	College	of	Sociology.	An	ideal	strangely	similar	to	an	active	reality	
on	the	other	side	of	the	Rhine.[…]	fascist	adventurers	[…]”,	p.	372.	The	again,	this	has	nothing	
fascistic	about	it	all	necessarily	(in	the	Nazi/historical	sense),	but	on	the	contrary	makes	Caillois	
the	prescient	“sociologist”	dispensing	utterly	contemporary	teleology	pursued	by	City	Boys	vying	
for	global	plutocratic	1%-rule.	(See	Cronenberg’s	Cosmopolis	(2012)	for	a	(one	of	many)	pop-
cultural	adaptation.)	
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unnecessary	 to	 –	 interfering	with	 –	 its	 spiritually	 binding	 faculty	 as	well	 as	 its	
force	as	symbolic	immediateness	[Unmittelbarkeit],	thought	of	as:	
[…]	 An	 implicitness	 [Selbstverständlichkeit]	 beyond	 all	 reglection,	 because	 the	
conferring	 of	 meaning	 [Sinngebung]	 merges	 into	 the	 Sinnbild,	 not	 into	 philosophical	
deduction,	 not	 into	 parchment	 and	 papery	 dogma.	 And	 thus	 its	 life	 as	 Sinnbild	 is	
eternal. 	284
Interpretation,	 then,	 degined	 as	 being	 borne	 of	 cognitive	 reception	 and	
subsequent	 analysis	 always	 necessitated	 a	multi-step	 process,	 “a	 psychological	
process”	 as	Dingler	 called	 it,	 during	which	 the	 beholder	 of	 the	 sign	 or	 symbol	
contained	in	the	artifact	had	to	match	the	“schema”	(conveyed	for	example	by	a	
heavily	 abstracted	 Sinnbild	 (such	 as	 a	 rune))	 with	 a	 corresponding	 “active	
image”	 [Vorstellungsbild,	 lebendiges	 Bild].	 In	 other	words,	 in	 order	 to	unlearn	
interpretation,	here	thought	of	as	an	inferior	form	of	perception,	one	had	to	girst	
learn	 or	 practice	 it	 until	 it	 would	 no	 longer	 present	 an	 intellectual	 task	 but	 a	
quasi-sensory,	 natural	 reaction.	 Repeating	 the	 process	 of	 this	 associative	
cognition	between	“schema”	and	“life/active	image”	would	allow	the	beholder	to	
gradually	 arrive	 at	 a	 “fusion	 [Verschmelzung]	 of	 schema	 and	 the	 imagined”,	 a	
fusion	 and	 a	 process,	 again	 herein	 in	 accordance	 with	 Einstein’s	 theory	 of	
primitive	art,	that	was	always	already	a	given	for	the	primitive	beholder;	not	so	
much	a	beholder	really	since	he/she	was	dissolved	“aufgehoben”	into	the	artifact,	
	“Vom	Kampf	um	die	deutsche	Seele”	[On	the	struggle	over	the	German	soul],	unauthored	text	284
in	Germanien,	1934,	p.	68.	Note	that	the	notion	of	“papery	dogma”	is	not	dissimilar	to	Bataille’s	
notion	of	“society’s	dead	letter”	in	his	“Base	Materialism	and	Gnosticism”.	Also	see	chapter	2	f22.	
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presumably	 facilitated	 by	 a	 ritualistic	 scenario	 of	 trance,	 invocation,	 no	 doubt	
induced	through	intoxication	–	Berauschung	–		by	drugs	etc. 	285
That,	 which	 we	 have	 here	 presented	 as	 separate	 moments	 of	 a	 psychological	
process,	 is	 for	 the	 primitive	 a	 whole	 and	 genuine	 experience	 of	 oneness	
[Einheitserlebnis]	without	psychological	and	critical	splitting. 	286
The	 sacred	 function	 of	 ornament	 that	 up	 until	 then	 thus	 did	 not	 allow	 for	 a	
supergiciality	 chiegly	 providing	 visual	 stimulation	 was	 according	 to	 Dingler	
severely	 corrupted	 by	 two	 historical	 developments	 that	 occurred	more	 or	 less	
side-by-side.	 The	 girst	 was	 the	 increasing	 interest	 and	 vogue	 for	 exotic	 and	
primitive	cultures,	reglected	in	the	rise	of	ethnographic	collections	and	museums	
displaying	 the	 colonies’	 artefacts	 now	 turned	 fantastic	 trophies.	 The	
appropriation	 by	 both	 the	 arts	 and,	 shortly	 following,	 commerce	 and	 their	
incorporation	 of	 the	 formal	 novelties	 introduced	 by	 these	 symbols	 and	motifs,	
this	 “Verwertung”	 [exploitation],	a	 “senseless	collecting	and	 imitating”	of	–	and	
the	“purely	playful	relation”	towards	–	ornament	is	what	lead	to	this	“distortion”,	
	Perhaps	not	surprisingly,	the	swastika	was	chosen	as	the	leading	Sinnbild;	it	managed	to	285
achieve	this	“fusion”	most	effectively,	curiously,	or	ironically,	because	or	in	spite	of	its	wholly	anti-
gigurative	nature	being	pure	“schema”	to	employ	Dingler,	whose	“active	/	life	image”	would	
basically	fulgill	what	Benjamin	had	called	fascism’s	“aesthetization	of	politics”.(1936)	
“The	swastika	contains	everything	while	not	articulating	anything”.	Otto	Wacker,	“Geisteshaltung	
und	Stil”,	Das	Bild,	1934,	p.12	
	Dingler,	Germanien,	1936,	p.	38	And	furthermore	this	return	to	a	pre-split,	holistic	state	of	286
experience	frequently	appears	in	Germanien	usually	ascribed	as	a	characteristic	to	not	any	
primitive	but	the	superior	primitive	of	the	Teuton.	“It	never	occurred	to	the	Teuton	to	record	and	
assess	philosophically	what	to	him	was	a	natural,	spiritual	expression	of	everyday	life.	He	had	
never	known	a	principal	separation	between	interior	and	exterior	life.”	Ibid.	p68.	(Cf.	Bataille	on	
the	Gauls	from	Chapter	I:	“Everything	that	can	make	disciplined	people	aware	of	values	and	
ofgicial	organization	(architecture,	statue	law,	secular	science	and	the	literature	of	lettered	
peoples)	remained	outside	the	consciousness	of	the	Gauls	who	calculated	nothing,	conceiving	of	
no	progress	and	giving	free	rein	to	immediate	suggestions	and	violent	sentiment.”	
	151
(this	line	of	argument	basically	aligning	with	Krauss’	notions	of	“Black	Deco”	and	
“Soft	Primitivism”	already	mentioned. )		Dingler,	therefore,	similar	to	Loos,	cast	287
this	“Verwertung”	as	a,	if	not	outright	crime,	certainly	nothing	less	than	profanity.	
To	 recall,	 over	 at	 Documents	 Michel	 Leiris	 seemed	 to	 have	 been	 in	 basic	
agreement	with	this	verdict,	asserting	that	it	was	an	“inginitely	deadlier	insult”	of	
Westerners	 to	 “transform	a	mask	or	a	statue	–	originally	made	 for	complicated	
and	precise	ritual	purposes	–	into	a	vulgar	art	object” .		288
The	 second	 process	 Dingler	 diagnosed	 to	 be	 responsible	 for	 said	
“distortion”	were	the	structural	changes	inherent	to	modernity	itself,	specigically	
by	 way	 of	 the	 rise	 of	 mass	 media	 which	 naturally	 entailed	 the	 ease	 of	 an	
indiscriminating	 reproducibility	 and	 dissemination	 of	 previously	 unique	 of	
works	 of	 art	 and	 meaning-laden	 symbols	 of	 any	 kind,	 including	 those	 never	
intended	 for	 boundless	 multiplication	 and	 circulation.	 This	 “thousand	 fold	
reproduction	 by	 mass	 industry”	 as	 Dingler	 wrote	 in	 1936,	 together	 with	 this	
m e a n i n g l e s s ,	 “ a r b i t r a r y ”	 [ w i l l k ü r l i c h ]	 “ e x p l o i t a t i o n	 o f	
signs”	[Zeichenverwertung]	led	girst	to	a	loss	of	their	magical	faculties	and	from	
there	 onwards	 to	 a	 gradual	 decline	 of	what	 he	 called	 their	 “	 ‘symbolic	 aura’	 ”,	
imagined	 as	 the	 leftover	 spell	 of	 these	 sacred	 or	 at	 least	 specigic	 symbolic	
relations	 of	 select	 objects	 and	 motifs	 for	 a	 collective	 group.	 While	 particular	
artefacts	and	their	respective	ornamentation	over	the	course	of	history	saw	their	
magic	and	religious	function	gradually	diminished,	they	nevertheless	continued	
	While	precisely	this	“soft	primitivism”	was	equally	what	was	ridiculed	by	Einstein	to	be	a	287
desperate	search	for	formal	innovation	by	the	contemporary	artist:	“Hilglos	negert	der	
Unoriginelle”.	“Afrikansiche	Plastik”,	1920,	p.	5.		
	1929,	in	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p.	94288
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to	 affect	 the	 collective	 social	 by	 way	 of	 “tradition”,	 which	 guaranteed	 the	
continued	 relevance	 of	 ornamentation	 and	 ornamented	 object	 by	 way	 of	 this	
“symbolic	aura”,	acting	as	a	kind	of	socially	uniting	aesthetic	nucleus	(also	called	
“Gefühlsaura”	by	him,	“affect	aura”).	
	 As	 Dingler	 stated:	 “Tradition	 could	 only	 be	 sacred	 [geheiligt]	 if	 it	
stemmed	 from	 a	 truly	meaningful	 effect	 of	 ornament”.	 In	 tradition,	 the	 former	
magic	and	religious	function	of	ornament	and	cultic	object	managed	to	live	on,	by	
retaining	a	residual,	irreproducible	“aura”.	For	this	aura	of	a	symbolic	system	to	
continue	 to	 exert	 its	 powers	 in	 the	 future	 it	 would	 equally	 need	 to	 “have	
collective	 meaning”,	 since	 an	 “arbitrary	 choosing	 of	 signs	 would	 only	 have	
meaning	for	an	individual”.	By	which	Dingler	presumably	meant	the	forsaking	of	
collective	aura	for	the	fancies	and	idiosyncrasies	of	the	rationalist	modern	ego	–	
perhaps	 no	 better	 personigied	 than	 by	 that	 culture-vulture,	 the	 avant-garde	
artist.	
If	Dingler’s	 line	of	argument,	not	least	his	particular	terminology	sounds	
strangely	familiar,	it	is	because	it	resounds	with	an	incomparably	more	eminent	
text	that	saw	its	publication	that	very	same	year,	Walter	Benjamin’s	interminably	
quoted	 and	 drawn	 upon	 “The	 Work	 of	 Art	 in	 the	 Age	 of	 its	 Technological	
Reproducibility”	(1936).		
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V	Transforming	Decay:	Benjamin’s	Barbarism			
The	trajectory	sketched	by	Benjamin	in	this	text	was	–	perhaps	unsurprisingly	–	
much	 more	 expansive	 in	 scope,	 than	 Dingler’s	 somewhat	 narrow,	 ultimately	
reactionary	 grasp	 of	 the	 cultural	 consequences	 following	 his	 own	 critique	 of	
what	one	may,	for	titular	parity’s	sake,	call:	“The	spiritual	symbol	in	the	age	of	its	
thousand	fold	reproducibility”.	Leaving	aside	their	differing	consequences	drawn	
for	a	collective	–	popular	–	culture	to	come	(Benjamin	seeing	gilm	as	a	promising	
art	 form	 that,	 in	 the	 right	 hands,	 could	 potentially	 advance	 a	 new	 society	
positively	parting	with	 the	historical	burden	of	 “tradition”;	Dingler	endorsing	a	
“new”	 Sinnbild	 aesthetic	 as	 a	 binding	 force	 to	 resume	 “tradition”	 serving	 a	
national-socialist	collective)	their	coinciding	discussion	of	the	concept	of	“aura”	
and	 their	 shared	 diagnosis	 of	 its	 “decay”	 [Verfall]	 begs	 a	 closer	 examination.	
What	exactly	was	it	that	Benjamin	considered	auratic	in	work	of	art	and	how	did	
this	quality	 vanish	 through	 image	 technology	 and	mass	 culture?	Why	and	how	
should	or	 could	 it	 be	 reinstated	 in	 forms	of	 cultural	production	other	 than	 the	
conventional	 gine	arts	proper	(importantly	here	 including	the	avant-garde)	as	a	
way	out	of	this	decay	or	crisis,	thereby	conceiving	of	crisis	not	as	a	dead-end	but	
as	a	stepping-stone	for	socio-cultural	renewal?	
Benjamin	 degined	 the	 traditional	work	 of	 art,	 its	 sphere	 of	 ingluence,	 as	
being		“the	original	of	the	here	and	now”,	which	were	the	spatio-temporal	criteria	
congirming	its	“authenticity”.		
The	authenticity	of	a	thing	is	the	quintessence	of	all	that	is	transmissible	from	its	
origin	on,	ranging	from	its	physical	duration	to	the	historical	testimony	relating	
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to	it. 	289
	 “Authentic”	 “duration	 […]	 testimony	 [and]	 […]	 history”	 were	 essentially	 the	
processes	 through	which	 tradition	manifested	 itself	 for	 any	given	 society,	 or	 at	
least	for	those	that	engaged	in	this	proliferation,	be	it	through	written	chronicles	
or	orally	through	in-situ	storytelling	or,	say,	through	the	sustained	performance	
of	certain	rites	and	the	 like	(the	 latter	especially	prized	by	regressive	positions	
such	 as	 Dingler’s	 and	 by	 Bataille’s	 enthusiasm	 for	 rediscovering	 ritual	 for	
society.)		
Aura	and	 tradition,	 interdependent	as	 they	were	 in	 the	original	work	of	
art,	 were	 therefore	 equally	 affected	 by	 “technological	 reproducibility”	 which,	
according	 to	 Benjamin,	 drastically	 impaired	 that	 quality	 of	 the	 “original	 of	 the	
here	and	now”,	by	rendering	these	very	criteria	commonplace:	
One	might	focus	these	aspects	of	the	artwork	in	the	concept	of	aura	and	go	on	to	
say:	what	withers	 in	the	age	of	the	technological	reproducibility	of	the	work	of	
art	 is	the	latter’s	aura.	This	process	is	symptomatic;	 its	signigicance	extends	far	
beyond	beyond	 the	 realm	of	 art.	 It	might	be	 stated	as	general	 formula	 that	 the	
technology	 of	 reproduction	 detaches	 the	 reproduced	 object	 form	 the	 sphere	 of	
tradition. 	290
	Jennings/Doherty/Levin	(eds.),	2008,	pp.21-22.	In	order	to	cohere	to	the	argument	made	here	289
–	that	of	concomitant	debates	about	originary	aura	and	its	decay	–	all	quotes	are	from	the	second	
version	of	the	artwork	essay	which	served	the	slightly	edited	French	translation	by	Klossowski	
published	in	the	Zeitschrift	für	Sozialforschung	in	1936.	The	German	version	can	be	found	in	
Gesammelte	Schriften	VII.1,	ed.	Rolf	Tiedemann/Hermann	Schweppenhäuser,	Frankfurt	a.M.,	
1989,	pp.	350-384.	
	Ibid.,	p.	22	290
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Furthermore,	 the	 following	 “shattering	 of	 tradition”	 by,	 roughly	 speaking,	
modernity,	 led	 to	 the	 “liquidation	 of	 the	 traditional	 value	 of	 the	 cultural	
heritage” .	Importantly	though,	this	“shattering”,	here	again	specigically	that	of	291
the	artwork’s	socially	auratic	function,	did	not	suddenly	occur	overnight	with	the	
onset	of	photography	and	mass	print	media	(Adorno’s	“Illustrierten-Kultur”),	but	
actually	went	much	further	back	in	the	context	of	the	Western	social	vis-à-vis	its	
art.	 Not	 unlike	 the	 critiques	 leveled	 against	 Western	 art	 history	 or	 rather	 its	
canon	 as	 already	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters,	 Benjamin	 sketched	 a	
historical	arc	of	 the	artwork	passing	 through	three	ontological	stages,	of	which	
its	ginal	stage	evokes	the	negative	notion	of	superior	yet	hollow	and	increasingly	
non-relatable	“power	art”,	devoid	of	meaningful	social	function	other	than	that	of	
perpetuating	aesthetic	and	political	dominance.	
As	we	know,	the	earliest	artworks	originated	in	the	service	rituals	–	girst	magical,	
then	religious.	[…]	In	other	words:	the	unique	value	of	the	“authentic”	work	of	art	
has	its	basis	in	ritual	[…the	location	of	its	original	use	value;	third	version]. 	292
Benjamin	went	on	to	state	that:		
[…]	 This	 ritualistic	 basis,	 however	mediated	 it	may	 be,	 is	 still	 recognizable	 as	
secularized	 ritual	 even	 in	 the	 most	 profane	 forms	 of	 the	 cult	 of	 beauty.	 The	
secular	 worship	 of	 beauty,	 which	 developed	 during	 the	 Renaissance	 and	
prevailed	 for	 three	 centuries,	 clearly	 displayed	 that	 ritualistic	 basis	 in	 its	
	Ibid.	Cf	Dingler,	who	further	introduced	the	notion	of	the	sacred	character	of	aura	as	imparted	291
by	the	specigic	symbol/image:	“Tradition	could	only	be	sacred	if	it	had	originally	emerged	from	a	
meaningful	affect	of	the	ornament”.		
	Ibid,	p.24292
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subsequent	decline	and	in	the	girst	severe	crisis	which	befell	it.	 	293
So,	 according	 to	 Benjamin	 too,	 art	 since	 the	 Renaissance	 had	 lost	 its	 social	
relevance	 as	 transmitted	 by	 an	 auratic	 sphere	 through	 which	 the	 community	
spiritually	and	meaningfully	engaged	with	the	work	of	art,	by	actually	relating	to	
the	values	or	expressions	it	offered.	The	artwork	-	or	better,	its	values	as	exerted	
through	a	social	protocol	-	had	become	“profane”,	 its	foremost	concern	being	to	
oblige	and	in	turn	decree	a	dictate	of	ideational	beauty	which	it	imposed	onto	the	
audience,	which	could	either	identify	with	it	in	a	stratigied,	hierarchical	manner,	
striving	to	resemble	its	ideal	creations	while	fully	accepting	the	status-quo,	or	be	
barred	from	participation	from	the	very	outset	due	to	one’s	class	(not	to	mention	
one’s	 race	 etc.).	 Participating	 in	 this	 “cult	 of	 beauty”	 thus	 entailed	
submissiveness	on	the	part	of	the	beholder-cum-devotee-cum-servant,	and	here	
it	seems	apposite	to	point	out	that	Benjamin	did	not	employ	the	notion	of	“cult”	
in	 the	 original	 German	 text	 but	 that	 of	 “service” 	 –	 “Schönheitsdienst”.	 This	294
“service	to	beauty”	–	as	opposed	to	a	“cult/worship	of”	it	–	thus	underscores	the	
almost	bureaucratic	act	of	serving	as	opposed	to	the	more	properly	cultic	act	of	
ritualistic	 immersion .	 “Schönheitsdienst”,	 the	 chief	 aesthetic	 realm	 of	 the	295
	Ibid.	p.24	Cf	Dingler,	who	basically	also	located	this	ontological	shift	affecting	the	reception	of	293
the	symbol:	“Only	at	a	later	stage	when	the	symbolic	character	becomes	distorted	or	forgotten,	is	
it	that	the	symbolic	giguration	transitions	into	the	ornamental,	which	is	even	then	still	tied	to	
tradition	and	still	carries	with	it	a	symbolic	sensorial/spiritual	aura	[Gefühlsaura].”	As	shown	
before,	this	is	the	last	stage	of	the	“symbolic	aura”	(Dingler)	before	its	ginal	demise	by	way	of	
“mass	industry	[and]	thousand-fold	reproduction”.	
	
	In	the	2008	English	translation	used	here	both	“cult”	and	“worship”	are	used,	the	latter	being	294
more	accurate	yet	still	missing	the	wholly	secular-servile	dimension	of	“Dienst”.
	Schönheitsdienst	does	of	course	continue	to	contain	a	religious	dimension,	i.e.	a	variant	of	the	295
“(church)	service”,	translated	here	as	“worship”	–	“Gottesdienst”.	
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Western	social	since	 the	Renaissance,	meant	serving	a	prescribed	 ideal,	 girst	as	
part	 of	 the	 choreographed	 protocol	 of	 the	 court,	 then	 as	 part	 of	 an	 ambitious	
bourgeoisie	that	engaged	art	to	advance	its	social	mobility	and	acceptability	(by	
that	 simultaneously	 despised	 yet	 aspiringly	 emulated	 aristocracy)	 that	 would	
yield	 the	 principal	 faculty	 of	 “good”/bourgeois	 taste	 (taste	 unsurprisingly	
therefore	as	much	dismissed	by	fascist	art	theory	as	by	the	avant-garde. )		296
It	 was	 due	 to	 that	 historical	 trajectory	 of	 art	 –	 a	 gradual	 waning	 of	 its	
affective-identigicatory	 binding	 power	 –	 that	 Benjamin	 foresaw	 the	 cinema	
becoming	the	new	model	of	meaningful,	affective	aesthetic	production	–	as	much	
as	 experience	 and	 indeed	participation.	The	 cinema	as	 a	 virgin	 inter-relational	
aesthetic	 realm	of	 investment	 could	potentially	 recoup	 the	magic	 and	 religious	
aspects	that	art	had	long	ago	forfeited.	Benjamin’s	attitude	towards	art’s	efgicacy	
regarding	its	capabilities	to	reclaim	this	kind	of	immersive	investment	was	at	the	
time	of	the	essay’s	writing	a	pessimistic	one:	he	speaks	of	19th	century	“l’art	pour	
l’art”’s	 “theology”,	 “a	 ‘pure’	art	which	rejects	not	only	any	social	 function	of	art	
but	 any	 deginition	 in	 terms	 of	 representational	 content”,	 for	 Benjamin	 proof	 of	
	And	explicitly	by	Bataille	according	to	Didi-Huberman	who	writes:	296
“The	childlike	frights	and	tantrums	evoked	by	Bataille	are	always	concerned	with	decomposing	
taste	[Geschmack],	that	contrived	reconciliation	with	the	world	of	‘concrete	forms’	“	2010,	p.249.	
(Transl.	by	the	author).	
One	example	of	the	devaluation	of	taste	in	fascist	art	theory	can	be	found	in	a	text	entitled	
“Geisteshaltung	und	Stil”	[Spiritual	Conviction	and	Style]	by	a	Dr.	Otto	Wacker.	Discussing	the	
human	urge	to	create	art	to	convey/contain	an	individuals	or	moreover	a	people’s	principles	and	
desires	Wacker	writes:	“The	measure	they	[those	disconnected	from	their	cultural	heritage	or	
“whose	soul	is	confused”]	employ	towards	orientation	has	become	an	utterly	gleeting	and	glat	
one:	taste.	Taste	is	the	gauge	for	those	who	cannot	conceive	a	world	of	their	own.	Taste	will	never	
create	anything	of	destiny	[schicksalsvoll]	only	once	in	a	while	it	will	be	lucky	to	pick	the	right	
thing,	just	like	the	blind	hen.	Taste	confuses	the	symbol	with	allegory.”	Wacker	actually	also	offers	
a	perfect	description	of	the	swastika	as	the	epitome	of	all	Sinnbilder:	“The	swastika	contains	
everything	while	not	articulating	anything	[i.e.	as	opposed	to	wordy	allegory].	It	is	a	symbol	of	the	
inner	world	of	today’s	German,	a	symbol	of	his	aim,	expression	of	his	will,	sign	of	his	worth”.	Das	
Bild	1934	p.12	.	This	succinct	deginition	of	the	Sinnbild	here	would	seem	to	rest	on	attributes	akin	
to	those	of	the	high	Modernist	work	of	art:	its	immanence,	its	autonomous	potency	attained	
precisely	by	omitting	representation	i.e.	articulation,	which	importantly	is	of	course	derived	not	
from	völkisch	“metaphysics”	but	from	a	transcendental	formalism.
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this	 theology	 having	 turned	 into	 a	 “negative	 theology” .	 Benjamin	 did	 not	297
identify	a	particular	style	or	movement	of	this	“’pure’	art”,	yet	one	may	presume	
it	would	be	the	works	of,	say,	De	Stijl;	certain	Bauhaus	art	perhaps	in	the	vain	of	
Josef	 Albers;	 Suprematism	 as	 advanced	 by	 Kazimir	 Malevich	 who	 of	 course	
celebrated	 a	 “world	 as	 Non-Objectivity”	 and	 thus	 would	 have	 gladly	
underwritten	 that	 rejection	 of	 “representational	 content”	 that	 Benjamin	 held	
responsible	 for	 modern	 art’s	 continual	 removal	 from	 the	 masses,	 whether	
intentional	 or	 unconscious.	 More	 to	 the	 point,	 Malevich’s	 celebration	 of	 his	
notion	 of	 a	 “Freed	 Nothing”	 [Das	 befreite	 Nichts]	 –	 the	 key	 aesthetic	
denomination	 of	 a	 Suprematist	 work	 like	 his	 “Black	 Square”	 (1915)	 –	 in	 fact	
represents	just	that	“negative	theology”	Benjamin	faulted	“pure	art”	for,	not	least	
congirmed	by	Malevich’s	religious	tone	as	he	made	his	case	 for	Suprematism	in	
The	World	as	Non-Objectivity	(1926)	 .	298
Another	example	of	the	avant-garde’s	contribution	to	–	or	mirroring	of	–	
“decay”,	 less	 in	 terms	 of	 purity	 but	 certainly	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 object-subject	
destabilization,	came	in	the	guise	of	the	work	of	Picasso.	The	latter,	so	Benjamin	
claimed,	 elicited	 an	 “extremely	 backward	 [most	 reactionary/third	 version]	
	Benjamin,	in	Jennings	et	al.	(eds.),	2008,	p.	24	297
	Kazimir	Malevich,	Die	Gegenstandslose	Welt,	Cologne,	1962	[Munich,	1926].	Malevich’s	298
exhaustive	manifesto	is	actually	strikingly	revealing	(of	the	intellectual-artistic	currents	of	the	
1920s)	in	that	it	explicitly	contains	various	key	strands	under	discussion	here:	A	critique	of	
Western	materialism	and	reason;	a	critique	of	art	as	a	historically	ideological	and	
representational	vehicle	of	secular	and	clerical	power	interests;	a	critique	of	art’s	pandering	to	
idealism.	The	consequences	thereof,	of	which	he	lists	many,	as	regards	Benjamin’s	“negative	
theology”,	are	of	course	just	the	ones	commended	by	Malevich:	”The	new,	abstract	art	is	received	
as	a	threat	because	it	demonstrates	the	decay	[Verfall!]	of	the	subject	and	the	object.	So	is	
Suprematism	as	it	displays	the	non-objectivity	[Gegenstandslosigkeit].”	All	of	these	“threats”	are	
for	Malevich	the	“liberation	[from	subjective/indoctrinated	experience]	by	way	of	the	Freed	
Nothing”,	p.	46	
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attitude” 	 by	 the	 “masses”,	 i.e.	 their	 aesthetically	 derived	 reception	 and	299
(non)investment,	whereas	the	on-screen	contortions	and	buffoonery	of	a	Charlie	
Chaplin	made	for	a	“highly	progressive	reaction”.	Chaplin,	not	Picasso,	generated	
that	non-plus-ultra	“immediate,	intimate	fusion	of	pleasure	–	pleasure	in	seeing	
and	 experiencing” 	 which	 importantly	 came	 courtesy	 not	 of	 the	 artistic	300
experimentation	with	color,	light,	space,	movement	–	modern(ist)	vision	–	of	the	
avant-garde,	 but	 of	 the	 life-like	 to	 larger-than-life	 spectacle	 of	 lights,	 camera,	
action.	
Benjamin	 herein	 painted	 a	 conglictual	 scenario	 of	 a	 kind	 of	 antipodal	
synchronicity:	 Modern	 art,	 by	 way	 of	 advancing	 abstraction,	 by	 the	 relentless	
dissolution	 and	 fragmentation	 of	 both	 subject	 and	 object,	 and	 thus	 of	
identigication	both	spatially	and	temporally,	had	advanced	in	tandem	with	media	
technology’s	 continual,	 ever	 more	 regined	 capabilities	 of	 a	 realistic,	 complete	
representation,	one	by	which	the	crowd/collective	increasingly	beheld	itself	and	
–	more	signigicantly	–	 saw	 itself	afgirmed	of	 its	 (meaningful,	 exciting)	existence	
and	 vitality.	 (Again,	 this	 scenario	 would	 correspond	 with	 Bataille’s	 assertion	
regarding	the	popular	rejection	of	modern	art,	enraging	the	“masses”,	 “as	 if	 the	
very	 bases	 of	 [their]	 existence	 had	 been	 brought	 into	 question”).	 This	
phenomenon	 of	 being	 beheld	 ranged	 from	 a	 banal	 sense	 of	 inclusion	 by	 being	
photographically	captured,	featured	even	perhaps	on	a	newsreel,	to	the	potential	
promise	of	temporary	rise	to	fame	as	a	celebrity	or	of	political	agency	as	a	street	
	Cf	Bataille	in	the	“Academic	Horse”	(1929)	where	this	“backward	attitude”	(i.e.,	rejection,	non-299
intelligibility)	is	contained	in	the	statement:	“There	is	no	reason	to	forget		[…]	that	this	recent	
negation	[modern	art]	has	provoked	the	most	violent	rage,	as	if	the	very	bases	of	existence	had	
been	brought	into	question”.	
	Benjamin	in	Jennings	et	al	(eds.),	2008,	p.	36300
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protester	turned	photogenic	rebel…	Which	is	to	say	“to	matter”,	both	in	the	sense	
of	an	action	and	as	a	being,	at	a	moment	when	the	avant-garde	in	turn	continued	
its	 splintering	 of	 matter.	 This	 antipodal	 synchronicity,	 was	 summed	 up	 by	
Benjamin	by	the	following	dynamic:	
The	more	reduced	the	social	 impact	of	an	art	 form,	 the	more	widely	 [sharper/
third	version]	criticism	and	enjoyment	of	it	diverge	in	the	public. 	301
“The	 shattering	 of	 tradition”,	 already	 aggressively	 exercised	 by	 the	 avant-garde	
since	the	early	20th	century,	for	Benjamin	found	its	synaesthetic	highpoint	in	the	
notion	of	shock,	or	in	Benjamin’s	Francophonic	preference,	of	“chock”.	(Which,	in	
view	of	shock’s	nature	as	a	emotional-visceral	impact,	corresponded	to	Bataille’s	
predilection	for	an	equally	visceral	vocabulary	of	“frenzy”,	“agitation”,	“violence”	
and	 so	 forth,	 all	 of	 which	 were,	 to	 his	 mind,	 decidedly	 desirable	 states).	
Importantly,	“shock”	in	Bataille	is	explicitly	tied	to	the	“heterogeneous”,	which	in	
turn,	 for	him,	was	Nazi	 fascism’s	affective	kernel .	The	prospects	 for	 tradition	302
	Ibid.	301
	“Heterogeneous	reality	is	that	of	a	force	or	shock.	It	presents	itself	as	a	charge,	as	a	value,	302
passing	from	one	object	to	another	in	a	more	or	less	abstract	fashion,	almost	as	if	the	change	
were	taking	place	not	in	the	world	of	objects	but	only	in	the	judgments	of	the	subject”.	1985,	
p.143.	It	thus	appears	that	Bataille	in	essence	here	précised	the	phantasmagoric	investment	
accorded	to	the	Sinnbild,	the	inferior	and/or	“uncanny”	artifacts	sublimated	by	völkisch	fascism	
(In	relation	to	Benjamin’s	notion	of	shock	as	girst	informing	the	aesthetic-moral	features	of	an	
avant-garde	registering	as	decay	–	as	“barbarisms”	–	the	heterogeneous	equally	corresponds	
thereto.	The	heterogeneous	not	only	deviates	from	–	negates	–	normative	aesthetics	but	more	
importantly,	at	least	in	the	1930s,	it	offends	social	values/norms,	denies	mass	identigication,	
cannot	be	integrated	into	a	utilitarian	(homogenous)	reality.	As	far	as	mass	culture	is	concerned,	
the	realm	Benjamin	identigied	to	productively	accommodate	shock	–	the	heterogeneous	–	to	“put	
it	to	work”	so	to	speak,	i.e.	generating	value	and	mass	investment,	Bataille	early	on	perceived	that	
the	heterogeneous	becomes	successfully	homogenized	by	mass	culture.	Again,	this	argument	can	
be	directly	delineated	from	Bataille’s	deginition	of	“social	homogeneity”,	“the	sciences	and	
technologies”,	the	way	these	two	entities	“establish	relations	of	identity	between	the	different	
elements	of	an	elaborated	and	measurable	world”.	1985,	p.160	f3.		
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and	cultural	heritage,	however	glum,	was	actually	“the	reverse	side	of	the	present	
crisis	and	renewal	of	humanity” ,	which	also	meant	 that	 the	 “shattering”	was	303
and	 could	 be	 proactively	 artistically	 reglected,	 exploited	 really	 by	 “chock”	 as	 a	
method.	 Shock	 here,	 structurally	 speaking,	 equaled	 barbarization,	 in	 that	 for	
Benjamin,	shock	was	essential	to	Dada’s	nothing	but	a	last,	unintelligible	(hence	
barbaric)	roar;	that	of	an	avant-garde	demonstrating	its	inaptitude	–	by	glaunting	
it	 as	 negation	 –	 towards	 the	 aesthetic	 and	 social	 features	 of	 a	 mass	 media	
suffused	environment	–	and	an	arguably	 invested	mass,	willingly	soaking	 it	up.	
Dadaist	and	other	avant-garde	aspirations	to	capture	and	relay	the	sensations	of	
modern	experience	were	“wanting	attempts”	 [mangelhafte	Versuche]	according	
to	 Benjamin .	 Dada,	 in	 Benjamin’s	 narrative	 fully	 aware	 of	 this	 inaptitude,	304
treated	 its	 art	 historical	 heritage	 as	 well	 as	 its	 talents	 sado-masochistically,	
through	 literal	material	 destruction	 and	degradation,	 through	 combative	 yet	 at	
the	 same	 time	 non-communicative	 performance	 of	 its	 outright	 societal	
impotence.	 In	 Benjamin’s	 reading,	 Dada’s	 employment	 of	 shock,	 its	 desire	 to	
shock/to	be	(a)socially	shocking,	was	stuck	in	being	“wrapped”	as	a	“moral	shock	
effect”	only	gilm	girst	“freed	[…][it]	from	this	wrapping” ,	by	drowning	this	moral	305
affect	 with	 the	 persuasive	 sensory	 cinematic	 experience,	 turning	 it	 into	 a	
spectacle,	so	that	even	when	disturbing	as	shock	it	would	cause	excitation	in	the	
audience	 (and	 thus	be	made	available	 to	consumption).	Benjamin’s	assessment	
of	Dada,	in	1936,	as	basically	(re)presenting	the	avant-garde’s	shortcomings	vis-
	Benjmain,	in	Jennings	et	al	(eds.),	2008,	p.22	303
	Third	version,	f29.	304
	Benjmain,	in	Jennings	et	al	(eds.),	2008,	p.39305
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à-vis	nascent	popular	culture	by	embodying	defect	is	understandable	given	that	
there	was	no	longer	much	Dada	to	speak	of	at	that	point,	its	gradual	dissolution	
having	 begun	 some	 years	 earlier.	 For	 Benjamin,	 this	 was	 presumably	 further	
proof	of	his	thesis,	a	thesis	that	importantly,	and	famously,	took	note	of	German	
fascism’s	 early	 realization	 of	 the	 unifying	 and	 mesmerizing	 faculties	 of	 the	
moving	 image,	 which	 it	 therefore	 effectively	 employed	 through	 the	 gilmic,	
dynamic,	 representation	 of	 the	 Volk’s	 wholeness;	 all	 the	 while	 simultaneously	
disposing	of	artistic	movements	 like	Dada.	While	Benjamin’s	particular	reading	
of	 Dada	 –	 as	 an	 example	 of	 an	 avant-garde	 movement	 intentionally	 or	
desperately	 cut	 off	 from	 culture’s	 overall	 development	 due	 to	 technological	
change	 –	 may	 in	 itself	 be	 subject	 to	 debate ,	 the	 way	 in	 which	 he	 employs	306
barbarization	 begs	 closer	 examination	 here,	 in	 that	 it	 connects	 to	 Bataille’s	
conjecture	regarding	the	barbaric	in	Documents	(from	which	however	completely	
different	 consequences	 were	 drawn	 as	 regards	 their	 respectively	 aspired	
aesthetics).		
The	history	of	 every	art	 form	has	 critical	periods	 in	which	 the	particular	 form	
strains	 after	 effects	 which	 can	 easily	 achieved	 only	 with	 a	 changed	 technical	
standard	–	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 in	a	new	art	 form.	The	excesses	 [extravagances/third	
	Starting	with	the	very	fact	that	various	artists	associated	with	Dada	and	Surrealism	did	306
certainly	engage	with	gilm,	and	in	the	case	of	Buñuel’s	infamous	scene	of	the	slit	cow’s	eye	in	“Un	
Chien	Andalou”	(1929,	with	Salvador	Dali),	certainly	deployed	shock	via	the	possibilities	offered	
by	this	medium,	i.e.	the	illusion	of	a	woman’s	eye	being	slit	“for	real”,	achieved	through	montage.	
Other	examples	would	be	Man	Ray’s	experimental	gilms	and	Marcel	Duchamp’s	use	of	gilmic	
projection	in	his	“Anemic	Cinema”	(1926),	the	medium	here	used	to	explore	perception	and	
abstraction	coupled	with	quasi-narrative	fragments	by	way	of	handwritten	puns.	Given	the	
emphasis	Duchamp’s	work	puts	on	irony	and	word	play	for	him	to	call	his	artistic	deployment	of	
gilm	“anemic”	could	just	as	much	aim	at	framing	the	spectacle	of	“the	pictures”	as	anemic	–	as	a	
kind	of	proto-structuralist	gilm	work	that	puts	the	onus	on	satire	rather	than	on	medium	
specigicity.	
	164
version]	 and	 crudities	 of	 art	 which	 thus	 result,	 particularly	 in	 periods	 of	 so-
called	decadence,	actually	emerge	from	the	core	of	its	richest	historical	energies.	
In	 recent	 years,	 Dadaism	 has	 amused	 itself	 with	 such	 barbarisms	 [such	
barbarisms	were	abundant	[gestrotzt]	in	Dadaism/third	version]. 	307
Barbarisms	in	art	for	Benjamin	at	this	point	in	history,	as	the	key	characteristics	
of	 any	 avant-garde	 operating	 in	 response	 to	 socio-political	 tension,	 reveal	
themselves	as	“excesses	[extravagances]	and	crudities”,	thus	in	dialogue	with	the	
excessive	“positive	extravagance”	Bataille	had	credited	the	Gauls’	artistic	output	
with;	 the	 latter,	 to	 recall,	 deliberately	 “everywhere	 taking	 a	 girst	 schematic	
interpretation	 to	 its	most	 absurd	 consequences”,	 through	 “violent	 and	horrible	
images”	 of	 “aggressive	 ugliness”.	 All	 of	which	 are	 aesthetic	 considerations	 that	
correspond	 to	 those	 Benjamin	 identigied	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Dada:	 the	 intentional	
“degradation	 of	 their	 material”,	 the	 “obscene	 expressions”	 consisting	 of	
“linguistic	refuse”	as	well	as	the	incorporation	of	urban	detritus	such	as	“buttons	
and	train	tickets”.	Finally,	 there	 is	 the	 foreboding	ending	of	Bataille’s	“Academic	
Horse”	 essay,	 wherein	 he	 surmises	 that	 “alterations	 of	 plastic	 forms	 often	
represent	 the	 principal	 symptom	 of	 great	 reversals”	 –	 of	 a	 “necessity	 for	
change” .	It	is	this	interrelation	of	the	barbarization	of	form	as	symptomatic	of	308
a	strained	environment	that	is	congruous	with	Benjamin’s	linking	together	of	the	
formal	 deviances	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 avant-garde,	 these	 very	 forms’	 breakdown	
	Benjmain,	in	Jennings	et	al	(eds.),	2008,	p.38	307
	Baker/Ades,	2006,	p.239	308
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registering	 as	 symptoms	 of	 wider	 social	 and	 political	 shifts.	 “Barbarism” ,	309
around	the	mid	1930s,	was	thus	framed	by	Benjamin	as	a	compulsory	feature	of	
artistic	production,	borne	of	necessity,	a	kind	of	autoimmune	function	signaling	
its	“decay”.	The	1936	artwork	essay	was	not	the	girst	introduction	of	this	notion	
of	the	barbaric	but	it	was	here	that	Benjamin	used	it	to	convey	the	avant-garde’s	
demise	 –	 “rich	 energies”	 give	 or	 take	 –,	 which	 ultimately	 only	 heralded	 the	
superiority	of	that	“new	art	form”	(the	cinema,	and	by	extension	mass	culture).	
This	 had	 not	 always	 been	 the	 case.	 Roughly	 three	 years	 earlier	 the	
barbaric	–	in	the	context	of	cultural	production	–	could	still	register	as	a	“positive	
barbarity”.	 As	 the	 welcome	 glipside	 of	 decay	 where	 the	 avant-garde	 –	 not	 the	
cinema	 representing	mass	 culture	 –	 still	 loomed	 large	 as	 the	 prime	 catalyst	 of	
radical	 social	 and	 aesthetic	 renewal	 to	 overcome	 what	 Benjamin	 called	 a	
“poverty	of	experience”,	which	pertained	to	the	title	of	his	1932	text:	“Experience	
and	Poverty”.	
V.2	Defying	cultural	fatigue:	“Positive	Barbarity”	
In	 “Experience	 and	 Poverty”	 [Erfahrung	 und	 Armut,	 1933,	 possibly	 written	 in	
Ibiza]	 the	main	 topic	 of	 discussion,	 or	 rather	 of	 concern,	was	 not	 so	much	 the	
traditional	artwork’s	exposure	 to	mediatization	by	 image	 industry.	Rather	 than	
	While	the	term	barbarism,	understood	as	a	linguistic	and	grammatical	instance,	is	usually	309
misapplied	in	the	context	in	which	it	is	discussed	here	(not	so	in	the	English)	–	which	is	that	of	
the	barbaric/barbarity	as	a	societal,	political	feature	–	its	meaning	as	a	mutilation	of	language	
and	images	is	apt	in	the	context	of	Dada	as	employed	by	Benjamin.	The	various	word-image	
collages	(Höch,	Hausmann)	just	as	much	as	the	non-intelligible	poetry	and	performance	by	say	
Tzara,	Hugo	Ball,	Emmy	Jennings	etc.	indeed	perform	linguistic,	enunciative	and	material	
barbarization.
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these	 media-specigic	 developments,	 Benjamin	 here,	 as	 was	 posited	 by	 many	
before	 him	 (Simmel	 etc.),	 conceived	 of	 the	 crisis	 of	 artistic	 production	 as	 one	
consequence	 of	 the	 aftermath	 of	 World	 War	 I.	 Thus	 technology	 gigured	 in	
“Experience	 and	 Poverty”	 before	 anything	 else,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 material	
destruction	 and	 atrocities	 caused	 by	 the	 historically	 girst	 time	 fully	 deployed	
technological	warfare	 as	 experienced	 by	 veterans.	 He	writes:	 “An	 entirely	 new	
poverty	 has	 come	 over	 the	 people	 by	 this	 tremendous	 unfolding	 of	
technology.” 	 “Poverty”	here	does	not	only	denote	 an	economic	 condition	 (he	310
does	 speak	 of	 “inglation”	 though,	 perhaps	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Berlin	 stock	
market	 crash	 of	 1927,	 if	 not	 the	 1929	Wall	 Street	 crash	 pregiguring	 the	 Great	
Depression).	 “Poverty”	 is	 moreover	 a	 spiritual	 state	 Benjamin	 diagnosed	 in	
contemporary	 German	 society,	 one	 whose	 capability	 and	 ultimately	 desire	 for	
“experience”	had	been	both	overwhelmed	and	subsequently	anesthetized	by	that	
unsurpassable	total	experience	of	war.	The	consequence	for	culture,	as	a	sphere	
thought	 of	 compensating	 for	 that	 loss	 of	 experience	 or	 at	 least	 adequately	
addressing	 this	 situation,	 had	 at	 this	 point	 in	 time	 devastatingly	 failed	 both	 of	
these	 expectations.	 Interestingly	 enough,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 proclivities,	
intellectual	trends	and	obsessions	discussed	in	the	previous	chapters,	Benjamin	
likewise	 discerned	 a	 keen	 investment	 by	 the	 public	 in	 the	 more	 fringe	 or	
‘alternative’	 directions,	 manifested	 for	 him	 by	 the	 hodge-podge	 of	 ideas	 and	
practices	ranging	from	‘astrology’,	‘gnosis’,	‘spiritualism’	all	the	way	to	‘yoga’	(the	
latter	 held	 in	 high	 esteem	 by	 a	 later	 Bataille	 as	 an	 everyday	 pastime	 serving	
	“Erfahrung	und	Armut”	(1932/33),	in	Texte	zur	Literaturtheorie	der	Gegenwart,	ed.	Dorothee	310
Kimmich	et	al.,	Stuttgart,	1996,	pp.	122-128.	All	quotes	by	Benjamin	in	this	passage	from	this	
text.	All	trans.	by	the	author.	
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introspection,	 and,	 if	 lucky,	 receive	 small	 doses	 of	 ecstasy) .	 The	 draw	 these	311
spheres	exerted	over	their	audiences	was	precisely	due	to	their	presentation	of	
an	alternative	to	traditional	Western	ideas	and	institutions	of	investment,	which	
were	 tellingly	 here	 again	 aligned	 by	 Benjamin	 with	 the	 “Renaissance”.	 This	
traditional	pinnacle	of	Western	thought	and	arts	and	its	legacy	are	presented	as	
historically	redundant	in	view	of	the	political	and	social	reality,	in	that	again	this	
legacy	is	unable	to	offer	genuine	“experience”,	which	is	responsible	for	the	kind	
of	escapisms	mentioned	above.	Furthermore,	humanism’s	ideals	as	relayed	by	its	
arts	 were	 devastatingly	 proven	 inconsequential	 given	 the	 actual	 brutalities	 of	
war.	 All	 of	 which	 Benjamin	 considered	 to	 present	 “a	 new	 barbarity”,	 only	 to	
perform	a	180	degree	turn	on	this	notion	in	the	following	sentence,	where	it	 is	
precisely	this	kind	of	zero-point	of	the	current	state	of	affairs	that	offers	or	rather	
compels	 a	 radical	 turnaround,	 leading	 him	 to	 deem	 it	 a	 “positive	 barbarity”.	
Positively	barbaric	for	Benjamin	meant	a	radical	break	with	the	accrued	cultural	
heritage	of	 the	19th	 century	as	much	as	 tradition	generally,	 rendered	suspect	 if	
not	obscene	in	view	of	its	incongruence	with	present	conditions	(i.e.	a	critique	in	
the	vein	of	Adorno’s	in	the	mid	1940s).	This	radicalism	of	a	“positive	barbarity”,	
now	 indeed	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 conventional	 meaning	 of	 the	 barbaric	 as	 a	
destructive	 act	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 materials	 and	 ideas,	 Benjamin	 accorded	 to	 a	
rather	heterogeneous	group	including	Paul	Klee,	Adolf	Loos,	Bertolt	Brecht,	 the	
Bauhaus,	 Le	 Corbusier,	 the	 science-giction	writer	 Paul	 Scheerbart,	whose	 latter	
scenarios	 Benjamin	 lauded	 for	 their	 rebuff	 to	 human	 semblance	 and	 their	
	“Sehr	viel	später,	im	Jahre	1938,	führte	ein	Freund	mich	in	die	Yoga-U| bung	ein.	Bei	dieser	311
Gelegenheit	entdeckte	ich,	daß	die	Gewaltsamkeit	des	Bildes	[das	Foto	der	chinesischen	Folter/
Exekution]	eine	bodenlose	Bestürzung	bewirkte.	Diese	Gewalt	–	[…]	–	erschütterte	mich	
dermaßen,	das	ich	eine	Ekstase	erlebte.”	Tränen	des	Eros,	ed.	Gerd	Berggleth,	Munich	1991,	
unpaginated.
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characters’	 “dehumanized	 names”	 [“entmenschte	 Namen”].	 All	 these	 practices	
were	radical	to	him	in	that	they	conceived	of	forms	devoid	of	tradition,	cultural	
heritage,	and	especially	in	the	visual	arts	and	literature,	of	human	semblance	(i.e.	
the	 source	of	 allegedly	 corrupt	or	 false	 identigication	not	unlike	 the	probing	of	
immaculate	human	semblance	by	Bataille	and	the	rebuke	to	it	by	völkisch-fascist	
aesthetic	 doctrine).	 What	 all	 these	 rather	 diverse	 practices	 unigied	 was	 their	
uncompromising	 vision,	 which	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Klee	 meant	 the	 unrelenting,	
dehumanized	 laying	 bare	 and	 stripping	 down,	 exposing	 the	 “inside	 [Innere]	 of	
things”	 (“like	 the	 motor	 of	 a	 car”)	 which	 was	 equally	 reglected	 in	 the	 glass	
architecture	 of	 the	 Bauhaus,	 its	 mandate	 for	 transparency,	 an	 aggressive	
transparency,	 as	 opposed	 to	 now	 perceived	 to	 be	 sentimental,	 stuffy,	 lofty	
“interiority”	 [Innerlichkeit].	 “That’s	 what	 makes	 it	 barbaric”	 wrote	 Benjamin.	
“Aura”	 here,	 even	 before	 becoming	 central	 in	 the	 artwork	 essay	 was	 gladly	
disposed	of,	with	Benjamin	ruminating	on	the	glass	architecture	of	Corbusier	and	
the	Bauhaus,	as	well	as	the	glass	worlds	imagined	by	Scheerbart	as	making	aura	
impossible,	 an	anachronism:	 “glass”	was	a	 “hard	and	 slick	material	onto	which	
nothing	sticks”	 .	 In	other	words,	glass	served	as	an	allegory	for	that	“positive	312
barbarity”	 in	 that	 it	 pre-empted	 tradition,	 legacy,	 past	 narratives	 all	 of	 which	
were	necessary	 for	 something	 like	 aura	 to	develop.	The	 same	was	 true	 for	 the	
“steel”	 employed	 in	 modernist	 architecture	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Bauhaus’	 “spaces”	
generally,	 “within	 which	 it	 was	 difgicult	 to	 leave	 behind	 traces”.	 “Positive	
	Which	of	course	is	quite	ironic	given	that	the	narcissistic	reglection	of	the	postmodern	urban	312
“dandy”	–	regardless	of	gender	–	in	the	gleaming,	highly	reglective	corporate	and	commercial	
surfaces	very	much	“sticks”.	(Also	see	Hal	Foster,	The	Return	of	the	Real,	Cambridge/Mass.	1996,	
p.	142:	“[…]	and	indeed,	as	with	pop,	it	is	difgicult	to	imagine	superrealism	apart	from	the	tangled	
lines	and	lurid	surfaces	of	capitalist	spectacle:	the	narcissistic	seduction	of	shop	windows,	the	
luscious	sheen	of	sports	cars	[…]”)		
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barbarity”	 derived	 its	 value	 and	 efgicacy,	 indeed	 its	 positivity	 as	 something	
desirable,	from	apparently	not	offering	experience,	in	fact	being	anti-experience	
and	anti-historical,	in	the	form	of	a	harsh	bareness	mirroring	that	impoverished	
experience	of	social	reality.	Its	various	forms	did	not	lend	themselves	to	serving	
as	receptacles	for	narratives	of	the	past,	 its	cold,	hard	and	transparent	surfaces	
made	 emotional	 projection	 difgicult.	 Benjamin	 embraced	 this	 bare	 aesthetic	 of	
extreme	reduction	and	economy,	as	it	allowed	for	a	kind	of	fresh	start,	cleansed	
of	 history,	 culture,	 its	 narratives	 and	 thus	 its	 traumas.	 “They	 [the	people]	have	
had	with	 ‘culture’	and	the	 ‘human’,	they	had	enough	of	 it	and	are	tired	of	 it”,	he	
writes.	 By	 which	 he	 not	 only	 pointed	 directly	 to	 the	 cultural	 fatigue	 outlined	
above	 but	 furthermore	 introduced	 another	 alternative	 to	 rival	 this	 promising	
“positive	 barbarity”	 which,	 importantly,	 still	 came	 courtesy	 of	 the	 avant-garde	
whether	in	the	form	of	art,	architecture,	theatre	or	literature	(i.e.	the	avant-garde	
here	was	still	capable	of	delivering	new	ways	of	shared	aesthetic	investment	by	
said	 “positive	 barbarity”,	 hence	 certainly	 a	 more	 optimistic	 prospect	 than	
Benjamin’s	 view	 of	 Dada’s	 “wanting	 attempts”	 and	 its	 “negation”	 as	 failure	 as	
discussed	in	the	artwork	essay).	This	other	alternative	was	nothing	else	but	mass	
culture	 catering	 to	 a	 tired,	 psychologically	 and	physically	 exhausted	 audience’s	
desire	 for	non-,	or	disincorporated	experience;	 it	 therefore	presented	a	kind	of	
easy-access	 alternative	 to	 “positive	 barbarity”,	 in	 Benjmain’s	 view	 no	 better	
illustrated	 than	 by	 the	 shallow,	 carefree	 and	 most	 importantly	 gravity-free	
animated	 world	 of	 Walt	 Disney,	 in	 which	 gigures	 and	 objects	 easily	 changed	
shapes,	 locales	 and	 even	 elements	 without	 experiencing	 any	 consequences	 or	
harm	 from	 these	 quite	 substantial	 multi-dimensional	 transformations.	 Hence	
Benjamin	 hypothesize	 that	 a	 presumably	 larger	 contingent	 of	 this	 emotionally	
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impoverished	 audience	 would	 be	 aesthetically	 tended	 to	 by	 the	 temporary,	
comforting	 lightness	 of	Hollywood,	 of	Disney,	 the	 “dream”	 as	Benjamin	 calls	 it,	
providing	an	escape	from	“sadness”	and	“”despondence”.	(Paradoxically	enough,	
even	 though	 the	 genre	 of	 trick	 gilm	 was	 directly	 tied	 to	 advances	 made	 in	
cinematic	technology,	for	Benjamin	it	was	precisely	the	Disney	characters’	–	the	
cartoons	-	glaunted	ease	or	obliviousness,	indeed	superiority,	towards	machines	
and	 technology	 that	 made	 the	 gilms	 persuasive	 as	 both	 relaxing	 and	 exciting	
entertainment.)	Whence	Micky	Mouse	 is	a	 “being	 full	of	wonders	 that	not	only	
surpasses	 the	 technological	 ones	 but	 further	makes	 fun	 of	 these”,	 by	which	 he	
presumably	 meant	 to	 say	 that	 mass	 culture	 as	 represented	 by	 Disney	 fully	
obscured,	 indeed	 perverted	 the	 underlying	 larger	 economic	 conditions	 from	
which	it	operated .		313
A	 few	 years	 before,	 Bataille	 had	 actually	 thought	 quite	 similarly	 of	
Hollywood	 within	 Documents,	 calling	 it	 “a	 contemporary	 site	 of	 pilgrimage”	
providing	distraction	and	“respite”;	not	exactly	amusement	though,	since	Bataille	
considered	 Hollywood	 a	 “sanctuary	 for	 all	 those	 whom	 life	 has	 treated	 as	 we	
	As	far	as	Mickey	Mouse	is	concerned	it	is	worth	pointing	out	the	shared	antipathy	for	this	313
“icon”	of	mass	culture	by	Carl	Einstein:	“New	collective	tendencies.	The	revolt	of	the	petit	
bourgeois.	National	Art”.	He	adds	to	the	typescript	by	hand,	seemingly	as	an	afterthought:	“Film	
Photo	Mickey	Mouse”.	Einstein,	Die	Kunst	des	20.	Jahrhunderts,	(1931)	quoted	in	Charles	W.	
Haxthausen:	“Reproduction/Repetition:	Walter	Benjamin/Carl	Einstein”,October	107,	2004,	p.74	
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commonly	treat	a	piece	of	cloth.” 	(And	rather	than	Disney,	Bataille	addressed	314
the	monumentality	of	the	studio	system	proper,	as	the	article	was	accompanied	
by	 images	 entitled	 “Hollywood	 revue”,	 production	 stills	 picturing	 a	 mise-en-
scène	 reminiscent	 of	 Busby	Berkeley’s	 lavish	 choreography	 and	 set	 design.).	 If	
Benjamin	had	linked	this	compensatory	role	of	the	entertainment	industry	to	the	
desolate	 status	quo,	Bataille	 framed	 it	 less	 in	historical-political	 terms	but	as	a	
consequence	 of	 “a	 state	 of	 absolute	 depression”,	 perhaps	 here	 implicating	
himself,	 as	 a	 writer	 of	 giction	 and	 non-giction,	 falling	 prey	 to	 the	 distracting/
alluring	mechanism	of	Hollywood’s	products	which	he	called	“amusements”	and	
a	“tinsel	mirage”.	(This	idea	of	falling	prey	to	the	spectacle	offered	by	Hollywood,	
and	 how	 this	 potentially	 deglates	 or	 undercuts	 avant-garde	 ambitions	 of	
conceiving	 an	 equally	 powerful	 counter-aesthetic	 towards	 it,	 is	 evoked	 by	
Bataille	when	he	writes	that	“our	few	remaining	heady	dreams	are	traced	by	the	
swift	bodies	of	young	American	girls	[...]”. )	Furthermore	Bataille	set	up	his	text	315
by	 a	 sentiment	 or	 urge	 “to	 seize	 the	 power	 to	 destroy	 everything	 and	 start	 to	
	Bataille:	“Lieux	de	Pelerinage:	Hollywood”,	Documents	I	5,	1929,	in	Ades/Baker,	2006,	pp.	314
74-77.It	should	be	noted	that	this	was	precisely	the	kind	of	critique	Benjamin	would	not	much	
later	contest	himself	in	the	ginal	version	of	the	artwork	essay:	“[…]	Some	people	have	launched	
spirited	attacks	against	precisely	this	supergicial	manner	[of	cinematic	experience/consumption].	
Among	these,	Duhamel	has	expressed	himself	in	the	most	radical	manner.	Duhamel	calls	the	
movie	‘a	pastime	for	helots,	a	diversion	[Zerstreuung]	for	uneducated,	wretched,	worn-out	
creatures	[i.e.	Marx’	wretched	ones,	now	being	supplied	with	–	sold	–	temporarily	alleviating	
products	by	that	same	industry	etc.,	in	Adorno’s	view]	who	are	consumed	by	their	worries	a	
spectacle	which	requires	no	concentration	and	presupposes	no	intelligence,	which	kindles	no	
light	in	the	heart	and	awakens	no	hope	other	than	the	ridiculous	one	of	someday	becoming	a	
‘star’	in	Los	Angeles.’	Clearly	this	is	the	same	ancient	lament	that	the	masses	seek	distraction	
[Zerstreuung]	whereas	art	demands	concentration	form	the	spectator.”	Paragraph	XV,	in	
Benjamin,	Selected	Writings,	Vol.	4:	1938-1940,	Cambridge/Mass.,	2003,	pp.	251-283.	Note	though	
that	in	a	short	text,	“Theory	of	Distraction”,	apparently	originally	content	considered	for	inclusion	
in	the	artwork	essay,	one	ginds	the	following	statement:	“Distraction	[Zerstreuung]	and	
destruction	[Zerstörung]	as	the	subjective	and	objective	sides,	retrospectively,	of	one	and	the	
same	process.”	Benjamin,	2008,	p.56		
	See	Bataille	“Human	Face”,	Documents	I	4,	1929,	in	Brotchie	(ed.),	1995,	p106	315
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build	 from	scratch	 […]”	which	corresponded	with	Benjamin’s	similarly	phrased	
sentiment	 of	 wanting	 “to	 start	 from	 scratch.	 To	 start	 anew,	 to	 wipe	 the	 slate	
clean”	 and	 to	 therefore	 trigger	 a	 “positive	 barbarity”.	 Benjamin’s	 call	 for	 an	
aesthetic	 that	 is	 barbaric	 because	 bare,	 stripped	 down	 etc.	 seemingly	 also	
corresponds	 here	with	Bataille’s	 base	materialism	 in	 its	 emphasis	 on	 the	 “raw	
phenomena”.	 Bataille	 however,	 at	 least	 in	 this	 text,	 betrays	 a	 kind	 of	
powerlessness	 vis-à-vis	 the	 social	 force	 as	 imparted	 by	 Hollywood,	 precisely	
because	 it	 functions	 as	 that	 contemporary	 sacred,	 replacing	 the	 religious-
mythical	site	of	pilgrimage	with	the	dazzling	yet	ultimately	cheap	star(let)	as	an	
object	 of	 investment,	 replacing	 the	 Goddess	 and	 the	 sacrigices	 made	 to	 her.	
Herein	Hollywood	would	actually	seem	to	align	with	Nazi	fascism’s	provision	of	
the	 institutions	and	aesthetics	 for	a	sacred,	collective	 investment,	as	elaborated	
in	 Bataille’s	 “The	 psychological	 structure	 of	 fascism”	 from	 1934.	 As	 such,	 one	
could	also	read	Bataille’s	conglation	of	the	mythical	and	sacred	with	the	staged,	
produced,	 proliferated	 and	 consumed	 processes	 of	 mass	 culture	 as	 basically	
predicting	 Benjamin’s	 artwork	 essay	 (within	 which,	 to	 repeat,	 gilm	 (not	
Hollywood)	 held	 socially	 transformative	 potential).	 As	 far	 as	 the	 “dream”	
character	of	mass	culture	was	concerned	Bataille,	like	Benjamin,	in	a	way	negates	
the	 creative	 force	 or	 import	 of	 the	 imaginary	 and	 the	 dream,	 both	 central	
faculties	of	Andre	Bréton’s	concurrent	blend	of	Surrealism	with	its	emphasis	on	
reverie	 as	 generating	 expanded	 artistic	 output.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 as	 will	 be	
discussed	 in	 the	next	 chapter,	 dreams	had	 already	been	 subject	 to	 the	 rational	
analysis	 by	 Freud,	 as	 an	 entity	 made	 up	 of	 repression	 and	 sublimation.	 This	
psychoanalytical	 function	of	the	dream	as	a	compensatory	outlet	 is	mirrored	in	
the	workings	of	Hollywood,	whose	“[…]	sole	dream	[it]	is	to	entertain	the	rest	of	
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the	world”	(so	states	Bataille,	 literally	amalgamating	dream	with	entertainment	
industry)	and	not	in	avant-garde	vision,	that	being	one	of	a	base	formlessness	or	
of	 a	 positive	barbarity.	 The	 kind	of	 cultural	 fatigue	with	which	Benjamin’s	 text	
opens	 in	 his	 case	 gives	 way	 to	 a	 critique	 of	 nascent	 contemporary	 culture	 as	
exempligied	by	Disney,	which	in	Bataille’s	case	verges	on	outright	contempt	for	it	
(or,	 as	Bernd	Mattheus	 calls	 it,	Bataille’s	 “cultural	pessimism” ).	The	 spiritual	316
emptiness	 [“Entleerung”,	 Kracauer]	 observed	 by	 both	 Benjamin	 and	 Bataille	 is	
furthermore	 once	 again	 shared	 by	 reactionary	 positions	 of	 the	 völkisch-fascist	
spectrum	of	the	time.	The	allegory	alone	in	Benjamin’s	“Experience	and	Poverty”	
of	the	outmoded,	neglected	gigure	of	the	“storytelling	grandfather”,	personifying	
tradition	 and	 customs	 making	 possible	 social	 cohesion	 that	 have	 become	
ineffective	 or	 are	 severely	 diminished	 by	modernity,	 can	 be	 found	 all	 over	 the	
place	in	proto-fascist	writing	of	the	time.	The	resulting	spiritual	emptiness,	and	
the	 erosion	 of	 a	 social	 bond,	 as	 I	 have	 already	 discussed	 in	 the	 girst	 chapter,	
therefore	also	 informs	Herman	Wirth’s	already	mentioned	The	Rise	of	Mankind.	
In	the	introduction	Wirth	writes:			
The	 occident	 is	 caught	 by	 a	 frightening	 drabness	 and	 emptiness	 by	way	 of	 its	
complete	mechanization	and	materialism.	 		317
Written	 in	 1928,	 this	 gloomy,	 pessimistic	 verdict	 of	 the	 state	 of	 things	
reverberated	with	its	contemporaries,	not	least	with	the	attitudes	voiced	within	
Documents	 to	 recall	 Michel	 Leiris’	 bemoaning	 of	 the	 “modern	 occidentals’”	 in	
	Mattheus,	1984,	p.	148.	The	term	may	not	be	correctly	pertaining	to	Bataille’s	critique	of	316
Hollywood.
	Wirth,	1928,	p.	4317
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“The	 Magic	 Island”	 (1929),	 their	 devotion	 to,	 or	 alarming	 dependency	 on	 a	
“mechanical	 [i.e.	 Fordist]”	 labor	 process	 and	 a	 strict	 adherence	 to	 a	 “purely	
utilitarian	 notion	 of	 civilization.”	 Yet	 despite	 or	 because	 of	 this	 perceived	
“drabness”	 and	 “emptiness”	 the	 quest	 for	 a	 new,	 trailblazing	 aesthetic	was	 not	
the	exclusive	claim	of	the	avant-garde.	It	can	be	detected	in	fascist	art	theory	of	
the	time,	which	equally	called	for	a	radical	break	from	both	a	bourgeois-cultural	
legacy,	understood	in	this	case	that	of	a	humanist	or	Western	tradition,	as	well	as	
from	 the	 material	 promises	 and	 sensory	 spectacle	 offered	 by	 mass	 culture.	
Aspirations	to,	or	at	least	consideration	for,	radical	abstraction	and	the	embrace	
of	raw	aesthetics	that	would	deny	beauty	can	even	be	found	in	these	writings:	
which,	however,	ultimately	led	to	an	expectably	problematic	ideological	rift	
within	fascist	aesthetic	itself.		
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VI	Volatile	Anti-Aesthetics	Left	and	Right		
VI.1	A	fascist	unconscious	
Nazi	 art,	 conceived	 as	 both	 an	 aesthetic	 and	 crucially	 a	 political	 project,	
culminating	 in	and	effectively	 illustrated	by	the	 	 “Great	German	Art	Exhibition”	
held	at	Munich’s	Haus	der	Kunst	in	1937,	is	habitually	associated	with	a	rigid	and	
reactionary	 homogeneity.	 The	works,	 as	 Benjamin	 Buchloh	 has	 pointed	 out ,	318
exhibited	resuscitations	of	already	exhausted	representations	of	gender:	strong	
and	 domineering	 male	 protagonists	 and	 wholesome,	 fertile	 and	 subservient	
female	 auxiliaries	 set	 in	 various	 imaginary	 “German”	 bucolic	 landscapes.	 The	
latter	were	cobbled	together	from	tropes	of	German	Romanticism	watered	down	
in	the	style	of	the	Sunday	painter,	thus	denying	the	glum	darkness	of	the	genre,	in	
which	notions	of	longing,	solitude	and	disorientation	were	more	or	less	urgently	
foregrounded	 by	 placing	 lone	 gigures	 or	 small	 gatherings	 of	 individuals	 in	
settings	of	awesome	natural	beauty	in	the	proper	Burkeian	sense	(i.e.	a	notion	of	
beauty	 linked	 to	 terror	 revealing	beauty’s	 sublime	 faculty).	 Fascist	painting,	by	
contrast,	betrays	a	 formal	naiveté	 in	the	rendering	of	 landscapes	and	of	bodies,	
which	 in	most	of	 the	works	bear	physiques	 that,	although	completely	opposite,	
are	 nevertheless	 as	 eccentric	 in	 their	 synthetic	 tautness	 than	 the	 frequently	
unhinged,	 jarring	 outlines	 and	 features	 that	 are	 signature	 to	 German	
Expressionism.	The	paintings’	palettes	are	orientated	 towards	subdued	pastels,	
for	the	most	part	eschewing	the	ocular	vividness	and	the	illusion	of	depth	offered	
	Buchloh,	“Designs	and	dialectics	of	annihilation”.	Lecture,	Haus	der	Kunst	Munich,	June	10th,	318
2012.	Online	at	
http://www.hausderkunst.de/index.php?
id=751&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=2483&cHash=b49a89f52e983fa7fcd87bae3c0a0468	
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by	fully	exploiting	the	properties	of	color	as	a	medium.	The	aspiring	and	ruling	
“(petit-)bourgeois	aesthetic	virtue	of	mimetic	giguration”	(Buchloh)	shaping	the	
representation	 of	 both	 subject	 and	 object	 is	 key.	 Quasi-classless	 subjects	 (i.e.,	
subjects	 “freed”	 of	 any	 attributes/degicits	 indicating	 their	 social	 standing	 or	
economic	conditions)	are	set	within	quasi-timeless	and	unresolved	sceneries	of	
an	 anachronistic	 “golden	 age”:	 half	 “Greco-Roman”,	 half	 “Teutonic”	 (Buchloh)	
(needless	to	say	with	both	of	these	qualities	being	of	a	phantasmagoric	nature).	
Even	 the	 slightest	 traces	 of	 urbanity	 and	 technology	 are	 absent,	 as	 are	
ornamentation,	 geometric	 patterns	 and	 abstraction	 of	 any	 kind;	 the	work	 thus	
images	 the	 regime’s	 myth	 of	 a	 near	 fascist	 future	 seemingly	 unaffected	 by	 –	
indeed	blithely	unconscious	of	–	modernity	(hence	of	fragmentation	of	any	kind).	
The	Volk	gains	its	power	and	agency	–	its	raison	d’être	–	exclusively	from	suspect	
premises	 of	 race	 and	 geography	 (i.e.,	 from	 blood	 and	 soil) .	 It	 is	 for	 these	319
reasons	 that	 Buchloh	 terms	 the	 entirety	 of	 fascist	 art	 as	 presented	 in	 this	
exhibition	a	 “pornography	of	promises”.	Furthermore,	 the	kind	of	work	making	
up	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	 “Great	 German	 Art	 Exhibition”	 perfectly	 exempligies	
Strzygowski’s	 deplored	 notion	 of	 allegory:	 a	 deception,	 fabricated	 and	
disseminated	by	political	power,	and	in	this	case,	an	allegory	barely	qualifying	as	
such	 since	 the	 representations	 offered	 here	 basically	 collapsed	 into	 composite	
	Mark	Antliff	argues	this	pictorial	exclusion	of	modernity	in	fascist	art	not	as	German	avant-319
gardist	refuge	but	as	a	kind	of	proactive	landscape	to	reglect	the	political	ambitions.	Nazi	art	used	
the	countryside	“[…]	as	the	focus	for	the	palingetic	myth	of	renewal	and	sustenance,	not	for	a	
retreat	from	twentieth	century”.		Avantgarde	Fascism,	Durham/NC	2007,	p.26.	He	does	not	offer	
the	corresponding	historical	scenario	seeking	said	“retreat”,	but	most	likely	he	is	thinking	of	
groups	such	as	the	Blaue	Reiter	and	the	Brücke,	who	each	drew	on	an	unpolluted	countryside	
and	folk	art	tropes	in	their	works,	rendered	importantly	through	an	expressionist	style	that	
unfastened	mimetic	giguration	and	employing	an	“expressive”,	luminous	palette	which	routinely	
contradicted	the	palette	of	the	natural	world	(i.e.	the	fantastically	hued	animals	of	Marc	or	the	
unnatural	skin	tones	of	urban	subjects	in,	say,	Kirchners	paintings	and	so	forth.)
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yet	psychologically	one-dimensional	archetypes .	It	was	Machtkunst	at	its	best	320
–	or	worst,	considering	the	exhibition’s	efgicacy	at	the	level	of	spectacle	and	pull,	
a	 level	at	which	the	“Great	German	Art	Exhibition”	was	positively	bested	by	the	
concurrently	held		“Degenerate	Art	Exhibition”	next	door	 .	321
The	ofgicial	 fascist	aesthetics,	as	briegly	outlined	above,	did	not	however	
singularly	 inform	 the	 genesis	 of	 a	 fascist	 aesthetic	 project	 forming	 in	 the	 early	
1930s.	 Rather,	 it	 should	 be	 considered	 a	 gradually	 and	 dictatorially	 instated	
aesthetic,	most	obviously	and	devastatingly	against	and	“at	the	cost”	of	the	avant-
garde,	 but	 furthermore	 departing	 from	 the	 aesthetic	 and	 ideological	 paths	
pursued	 by	 the	 völkisch-fascist	 aesthetic	 project	 presented	 in	 the	 previous	
chapters.		
In	view	of	the	psychological	“glatness”	or	one-dimensionality	of	the	work	
(as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 deferral	 of	 history,	 class	 and	 social	 realities	 by	 representing	
gictitious	yet	repressed	scenarios	suspended	in	a	kind	of	psychological	vacuum)	
it	 seems	 necessary	 to	 point	 out	 that	 one	 of	 the	 most	 crucial	 ideas	 for	 the	
European	 avant-garde,	 Freud’s	 concept	 of	 the	 “unconscious”	 (1900),	 was	
implicitly	addressed	within	Germanien.	The	argument	against	a	Freudian	concept	
	Note	that	Carl	Jung’s	notion	of	the	archetype	therefore	unsurprisingly	lent	itself	to	fascist-320
völkisch	ideological	co-optation:	“Today	it	has	been	proven	namely	by	the	studies	conducted	by	
C.G.	Jung,	that	the	myths	bear	the	expressions	of	the	typical	experiences	of	our	race,	that	they	
mirror	the	behaviors	typical	of	our	race	when	dealing	with	signigicant	turning-points	in	man’s	
development”.	Viergutz,	Germanien	1936,	p.132	
	“der	besuch	der	ausstellung	haelt	nach	wie	vor	ununterbrochen	an.	taeglich	stroemen	321
mindestens	ueber	20.000	menschen	aus	dem	in.	–	und	ausland	durch	die	saele	und	verlassen	die	
ausstellung	auf	das	tiefste	beeindruckt	von	den	ungeheuerlichkeiten	die	dem	deutschen	volk	
einst	als	kunst	vorgesetzt	wurden.	besonders	gross	ist	die	besucherzahl	der	englaender	und	
amerikaner,	die	zum	groessten	teil	sehr	erfreut	darueber	sind,	dass	in	deutschland	endlich	
einmal	mehr	der	trennungstrich	zwischen	schund	und	wahrer	kunst	gezogen	wurde.	[…]	gesamt-
besucherzahl	vom	19.	juni	nnn	[sic]	juli	mit	3.august		384.290.	hoechstbesucherzahl,	sonntag	den	
2.	august		35.600		.		die	ausstellungsleitung.”	Communique	from	the	exhibition’s	curatorial	team	
dated	4.8.1937.	BArch	R55/20743.1
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of	 the	unconscious	did	not,	however,	exclusively	take	the	 form	of	an	expectable	
rejection	on	moralist	grounds.	Rather,	it	could	be	argued	that	fascist	thought,	in	
the	 manner	 of	 the	 positions	 taken	 in	 that	 particular	 völkisch	 spectrum	 -	
exempligied	 by	 Germanien	 -	 was	 anxious	 to	 wrest	 the	 unconscious	 from	
psychoanalysis	 (Freud),	 replacing	 it	with	 a	higher,	more	pristine	 “unconscious”	
that	essentially	would	be	innate	to	the	kind	of	desired	affective	response	to	the	
Sinnbild:	an	affective	process	devoid	of	materialist	analysis,	of	interpretation,	of	
self-reglexivity,	but	instead	giguring	as	a	“natural”	sensory	experience	that	would	
provide	 a	 direct	 link	 with	 the	 ancestral	 and,	 by	 tapping	 that	 ancient	 energy,	
would	 yield	 the	 energy	 for	 a	 fascist	 community	 to	 come.	 One	 such	 text	 in	
Germanien	thus	reads:		
The	researcher	of	the	Sinnbild	[Sinnbildforscher]	will	be	capable	of	experiencing	
and	re-experiencing	Sinnbilder	himself	 [nachzuerleben],	and	 in	doing	so,	given	
that	 he	 can	 master	 the	 material	 [den	 Stoff	 meistern],	 he	 can	 open	 up	 new	
sources	of	völkisch	power	[Kraft]	to	us. 		322
This	 “mastering	 of	 the	 material”	 of	 the	 already	 discussed,	 frequently	 self-
confessed	unintelligible,	abstract	even	“uncanny”	Sinnbild	by	the	völkisch-fascist	
faction	was	naturally	no	easy	task,	not	 least	since	the	actual	 faculties	and	skills	
required	 of	 the	 “researcher”	 remained	 rather	 vaguely	 identigied.	 Indeed,	 as	
Viergutz	acknowledged:	
We	 would	 have	 to	 despair	 in	 view	 of	 ever	 being	 able	 to	 cogently	 [deutend]	
understand	 the	 Sinnbilder	 and	 signs	 [Zeichen]	 of	 our	 ancestors	 if	 it	 weren’t	
	Viergutz,	Germanien	1937,	p.	132322
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possible	for	us	to	experience	Sinnbilder	ourselves.	Which	we	actually	do	day	and	
night	 most	 discernibly	 in	 our	 dreams,	 since	 our	 inner	 powerful	 emotions	
[Regungen]	of	the	soul	gind	their	expression	in	images	that	are	strangely	gleeting	
in	their	outlines	yet	have	a	distinct	character	like	the	soul’s	emotions. 	323
Hence	the	(unconscious)	act	of	dreaming	gave	access	to	that	desperately	sought	
after	reconnection	with	ancestral	knowledge	in	that	it	generated	the	experience	
of	 eternal	 Sinnbilder,	 which	 thus	 became	 partially	 legible	 (meaning	 their	
ultimately	 political	 asset	 became	 conceivable).	 Importantly	 though,	 given	 the	
aesthetic-political	 promise	 of	 the	 Sinnbild	 for	 a	 concrete	 fascist	 project,	 the	
dream	did	not	serve	to	generate	images	registering	as	an	expanded	imagination,	
as	fantasy,	but	essentially	provided	the	knowledge	–	the	“material”	[Stoff]	–	to	be	
utilized	in	the	waking	state,	for	a	shaping	of	a	fascist	reality.	Nevertheless,	despite	
being	orientated	 towards	a	political	project,	 “Sinnbildforschung”	can	ultimately	
be	 said	 to	 have	 grappled	 with	 this	 “subject	 of	 such	 great	 interest”,	 as	 Freud	
admitted	it	to	be	on	the	girst	page	of	the	Interpretation	of	Dreams:	
It	 may	 be	 asked	 what	 view	 was	 taken	 of	 dreams	 in	 pre-historic	 times	 by	
primitive	races	of	men	and	what	effect	dreams	may	have	had	upon	the	formation	
of	their	conceptions	of	the	world	and	of	the	soul. 	324
	Ibid.,	pp.131-132	(transl.	by	the	author)	323
	Freud,	The	Interpretation	of	Dreams,	Standard	Edition	Vol	4-5,	ed.	and	trans.	James	Strachey,	324
London	1953	[1900],	pp.1-2		
	181
A	 question	 which,	 after	 the	 girst	 page,	 Freud	 	 “[…]	 with	 much	 reluctance	
refrain[ed]	from	dealing	with	in	this	connection”. 	325
Since	 these	 primal	 “conceptions	 of	 the	 world	 and	 the	 soul”	 were	 to	 be	
recuperated	by	völkisch-fascism	and	were,	according	 to	Viergutz,	 locatable	and	
obtainable	expressly	by	the	act	of	dreaming,	this	“unconscious”	state	demanded	
further	elucidation.	For	 it	was	 	 “unconscious”	experience	 turned	knowledge,	 in	
the	form	of	receiving	that	dream-material,	that	in	turn	would	provide	the	actual	
“schema”	(i.e.	the	concept)	as	Hugo	Dingler	had	called	it,	indispensable	in	order	
to	properly	understand	 the	 “active	 image”	 (Lebensbild,	 i.e.	 a	phenomenological	
and	moreover	social	reality).	This	process	of	tapping	dreams	(the	unconscious)	
in	 order	 to	 unearth	 and	 identify	 the	 spiritual-political	 content	 (unfazed	 by	
history,	by	power	art,	by	prescribed	(humanist)	aesthetics	and	ideals,	berated	by	
Strzygowskis	as	“powers	of	the	wills”	[Willenskräfte])	thus	perfected	the	already	
discussed	 projective	 nature	 of	 “art	 research”	 itself;	 its	 amazing	 capacity,	 to	
restate	 Strzygowski,	 of	 “rendering	 actual	 even	 that	 which	 has	 not	 been	
conserved”.	(Or,	to	expand	that	theory:	the	cultural	legacy	had	been	“conserved”	in	
the	 dream).	 The	 dynamic	 between	 the	 abstract	 realm	 which	 the	 Sinnbilder	
decoded	and	this	realm’s	ancestral	and	ethnically	derived	powers	thus	gigure	as	a	
kind	of	völkisch-fascist	cathexis	permeating	the	various	wanting,	residual,	pieced	
together	 artefacts	 constituting	 the	barbaric-superior	 legacy	 that	 this	 fascist	 art	
research	sought	to	redress.		
Structurally	 speaking,	 it	 was	 regression	 that	 lay	 at	 the	 core	 of	 a	
methodology	of	the	Sinnbild,	as	the	aesthetic	fundamental	to	fascist	ideology	of	
	Ibid.325
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the	völkisch	variety,	precisely	in	the	way	this	methodology	was	tied	to	the	dream.	
For	 it	 was	 regression,	 understood	 as	 a	 process,	 not	 as	 an	 aesthetic	 or	 social	
judgment,	 which	 according	 to	 Freud	 was	 the	 chief	 dynamic	 underlying	 the	
“system	Unconscious”.	Towards	the	end	of	the	middle	part	of	the	Interpretation	of	
Dreams	Freud	states	that	“for	simplicity’s	sake”	“we	can	locate	the	impetus	to	the	
construction	of	dreams	in	the	system	Uncs.”	It	is,	claims	Freud,	“the	starting	point	
of	dream	formation” .	The	“unconscious”	as	 “starting	point”	 thus	 functions	as	326
the	 catalyst	 for	 the	 visual	 sequences	 of	 the	 dream	 that	 develop	 regressively.	
Regressive,	 in	 Freud’s	 “interpretation”	 [Deutung],	 because	 the	 dream	 process/
formation	 instigated	 by	 the	 unconscious	 is	 “an	 excitation	 [that]	 moves	 in	
backward	 direction”	 from	 the	 “motor	 end”	 –	 the	 actual	 starting	 point	 of	
perception	in	the	waking	state	–	to	the	“sensory	end” .	327
We	call	 it	 ‘regression’	when	in	a	dream	an	idea	is	turned	back	into	the	sensory	
image	 from	which	 it	 was	 originally	 derived	 […]	 from	 thoughts	 to	 the	 pitch	 of	
complete	sensory	vividness. 	328
But	not	only	were	 the	constitutive	parts	of	 the	unconscious	at	 the	sensory	end	
“vivid”;	 furthermore,	 “in	 [that]	 regression	 the	 fabric	 of	 dream-thoughts	 is	
	Ibid.,	pp.	541,	542	(Standard	Edition	Vol.	5).	“In	which	of	these	systems,	then	are	we	to	locate	326
the	impetus	to	the	construction	of	dreams?	For	simplicity’s	sake	in	the	system	Ucs.”	
	
	Ibid.	327
	Ibid.,	p.	543	328
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resolved	into	its	raw	material” .	That	very	“fabric”,	to	recall	the	“material	to	be	329
mastered”	by	 the	Sinnbildforscher,	 came	 full	 circle	 in	 the	 “raw	material”	which	
was	to	be	sublimated	into	a	charged	Sinnbild	by	the	fascist	anti-aesthetic	for	the	
purpose	 of	 “open[ing]	 new	 sources	 of	 power”.	 The	 act	 of	 engaging	 with	 the	
Sinnbild	 in	 a	 supra-aesthetic	 manner	 akin	 to	 the	 primitive	 “being	 dissolved	
[aufgehoben]	 in	 the	 artwork”	 (Einstein,	 1915)	 encapsulated	 that	 unmediated	
“sensory	 vividness”	 achieved	 by	 regression,	 which	 enabled	 not	 only	 the	
individual	modern	dreamer	but	an	entire	people	to	“go	back	to	the	old	ways	of	
looking	at	things	and	of	feeling	about	them,	to	impulses	and	activities	which	long	
dominated	 us	 [them]”,	 thus	 that	 which	 had	 been	 “suppressed	 [would]	 has	
become	 the	 motive	 force	 of	 dreams”	 –	 and	 not	 merely	 the	 “motive	 force	 of	
dreams”	but	of	an	actual	political	project	called	fascism .	Quite	astonishingly,	as	330
early	 as	 1933	 Bataille	 had	 likewise	 essentially	 linked	 his	 reading	 of	 Freud’s	
Interpretation	of	Dreams,	to	his	own	theory	of	heterogeneity	and	consequently	to	
his	analysis	of	fascism	bearing	girst	and	foremost	“a	psychological	structure”.	
In	heterogeneous	reality,	the	symbols	charged	with	affective	value	thus	have	the	
same	importance	as	the	fundamental	elements,	and	the	part	can	have	the	same	
value	as	the	whole.	It	is	easy	to	note	that,	since	the	structure	of	knowledge	for	a	
homogenous	 reality	 is	 that	of	science,	 the	knowledge	of	a	heterogeneous	 reality	
	Ibid.		329
	James	Sully	and	Yves	Delage,	quoted	in	Freud	1953,	Vol.	5,	p.	591	Which	in	this	constellation	330
would	echo	Bataille’s	call	“to	rediscover	motifs	of	force”,	which	he	perceived	in	the	Gnostics’	base	
materialism	serving	as	a	model	for	aesthetic	transgression	enabling	renewal,	including	on	a	
socio-political	level.		
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as	such	is	to	be	found	in	the	mystical	thinking	of	primitives	and	in	dreams:	it	is	
identical	to	the	structure	of	the	unconscious	. 	331
Bataille’s	 conception	 of	 “charged”	 “affective”	 “symbols”	 that	 “have	 the	 same	
importance	as	fundamental	elements”,	i.e.	as	reality,	certainly	provides	as	good	as	
any	 a	 description	 of	 the	 entire	 völkisch-fascist	 undertaking	 (which	 for	 Freud,	
being	 the	 diehard	 rationalist	 he	 was,	 actually	 would	 be	 a	 conception	 possibly	
symptomatic	of	schizophrenia ).	332
Georges	Didi-Huberman,	on	 the	other	hand,	 takes	up	Freud’s	 concept	of	
regression	 not	 in	 the	 context	 of	 fascist	 image	 theory	 but	 with	 regard	 to	
Documents’	 specigic	deployment	of	 images	 to	–	on	a	visual	plane	–	presage	 the	
arguments	advanced	 in	 the	 texts,	 as	opposed	 to	 simply	 serving	as	 illustrations.	
He	 speaks	 of	 a	 “dialectic	 of	 forms”,	 a	 term	 he	 adopts	 from	 Bataille	 himself	 in	
Documents. 	 This	 dialectic,	 states	 Didi-Huberman,	 is	 not	 merely	 of	 a	333
“transgressive”	 nature	 characteristic	 of	 Bataille’s	 thinking	 as	 a	 whole	 but	
furthermore	implies	“regression”.	This	notion	of	regression	at	work	or	rather	as	a	
	Bataille,	1985	[1933/34],	p.	143.	Bataille	in	footnote	7	in	the	original	text	specigies	The	331
Interpretation	of	Dreams	as	the	source	for	his	reference	to	the	unconscious	(1985,	p.	160).	This	
emphasizing	of	the	psychological	component	as	key	to	Nazi	fascism	at	the	very	moment	of	its	
ofgicial	outset	can	further	be	discerned	in	Wilhelm	Reich	(as	libidinal	transposition	in	Die	
Massenpsychologie	des	Faschsimus,1933)	and	Ernst	Bloch		(as	“non-synchronicity”	
“Ungleichzeitigkeit”(	1933),	a	notion	equal	part	psychological	as	it	is	(phantasmagorically)	
historical,	in	Erbschaft	dieser	Zeit,	1934).	
	“We	may	on	the	other	hand	attempt	a	characterization	of	the	schizophrenic’s	mode	of	332
thought	by	saying	that	he	treats	concrete	things	as	though	they	were	abstract”.	“The	
Unconscious”,	Standard	Edition	Vol.	14,	ed.	and	trans.	James	Strachey,	London1957,	p.	204	
	“The	secret	[?]	play	between	image	montage	and	the	de-montage	of	theories	within	the	333
magazine,	which	Bataille	executes	on	notions	such	as	form	and	resemblance,	this	structural	and	
methodological	“materialistic”	co-play	is	the	reason	we	discern	something	in	the	expression	
“dialectics	of	forms”	that	comes	dangerously	close	to	one	of	a	dialectics	of	images”,	2010,	p.242	
(Trans.	by	the	author).	
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link	 between	 the	 ideas	 conveyed	 in	 Bataille’s	 writing	 vis-à-vis	 the	 images	
selected	 by	 him	 to	 enter	 into	 dialogue	with	 these	 ideas	 registers,	 according	 to	
Didi-Huberman,	 as	 a	 Freudian	 process	 of	 regression,	 again	 structurally.	 The	
“discontent”	 reglected	 in	 the	 destabilizing	 of,	 and	 the	 attacks	 on,	 hitherto	
normative	 abstractions	 (e.g.	 beauty,	 progress,	 order)	 formulated	 in	 the	writing	
lead	to	the	images	that	register	as	“symptoms”.	These	symptomatic	images	thus	
become	 the	 bases	 of	 uncertainty	 or	 outright	 collapse	 with	 regard	 to	 these	
abstract	 values,	 for	 which	 Didi-Huberman	 suitably	 picks	 the	 image	 of	 the	
crumbling	 “factory	 chimney”	 as	 a	 prime	 example	 of	 the	 idea	 regressing	 into	
(leading	 back	 to)	 the	 image	 that	 is	 symptomatic	 of	 the	 idea	 (i.e.	 it	 structurally	
and	temporally	precedes	the	theoretical	idea	–	the	diagnosis	–	by	surfacing	as	the	
symptom,	pertaining	as	these	two	terms	do	not	only	to	“invisible”	psychological	
processes	but	to	physiologically	visible	ones) .			334
Another	 way	 to	 locate	 regression	 in	 Bataille’s	 thinking	 at	 the	 time	 of	
Documents	 is	 by	way	 of	 those	 “raw	phenomena”	 he	 exhumed	 –	 from	 the	 body,	
from	culture,	from	history	–	and	celebrated	for	their	rawness,	not	least	in	order	
to	stain	aesthetic	and	philosophical	paradigms	through,	literally,	exposure	of	the	
raw.	Freud’s	notion	of	that	“fabric	of	dream	thoughts”	–	basically	the	ontology	of	
Bréton’s	surrealism	–	as	the	realm	preceding	full	regression	into	“raw	material”	
provides	 a	 context	 for	 Bataille’s	 promotion	 of	 “raw	 phenomena”.	 Freud’s	
evocation	of	the	“raw	phenomena”	of	(base)	materialism	thus	supports	Bataille’s	
critique	 of	 Surrealism:	 its	 editing	 or	 raisin	 picking	 of	 the	 unconscious	 –	 “the	
	All	quotes	by	Didi-Huberman	in	this	passage	in	Ibid,	pp.	242-243	334
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pitiable	 treasure-trove” 	 –,	 eschewing	 its	more	 pugnacious	 features.	 (Krauss’	335
notion	of	a	“hard	primitivism”,	which	she	accredits	to	the	Bataille	of	Documents,	
thus	corresponds	with	Freud’s	“raw	material”,	since	 it	 is	 the	regressive	basis	 to	
the	sublimated	“fabric	of	dream	thoughts”	which	Bataille	would	discredit	Bréton	
for ).		336
Didi-Huberman	pinpoints	Freud’s	original	German	term	of	“Rückbildung”	
as	 neatly	 literalizing	 the	 process	 and	 the	 ginal	 state	 of	 regression	 (which	 the	
French/English	 term	 “regression”	 does	 not	 achieve),	 the	 actual	 process	 of	
conscious	thought	regressing	 into	that	“sensory	 image”	emerging	 in	the	dream;	
those	 images	 whose	 “outlines	 were	 so	 gleeting	 yet	 of	 such	 distinct	 [vivid]	
character”,	to	recall	Viergutz.	Which	means	that,	to	further	engage	the	semantic	
capacity	 of	 a	 “Rückbild(ung)”,	 when	 read	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 fascist	 progress	
achieved	 through	 regression	 by	 way	 of	 Sinnbild	 aesthetic,	 the	 “Rückbild”	 was	
glipped	 into	 the	 “Vorbild”	 (ideal/model).	 As	 regression	 in	 reverse	 and	 yet	 as	 a	
state/State	 perfectly	 summed	 up	 by	 Freud	 in	 his	 later	 appendix	 concerning	
regression,	 where	 he	 differentiated	 between	 topical,	 temporal	 and	 formal	
regression,	 the	 latter	described	as	a	scenario	“where	primitive	expressions	and	
representations	replace	common	ones”.	
	Bataille,	“The	‘Old	Mole’	and	the	Pregix	Sur”,	(ca.	1929/1930).		In	Bataille,	1985,	p.	39	335
	Ibid.:	“The	same	double	tendency	is	found	in	contemporary	surrealism,	which	maintains,	of	336
course,	the	predominance	of	higher	ethereal	values	(clearly	expressed	by	the	addition	of	the	
pregix	sur,	the	trap	into	which	Nietzsche	had	already	fallen	with	superman).	More	precisely,	since	
surrealism	is	immediately	distinguishable	by	the	addition	of	low	values	(the	unconscious,	
sexuality,	gilthy	language,	etc.)	it	invests	these	values	with	an	elevated	character	by	associating	
them	with	the	most	immaterial	values.”		
	187
All	 three	 kinds	 of	 regression	 are	 in	 the	 end	one	 and	 the	 same	 and	 coincide	 in	
most	 cases,	 because	 the	 temporally	 more	 ancient	 is	 also	 the	 formally	 more	
primitive	one	and	 in	view	of	 the	psychological	 topicality	both	are	closer	 to	 the	
sensory	end. 	337
If	“Rückbildung”	produced	the	“Vorbild”	(i.e.,	the	Sinnbild)	–	if	regression	was	the	
ideal	–	that	“system	Uncs.”	had	to	be	tweaked	accordingly	so	as	to	no	longer	serve	
as	 the	 chief	 repository	 for	 the	 not	 least	 visually	 associative	 thoughts	 the	 ego	
would	 have	 to	 suppress.	 It	 had	 to	 be	 sublimated;	 put	 differently,	 it	 had	 to	 be	
sublimated	in	a	(fascist)	superego,	where	the	(Freudian)	unconscious	was,	in	the	
truly	Hegelian	sense,	“aufgehoben”:	negated,	conserved	-	sublated.	Thus,	to	come	
back	to	Viergutz,	this	meant	that:	
The	 formation	 of	 the	 symbol	 in	 so-called	 abstract	 signs,	 such	 as	 the	 runes,	 is	
simultaneously	a	creative	process	of	a	higher	nature.	Within	them	experiences	of	
the	human	soul’s	deeper	 layer	 gind	expression	unattainable	 [nicht	hinabreicht]	
by	 the	 everyday	 conscious;	 experiences	 of	 the	 individual-spiritual	
[eigenseelische]	development	but	also	those	of	supra-personal	[überpersönlich]	
experience	[that	are]	in	a	state	of	sacred	immersion	[heilige	Ergriffenheit]. 	338
So	 the	 fascist	 Sinnbild,	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 the	 “soul’s	 deeper	 layer”	 (i.e.	 the	
unconscious),	 not	 only	 served	 as	 a	 receptacle	 of	 personal	 “eigenseelische”	
development	 (leaving	 it	 open	 as	 to	 whether	 that	 “Entwicklung”	 registered	 as	
progress	 or	 crisis),	 but	 accommodated	 an	 abstract	 religious	 dimension:	
“heilig”	(sacred).	Furthermore,	while	the	unconscious	was	indeed	acknowledged	
	Quoted	in	Didi-Huberman,	2012,	p.	243	(Trans.	by	the	author).	337
	Viergutz,	Germanien	1937,	p.132.	Also	note	that	the	non-plus-ultra	“modern”	Sinnbild	338
capturing	and	transporting	sacred	immersion	and	higher	experience	across	a	select	collective	
was	–	inevitably	–	the	swastika.	See	Chapter	4/5	
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for	 a	 visual	 theory,	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 buried,	 indescribable	 stratum,	 it	was	deep	 yet	
under	 no	 circumstances	 base.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 by	 exclusively	 linking	 the	
unconscious	 to	 “higher	 nature”	 and	 according	 it	 a	 “sacred	 state”,	 it	was	 clearly	
positioned	 above	 the	 ratio.	 Needless	 to	 say,	 “sacred”	was	 surely	 not	 conceived	
here	as	it	was	by	Bataille	in	his	“Psychologocal	Strucutre	of	fascism”	and	later	in	
the	context	of	 the	Collège	de	Sociologie	where	he	derived	 the	double	nature	of	
the	 sacred,	 (its	 heterogeneity)	 from	 Rudolf	 Otto’s	 ingluential	 work	Das	 Heilige	
(1917) ,	complete	with	the	problematic	notion	of	sacer	–	holy	and	damned.	For	339
fascist	ontology,	the	sacred	was	a	pure	state	that	could,	however,	register	in	the	
formally	 and	 indeed	 socially	 raw	 (barbaric).	 This	 fascist	 treatment	 of	 the	
unconscious,	 its	 appropriation	 of	 it,	 co-opting	 it	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
Sinnbildforschung,	was	made	 rather	 explicit	 yet	 again	 by	 Josef	 Plaßmann.	 In	 a	
text	 entitled	 “Sinnfälliges	 und	 Sinnbildliches”	 [The	 literal	 and	 the	 spiritual-
symbolic]	 the	 entire	 thought	 process	 of	 psychoanalysis	 was	 decried	 for	 being	
utterly	 one-dimensional	 and	 glat-footed,	 a	 system	 of	 thought	 inferior	 to	 the	
conception	 of	 a	 Sinnbild	 aesthetic	 by	 catering	 to	 base	 instincts	 and	 simplistic	
associations.	Plaßmann	laid	out	this	incongruity	in	the	following	way:	
It	 is	more	palpable	 so	 to	 speak,	 to	 say:	 the	 steer	 is	 being	worshipped	 as	deity	
because	 he	 represents	 procreative,	 reproductive	 power;	 or	 when	 a	 menhir	 is	
conceived	 as	 a	 phallus.	 It	 is	 this	 comfortable	 and	 illustrative	 way	 of	 thinking	
which	 modern	 psychoanalysis	 has	 appropriated	 with	 great	 dexterity	 and	
success.	 It	 [psychoanalysis]	 represents	 the	 uttermost	 extreme	 opposite	 to	 the	
abstract-symbolic	conception	of	the	world	[Weltauffassung]	–	so	much	so	that	a	
bridge	between	these	concepts	 is	entirely	 impossible.	 It	simply	pertains	to	two	
	Das	Heilige.	Über	das	Irrationale	in	der	Idee	des	Göttlichen	und	sein	Verhältnis	zum	Rationalen.	339
Breslau,	1917.	
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fundamentally	 opposed	 positions	 regarding	 the	 perceiving	 and	 interpreting	
subject. 	340
Echoing	 Dingler’s	 condescension	 of	 that	 “psychological	 process”,	 of	
“interpretation”	 [Deutung],	 presented	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 afgliction	 of	 the	 modern-
rational,	 over-analyzed,	 over-analytical,	 as	 well	 as	 visually	 overwhelmed	
“Machtmensch”,	 Plaßmann	 positioned	 the	 affective-perceptive	 contact	with	 the	
Sinnbild	above	psychological	investment	–	the	latter	more	often	than	not,	at	least	
in	 Freud,	 one	 of	 a	 libidinal	 nature .	 This	 so-called	 “abstract-symbolic	341
conception”	 [abstrakt-symbolische	 Weltauffassung]	 advanced	 here	 and	
elsewhere	 within	 the	 völkisch-fascist	 discourse	 thus	 demanded	 of	 the	
“perceiving	subject”	–	clearly	superior	to	the	“interpreting	subject”	–	the	not	easy	
task	 of	 bypassing	 psychology	 and	 materialistic	 rationalization	 in	 favor	 of	 an	
innate	 recognition	 of	 the	 abstract	 Sinnbilder,	 that	 would	 ultimately	 yield	 a	
positive,	 non-servile	 (sovereign)	 and	 non-materialistic	 (anti-capitalist)	
identigication.	
Following	 from	 this,	 the	 notion	 of	 Freudian	 sublimation	 –	 the	
transposition	 of	 instincts	 of	 that	 primordial	 Id	 to	 the	 Superego,	 which	 in	 turn	
	Plaßmann,	“Sinnfälliges	und	Sinnbildliches”,	Germanien,	Heft	2,	1933,	pp.	36-37.	While	340
presumably	coincidental	it	is	noteworthy	that	these	ideas	appeared	the	same	year	as	the	various	
psychological	examinations	of	Nazism	mentioned	above.	(Trans	by	the	author).	
	To	turn	things	around	yet	again,	Freud	had	actually	argued	this	libidinously	–	and	341
scatologically	–	associative	(thus	foul,	and	indeed	one-dimensional	according	to	Plaßmann)	
phenomenology	not	at	all	to	be	specigic	to	a	repressed/discontent	modern	subject,	but	had	early	
on	made	the	case	that	it	was	in	fact	a	central	feature	of	folklore	and	vernacular	myth	in	“Dreams	
and	Folklore”	(1911,	with	Oppenheim).	I.e.,	it	was	precisely	in	this	more	“primitive”	social	context	
–	rural	Austrian	and	Slavic	folktales,	proverbs	and	anecdotes	etc.	–	that	a	libidinal-scatological	
cathexis	stemming	from	the	unconscious	was	culturally	acknowledged,	integrated	and	thus	
“naturalized”.	Not	that	Freud	seemed	to	derive	much	pleasure	from	this	vernacular	unconscious:	
“We	wanted	to	suggest	that	one	should	not	be	deterred	by	the	often	repulsively	dirty	and	
indecent	nature	of	this	popular	material	from	seeking	in	it	valuable	congirmation	of	psycho-
analytic	views.”	Standard	Edition,	Vol.	12	,	ed.	and	trans.	James	Strachey,	London,	1958	p.	203	
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prescribed	 a	 socio-culturally	 acceptable	 rationale	 hopefully	 adhered	 to	 by	 the	
Ego’s	 associative	 perception	 –	 was,	 unsurprisingly,	 similarly	 unacceptable	 for	
Plassman:		
Its	[psychoanalysis’]	laws	only	ever	pertain	to	the	sphere	of	the	Sinnfälliges	[the	
obvious/literal]	 but	 also	 only	 there.	 That	 is	 because	 it	 [psychoanalysis]	 never	
achieves	to	exceed	the	sphere,	precisely	since	this	[Sinnfälliges]	is	its	substantial,	
rationalized	expression.	A	key	notion	in	this	regard	is	“sublimation”,	the	arguable	
“process”	 [Entwicklung]	 from	 the	 “vegetative-instinctive”	 [vegetativ-
triebhaftem]	towards	“higher	thinking”.	 […]	[höheres	Denken].	From	this	to	the	
phallic	interpretation	of	the	gothic	church	tower	it	is	only	a	small	step.	Whence	
the	 fanatic	 consequence	 with	 which	 psychoanalytical	 theory	 wants	 to	 force	
everything	into	its	system. 	342
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	 critique	 of	 contemporaneous	 psychological	 theory	 may	
simply	exhibit	a	clever,	if	not	fully	compelling,	case	of	Verneinung	[negation]	on	
the	 side	 of	 Plaßmann	 and	 fascism’s	 transposition	 of	 the	 sexual	 body	 onto	 the	
hopefully	 compensatory	 body	 politic	 generally	 –	 “negation”	 merely	 being	 “a	
substitute,	at	a	higher	level,	for	repression”	according	to	Freud	himself .	On	the	343
other	 hand,	 while	 Plaßmann	 and	 other	 authors	 in	 his	 spectrum	 more	 or	 less	
directly	 discussing	 psycho-analytic	 theory	 never	 actually	 brought	 up	 Freud’s	
name,	it	is	noteworthy	that	this	critique	of	“psycho-analytic	theory	want[ing]	to	
force	everything	into	its	system”	was	almost	identically	perceived	and	articulated	
by	Carl	Einstein	around	the	same	time.	Einstein,	however,	had	no	reservations	in	
calling	 out	 Freud	 by	 name.	 In	 an	 exhibition	 review	 on	 Picasso	 in	 Documents	
Einstein	writes:	
	Plaßmann,	Germanien,	p.	37	(Trans.	by	the	author)	342
	“The	Unconscious”,	Vol.14	Standard	Edition,	p.	186	343
	191
[…]	With	him	[Picasso]	we	escape	Freud’s	fatalistic	and	stable	hallucination,	this	
limited	form,	in	which	the	unconscious	is	represented	in	a	metaphysical	way	and	
as	a	lasting	substance. 	344
Elsewhere,	Einstein	berated	psychoanalytic	theory	for	wanting	to	“translate”	the	
images	of	 the	unconscious	“into	 the	house	of	 language”.	 Important	here	 is	 that,	
while	 Freud’s	 unconscious	 is	 degined	 by	 Einstein	 as	 a	 “hallucination”,	 its	
shortcoming	 is	 that	 it	 is	 of	 a	 “stable”	 nature,	 crossing	 with	 one	 of	 Einstein’s	
typically	 paradoxical	 terms	 devised	 for	 his	 aesthetic	 theory:	 “tectonic	
hallucination”.	(Which,	to	put	it	very	crudely,	was	Einstein’s	aspired	to	aesthetic	
that	derived	its	modern	and	revolutionary	force	as	much	from	a	formally	Cubist/
Non-Western	 geometrical	 breakdown	 of	 subjects	 and	 objects	 as	 from	 an	
unhindered	 continually	 gluid	 imagination	 coming	 together	 on	 the	 picture	
plane .	 (Einstein’s	 other	 intriguing	 oxymora	 that	 basically	 entailed	 this	 same	345
fusion	were	“formal	mythology”	and	“formal	animism”,	artistic	acmes	he	almost	
exclusively	reserved	for	Picasso.)	Einstein’s	earlier	discussed	critique	of	allegory,	
in	which	 it	presents	a	 “form	of	assassination	because	 it	disposed	of	 the	object,	
robbing	 it	 of	 its	 literal	 meaning”	 may	 serve	 as	 a	 template	 for	 his	
contemporaneous	critique	of	Freud’s	unambiguously	materialist	rationale.	Thus,	
	Quoted	from	Rainer	Rumold:	“‘Painting	as	a	Language.	Why	Not?’	Carl	Einstein	in	Documents”,	344
October	107,	Winter	2004,	p.91.	Rumold	goes	on	to	further	clarify	Einstein’s	critique:	”The	
difference	from	Freud	here,	[…],	is	that	the	psychoanalyst	developed	a	language	in	which	the	
forms	of	the	unconscious	could	be	interpreted	in	rational	terms	by	the	rational	subject,	terms	
which	establish	the	unconscious	as	being	‘elsewhere’,	as	the	‘mass	of	repression’	(in	that	sense	
‘metaphysical’	and	‘stable’)”.	For	a	further	discussion	on	Einstein	and	the	role/critique	of	the	
(Freudian)	unconscious	see	Sebastian	Zeidler,	“Life	and	Death	from	Babylon	to	Picasso:	Carl	
Einstein’s	Ontology	of	Art	at	the	Time	of	Documents”.	Papers	of	Surrealism	Issue	7,	2007.	Online	
publication.	
	Essentially	as	performed	by	Picasso	in	the	later	1920s,	see	his	“The	Painter	and	his	Model”,	345
1926,	or”	The	Milliner’s	Workshop”	1926,	works	Zeidler	draws	on	in	his	discussion	of	Einstein.		
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not	unlike	 the	völkisch-fascist	desire	of	reclaiming	–	 tapping	–	 the	unconscious	
(the	“soul’s	deeper	layer”),	albeit	with	vastly	divergent	ideological	and	ultimately	
aesthetic	 programs,	 the	 unconscious	 had	 to	 be	 cut	 loose	 from	 Freud’s	
rationalizing	and	thus	literalizing	hold	on	it.	In	Einstein’s	case,	this	was	necessary	
for	the	unconscious	to	unrestrictedly	serve	as	the	generator	of	a	boundless	(i.e.	
formless	 as	 opposed	 to	 “limited	 form”)	 imaginary	 undermining	 rationality,	
forgoing	classigication	and	thus	 the	eventual	progitability	of	 the	unconscious	by	
becoming	 in	 a	 sense	 available	 and	 acquiescent	 towards	 modern-industrial	
production	of	 (computable)	evidence	and	 (quantigiable)	value.	 Ironically,	Freud	
had	 actually	 acknowledged	 psychoanalysis’,	 and	 by	 extension	 the	 unconscious’,	
productive	 share	within	 that	 young	 enterprise	 called	 modernity,	 stating	 a	 few	
years	 before	 Einstein’s	 diatribe	 that:	 “Analysts	 are	 at	 bottom	 incorrigible	
mechanists	 and	materialists,	 even	 though	 they	 seek	 to	 avoid	 robbing	 the	mind	
and	 spirit	 of	 their	 still	 unrecognized	 characteristics” .	 Freud	 thus	 pleaded	346
guilty	 to	Einstein’s	 incrimination	of	a	Freudian	unconscious	which,	however,	as	
far	 as	 the	 relationship	between	visual	 art	 and	 the	unconscious	was	 concerned,	
Freud	 had	 conceived	 of	 entirely	 differently	 to	 begin	 with,	 offering	 rather	
reactionary	 ideas	 about	 art,	 especially	 given	 their	 historical	 context	 (1913) .	347
	Freud,	“Psycho-Analysis	and	Telepathy”	(1921),	Standard	Edition	Vol.	18,	ed	and	trans.	James	346
Strachey,	London	1955,	p.179	
	“The	artist’s	girst	aim	is	to	set	himself	free	and,	by	communicating	his	work	to	other	people	347
suffering	from	the	same	arrested	desires,	he	offers	them	the	same	liberation.	[…]	He	presents	his	
most	personal	wishful	phantasies	as	fulgilled;	but	they	only	become	a	work	of	art	when	they	have	
undergone	a	transformation	which	softens	what	is	offensive	in	them,	conceals	their	personal	
origin	and,	by	obeying	the	laws	of	beauty,	bribes	other	people	with	a	bonus	of	pleasure.”	Freud,	
“The	Interest	of	Psycho-Analysis	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	Sciences	of	Aesthetics”,	1913,	
Standard	Edition	Vol.	13,	ed.	trans	James	Strachey,	London	1955,	p.	187.	(Nevertheless	Freud’s	
idea	of	art	is	still	–	or	is	that	again?	–	going	strong,	i.e.	the	above	paragraph	is	essentially	a	résumé	
of	Jeff	Koons’	entire	career).	
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(Art	 for	Freud	seems	to	have	served	a	kind	of	remedial/compensatory	function	
quite	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 concurrent	 avant-garde’s	 turn	 to	 abstraction	 and	
fragmentation	 of	 stable	 forms/subjects	 (Cubism,	 Futurism)	 and	 to	
representations	 of	 social	 dissonance,	 urban	 alienation,	 angst	 etc.	 (e.g.	 Die	
Brücke)).	 While	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 study	 cannot	 do	 justice	 to	 a	 comprehensive	
discussion	of	Einstein’s	overall	aesthetic-political	theory 	(since	his	is	certainly	348
as	 complex	 and	 exhaustive	 as	 Bataille’s	 –	 or	 Benjamin’s	 for	 that	 matter),	
Einstein’s	 particular	 usage	 of	 the	 unconscious	 and	 the	 place	 it	 occupies	 in	 his	
project	 of	 an	 anti-aesthetic	 do	 not	 merely	 reveal	 yet	 another	 aspect	 of	 the	
previously	 discussed	 mutual	 critiques	 and	 aspirations	 of	 ideologically	
irreconcilable	movements.	Furthermore,	by	examining	these	mutual	conceptions	
of	 a	new,	 to	varying	degrees	barbaric,	 (anti-)aesthetic,	 their	political	 ambitions	
become	not	only	more	conceivable	but,	moreover,	their	ultimate	falling	short	of	
set	expectations	begin	to	show	–	whether	arising	out	of	these	projects’	inherent	
contradictions	 or	 due	 to	 rejection	 by	 and	 irreconcilability	 with	 the	 aesthetic	
program	of	 the	 respective	 regimes	 to	political	 and/or	economic	ends.	 (Evinced	
by	 Nazi	 fascism	 proper	 and	 the	 avant-garde’s	 arguable	 resistance/failure	 in	
playing	an	active	part	in	the	production	of	(popular)	culture).	In	this	context	it	is	
important	to	not	only	recall	Einstein’s	consistent	political	agenda	(a	communist-
anarchic	 one)	 inseparably	 from	 his	 aesthetic	 theory,	 but	 to	 recall	 his	 actual	
conviction	 that	 a	 concept	 like	 “tectonic-hallucination”	 would	 meet	 with	 an	
enthusiastic	response	by	a	large	audience	(Einstein’s	counter-offer	to	the	public	
so	to	speak	to	Benjamin’s	“positive	barbarity”	and	Bataille’s	“base	materialism”).		
	For	this	one	may	consult	the	special	issue	on	Einstein	of	October	107,	2004	as	well	as	David	348
Quigley:	A	Defense	of	the	Real,	Vienna	2007,	to	name	more	recent	studies.	
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In	 other	 words,	 key	 for	 this	 discussion	 is	 that:	 “As	 recently	 as	 1931,	
Einstein	had	proposed	that	painting,	by	means	of	tectonic	form,	had	the	potential	
to	convert	subjective	visual	experience	into	collective	signs”.	 	If	Einstein,	for	all	349
his	 idiosyncratic	 ideas,	nevertheless	presents	a	“classic”	avant-garde	vision	that	
in	hindsight	became	expectedly	incompatible	with	the	course	of	mass	culture	of	
the	 1930s 	 –	 as	 utopian	 vision 	 –	 then	 it	 appears	 all	 the	more	 absurd	 that	350 351
Plaßmann,	as	late	as	1933,	would	make	the	case	for	abstraction	as	the	aesthetic	
paradigm	for	a	supreme	aesthetic	to	be	invested	in	by	a	large	(fascist)	collective.	
In	the	very	same	essay	in	which	he	sought	to	repossess	the	unconscious	
for	 his	 “abstract-symbolic	 conception	 of	 the	 world”	 (i.e.,	 a	 fascist	 “formal	
mythology”),	 Plaßmann	 also	 laid	 out	 the	 necessity	 for	 the	 new/resuscitated	
hoped-for	 visual	 representation	 to	 part	 with	 literally	 wholesome	 mimetic	
giguration	 in	 favor	 of	 what	 he	 unworkably	 coined	 “Ausdruckskunst”	 [Art	 of	
	Charles	Haxthausen	“Reproduction/Repetition:	Walter	Benjamin/Carl	Einstein”.	October	107,	349
2004,	p.74.	His	is	an	extensive	discussion	of	just	that	complex	and	furthermore	of	Einstein’s	quasi	
diametrically	opposed	program	vis-à-vis	Walter	Benjamin’s	contemporaneous	work	on	
corresponding	questions	relating	to	avant-garde	aesthetics	and	mass	experience.	
	From	a	pop-cultural	perspective,	one	could	make	the	case	for	a	delayed	response	to	aesthetic	350
propositions	such	as	Einstein’s	by	way	of	psychedelic	counter-culture	emerging	in	the	1960s	in	
the	United	States;	to	which	notions	of	expanded	cinema	would	provide	the	art	historical	context	
(see	Gene	Youngblood).	(While	keeping	in	mind	though	that	Einstein	had	very	little	enthusiasm	
for	gilm	as	a	whole	during	his	time,	including	its	deployment	by	the	visual	arts).	Or	later	VJ	
culture,	i.e.	the	predominantly	abstract	or	non-narrative	montage	projections	playing	an	integral	
part	in	the	crowd’s	experience	in	techno/electronic	music	rave	culture	emerging	in	the	early	
1990s	in	Berlin	and	Detroit.	(And	notably,	in	the	case	of	Detroit,	an	aesthetic	initially	conceived	
and	appreciated	in	large	parts	by	an	indeed	working-class	(and	largely	Afro-American)	
audience.)	
	Rumold	calls	it	Einstein’s	“revision	of	vision”.	351
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Expression ].	 An	 “Ausdruckskunst”	 that,	 in	 striving	 to	 be	 ultimately	352
“meaningful”	[sinnvoll],	derived	not	from	a	reactionary	turn	to	a	petit-bourgeois	
“re-skilling”	 (Buchloh)	 but	 from	 “spontaneous”	 “purely	 instinctual”	 [rein	
triebhaft ]	 “Ausdruckslust”	 [desire	 to	 express].	 As	 such,	 “Ausdruckskunst”	353
became	 probable:	 “the	 more	 the	 expression	 of	 the	 work	 departs	 from	 direct	
[unmittelbaren],	 rationalistic	 reproduction,	 and	 the	 more	 it	 abstracts	
[abstrahiert].” 	354
To	 simplify	 the	 concept	 of	 abstraction	 for	 a	 readership	 presumably	
disinclined	towards	it,	Plaßmann	presented	the	following	clear-cut	scenario:	
To	abstract	means:	to	remove	from	the	concrete	(leafed)	tree	or	body	its	leafs	or	
its	glesh,	to	make	the	structure,	the	sensible	construction	of	the	whole	visible	and	
to	 think	 it	 through.	Hence	 abstract	 symbolism	 is	 not	 all	 something	 “primitive”	
but	something	further	developed	than	a	naturalistic	“life-likeness”	[Naturtreue]	
–	 contrary	 to	 the	 common	 [landläugig]	 belief	 of	 some	 laymen	 and	 scientists	
[presumably	here	meaning	art	theorists?]. 	355
	Bearing	in	mind	that	this	“Ausdruckskunst”	was	not	in	conversation	with	(German)	352
Expressionism	proper,	although,	as	the	so-called	“Expressionismusstreit”	(1933)	literally	reveals,	
the	formal	attributes	and	more	importantly	the	ideological	contextualization	of	an	artistic	
“expression-ess”	was	less	solidly	agreed	upon	(or	rejected)	as	one	would	assume	–	it	was,	in	the	
early	1930s	in	Germany,	“up	for	grabs”	so	to	speak.	
	Again	for	Plaßmann	(and	others	of	his	milieu)	to	employ	the	very	notion	of	“triebhaft”	–	353
essential	Freudian	terminology	surely	disseminated	by	the	1930s	–	in	the	service	of	a	fascist	
aesthetic	program	is	not	only	peculiar	but	suggests	scant	acquaintance	with	contemporary	
psychology,	regardless	of	all	the	resolute	criticism	against	it.	“Triebhaft”	cannot	really	be	
translated	as	“libidinal”	in	this	ideological	context	since	it	here	is	a	notion	excluding	drive	as	
libido,	thus	I	have	translated	it	as	“instinctual”.	
	Plaßmann,	Germanien	1933,	p.	34	(Trans.	by	the	author).	354
	Ibid.355
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This	kind	of	 abstraction	 recommended	 to	 the	 fascist	 Sinnblid	artist/researcher	
was	not	only	“contrary	to	common	belief”,	but	soon,	unsurprisingly,	anathema	to	
fascist	 aesthetics	 proper	 as	 outlined	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 chapter.	 More	
problematically,	in	view	of	a	quest	for	a	völkisch-fascist	aesthetic,	Plaßmann	had	
failed	to	consider	that	both	the	tree	and	the	body,	once	shed	of	its	greenery	and	
skinned	 of	 its	 glesh,	 would	 potentially	 make	 for	 not	 exactly	 that	 elevated	 and	
“sensible	 construction”	 he	 hoped	 to	 gain	 from	 abstraction.	 For	 in	 Documents,	
Bataille	more	or	less	fully	executed	and	paraded	both	of	these	“abstractions”,	 in	
which	photographic	close-ups	of	a	“naked”	glower’s	interior	by	the	photographer	
Blosfeldt	and	anatomical	 illustrations	of	the	17th	century	rather	worked	against	
notions	 of	 sublime	 or	 ideational	 “constructions”.	 While	 Bataille’s	 text	
accompanying	 the	 glower	 photographs	 merely	 used	 this	 subversion	 of	 the	
glower’s	symbolism	(traditionally	that	of	beauty	and	love)	as	a	stepping-stone	for	
a	wider	philosophical	debate	on	a	denial	of	a	kind	of	dialectic	of	the	base	and	the	
elevated	in	Western	aesthetic	tradition,	he	asserted	that	“even	the	most	beautiful	
glowers	are	spoiled	in	their	centers	by	hairy	sexual	organs.” 	Consequentially,	as	356
the	 photograph	 substantiated,	 “if	 one	 tears	 off	 all	 the	 corolla’s	 petals,	 all	 that	
remains	 is	 a	 rather	 sordid	 tuft.” 	 The	 human	 body,	 once	 “removed	 from	 its	357
glesh”,	 didn’t	 fare	much	 better,	 the	 “sensible”	 aspect	 of	 a	 rationalistic-scientigic	
anatomical	 partitioning	 as	 depicted	 in	 Amé	 Bourdon’s	 “Nouvelles	 tables	
anatomiques”	 (1678)	unraveling	 into	a	kind	of	 conundrum	of	 the	human	 form,	
thus	posing	a	challenge	to	rather	than	establishing	an	immaculate	and	eternally	
	Bataille,	“The	Language	of	Flowers”,	Documents	I	3,	1929.	In	Bataille,	1985,	p.12	356
	Ibid.		357
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noble	“structure”.	For	Leiris,	who	discussed	these	17th	century	tables,	the	laying	
bare	of	the	human	form	divulging	its	inner	“construction”	–	along	with	its	not	so	
abstract	innards	–	was	yet	another	case	of	“a	wholly	other”,	“equally	fascinating	
and	 terrifying”,	 undermining	 a	 notion	 of	 beauty	 and	 thus	 a	 celebration	 of	
humanity	 as	 presented	 by	 say	 Renaissance	 art,	 instead	 presenting	 “the	 true	
arcanum	of	human	nature”.	And	more	often	 than	not,	 the	stripping	of	 the	body	
pointed	 to	 the	 inescapable	 aging	 and	 withering	 of	 its	 “structure”,	 to	
decomposition,	the	“most	precarious	moments	of	its	existence” .	With	regard	to	358
artistic	abstraction	it	therefore	seemed	only	logical	for	Leiris	to	locate	this	upset	
to	 human	 existence	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Picasso,	 whose	 “barbaric	 phase” 	 (Alfred	359
Barr),	 regardless	of	 its	supposed	“formal	animism”	and	“tectonic	hallucination”,	
was	 “realism”,	 the	 “recognition	 of	 the	 real,	 which	 it	 seeks	 to	 hollow	 out	 and	
undermine”. 	360
With	 regards	 to	 abstraction	 in	 representation	 and	 the	 possible	 “side-
effects”	that	came	with	it,	Strzygowksi	appeared	more	willing	to	admit	that	any	
anti-aesthetic	 degiant	 of	 power	 art	would	 have	 to	 risk	 this	 departure	 from	 the	
ideal	 and	 beauty,	 as	 early	 as	 1923.	 His	 already	 discussed	 The	 Crisis	 of	 the	
Humanities,	is	a	case	in	point.	
	Leiris,	“L’Homme	et	son	interieure”,	Documents	II	5,	1930	(trans.	by	the	author).	358
	Quoted	in	Robert	Goldwater,	Primitivism	in	Modern	Art,	Cambridge/Mass.,	1986	[1938],	p.	359
152,	a	classic	early	(North	American)	study	on	non-Western	imports	to	Modern	Art.	Goldwater,	
speaking	about	Picasso,	states	that	with	the	latter	modern	art	at	that	time	evinces	“an	
intensigication	from	primitiveness	to	barbarity”	which	he	discusses	at	another	point	in	the	
context	of	a	“hatred	of	culture”	as	a	trait	of	artistic	production	during	that	period.		
	Leiris,	“Toiles	récentes	de	Picasso”.	Documents	II	2	1930,	quoted	in	Didi-Huberman,	2010,	360
p.155.	
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VI.2	The	crisis	of	fascist	anti-aesthetics	
To	summarize	the	context	of	the	position	taken	by	Strzygowski	in	this	work:	The	
stagnant	and	discriminating	patriarchy	of	academic	art	history	and	the	emptied	
out	artistic	prototypes	it	continued	to	uphold	and	enforce	were	what	generated	
said	 “crisis”.	 	 Importantly,	 the	 crisis	 did	 not	 register	merely	 as	 a	 socio-cultural	
dead-end	or	as	resignation,	but	set	off	a	critique	and	resistance	that	initially	took	
the	 form	of	 negation	 and	 from	 there	 onwards	 of	 a	 volatile	 anti-aesthetic.	 	 The	
social	 segment	 most	 active	 and	 effective	 in	 advancing	 such	 an	 anti-aesthetic,	
according	 to	Strzygowski,	were	not	even	unorthodox	art	historians	 like	himself	
but	naturally	the	contemporary	artist,	“agents	in	the	gield”	so	to	speak:		
Die	 ersteren	 gehen	 voran	 [die	 Künstler]	 angeregt	 durch	 die	 Abwendung	 der	
Kunst	von	den	Schönheitsgesetzen,	die	die	humanistische	A| sthetik	im	Anschluß	
an	 die	 Antike	 und	 Renaissance-Gestalt	 ausgebildet	 hatte.	 Der	 Naturalismus 	361
brach	 damit.	 Er	 ist	 in	 seinen	 Modellen	 nicht	 mehr	 wählerisch,	 die	 Gestalt	 ist	
nicht	 mehr	 die	 “schöne	 Gestalt”	 an	 sich,	 sondern	 jede	 Gestalt,	 der	 Nachdruck	
liegt	nicht	so	sehr	auf	ihr,	als	auf	der	Art	wie	sie	in	Form	gebracht	ist,	das	heißt	in	
Masse,	Raum,	Ton	und	Farbe	erscheint. 	362
	Presumably	the	“Naturalism”	Strzygowski	has	in	mind	here	is	Realism	by	way	of	a	Gustave	361
Courbet,	i.e.,	the	depiction	of	anonymous	subjects	engaged	in	manual	labor,	on	a	scale	and	by	
deploying	the	representational	modes	reserved	for	nobility	and	the	genre	of	history	painting.	It	
would	be	erroneous	though	to	consider	the	depiction	of	an	anonymous	peasant/worker	as	
unselective	[nicht	wählerisch],	for	it	is	the	selection	of	the	subject	that	lends	the	work	political	
agency	–	it	is	precisely	not	“any/every	subject	[Gestalt]”	but	“The	Stone	Breakers”	(1849-50),	
“The	Sower”	(Jean-Francois	Millet,	1850)	etc.	The	conscious	choice	of	the	subject	portrayed	is	
already	made	explicit	in	the	title.	Strzygowki’s	suggestion	that	the	emphasis	in	realism	shifts	
from	mimetic	giguration	to	foregrounding	the	materiality	of	paint	the	work	–	as	representation	–	
is	dependent	upon	seems	valid	on	the	other	hand.	
	Strzygowski,	1922,	p.52	362
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It	 is	 beyond	 question	 that	 the	 artist	 “leading	 the	 way”	 in	 Strzygowski’s	
conception	 of	 an	 anti-bourgeois	 anti-aesthetic,	 his	 prospect	 of	 an	 avant-garde,	
was	 to	 be	 of	 Aryan	 descent	 (keeping	 in	 mind	 the	 dubious	 nature	 of	 this	
classigication	 alone) .	 This	 was	 mandated	 by	 quasi	 ontological	 conditions	363
enabling	true	artistic	(counter-)	production	since,	“the	truly	artistic,	which	lies	in	
content	 and	 form,	 is	 borne	 by	 the	 free	 subject.	 This	 subject	 however	 is	
fundamentally	tied	to	blood	and	soil” 	(Strzygowksi).	364
The	 anti-aesthetic	 derived	 -	 attained,	 so	 to	 speak	 -	 in	 this	 congiguration	
through	 “blood	 and	 soil”	 did,	 nevertheless,	 not	 preclude	 the	 artist	 from	
considering	the	various	attacks	exercised	by	the	traditional	avant-garde	proper.	
“Gestalt”	and	“beauty”,	according	to	Strzygowski,	had	to	make	way	for	“volume,	
space,	tone	and	color”.	In	fact,	these	formal	attributes,	put	forward	by	that	newly	
	Which	however	especially	in	Strzygowski	didn’t	equal	German,	not	even	in	terms	of	363
geography.	In	his	catalogue	publication	from	1932	“The	Afghan	Stuccos	of	the	N.R.F.	collection”,	
contextualizing	the	artefacts	from	the	archeological	expedition	he	undertook	with	Andre	
Malraux,	Strzygowksi,	speaks	of	the	“Barbarian	Hero”,	a	title	he	gives	to	one	of	the	three-
dimensional	stuccos	featured,	essentially	presenting	a	bust.	Here	human	representation	is	not	
reproached	as	it	usually	is	by	Strzygowski,	for	replicating	the	oppressive	yet	hollow	
representation	of	power	(i.e.,	power	art).	The	reason	for	this	is	that	here	artistic	production	
emerges	from	the	social	base	and	the	local,	becomes	validated	as	a	vernacular	aesthetic	of	sorts:	
“We	owe	the	existence	of	the	works	of	art	which	have	just	been	reviewed	solely	to	local	creative	
desires”.”	[…]	this	change	[towards	gigurative	representation]	was	accomplished	freely,	thanks	to	
an	independent	impulse	of	the	Iranian	spirit,	and	not	owing	to	the	mere	adoption	of	the	forms	of	
contemporary	art	already	employed	in	the	historic	centres.”.	“[…]	living	authochthonal	[sic]	forces	
created	a	new	art	[…]”.	Strzygowski,	The	Afghan	Stuccos	of	the	N.R.F.	Collection,	Stora	Art	Gallery,	
New	York,	1932.	NRF	Paris	1932,	pp.	9,	21/22	(Here	again	it	is	a	group’s	“impulse”	and	their	
ignorance	of	normative	aesthetic	that	guarantee	“veritable”	agency	and	authenticity,	in	
correspondance	with	the	agency	Bataille	afforded	the	Gauls	in	“The	Academic	Horse”.)	
	Strzygowski,	1922,	p.	204	364
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autonomous,	free	artist,	had	become	imbued	with	agency	defying	Machtkunst,	in	
this	case	echoing	Plaßmann’s	call	for	abstraction :	365
Every	explicitly	factually	bound	art	striving	for	a	calculated	effect	on	the	viewer	
will	push	the	gigures	[Gestalten]	to	the	edge	towards	appearing	as	a	reality.	The	
more	the	artist	as	an	individual	[Persönlichkeit]	follows	his	inner	urges	the	less	
important	 the	 gigure	 as	 such,	 and	 the	 stronger	 the	 impact	 of	 form	 as	 such	 i.e.	
volume,	space,	tone,	color	will	be.	 	366
And	 it	 did	 not	 end	 with	 these	 formal	 categories	 now	 overcoming	 hitherto	
superior	 gigurative	 /classicist	 representation,	 since	 Strzygowski	 went	 on	 to	
announce	that:	
The	struggle	for	the	justigication	of	the	non-beautiful,	 in	fact	of	ugliness	begins,	
in	 which	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 subject	 is	 greatly	 aided	 by	 drawing	 on	 aspects	
derived	from	the	poor	and	the	sick. 	367
	A	scenario	which	is	more	broadly	recognized	and	clearly	identigiable	in	Italian	fascism	as	365
informed	by	a	Futurist	formal	vocabulary	a	decade	earlier,	e.g.	the	intensigication	and	
augmentation	of	the	body	in	motion	to	develop	machine-like	features	such	as	in	Boccioni,	in	the	
process	of	which	the	body	did	of	course	risk	to	become	not	only	re-formed	but	deformed,	
misshaped,	altered	in	a	negative	sense	from	a	reactionary-fascist	perspective.	
	Strzygowski,	1922,	p.	152.366
	Strzygowski,	1922,	p.53	This	connection	between	precarious	social	groups,	physically	or	367
mentally	impaired	and	modern	art	was	girst	maintained	by	the	Zionist	Max	Nordau	in	his	1893	
book	Entartung.	According	to	Christoph	Zuschlag	and	in	the	context	of	cultural	production	which	
Nordau’s	text	responded	to,	the	notion	of	degeneration	as	applied	to	art	addressed	“symbolism,	
realism,	impressionism”.	Especially	with	regard	to	impressionism,	i.e.	the	genre’s	distinctive	
atomizing	of	subjects	into	color	particles	of	dots	it	would	make	sense	–	from	Nordau’s	point	of	
view	–	to	speak	of	impressionism’s	aesthetics	and	processes	as	symptoms	for	“the	disturbance	of	
the	nerve	apparatus	and	the	retina”.	As	far	as	this	disturbance	concerned	the	social	it	was	“	the	
Lumpenproletariat	–	criminals,	prostitutes,	anarchists,	ofgicially	declared	lunatics	–	that	
degenerated	girst.	These	groups’	mental	and	at	times	physical	traits	are	reglected	in	the	modern	
artist.”	Zuschlag,	Entartete	Kunst,	Worms,	1995,	pp.	22-23.
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While	 this	 recognition	 of	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 aesthetic	 status-quo	 did	 not	
mean	that	Strzygowski	and	the	overall	early	fascist	anti-aesthetic	embraced	the	
“poor	 and	 the	 sick”	 (i.e.,	 to	 run	 the	 ideological	 pre-bare	 life	 gamut:	 the	
degenerate,	 the	 abject,	 les	 misérables,	 Lumpen)	 per	 se,	 it	 does	 reveal	 the	
existence	of	a	genuine	discourse	on	what	exactly	this	fascist	anti-aesthetic	would	
entail,	how	“far”	it	would	go	in	its	“turning	away	from	the	laws	of	beauty”	(hence,	
it	seems	fair	 to	say	 in	this	context,	 in	 its	conscious	abandonment	of	Benjamin’s	
repudiated	notion	of	“Schönheitsdienst”)	
Bataille,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	made	 this	 connection	 of	 the	 “sick”	with	 the	
formal	 attacks	 of	 the	 avant-garde	 on	 the	 human	 body,	 on	 its	 representation,	
explicit	 -	 as	 is	 exempligied	 by	 his	 text	 discussing	 illustrations	 from	 the	 18th	
century	depicting	various	“deviations	of	nature”	as	the	article	was	called,	the	title	
directly	 taken	 from	the	eponymous	original	publication.	Siamese	 twins,	dwarfs,	
bodies	 born	 without	 heads	 or	 with	 two	 pairs	 of	 eyes,	 all	 kinds	 of	 astounding	
physical	 deformations	 producing	 gigures	 clearly	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 properly	
proportioned	anatomy	the	canon	had	recommended	by	equating	 it	with	power,	
functionality,	 grace,	 desire	 etc.	 Bataille	 laid	 out	 a	 trajectory	 in	which	 these	 so-
called	 “monsters”	 (often	 conceived	 as	 harbingers	 of	 crises	 in	 16th	 century	
society)	 had	 turned	 into	 “freaks”	 in	 industrialized	 consumer	 culture.	 These	
“deviations”	 had	 become	 the	 stuff	 of	 funfairs,	 an	 odd	 spectacle,	 “a	 carnival	
pleasure”.	 Nevertheless,	 Bataille	 claimed,	 the	 “[…]’freak’	 in	 any	 given	 fair	
provokes	a	positive	impression	of	aggressive	incongruity,	a	little	comic,	but	much	
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more	a	source	of	malaise.	This	malaise	is,	in	an	obscure	way,	tied	to	a	profound	
seductiveness.”	 	368
Didi-Huberman	in	his	book	juxtaposes	these	“deviations	of	nature”,	herein	
resuming	 Bataille’s	 own	 practice	 of	 juxtaposition,	 with	 works	 by	 Picasso	 that	
were	 presented	 in	 the	 same	 issue	 yet	 not	 side-by-side	 (the	 simultaneous	
appearance	 nevertheless	 surely	 again	 a	 deliberate	 editorial	 decision	 by	
Bataille ).	 Didi-Huberman	 hereby	 intensigies	 Bataille’s	 layout	 strategy	 of	369
correlation	 to	 augment	 the	notion	of	 a	base	materialism.	A	materialism,	 as	 the	
notion	suggests,	stemming	from	nature.	The	deviations’	very	existence	therefore	
spoil	the	ideal	prototypes	embraced	by	art,	since	both	of	these	categories	can	lay	
claim	 to	 the	 same	 source	 and	 origin,	 which	 further	 means	 their	 purported	
distinction	 is	 the	 result	 of	 not	 only	 enforced	 but	 moreover	 forged	 “unreal”	
separation.	 It	 is	 in	 the	context	of	exactly	 this	material	 “fact”	ensnaring	 idealism	
and	deviation	that	Didi-Huberman	quotes	Michel	Leiris’s	text	on	Picasso.	Leiris,	
by	 taking	 Picasso’s	 work	 as	 proof,	 disclaimed	 any	 association	 with	 Bréton’s	
surrealist	project	proper	(“the	most	degrading	escapism”,	according	to	Bataille).	
With	 regard	 to	 these	paintings’	 alleged	 subversions	of	 the	human	 gigure,	Leiris	
put	the	onus	on	the	works’	uncompromising	“realism”	that	he	equated	with	the	
artists’	 “freedom”,	 presumably	meaning	 his/her	 freedom	 from	having	 to	 oblige	
	Bataille,	“Deviations	of	Nature”,	Documents	I	3,	1929,	in	Bataille,	1985,	pp.	53-54	368
	Picasso’s	work	was	featured	in	the	context	of	Michel	Leiris	article	“Quelques	toiles	récents”.	It	369
is	the	work	period	of	Picasso	that	MoMA’s	Alfred	Barr	would	refer	to	as	the	artist’s	“barbaric	
phase”	and	that	already	presages	Carl	Einstein’s	concepts	of	a	“tectonic	hallucination”	and	a	
“formal	mythology”	that	would	inform	the	works	made	a	year	later	where	the	decomposition	of	
the	body	is	now	further	disintegrated	by	being	suspended	in	an	abstract	space	of	intersecting	
lines	and	gields.	The	issue	aside	from	Picasso	and	Bataille’s	“Deviations	of	Nature”	contained	the	
article	by	Rene	Groussart:”	A	case	of	Regression	towards	“Barbarian”	Arts:	the	Kagiristan	statuery.	
“	that	immediately	preceded	Bataille’s	text.		
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the	 constraints	 levied	 by	 an	 aesthetic	 mandate	 of	 idealization,	 sublimation,	
identigication,	representation. This	(artistic)	freedom	importantly	meant:	“not	to	
escape	or	negate	the	real	but	on	the	contrary	to	recognize	it,	to	hollow	it	out,	to	
undermine	it”,	to	repeat	Leiris’s	judgment	here .370
It	 should	 be	 noted	 in	 this	 context	 of	 equating	 artistic	 freedom	 with	
aggressively	 “deviating	 from	nature”	 that	 consequently	 is	 considered	 to	 signify	
“the	 real”,	 but	 more	 importantly,	 in	 view	 of	 Didi-Huberman’s	 explicit	
juxtaposition	of	deviation	with	Picasso,	that	this	kind	of	polarizing	juxtaposition	
had	a	prominent	predecessor.	Two	years	ahead	of	Leiris’s	text	on	Picasso,	one	of	
the	key	proponents	of	what	I’d	like	to	call	ofgicial	fascist	art	theory,	Paul	Schulze-
Naumburg,	 in	 his	 ingluential	Kunst	 und	 Rasse	 [Art	 and	 Race]	 (1928)	 employed	
precisely	this	juxtaposition	to	make	the	case	for	degeneration	at	work	in	avant-
garde	 art.	 He	 squared	 off	 (convincingly)	 formal	 analogies	 between	 images	 of	
debilitated	 subjects,	 including,	 importantly,	 poor	 subjects,	 as	 evinced	 by	 an	
image	of	a	homeless	woman	suffering	from	alcoholism,	with	work	by	Modigliani	
and	Schmidt-Rothluff	etc.	serving	as	hard	evidence	for	a	direct	relation	between	
mental	 and	 physical	 debilitation	 and	 the	 avant-garde.	 With	 regard	 to	 these	
“deviations	of	nature”	and	deviations	from	the	social	and	their	impression	onto	
modern	art,	in	fact	their	complicity	with	it,	Schulze-Naumburg	wrote:	
Daneben	sehen	wir	 überall	eine	Bevorzugung	und	Betonung	der	Erscheiningen	
der	Entartung,	wie	sie	uns	aus	dem	Heer	der	Gesunkenen,	der	Kranken	und	der	
körperlich	Mißgebildeten	bekannt	sind.	[…]	
	All	quotes	by	Bataille	and	Leiris	in	this	passage	from	Didi-Huberman,	2010,	pp.	154-155	370
(Trans.	by	the	author).
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Daß	 diese	 Bilder	 also	 Vorstellungen	 einer	Wirklichkeit	 hervorrufen	 und	 daher	
auch	 wohl	 auch	 hervorrufen	 wollen,	 wird	 sich	 nicht	 leugnen	 lassen.	 Wo	 aber	
ginden	 wir	 eine	 Welt,	 die	 den	 Gestalten	 und	 der	 Atmosphäre	 dieser	 Bilder	
entspricht?	
Man	 muß	 schon	 in	 die	 tiefsten	 Tiefen	 menschlicher	 Not	 und	 menschlichem	
Abschaums	 hinabsteigen;	 in	 den	 Idiotenanstalten,	 psychiatrischen	 Kliniken,	
Krüppleheimen,	den	Stationen	der	Lepra	oder	in	Schlupfwinkeln,	 in	denen	sich	
die	Verkommensten	verbergen,	gindet	man	zur	Not	und	auch	nur	annähernd	das	
Material,	 das	 solche	 und	 ähnliche	 Vorstellungen	 wachruft.[…]	 Es	 mag	 eine	
Aufgabe	bedeuten,	das	Menschliche	auch	noch	im	Niedrigsten	zu	suchen. 	371
This	 clearly	 presented	 a	 critical	 precursor	 to	 the	 deginite	 irreconcilability	 of	 a	
fascistic	exploration	of	an	anti-aesthetic	with	the	anti-aesthetic	project	by	way	of	
Documents:	 Schulze-Naumburg’s	 condemned	 descent	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 human	
scum	[“Abschaum”],	 that	 sifting	 through	and	excavation	of	 the	 lowermost	 [“das	
Niedrigste”],	 was	 of	 course	 precisely	 what	 Bataille	 was	 dealing	 with	 in	
Documents.	 Signigicantly	 though,	 Schulze-Naumburg	 did	 not	 discount	 these	
lowest-of-lowest	 aesthetics	 for	 being	 products	 of	 a	 crazed	 imagination,	 for	
products	of	 fantasy.	He	actually	acknowledged	 their	 reglective	 relation	vis-à-vis	
the	“appearances	of	reality”,	 i.e.:	congirming	Leiris’s	claim	for	this	anti-aesthetic	
to	 derive	 its	 force	 by	 signifying	 the	 real	 which,	 to	 recall,	 Schulze-Naumburg	
acceded	 “cannot	 be	 denied”.	 Which,	 consequentially,	 would	 also	 mean	 that	 a	
position	like	Schulze-Naumburg’s,	certainly	ingluential	to	the	formative	aesthetic	
	Paul	Schulze-Naumburg,	Kunst	und	Rasse,	Berlin	1928,	pp.	111,	113.	This	“army	of	the	371
sunken”,	no	doubt	intended	by	Schulze-Naumburg	to	unambiguously	project	a	kind	of	pariah	
minority	could	of	course	just	as	well	denominate	a	large	swath	of	a	veteran	generation	as	
discussed	in	Benjamin’s	“Erfahrung	und	Armut”;	those	“whom	life	has	treated	as	we	commonly	
treat	a	piece	of	cloth”	(Bataille);	the,	literally,	damaged	–	all	those	dismal	types	and	cripples	
populating	the	canvases	of	German	expressionism	and	most	famously	Berlin	Dada.	
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program	over	the	course	of	the	1930s,	implicitly	acknowledged	that	a	conception	
of	 a	 fascist	 art	would,	 if	 necessary,	 evade	 if	 not	 fudge	 the	 real,	 i.e.	 admitting	 –	
however	 tightly	 regulated	 –	 the	 powerful	 imaginary	 component	 for	 fascist	
aesthetics	 for	 which	 it	 has	 been	 recognized	 –	 Buchloh’s	 “pornography	 of	
promises”	 (of	 inviolacy).	 (While,	 to	 recall,	 both	Documents	 and	 the	 authors	 of	
Germanien	 were	 eager	 to	 disassociate	 their	 aesthetic	 concepts	 from	 the	
imaginary,	 albeit	 for	 opposite	 concerns ).	 Any	 hitherto	 aesthetic	 and	372
ideological	potential	of	the	barbaric	that	within	the	trajectory	laid	out	so	far	was	
claimed	 both	 by	 the	 avant-garde	 and	 a	 somewhat	 disorientated	 and	
contradictory	subset	of	völkisch	fascism	as	a	seemingly	inexhaustible	vehicle	for	
the	 raw,	 the	 formless,	 the	 desirable,	 the	 immediate,	 the	 authentic/unmediated,	
the	 freed,	 and	ultimately	 the	 real	 –	 the	 latter	by	 registering	 as	 a	 symptom 	–	373
was	 resolutely	 recanted	 and	 ultimately	 banned	 from	Nazi	 Germany’s	model	 of	
(high)	art.	
While	 for	 Bataille	 and	 Documents	 generally,	 the	 barbaric	 could	 indeed	
serve	 aesthetic	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 degree,	 socio-political	 ends	 as	 critical	 and	
formally	 inventive	 agency	 (as	 per	 Einstein),	 leading	 to	 an	 unequivocal	
endorsement	 of	 a	 relentless	 stirring	 up,	 disintegration	 and	 a	 hollowing	 out	 of	
	To	recap,	in	the	case	of	Bataille	and	his	circle,	since	the	imaginary	was	complicit	with	the	372
corrupt	realm	of	bourgeois	diversion,	entertainment	industry	and	of	course	art	in	the	guise	of	
Surrealism	that	would	allow	only	so	much	of	the	unconscious	to	peek	through,	at	pains	to	stay	
clear	of	any	“fouling”	caused	by	a	Freud	fed	through	Bataille	(“the	excremental	philosopher”	as	
who	Breton	had	labeled	him).	And	in	the	case	of	völkisch-fascism	by	an	anxiety	over	a	precarious	
barbaric	sublime	supra-aesthetic	cobbled	together	from	a	delusional	re-assemblage	of	“national”	
history	and	racial	identity,	a	projective	infusion	of	raw	and	abject	material	culture	of	an	instable	
legacy,	of	a	Sinnbild	aesthetic	that	was	to	be	natural	and	congenital	–	beyond	interpretation	–	so	
as	to	not	be	faulted	for	the	phantasmagoria	it	was.	
	Put	differently	“the	barbaric	is	a	dialectic”	(Georges	Didi-Huberman	from	a	conversation	with	373
the	author,	February,	3rd,	2013).
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“proper”	representation,	replacing	it	with	images	–	both	archival	and	novel	–	of	
the	 unstable,	 the	 vertiginous,	 the	 pathetic,	 the	 horrigic,	 the	 foul	 and	 the	
unintelligible	(read	deformed,	formless,	base	and	perhaps	at	times	abject)	across	
historical	periods	and	 stages	of	 civilization,	 this	path	was	much	 less	 accessible	
for	 a	 confused	 (proto-)fascist	 aesthetic-political	 program	 of	 the	 late	 1920s	 to	
early	 1930s.	 Thus,	 while	 these	 groupings	 were	 basically	 in	 unison	 in	 their	
embrace	 of	 the	pre-historic	 and	 certainly	 a	 “hard	primitivism”,	 that	 next	 stride	
towards	the	contemporary,	one	very	much	taken	by	Documents,	became	severely	
stalled	in	this	branch	of	fascist	art	theory.	Or,	differently	put,	one	could	say	it	did	
not	become	stalled,	but	the	consequences	drawn	from	this	overlapping	point	of	
departure	 bifurcated	 radically	 once	 applied	 to	 the	 contemporary.	 Thus,	 in	 the	
little	documentation	 there	 is	on	 the	Ahnenerbe’s,	 i.e.	 the	völkisch-fascist	 actual	
program	 for	 a	 comprehensive	 contemporary	 artistic	 agenda,	 the	 regressive,	
deeply	 reactionary	 character	 quickly	 came	 to	 the	 fore.	 In	 a	 concise	 brieging	
regarding	the	setting	up	of	a	new	sculpture	shop	for	the	institution,	the	following	
demands	and	aims	were	put	forward:	
After	 the	 Ahnenerbe’s	 work	 has	 brought	 valuable	 and	 directive	 scientigic	
information,	 exploring	 the	 beliefs	 and	 attitudes	 of	 our	 ancestors,	 it	 is	 now	
necessary	 to	 make	 this	 knowledge	 effective	 for	 the	 people.	 It	 is	 the	 task	 of	 a	
determinedly	conducted	artistic	practice,	to	mediate	these	gindings	through	the	
immediate	affect	of	art.	
The	sculpture	studio	therefore	had	the	following	overriding	task:	
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By	way	of	the	artistic,	in	line	with	the	formal	sensibility	of	contemporary	man,	to	
design	 festival	 sites,	 monuments,	 settlements,	 graveyards,	 cofgins	 [!]	 by	
employing	the	Sinnbilder	which	we	attained	through	scientigic	work.	 	374
That	 this	was	 incredibly	 limiting	 to	 any	 artistic	 practice	with	 even	 a	minimum	
investment	in	reglexivity	and	engagement	of	any	kind	(other	than	engaging	blood	
&	soil)	was	settled	by	the	assertion	that	this	art/applied	arts	should	be	achieved	
“through	a	form	that	excludes	anything	willed”.	Again	presumably	a	direct	stab	at	
Alois	 Riegl’s	 notion	 of	 Kunstwollen,	 which	 Strzygowksi	 had	 earlier	 indicted	 as	
“art’s	genuine	enemy,	being	conscious	work	of	the	intellect” ,	the	fascist	artistic	375
student	 body	 was	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 expected	 to	 draw	 on	 aesthetic,	 forceful	
expression	 through	 a	 spiritual,	 immediate	 charge	 from	 the	 ground,	 abetted	 by	
that	 diligently	 studied	 up	 on	 yet	 no	 less	 glakey	 inventory	 of	 runic	 Sinnbild	
language,	 while	 simultaneously	 eclipsing	 further	 intellectual	 (worldly)	
investment,	 suggesting	 a	 sort	 of	 spiritual-völkisch	 artist-cum-medium.	 This,	
however,	was	not	understood	to	be	or	presented	as	an	oppressive	situation	but,	
on	the	contrary,	a	liberating	one,	safeguarding	“the	artist’s	personal	freedom”	as	
Strzygowski	maintained,	 since	 the	young	artist	was	no	more	bound	 to	produce	
the	corrupt	artefacts	requested	by	and	devoted	to	Power	Art.	Which,	needless	to	
	BArch	NS21/276,	“Vorschläge	für	den	Ausbau	der	Bildhauerwerkstatt	des	Ahnenerbes”,	374
undated	document.	
	1922,	p.	204:	“Das	Wollen,	das	heißt	die	bewußte	Verstandesarbeit	ist	der	natürliche	Feind	375
der	Kunst,	bedingt	geradezu	die	in	die	Entwicklung	eingreifende	Unfreiheit.	Das	Wollen	ist	Sache	
jener	politischen	Bändiger	der	namenlosen	Masse,	denen	der	Künstler	in	sachlicher	
Gebundenheit	verfällt,	wenn	er	sich	zu	ihrem	Diener	hergibt.	Dagegen	sind	des	die	triebhaften	
Gewalten	seines	eigenen	Innern,	die	ihn	immer	wieder	gefühlsmäßig	zum	Gestalten	drängen.	Es	
ist	die	Natur	selbst,	die	in	ihm	weiterschafft,	in	ihr	liegt	die	persönliche	Freiheit	des	Künstlers	
umschlossen,	man	mag	hinterher	aus	dem	Kunstwerk	noch	so	sehr	auf	bewußtes	Wollen	
zurückschließen.“	
	208
point	out,	was	the	height	of	cynicism	(or	naivety)	since	that	was	exactly	what	was	
entailed .		376
So	in	view	of	laying	out	and	pursuing	an	“avant-gardist”	artistic	program,	
völkisch-fascism’s	interest	and	investment	into	heterogeneity	failed	at	this	point,	
not	 least	 by	 espousing	 forms	 and	 expressions	 that	 were	 too	 idiosyncratic	 to	
effectively	 relay	 an	 aesthetic	 language	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 a	 national-socialist	
collective .	 The	 movement	 did	 not	 devise	 aesthetically	 popular	 solutions	 or	377
exert	further	ingluence	over	the	artistic	program	of	the	regime.	The	new	national	
artist’s	conception	as	“a	free	subject”	“stirred	on	by	the	 instinctive	forces	of	his	
inner	 self	 towards	 emotional	 creation”	 (Strzygowski),	 the	 artist	 of	
“Ausdruckskunst”	 stemming	 from	 “purely	 instinctual”	 “desires	 of	
expression”	(Plaßmann)	–	basically	a	kind	of	new	barbaric	artist	creating	an	art	
spiritually	powerful	through	runic	abstraction	and	in	the	service	of	no	authority	
than	 himself	 and	 his	 people/”tribe”:	 Alfred	 Rosenberg,	 while	 somewhat	
sympathetic	 of	 these	 confused	 agendas,	 in	 1934	 declared	 them	 to	 be	 all	 but	
illegitimate	:	
In	the	course	of	an	honest	and	justigied	search	for	new	forms	and	experiences,	a	
part	 of	 the	 German	 youth	 is	 inclined	 to	 embrace	 just	 this	 exciting	
	Strzygowski	elsewhere	had	degined	Power	Art	as	follows:	“Diese	Machtkunst,	bisher	für	die	376
Kunstgeschichte	als	sogenannte	hohe	Kunst	nahezu	alleingültig,	diente	im	wesentlichen	der	
Aufmachung	des	Machtgeistes.	Große	Steinbauten	und	schauspielernde	Menschengestalten	
waren	ihre	Wirkunsmittel.”	1940,	p.	109	
In	other	words	Speer’s	Luitpoldarena	erected	for	the	Reichsparteitag,	with	Goebbels’	crowd	
choregraphy	famously	captured	by	Leni	Riefenstahl’s	cinematography	in	her	“Triumph	des	
Willens”	(1934).	
	While	for	Einstein,	it	should	be	noted,	“[…]	the	legitimacy	of	any	art	required	of	it	its	377
instrumentality	in	forming	a	collective	subjectivity”.		Quoted	in	Haxthausen,	October	107,	2004,	
p.74	
	209
[nervenerregend]	 formula	 [abstraction,	 expressionism]	 as	 typical	 of	 the	
Germanic	character.	Ecstasy	has	nowhere	been	a	pivotal	element	in	German	art	
history. 	378
Hitler	himself	had	 little	 taste	 for	anything	vaguely	barbaric	 as	 far	 as	aesthetics	
were	 concerned,	which	he	made	quite	 clear	 in	 his	 inauguration	 speech	 for	 the	
Haus	der	Deutschen	Kunst:	
Now	however	all	these	cliques	of	dilettantes	and	art	frauds	supporting	and	thus	
sustaining	 each	 other	 will	 be	 removed.	 These	 pre-historic	 Stone	 Age	 men	 of	
culture	[Kultursteinzeitler]	and	stutterers	of	art	[Kunststotterer]	may,	for	all	we	
care,	return	to	the	caves	of	their	ancestors,	to	apply	their	primitive	international	
[!]	scribbles	[Kritzeleien]	there .	379
Hence	the	“Great	German	Art”	proudly	presented	in	1937	did	not	bear	any	traces	
of	abstraction,	of	oblique	runes,	of	quasi	pre-historic	legacies	of	Atlantis,	of	that	
treasured	 non-representational	 and	 non-human	 “German”	 ornamentation	 and	
geometric	patterning,	of	an	“emphasis	on	space,	tone,	color,	volume”,	etc.,	not	to	
mention	the	grotesqueness	and	wicked	expressions	of	German	medieval	folk	art	
and	rural	carnival	rites	embraced	by	the	völkisch	segment .		380
	Alfred	Rosenberg,	Revolution	in	der	bildenden	Kunst?,	Munich	1934,	p.	6	378
	Adolf	Hitler,	“Aus	der	Ansprache	des	Führers	zur	Eröffnung	des	Hauses	der	Deutschen	Kunst”.	379
Das	Bild,	1937,	p.	259	
	Christoph	Zuschlag	writes:	“The	hope	of	the	‘völkisch’	the	regime	would	consider	it	a	point	of	380
honor	“to	deploy	the	proven	soldiers	of	the	cultural	war	in	the	girst	row”	would	not	be	realized.”	
Entartete	Kunst,	1995,	p.	36	
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Documents	on	the	other	hand	had,	by	1937,	long	folded,	while	the	Collège	
de	 Sociologie	 was	 founded	 that	 year,	 as	 was	 Bataille’s	 journal	 Acéphale.	 Its	
content,	 predominantly	 stemming	 from	 Bataille,	 sought	 to	 further	 analyze	
fascism’s	 energetic	 pull	 over	 a	 large	 mass,	 its	 co-optation	 of	 Nietzsche,	 its	
deployment	of	myth	by	way	of	Rosenberg	et	al,	all	 in	order	to	conceive	an	anti-
fascist	 model	 for	 a	 society	 that	 not	 only	 rejected	 mass	 culture	 and	 failed	
parliamentary	democracy	but	furthermore	had	evidently	lost	any	interest	in	and	
expectation	for	art	to	play	any	signigicant	part	in	this	undertaking.	The	notion	of	
a	 diverging	 “contradictory	 social	 state”	 that	 Bataille	 had	 linked	 to	 a	 deviating	
aesthetic	in	Documents	had	completely	evaporated.		In	the	somewhat	cryptic	and	
quite	 dramatic	 ginal	 text	 appearing	 in	 the	 last	 issue	 of	Documents	 belatedly	 in	
1931,	 Bataille	 conceived	 of	 art	 as	 the	 realm	 of	 endless	 and	 inconsequential	
“transpositions”.	 “We	 enter	 art	 galleries	 as	 we	 do	 the	 chemist’s,	 seeking	 well-
presented	remedies	for	accepted	sicknesses” ,	thus	in	a	way	congirming	Freud’s	381
notion	of	art	as	merely	serving	an	aesthetically	compensatory	function	devoid	of	
any	political	or	social	agency	(while	Freud	of	course	did	not	even	think	of	art	as	
the	 realm	 in	 which	 symptoms	 were	 registered	 since	 art	 remedied	 these).	 No	
wonder,	 given	 the	 kind	 of	 scenarios	 Bataille	 envisioned	 for	 a	 social	 model	 in	
which	art	would	essentially	have	to	drop	transposition	and	deliver	the	real	thing	
to	(be)come	alive,	essentially	forsaking	art	altogether,	especially	modern	art:	
We	 are	 a	 long	 way	 from	 those	 savages	 who,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 their	 enormous	
festivals,	suspend	the	skulls	of	 their	ancestors	 from	masts	of	plenty,	who	press	
their	 father’s	 shinbone	 into	 the	 mouth	 of	 a	 pig	 at	 the	 moment	 when	 the	
	Bataille,	“The	Modern	Spirit	and	the	Play	of	Transpositions”,	Documents	8,	1931.	In	Ades/381
Baker,	2006,	p.242
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slaughtered	beast	vomits	its	glood	of	blood.	We	also	play	with	endless	shinbones	
and	skulls;	everywhere	animal	and	human	blood	glows	all	around	us.	But	we	do	
not	know	how	to	use	blood	or	bones	to	break	the	regularity	of	days	which	are	
lost	to	us	like	the	contents	of	a	badly	made	cask. 	382
	Ibid.382
	212
	213
VII	The	Use-Value	of	Barbarism:	Class	Struggle	or	Declassing?	 	383
VII.1	Barbaric	participation	
Bataille’s	ginal	conclusion	at	the	end	of	Documents,	in	which	he	essentially	divests	
art	of	any	efgicacy	in	contributing	to	a	different	social	and	political	model	through	
a	 combative	 anti-aesthetic	 (a	 divestment	 concerning	 a	 select	 and	 by	 and	 large	
French	avant-garde	which	had	throughout	Documents	featured	as	the	promising	
vanguard ),	seems	inevitable	given	his	desire	to	revive	a	barbaric	community	of	384
	This	chapter	heading	refers	back	to	Denis	Hollier’s	essay	“The	Use-Value	of	the	Impossible”	383
which	appeared	girst,	in	French,	as	the	foreword	to	the	reprint	of	Documents	(Paris,	1991)	
subsequently	adopted	by	Bois	and	turned	into	the	heading	“The	Use	Value	of	‘Formless’”	in	his	
and	Krauss’s	book	Formless:	A	User’s	Guide	(New	York,	1997).	(Hollier	in	turn	referenced	
Bataille’s	text	“The	Use	Value	of	D.A.F.	de	Sade	(An	Open	Letter	to	My	Current	Comrades)”,	
1929/30).	The	opposition	of	“class	struggle”	and	“de-classing”	refers	to	Bois’s	respective	
presentation	of	these	terms	in	his	discussion	in	Formless.	
	Which	is	explicable	in	view	of	the	trajectory	of	German	avant-garde	art	of	the	late	1920s	with	384
the	emergence	of	Neue	Sachlichkeit,	this	expression	alone	presumably	not	met	with	much	
enthusiasm	by	either	Bataille	or	Einstein.	Einstein,	despite	his	initial	participation	in	Berlin	Dada	
by	way	of	his	and	George	Grosz’s	satirical	magazine	Der	Blutige	Ernst,	was	skeptical	of	the	
movement	as	a	whole	though:	their	usage	of	(commercial)	imagery	and	strategies	directly	
relating	to	those	of	mass	media	and	propaganda	(photography,	illustration,	collage)	in	his	view	
reproduced	and	thus	reafgirmed	a	rationalizing	“tectonic”	aesthetic	instead	of	countering	it	by	
offering	the	kind	of	abstracted-deconstructing	“tectonic	hallucination”	as	claimed	for	the	
Surrealism	of	a	Picasso,	Miro,	André	Masson	etc.	A	notion	of	avant-garde	that	for	Einstein	as	
already	mentioned	derived	its	principal	achievement	from	a	collective	“use-value”:	“	“Their	
images	(Berlin	Dada,	Neue	Sachlichekit]	do	not	have	the	power	of	binding	symbols”.	Kunst	des	20.	
Jahrhunderts,	Berlin	1992,	p.844	
As	for	Bataille,	one	can	only	presume	that	on	a	formal	level	alone	the	work	of	the	mid	to	late	
1920s	coming	out	of	Berlin	did	not	offer	much	in	terms	of	formlessness,	heterogeneity	let	alone	
aspects	of	an	abject	sacred.		
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sorts	–	one	not	congined	to	an	anti-aesthetic	project,	as	his	attempt	to	form	such	
a	mythical-barbaric	community	by	way	of	Acéphale	congirms .	385
Which	is	also	to	say	that,	if	Bataille	relegated	avant-garde	aspirations	to	a	
continual,	yet	basically	impotent	“play	of	transpositions”,	the	same	could	be	said	
of	 Bataille’s	 relation	 to	 the	 barbaric,	 one	 essentially	 -	 and	 literally	 -	 travelling	
from	 one	 social-geographic	 imaginary	 to	 another.	 (I.e.	 Bataille	 transposed	 his	
ideas	for	a	quasi-barbaric	social	model	onto	conceptions	gleaned	from	perceptive	
archival	 research	 and	 thereof	 derived	 fantastic	 excesses,	 be	 that	 in	 form	 of	 a	
Gaulish,	Aztec,	Iberian,	Chicago	mob	or	Parisian	demimonde-Lumpen	“barbaric”	
community.)		
When	viewed	 separately	 from	his	 objective	 to	 somehow	 reconnect	with	
that	 dubious	 inner	 barbarian,	 Bataille’s	 overall	 judgment	 of	 the	 avant-garde	 at	
the	 end	 of	 Documents	 is	 far	 less	 idiosyncratic	 but	 posits,	 rather,	 the	 alleged	
failure	of	the	avant-garde	to	successfully	translate	an	anti-aesthetic	revolutionary	
	Where	as	part	of	the	meetings	held	in	the	Marly	forest	outside	Paris	one	of	the	members	385
(Patrick	Waldberg,	Bataille,	Andre	Masson,	Pierre	Klossowski,	Georges	Ambrosino,	Jean	Wahl,	
Jules	Monnerot)	was	supposed	to	“volunteer”	to	be	sacrigiced	for	the	group’s	initiation	rite,	a	plan	
that	never	came	to	fruition.	(According	to	Moebius	the	member	volunteering	to	be	sacrigiced	was	
Bataille	himself,	a	wish	not	granted	by	the	other	three	members	present	on	that	occasion.	
Moebius,	2006,	p.	271)	That	despite	all	these	secterian	antics	Acéphale	may	also	be	viewed	as	a	
sort	of	occultist	proto-Situationism	is	plausible	by	anecdotes	such	as	the	group’s	“rituals”	(read	
cultic	détournements)	described	by	Allan	Stoekl:	“One	of	the	Acéphale	rituals	–	which	was	never	
carried	out	–	was	to	soak	a	human	skull	in	brine	until	it	became	soft	and	malleable,	then	place	it	
at	the	base	of	the	obelisk	in	the	Place	de	la	Concorde	on	January	21	(1938?);	the	Press	was	then	
to	be	notigied	of	the	very	mysterious	reappearance	of	the	king’s	skull.”	Bataille,	1985,	p.	263.	For	
an	extensive	historical	account	of	the	group	Acéphale	see	Marina	Galetti	L’Apprenti	Sorcier,	Paris	
1999,	Rita	Bischof,	Tragisches	Lachen,	Berlin	2010		
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program	into	a	social	reality,	as	claimed	by	Peter	Bürger	 .	Bürger	uses	Hegel’s	386
notion	of	“augheben”	(sublate)	for	such	an	aspired	to	transformation,	a	sublation	
that	 according	 to	 him	 did	 not	 occur	 and	 therefore	 congirms	 his	 view	 of	 the	
impossibility	 of	 the	 avant-garde,	 in	 hindsight,	 to	 realize	 an	 anti-aesthetic	
revolutionary	 project	 within	 “social	 life”	 (“Lebenspraxis”) .	 Of	 particular	387
relevance	to	this	discussion	is	Bürger’s	elaboration	of	the	anti-aesthetic	device	of	
shock	 as	 having	 become	 an	 “institutionalized”	 experience,	 a	 part	 of	 consumer	
culture,	which	would	be	a	continuation	of	Benjamin’s	situating	of	shock	around	
the	 early	 1930s :	 as	 an	 anti-bourgeois	 Dada	 tactic,	 becoming	 fully	 employed	388
not	 as	 anti-aesthetic	 device,	 nor	 as	 a	 chief	 political-ecstatic	 instance	 of	
heterogeneity	 (Bataille),	 but	 as	 a	 key	 component	 to	 cinematic	 experience	 and	
	Peter	Bürger,	Theorie	der	Avantgarde,	Frankfurt	a.M.,	1974.	Here	it	would	seem	important	to	386
co-introduce	Denis	Hollier’s	critique	of	Bürger’s	critique	issuing,	as	it	does,	a	wholesale	verdict	of	
failure	to	the	historical	avant-garde.	Hollier	writes:	”The	iconoclastic	radicalism	of	the	avant-
garde	sets	salvation	through	the	group	against	salvation	through	works.[…]	And	it	is	precisely	
what	is	implemented	by	community	authority:	It	requires	a	number	of	people	to	do	nothing.	How	
can	on	then	blame	the	avant-garde	for	having	failed	“in	its	attempt	to	lead	art	back	into	social	
life”,	when	the	real	content	of	most	of	the	avant-garde	groups	was	precisely	a	communal	
experiment,	i.e.	an	experiment	in	transforming	social	life	into	art?”	Hollier	(ed),	1988,	p.	xiv	
	“The	avant-garde	art	intends	a	sublation	of	autonomous	art	into	social	life.	This	sublation	has	387
not	taken	place	and	presumably	cannot	take	place	in	bourgeois	society,	unless	in	form	of	a	wrong	
sublation	of	autonomous	art.	That	there	exists	such	a	wrong	sublation	is	evinced	by	popular	
literature	and	the	aesthetics	of	the	commodity.[…]	In	late	capitalist	society	the	intentions	of	the	
historical	avant-garde	are	being	realized	under	inverted	signs”	pp.72-73.	Bataille’s	depreciated	
“play	of	transpositions”	of	modern	art	would	thus	seem	to	correspond	with	that	of	Bürger’s	
“falsche	Aughebung”	(even	though	Bürger’s	avant-garde’s	sublation	into	everyday	life	would	
doubtlessly	yield	a	very	different	“Lebenspraxis”	than	the	kind	of	“ecstasy	of	social	life”	project	
envisioned	by	Bataille).	
	Regarding	the	socio-cultural	trajectory	of	shock	Bürger	writes:	“[…]	one	has	to	ask	oneself	if	388
this	provocation	[i.e.	Zurich	Dada’s	evenings	at	the	Cabaret	Voltaire]	actually	doesn’t	reinforce	
existing	attitudes	[the	bourgeois	audience’s]	by	providing	an	occasion	for	these	to	manifest	
themselves.	[…]	Nothing	loses	its	affect	more	quickly	than	shock,	because	it	is	by	nature	a	unique	
experience.	[…]	An	institutionalized	shock	would	most	likely	affect	the	recipients’	social	life	
[Lebenspraxis]	the	least;	it	is	being	‘consumed’”.	p.108.	
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therefore	 a	 perpetually	 recycled	 staple	 of	 popular	 culture	 devoid	 of	 any	
transformative	value.		
Bataille’s	 resignation	 pertaining	 to	 the	 dissolution	 of	 an	 anti-aesthetic	
project	 such	 as	 Documents	 again	 refers,	 however,	 to	 Benjamin	 Buchloh’s	
discussion	of	 the	 last	pre-war	Surrealist	 exhibition	 in	Paris	1938,	organized	by	
Breton,	Paul	Eluard	and	Duchamp:	the	“Exposition	Internationale	du	Surrealiste”.	
Buchloh	revisits	this	exhibition	as	a	quasi-ginal	statement	of	the	European	avant-
garde	vis-à-vis	the	eradication	of	the	avant-garde	as	evinced	by	the	art	of	the	new	
Germany:	 as	 a	 testament	 to	 a	 “universal	 prostitution”	 and,	 by	 extension,	 the	
avant-garde’s	admission	to	be	(ineffectively)	operating	within	or	rather	to	have	
become	 fully	 absorbed	 by	 (or,	 to	 enlist	 Bürger,	 wrongly	 sublated	 into)	 “a	
community	degined	by	commodity	consumption”;	all	 this	while	the	Nazi	regime	
had	 simultaneously	 successfully	 realized	 the	 “annihilation	 of	 the	 aesthetic	
sphere”. 		389
If	Walter	Benjamin	had	stated	more	than	a	year	ahead	of	the	“Degenerate	
Art	 Exhibition”,	 the	parallel	 “Great	German	Art	 Exhibition”	 and	 the	 “Exposition	
Internationale	du	Surrealiste”	that	“[…]	humankind’s	[i.e.	Western	society’s]	self-
alienation	has	reached	such	a	degree	that	it	can	experience	its	own	destruction	
as	an	aesthetic	pleasure	of	the	girst	order” ,	it	is	a	diagnosis	that	in	the	context	390
under	 discussion	 here	 pertains	 to	 not	 only	 one,	 or	 two	 but	 three	 (historical)	
scenarios.	 Firstly,	 Benjamin’s	 own	 historical	 context:	 that	 of	 a	 large-scale	
	Benjamin	Buchloh:	“Designs	and	Dialectics	of	Annihilation”.	Lecture,	Haus	der	Kunst,	Munich,	389
June	10th,	2012	
	Benjamin,	1936,	penultimate	sentence.	390
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voluntary	and	participatory	submission	to	Nazism	and	the	promise	of	a	kind	of	
political	 ecstasy	 that	 perversely	 conglates	 politics	 and	 aesthetics.	 Secondly,	 the	
trajectory	 laid	 out	 by	 Buchloh,	 i.e.	 the	 voluntary	 “universal	 prostitution”	 of	
modern	 society	 to	mass	 and	 commodity	 culture	 with	 its	 promise	 of	 a	 kind	 of	
material	ecstasy.	Doubtless,	while	“prostitution”	does	not	equal	“destruction” 	391
and	 capitalist	 consumerism	 certainly	 does	 not	 equal	 Nazi	 fascism,	 the	 way	
“prostitution”	is	employed	by	Buchloh	implies	again	a	submission	to	a	system	of	
ultimately	 social	 deterioration	 by	 way	 of	 administered/managed	 consumerist	
desire.	 I.e.,	 a	 submission	 to	 a	 regime	 of	 capitalism,	 one	 indeed	 sold	 as	 and	
“experienced	[…]	as	aesthetic	pleasure”	(Benjamin).	With	Bataille,	a	 third	angle	
emerges	when	linked	to	a	notion	of	barbarity.	For	if	Benjamin	asserted	that	the	
collective	 “experience[d]	 its	 own	 destruction	 as	 an	 aesthetic	 pleasure”,	 this	
would	 in	 principal	 correspond	with	Bataille’s	 admired	 (phantasmagoric)	Aztec	
culture’s	 excessive	human	 sacrigices,	which	not	only	 revealed	 “an	astonishingly	
joyous	 character	 of	 [these]	 horrors” ,	 but	which	 Bataille	 furthermore	 alleges	392
was	 an	 instance	 of	 	 “[…]	 the	 Aztecs	 wanting	 to	 serve	 these	 strange	 people	
(Cortez’	 Spaniards)	 as	 ‘spectacle’	 and	 ‘theatre’,’	 to	 tempt	 them	 to	 laughter’,	 to	
offer	them	‘diversion’	”. 		393
A	collective-barbaric	scenario	 in	which	“self-alienation”	–	conceived	as	a	
state	 not	 caused	 by	 but,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 co-opted	 or	 distorted	 by	 both	 mass	
	Although,	one	last	time,	according	to	Benjamin	“distraction	[Zerstreuung]	and	destruction	391
[Zerstörung]”	were	“the	subjective	and	objective	sides	of	one	and	the	same	process”.	Benjamin,	
2008	[1936],	p.	56
	Bataille	quoted	in	Krauss	1985,	p.55	392
	Bataille,	1928.	in	Kulturgeschichte	und	Modernität	Lateinamerikas,	ed.	Constantin	von	393
Barloewen,	Berlin,	1996,	p.216.	(Trans.	by	the	author)	
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culture	and	a	fascist	surrendering	of	the	self	–	could	point	to	an	“ecstatic	loss	of	
oneself”	as	much	as	 it	could	point	to	an	attainment	of	that	“wholly	other”	state	
Bataille	had	discussed	on	numerous	occasions .	 (In	 the	case	of	 fascism,	not	a	394
state	 of	 alienation	 but,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 one	 of	 coalescing	 with	 the	 tightly	
choreographed	 (homogenous	 and	 headed)	 body	 politic	 of	 the	 Volk).	 I.e.,	 self-
alienation	as	the	desired	sacred	state	of	a	transgressing	of	one’s	own	subjectivity,	
which	Bataille	envisioned	taking	place	in	a	communitarian	setting	at	the	time	of	
the	Collège	de	Sociologie	and	which	would	subsequently	form	the	central	topic	of	
Inner	 Experience	 (1943),	 as	 limit-experience:	 a	 recurring	 theme	 throughout	
	On	this	see	especially	Dominique	Kunz	Westhoff,	“Face	au	nazisme:	‘	faire	image’”.	In:	Critique	394
788-789,	Jan-Feb	2013,	pp.	31-42.	“Chez	Bataille	[…]	cette	reformation	de	la	société	autour	d’une	
giguration	de	ce	qui	la	terrigie	n’est	pas	véritablement	destinée	à	se	stabiliser.	Sa	description	du	
sentiment	communiel	semble	plutôt	conduire	le	groupe,	in	Iine,	à	une	dissolution	généralisée	[…]	
un	sacrigice	sans	rémission	de	toute	identité,	et	même	de	toute	entité	[…]”,	p.38
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Bataille,	 appearing	 as	 late	 as	 in	 the	 1961	 art	 historical	 study	 Tears	 of	 Eros .	395
“Self-alienation”,	 in	 Bataille’s	 conception	 of	 a	 re-sacralized	 social	 model,	 could	
essentially	 be	 redeemed	 from	 its	 corruption	 by	 fascism 	 and	mass	 culture	 to	396
become	 a	 central	 feature	 of	 “the	 true	 world	 of	 lovers” ,	 one	 in	 which	 a	397
sovereign	 act	 to	 alienate	 oneself	 from	 the	 self	would	mark	 a	 condition	 for	 the	
realization	 of	 a	 group	 like	 Acéphale	 –	 not	 a	 condition	 symptomatic	 of	 decay/
catastrophe	(Benjamin),	or	of	discontent	(Freud),	or	of	disenchantment	(Weber),	
	Bataille	annotated	his	valued	illustration	from	the	Codex	Vaticanus	depicting	the	“Aztec	395
sacrigice	through	the	tearing	out	of	the	heart”	with	the	following	caption,	girst	in	1939:	”Human	
sacrigice	is	loftier	than	any	other	–	not	in	the	sense	that	it	is	crueler	than	any	other,	but	because	it	
is	close	to	the	only	sacrigice	without	trickery,	which	can	only	be	the	ecstatic	loss	of	oneself”.	“Le	
sacré”,	Cahiers	d’art	1939,	in	Bataille,	1985,	p.244.	The	same	image	appears	at	the	end	of	Tears	of	
Eros,	after	the	photographs	of	a	Voodoo	ritual	involving	trance	and	self-mutilation	and	next	to	the	
aforementioned	image	of	the	“Chinese	torture	of	the	100	pieces”	(a	body	pulled	into	hundred	
pieces),	the	“punishment	reserved	for	utmost	crimes”	(Bataille).		
This	notion	of	“ecstatic	loss	”	tied	to	a	socio-political	project	is	the	crux	underlying	the	
irreconcilability	of	Benjamin	with	Bataille	throughout	the	activities	of	the	College	de	Sociologie,	
which	Benjamin	attended	yet	was	not	really	a	part	of	as	such.		All	discussions	on	this	disconnect	
(by	Hollier,	Moebius,	Stoekl	for	example)	point	to	the	fact	that	according	to	Benjamin	it	was	
precisely	the	communitarian	mythical-irrational	tendencies	(sought	to	be	reinvigorated	by	the	
College)	sprouting	in	gin-de-siecle	Germany	that	contributed	to	the	eventual	pull	of	Nazism.	In	
hindsight	a	pull	that	gained	its	efgicacy	not	from	offering	anything	substantial	in	terms	of,	say,	
irrational	völkisch-pagan	interests,	but	on	the	contrary,	by	providing	very	solid	matrixes	to	
absorb	these	earlier	jumbled	spiritual	searches	and	wanderings:	that	of	a	concrete	Reich	
complete	with	a	solid	system	of	initial	separation	and	ultimate	“Selektion”.	It	is	not	least	due	to	
these	solid	matrixes	that	the	regime	is	wholly	compatible	with	rationalizing	aspects,	with	
modernization	including	infrastructure,	with	industrial	productivity	and	so	forth.	
Departing	from	this	episode	of	disjuncture	in	intellectual	history	to	the	wider	historical	context	
Bataille’s	investment	into	communal	human	sacrigice	as	kind	of	ultimate	state/State	is	
problematic.	To	exalt	human	sacrigice	for	a	social	concept	recuperating	the	sacred	and	ecstasy	at	
the	moment	of	an	evolving	organization	of	mass	extermination	is	what	makes	Bataille’s	
exceptional	theorization	of	fascism	so	challenging	-	and	perplexing.	(Keeping	in	mind	that	
Bataille’s	knowledge	of	the	actual	nature	of	the	camps	was	either	non-existing	or	very	limited	at	
the	time).	
	With	regard	to	a	“corrupted”	notion	of	human	sacrigice	in	view	of	Nazism,	i.e.	the	holocaust,	it	396
is	quite	striking	that	Bataille’s	in	his	text	on	the	Aztecs	(1928)	concludes	that	despite	their	
“bizarre	ecstasy”	in	sacrigicing	themselves	“they	died	as	suddenly	as	insects	being	crushed.”	Von	
Barloewen	(ed.),	p.216.	Through	which	he	actually	prognosticates	Agambens’	critique	of	a	
“misconstruction”	of	ecstatic/sacred	notion	of	execution	with	a	biopolitical	rationale	(for	which	
Agamben	quotes	Hitler	speaking	of	exterminating	the	Jews	“like	lice”).	See	chapter	3	
	Bataille,	“The	Sorcerer’s	Apprentice”,	in	Bataille,	1985,	p.229	(First	in	the	journal	Nouvelle	397
Revue	Francaise	No.228,	1938)	
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and	 of	 course	 not	 of	 self-estrangement	 as	 originally	 degined	 by	 Marx .	 This	398
situation,	or	rather	the	location	of	the	barbaric	as	central	to	Bataille’s	thinking	at	
the	time	of	Documents	(and	surely	continuing,	indeed	intensifying	at	the	time	of	
the	Collège	and	Acéphale)	was	articulated	by	Rosalind	Krauss	and	Yve-Alain	Bois	
in	 their	 revisiting	 of	 Documents.	 For,	 in	 their	 publication	 L’Informe:	 mode	
d’emploi,	which	appeared	in	conjunction	with	their	ingluential	1996	exhibition	at	
the	Centre	Pompidou,	Bois	identigied	the	barbaric	as	a	crucial	factor	underlying	
Bataille’s	 anti-aesthetic	 project	 of	 Documents.	 The	 following	 passage	 by	 Bois	
thematically	 touches	 on	 just	 that	 complex	 presented	 so	 far	 in	 this	 chapter,	
making	 it	 necessary	 to	 quote	 it	 at	 length.	 Signigicant	 for	 this	 discussion,	 Bois	
introduces	his	argument	concerning	a	Bataillean	barbaric	with	Bataille’s	polemic	
of	the	institution	of	the	“Museum”,	an	entry	to	the	Critical	Dictionary:	
‘The	museum	 is	 the	colossal	mirror	 in	which	man	 ginally	contemplates	himself	
from	 all	 sides,	 ginds	 himself	 literally	 admirable,	 and	 abandons	 himself	 to	 the	
ecstasy	 expressed	 in	 all	 the	 art	 journals’;	 (an	 expression	 of	 ecstasy	 that	 the	
Documents	reader	would	thus	have	the	right	to	expect	but	which	he	would	gind	
no	 trace	 of	 in	 the	 review).	 We	 should	 resist	 the	 temptation	 to	 read	 these	
sentences	 by	 Bataille	 as	 a	 presage	 to	 the	 unforgettable	 phrase	 uttered	 several	
	This	idea	of	a	Bataillean	sovereign	self-alienation	as	positivity	registers	in	part	in	the	revised	398
“rehabilitated”	notions	of	community	laid	out	by	Jean-Luc	Nancy,	for	example	in	Being	Singular	
Plural	(and	in	Agamben’s	The	Coming	Community).	How	such	a	reclaiming	of	self-alienation	may	
have	returned	in	culture	generally,	girst	as	a	counter-cultural	political-sexual	“liberation”	and	
consequently	reformulated	as	the	various	“lose	yourself”	esoteric-materialist-narcissistic	
pursuits	and	lifestyle	trends,	complete	with	a	thriving	industry	advertising	these	prospects,	
necessitates	yet	another	debate;	i.e.	any	notion	of	self-alienation	now,	if	one	can	call	it	that,	is	
principally	to	satisfy	a	pampering	and	productive	treatment	for	the	self.	It	is	from	this	context	that	
a	title	and	a	work	like	Get	rid	of	yourself	(Bernadette	Corporation,	2001-03)	in	part	derives	its	
concept:	“Get	Rid	of	Yourself	is	an	encounter	with	emerging,	non-instituted	or	identity-less	forms	
of	protest.	[…]	The	crisis	it	announces	is	the	sudden	return	of	history,	but	this	time	without	
characters	or	a	story,	and	of	a	politics	without	subjects”.	http://
anarchistwithoutcontent.wordpress.com/2011/07/04/get-rid-of-yourself-transcript/	
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years	later	[1936]	by	Walter	Benjamin	(‘There	is	no	document	of	culture	that	is	
not	at	the	same	time	a	record	[document]	of	barbarism’)	since	this	would	be	to	
push	Bataille’s	 thought	 toward	Marxism,	with	which	he	was	engaged	only	very	
briegly	[…]	always	maintaining	his	distance.	Bataille	was	less	interested	in	class	
struggle	 than	 in	 de-classing,	 and	 barbarism	 was	 something	 to	 which	 Bataille	
appealed	 with	 all	 his	 might.	 No	 Marxist	 could	 have	 penned	 the	 following	
sentences:	 ‘Without	 a	 profound	 complicity	with	 natural	 forces	 such	 as	 violent	
death,	 gushing	 blood,	 sudden	 catastrophes	 and	 the	 horrible	 cries	 of	 pain	 that	
accompany	 them,	 terrifying	 ruptures	 of	 what	 had	 seemed	 immutable,	 the	 fall	
into	stinking	gilth	of	what	had	been	elevated	–	without	a	sadistic	understanding	
of	 an	 incontestably	 thundering	 and	 torrential	 nature,	 there	 could	 be	 no	
revolutionaries,	there	could	only	be	a	revolting	utopian	sentimentality’	 	399
Several	 points	 can	be	 extrapolated	 from	 this	 paragraph,	 from	Bois’s	 veto	 of	 an	
alignment	 of	 Bataille’s	 appeal	 to	 “barbarism”	 with	 Benjamin’s	 dismal	
“document[s]	 of	 barbarity”;	 the	 object	 par	 excellence	of	 historical	materialism;	
the	irrefutable	evidence	renewing	the	cause	time	and	again	for	the	historical	to	a	
	Formless:	A	User’s	Guide,	New	York,	1997	[Paris,	1996],	pp.	47-49.	Bataille’s	text	“Museum”	399
girst	published	in	Documents.	Benjamin’s	quote	girst	appeared	in	“Eduard	Fuchs,	der	Sammler	
und	der	Historiker”	[Eduard	Fuchs,	collector	and	historian]	(1937)	and	again	in	“U| ber	den	Begriff	
der	Geschichte”	[Theses	on	the	philosophy	of	history]	(1940).	Bataille’s	quote	in	the	end	is	from	
“La	valeur	d’usage	de	D.A.F	de	Sade”,	apx.	1929/30,	posthumously	published	in	the	Oeuvres	
Complètes	II,	English	version	in	Bataille,	1985,	p.	101	
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post-War	left	to	ask:	“Barbarei	oder	Sozialismus?” ;	Socialisme	ou	barbarie?	 .	400 401
And,	last	but	not	least,	the	implication	of	(contemporary)	art	as	an	institution	(i.e.	
not	 primarily	 understood	 as	 a	 physical	 place,	 such	 as	 Bataille’s	 bourgeois	
“Museum”)	arguably	providing	 the	space	and	 the	 faculties	 to	address	barbarity	
(as	a	“dialectic”,	if	one	will),	employed	as	an	instrument/procedure	of	critique .	402
Neither	 as	 (non-ironic)	 formal	 barbarization	 with	 the	 end	 of	 mere	 formal	
innovation	nor	as	a	(non-ironic)	iconoclastic	pose	within	the	now	rather	glexible	
parameters	 of	 the	 institution;	 and	 not	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 mobilizing	 content	 that	
unambiguously	 cries	 out	 “barbarism!”	 consistent	 with	 visual	 culture	 at	 large,	
from	 the	 “true”	 depictions	 of	 photo	 journalism	 to	 “gictitious”	 ones	 of	 the	
entertainment	 industry.	 (Not	 because	 art	 is	 not	 at	 once	 “true”	 and	 “gictitious”,	
	A	statement	habitually	attributed	to	Rosa	Luxemburg	who	however	in	her	1916	text	“Die	400
Krise	der	Sozialdemokratie”	pointed	out	her	usage	of	this	antagonism	to	be	indebted	to	Friedrich	
Engels:	
“Friedrich	Engels	sagte	einmal:	die	bürgerliche	Gesellschaft	steht	vor	einem	Dilemma:	entweder	
U| bergang	zum	Sozialismus	oder	Rückfall	in	die	Barbarei.[...].	Dieser	Weltkrieg	–	das	ist	ein	
Rückfall	in	die	Barbarei.	[…].	Wir	stehen	also	heute,	genau	wie	Friedrich	Engels	vor	einem	
Menschenalter,	vor	vierzig	Jahren,	voraussagte,	vor	der	Wahl:	entweder	Triumph	des	
Imperialismus	und	Untergang	jeglicher	Kultur,	wie	im	alten	Rom,	Entvölkerung,	Verödung,	
Degeneration	[!],	ein	großer	Friedhof.	[....]	Dies	ist	ein	Dilemma	der	Weltgeschichte,	ein	
Entweder-Oder,	dessen	Waagschalen	zitternd	schwanken	vor	dem	Entschluß	des	
klassenbewußten	Proletariats.	Die	Zukunft	der	Kultur	und	der	Menschheit	hängt	davon	ab,	ob	
das	Proletariat	sein	revolutionäres	Kampfschwert	mit	männlichem	Entschluß	in	die	Waagschale	
wirft”.	
http://www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/luxemburg/1916/junius/teil1.htm	Retrieved	April	
19th	2013	
	A	group	and	a	magazine	founded	by	Cornelius	Castoriadis	and	Claude	Lefort	in	1949	with	an	401
anti-Stalinist	agenda,	pursuing	a	pragmatic	realization	of	Marxist	concepts	in	post-war	France.	
The	magazine	folded	in	1965,	the	group	in	1967	(Lefort	had	left	it	earlier).		
	The	changed	role	of	the	institution,	its	previous	illiteracy	in	adequately	dealing	with	this	402
“document	of	barbarism”	–	a	staple	of	any	old	biennial	by	now,	a	curatorial	requisite	–	was	
pointed	out	by	Hal	Foster	in	his	discussion	of	the	eminent	1984	MoMA	exhibition	“Primitivism	in	
20th	Century	Art”:	“In	its	very	lack,	the	show	suggested	the	need	of	a	Foucauldian	archeology	of	
primitivism	[…]	Such	an	enterprise	is	beyond	the	museum,	the	business	of	which	is	patronage	–	
the	formation	of	a	paternal	tradition	against	the	transgressive	outside,	a	documentation	of	
civilization,	not	the	barbarism	underneath.”	“The	‘Primitive	Unconscious’	of	Modern	Art”,	October	
Vol.	34,	1985,	p.55
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since	it	is	of	course	both,	but	if	its	exclamations	do	not	differ	conceptually	from	
those	 above,	 it	 would	 make	 them	 supergluous,	 products	 of	 photo	 journalism	
arguably	being	more	“informative”	and	those	of	entertainment	industry	arguably	
more	“entertaining”).			
First,	 rather	 than	determining	 that	 “Bataille	was	 less	 interested	 in	 class	
struggle	 than	 in	 de-classing”,	 one	 can	 posit	 rather	 that	with/for	 Bataille	 “class	
struggle”	ideally	yielded	or,	in	fact,	is	sublated	in	political/social	“de-classing” .	403
This	 was	 a	 process	 through	 which	 a	 uniform,	 organized	 “Marxist”	 proletariat	
would	 ideally	 progress	 towards	 the	 formal	 (non-)structure	 of	 a	 counter-Marx	
Lumpenproletariat,	 which	 Marx	 had	 degined	 as	 “the	 whole	 indeginite,	
	Stephan	Möbius	actually	makes	a	similar	argument	however	explicitly	in	connection	to	403
Acéphale:	“Acéphale	was	not	only	religiously	motivated	but	strived	to	in	a	sense	practice	a	
sublation	(in	the	Hegelian	sense)	of	politics	into	religion,	so	that	politics	and	everyday	religious	
life	would	not	pose	oppositions	[…].	2006,,	p.	254.	Again	the	point	is	well	taken	in	terms	of	the	
description	of	the	process	but	just	like	Moebius’s	earlier	use	of	“order”	in	terms	of	the	Collège’s	
aspirations	for	a	social	model	to	employ	the	very	notion	of	“religion”	as	the	desired	realm	of	
Acéphale	(the	group)	makes	for	an	unfortunate	choice	of	terminology.	Already	in	the	“Use-value	
of	de	Sade”	text	(1929/30)	Bataille	clearly	distinguished	between	“religion”	and	what	he	calls	
“practical	and	theoretical	heterology”	(essentially	enacted	by	Acéphale		the	group	and	Acéphale	
the	journal).	“In	practice	one	must	understand	by	religion	not	really	that	which	answers	the	need	
for	the	unlimited	projection	(expulsion	or	excretion)	of	human	nature,	but	the	totality	of	
prohibitions,	obligations,	and	partial	freedom	that	socially	channel	and	regularize	this	projection.	
[…]	It	[religion]	betrays	the	needs	that	it	was	not	only	supposed	to	regulate,	but	satisfy.”	1985,	
pp.96-97.		
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disintegrated	 mass,	 thrown	 hither	 and	 thither	 [hin-	 und	 her	 geworfen]“ .	 A	404
necessarily	 “de-classed”	social	primal	structure,	 the	only	one	plausible	perhaps	
to	 allow	 for	 a	 consequent,	 and	 no	 doubt	 equally	 “utopian” ,	 not	405
“disintegrated”	 (Marx)	 but	 “bi-or	 polyacephalic”	 (Bataille)	 community.	 I.e.,	 a	
community	devoted	to	a	“frenzy	of	forms”	(1929)	and	acting	as	a	“frenzied	being”	
(1936),	 presenting	 a	 political	 formlessness,	 a	 “being”	 literally	 confounding	
identigiers	such	as	“the	workers”,	“the	proletariat”,	“the	party”	etc.,	homogeneities	
	“…die	ganze	unbestimmte,	aufgelöste,	hin-	und	hergeworfene	Masse…”	Marx,	Der	achtzehnte	404
Brumaire	des	Louis	Bonaparte,	Berlin	1960	[1852]	p.	160.		
English:	http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch05.htm		
And	to	further	elucidate	this	structural	correspondence	Marx’s	very	expression,	“thrown	hither	
and	thither”	also	resembles	Bataille’s	notion	of	the	“va-et-vient”	in	the	text	“The	Big	Toe”:	
“Although	within	the	body	blood	glows	in	equal	quantities	from	high	to	low	and	from	low	to	high,	
there	is	a	bias	in	favor	of	that	which	elevates	itself,	and	human	life	is	erroneously	seen	as	an	
elevation”.	Brotchie	(ed.)	1995,	p.20.	“Va-et-vient”	in	French	refers	to	both	a	vertical	up-and-down	
(i.e.	in	this	case	class	hierarchy)	and	a	more	horizontal	“hither	and	thither”	movement.	Also	see	
Didie-Huberman,	2010,	p.185	
Hollier	makes	a	similar	point:	”By	contrast,	the	Lumpenproletariat	–	which	unlike	an	organized	
proletariat,	represents	nothing	–	would	be	a	heterogeneity	that,	turned	loose,	would	bring	on	the	
disintegration	of	all	the	structures	guaranteeing	the	homogeneity	of	the	social	edigice”.	Against	
Architecture,	trans.	Betsy	Wing,	Cambridge/Mass,	1992	p.125-126.	“Social	edigice”	is	a	term	used	
by	Bataille	in	the	DAF	de	Sade	text.	
(In	a	discussion	by	Krauss	on	the	Bataillean	Lumpenproletariat	she	draws	on	a	translation	in	
which		“hither	and	thither”	is	replaced	by	“amorphous	[…]	glotsam	and	jetsam”	“”.	While	less	
accurate	in	view	of	the	original	German	text,	this	makes	for	a	more	palpable	illustration	of	the	
“excremental	and	expulsed”	notion	of	the	Lumpen/refuse	(non)-constituency.	Krauss,	“’Informe’	
without	Conclusion”,	October	Vol.	78,	1996,	p.100)
	A	utopian	notion	disclaimed	by	Bataille	when	he	writes:	“The	revolutionary	impulse	of	the	405
proletarian	masses	is,	moreover,	sometimes	implicitly	and	sometimes	openly	treated	as	sacred,	
and	that	is	why	it	is	possible	to	use	the	word	Revolution	entirely	stripped	of	its	utilitarian	
meaning,	without	however,	giving	it	an	idealist	meaning.”	1985,	p.100	What	Bataille	means	by	
“utilitarian”	is	surely	the	post-revolutionary	emergence	of	a	heroic	organized	socialist/Marxist	
political	system,	Luxemburg’s	“class-conscious	proletariat”	(thus	the	exact	opposite	of	Bataille’s	
self-deginition	for	such	a	group).	The	“revolution”	is	“utilitarian”	also	of	course	due	to	the	actual	
redistribution	of	wealth	and	the	reappropriation	of	the	means	of	production	for	a	collective	
worker	state	(again	opposite	Bataille’s	ideal	since	while	being	afgirmative	of	redistribution,	his	
political	teleology	would	be	non-accumulative	expenditure,	not	utility	and	production).	“Idealist”	
in	the	sense	of	the	revolution	being	orientated	towards	an	abstract	ideal	(say,	Jacobinian	or	
bourgeois	liberté,	egalité,	fraternité).	Utopian,	ginally,	because	Bataille’s	revolting,	in	the	double	
sense,	being	is	in	itself	idealist	though:	as	a	desired	–	and	unrealized	–	anti-ideal.	
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as	Bataille	would	say .	For	Bois	also	omits	the	part	directly	preceding	Bataille’s	406
typically	 excessive	 scenario	 of	 this	 formless	 frenzy.	 There	 Bataille’s	 introduces	
the	 in	 this	 case	 odd	 term	 of	 “participation”,	 i.e.	 a	 democratic	 process	 (albeit	
naturally	not	 in	 the	 sense	of	 parliamentary	democracy).	Participation	 is	 in	 fact	
degined	(extra-)politically	in	this	same	paragraph	Bois	draws	on:	
Participation	–	in	the	purely	psychological	sense	as	well	as	in	the	active	sense	of	
the	 word	 –	 does	 not	 only	 commit	 revolutionaries	 to	 a	 particular	 politics,	 for	
example,	to	the	establishment	of	socialism	throughout	the	world.	It	is	also	–	and	
necessarily	 –	 presented	 as	moral	 participation:	 immediate	 participation	 in	 the	
destructive	act	of	the	revolution	[…]. 	407
So	overall	the	actual	political	goal,	or	in	fact	the	potential	of	Bataillean	thinking,	
remains	 uncertain	 and	 therefore	 contested .	 While	 some,	 such	 as	 Moebius,	408
argue	 that	 the	 kind	 of	 revolutionary	 frenzy	 yearned	 for	 by	Bataille	 serves	 as	 a	
	A	later,	more	nihilistic	than	utopian	version	thereof	is	essentially	outlined	by	Agamben	in	his	406
own	(a)political	version	of	political	formlessness:	the	Coming	Community	(1991)	of	“whatever	
singularities”,	of		“scattered	existences”	(barbaric?	nomadic?	Or	actually	post-fordist	
hypermobile?),	of	“indifference”,	“amorphous”	(i.e.	already	semantically	indebted	to	Bataille’s	
formless	as	well	as	Marx’	Lumpenproletariat).	A	community	in	which,	in	accordance	with	
Agamben’s	overall	adoption	of	Bataille,	transgressive	ecstasy	sobers	up	to	a	rationally	calculating	
(un-)co-operativeness	if	not	professionalized	deviation,	undermining/playing	the	system	from	
inside,	perverting	its	protocols	(which	as	such	would	actually	in	part	correspond	to	the	demands	
of	a	“practice	of	resistance”	from	within	the	institution	formulated	by	Foster	in	the	early	1980s	in	
The	Anti-Aesthetic;	who	however	never	insinuates	this	kind	of	post-political	illicitness).	No	doubt	
this	explains	Agamben’s	appeal	–	that	of	post-political	insurrection	–	to	not	only	para-anarchic	
groups	(Tiqqun/Invisible	Committee)	but	to	their	“transposition”	onto	certain	artistic	practices	
(say,	Claire	Fontaine)	that	in	turn	may	present	a	post-institutional	critique	variant	of	Foster’s	
quest	to	“dissolve	the	line	between	critical	and	creative	forms”	(Seattle,	1983).
	Bataille,	1985,	p.100	407
	Specigically	in	regard	to	Marxism	Stoekl	writes:	”Bataille’s	position	vis-à-vis	Marxism	is,	to	say	408
the	least,	a	complex	one.	While	it	seems	that	at	least	up	until	1936	he	was	trying	to	join	his	notion	
of	expenditure	to	the	negativity	envisaged	by	Marxism	[…]	Bataille	recognizes	a	rending	conglict	
between	a	devotion	to	expenditure	and	a	devotion	to	the	revolutionary	productivity	and	utility	
valorized	by	Marxism.”	1985,	p.xxv	f22	
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transitional	 stage	 towards	 a	 “pragmatic”	 organization	 of	 a	 (sacred,	 sexual,	
decentralized-communist,	 transgressive)	 community,	 someone	 like	 Sylvère	
Lotringer	 seems	 to	 doubt	 this	 second	 stage	 to	 have	 ever	 been	 of	 interest	 to	
Bataille,	 not	 even	 in	 theory.	 Lotringer	 makes	 this	 point	 through	 an	 argument	
quite	different	 from	that	of	Bois	(who	removes	the	Bataille	of	 the	Informe	 from	
the	 quasi-activist	 Bataille	 writing	 for	 La	 Critique	 Sociale).	 Lotringer	 writes:	
“Expecting	nothing	else	 from	 the	 revolution	 than	 revolution	 itself,	 he	 [Bataille]	
remained	this	strange	political	hybrid	–	an	ultra-leftist	mystic;	a	fanatic	without	a	
cause” .	This	is	correct	in	so	far	as	the	idea	of	the	revolution	for	the	revolution’s	409
sake	does	indeed	seem	to	hold	the	highest	value	with	Bataille,	again	in	line	with	
formlessness	 as	 a	 political	 process/event.	 To	 say,	 however,	 that	 Bataille	 is	
“without	 a	 cause”	 is	 irresponsive	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 cause	 is	 indeed	 this	
participation,	as	problematic,	“psychoaesthenic”	(Bréton)	and	indeed	“barbaric”	
as	this	participation	and	its	“cause”	may	be:	a	cause	which	can	almost	exclusively	
only	be	one	of	a	minority	such	as	a	secret	society	or	a	cult,	in	the	vein	of	Bataille’s	
own	attempt	with	Acéphale,	(and	Caillois’	more	resplendent	pipe	dreams.)		
Bataille	 not	 only	 spoke	 of	 revolution	 in	 his	 “Letter	 to	 my	 current	
comrades”	but,	further,	of	a	“postrevolutionary	phase”,	(although	it	is	somewhat	
difgicult	 to	 make	 out	 how	 exactly	 this	 phase	 signigicantly	 differed	 from	 the	
“revolutionary	phase”):	
All	 organizations	 that	 have	 ecstasy	 and	 frenzy	 as	 their	 goal	 (the	 spectacular	
deaths	of	animals,	partial	tortures,	orgiastic	dances	etc.)	will	have	no	reason	to	
	Sylvère	Lotringer	(ed),	More	&	Less	2,	New	York	1999,	p.6.	He	also	calls	him	–	and	Bréton	–	a	409
“fascist	by	default”.
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disappear	when	a	heterological	 conception	of	human	 life	 is	 substituted	 for	 the	
primitive	conception” .	410
What	 is	 perhaps	 more	 critical	 though	 is	 that	 Bataille	 here	 introduces	 a	
demarcation	 of	 concepts,	 untying,	 as	 he	 does,	 the	 “heterological”	 from	 the	
“primitive”	(even	if	it	substitutes	it,	which	is	still	a	distinction).	Crucial	here,	then,	
are	 not	 the	 already	 established	 Bataillean	 societal	 paradigms	 of	 “frenzy”	 and	
“ecstasy”	–	deginitely	means	to	an	end	in	for	example	fascism;	largely	an	end	in	
themselves	for	Bataille	–	but	this	“substitution”	he	intends.	Since	he	is	speaking	
of	a	“postrevolutionary	phase”,	i.e.	something	located	in	the	near	future,	he	also	
identigies	 the	 primitive	 as	 a	 category	 that	 can	 only	 be	 a	 stagnant	 concept,	 a	
regressive	state,	tied	to	a	time	and	a	place.	Even	if	the	primitive	is	conjured	as	a	
phantasmagoric	 time	 and	 place	 –	 which	 is	 how	 it	 traditionally	 appears	 in	 the	
history	of	Western	art,	as	primitivism	–	it	ultimately	does	not	really	provide	the	
template	for	a	“postrevolutionary	phase”	in	Bataille’s	(a)political	vision.	(And,	by	
extension,	holds	out	little	in	terms	of	percipience	in	an	aesthetic	context).		
The	 barbaric,	 by	 comparison,	 when	 “substituting”	 the	 surely	 no	 less	
abstract	 term	 of	 “heterology”,	 is	 quite	 the	 opposite:	 its	 localization	 poses	 a	
continual	challenge	as	to	where	to	locate	it	and	according	to	which	criteria	–	it	is	
locatable	both	at	the	heart	of	culture/society/politics	as	well	as	at	its	peripheries	
and	is	thus	also	a	condition	that	is	specigically	tied	to	the	present.	Hence	I	think	it	
would	 be	 appropriate	 to	 say	 that	 barbarism	 holds	 a	 more	 crucial	 position	 in	
Bataille’s	 overall	 writing	 than	 primitivism	 (whether	 hard	 or	 soft):	 primitivism	
from	the	outset	in	Documents	having	been	a	subject	of	suspicion;	purchased,	as	it	
	1985,	pp.101-102410
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was,	 by	 the	 gallery,	 as	 much	 as	 by	 the	 emporium.	 Documents	 addressed	 the	
problematic	 of	 primitive	 and	 primitivism,	 not	 least	 by	 accepting	 the	 resultant	
contradictions	in	applying	and	locating	the	term,	evidently	so	in	view	of	Leiris’s	
writing	discussed	in	the	girst	chapter.	
		 With	regard	to	Benjamin’s	short-lived	 idea	of	a	“positive	barbarity”,	now	
again	 pertaining	 to	 a	 more	 or	 less	 strictly	 aesthetic	 project,	 the	 barbaric	 is	
conceived	 as	 situated	 in	 the	 near	 future,	 as	 progressive,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	
aesthetic	 critique	 and	 novelty.	 Which	 also	 explains	 why	 it	 would	 never	 have	
made	sense	for	Benjamin	in	this	context	(and	generally)	to	engage	any	notion	of	
the	 primitive	 in	 the	 girst	 place.	 The	 primitive	 cannot	 be	 new,	 the	 barbaric	 by	
contrast	 seems	 to	 be	 compulsorily	 tied	 to	 the	 new	 since	 it	 registers	 in	 the	
(drastic)	changes	of	social	and	political	realities.	(And	by	new	I	do	not	mean	to	
put	forward	a	positivist	progressive/linear	term	of	novelty	but	to	emphasize	an	
untying	of	the	barbaric	from	not	only	the	primitive	but	furthermore	the	archaic:	
in	other	words,	 it	 is	 aligned	with	 the	 everyday).	And,	 just	 like	 these	 social	 and	
political	spheres,	the	attendant	notion	of	the	barbaric	is	thus	subject	to	continual	
instability.		
Before	 discussing	 how	 the	 barbaric	 may	 “effectively”	 register	 or	 even	
engage	 in	 any	 transpositional	 context	 without	 evaporating	 into	 the	 art	
historically	 devaluated	 plot	 to	 supersede	 or	 transgress	 the	 market	 and	 the	
institution	 (which	 can	 of	 course	 easily	 be	 achieved	 by	 abandoning	 these)	
however,	 it	 is	 important	to	 girst	 look	at	how	Krauss	and	Bois	actually	sought	to	
realize	 this	 attempt	 by	 way	 of	 their	 Pompidou	 exhibition.	 And	 before	 re-
assessing	 any	 “use-value	 of	 the	 formless”	 (Bois),	 i.e.	 of	 Bataille	 by	 Krauss	 and	
Bois,	the	art	historical	trajectory	leading	up	to	this	deployment	of	Bataille	ought	
	229
to	 be	 briegly	 revisited,	 since	 engaging	 Bataille	 to	 the	 ends	 of	 an	 art	 historical	
agenda	whose	aim	it	was	to	undo	the	theorization	of	high	Modernism,	“to	read	it	
against	the	grain”	(Krauss),	did	not	just	suddenly	occur	in	the	mid	1990s.	Rather,	
the	show	and	the	ideas	presented	in	the	book	present	a	kind	of	conclusion	of	a	
discussion,	 which	 in	 Krauss’s	 and	 Bois’s	 case	 and	 in	 connection	 with	 a	
“rediscovery”	of	Bataille,	had	commenced	roughly	a	decade	earlier.	
VII.2	Barbaric	critique	
Krauss’s	 initial	 usage	 of	 Bataille,	 beginning	 in	 the	mid	 1980s,	 unfolds	 via	 two	
parallel	 and	 intersecting	 debates.	 One	 is	 her	 employment	 of	 the	 Bataillean	
formlessness,	base	materialism	and	heterogeneity	 in	the	context	of	her	critique	
of	 a	 narrative	 that	 had	 unambiguously	 aligned	 the	 development	 and	
achievements	 of	 the	 avant-garde	with	 an	 exotic	 primitivism	 girst	 and	 foremost	
serving	 as	 a	 source	 for	 formal	 novelty	 and	 otherness	 and	 roughly	 speaking	
coming	 to	 fruition	 as	 new	 additions	 to	 the	 Western	 artist’s	 “toolbox”	 while	
congirming	 his	 ingenious	 talent.	 (Or,	 alternatively,	 out	 of	 an	 artistic	 crisis	 to	
remember	 Carl	 Einstein’s	 taunting	 “Hilglos	 negert	 der	 Unoriginelle”	 [The	
unoriginal	 artist	 helplessly	 copies	 the	 negro]).	 The	 avant-garde	 artist,	 in	 this	
critiqued	 development,	 had	 somehow	 ingeniously	 appropriated	 and	 fused	 the	
novelty	and	otherness	of	exotic	primitivism	with	his	(not	her	in	this	context)	own	
advances	 in	 conceiving	 a	 vanguard	 aesthetic,	 and	 in	which	 this	 otherness	was	
enthusiastically	 embraced	 (essentially	 gleaned	during	 a	 visit	 to	 the	Trocadéro)	
by	 the	 modern	 artist	 without	 speaking	 to	 the	 underlying	 fraught	 colonialist	
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subtext	 that	 such	 an	 embrace	 would	 imply .	 Her	 critique	 of	 this	 narrative	411
likewise	 focused	 on	 the	 trajectory	 of	 “softening”,	 by	 which	 these	 modernist-
primitivist	 works	 merely	 siphoned	 formal	 elements 	 from	 religiously	 or	412
magically	 imbued	 objects	 linked	 to	 a	 social	 context,	 thus	 presenting	 a	 form	 of	
unreglected	appropriation	art.	Furthermore,	since	the	contexts	of	the	respective	
tribal	 or	 archaic	 cultures	 frequently	 involved	markedly	 corporeal,	 non-abstract	
scenarios,	 including	 utterly	 violent	 ones	 (e.g.	 the	 Aztecs),	 Krauss	 points	 to	 the	
contradiction	 in	 engaging	 this	 aesthetic	 otherness	 for	 the	 benegit	 of	modernist	
“vision”,	 because	 this	 aesthetic	 other	was	 inextricably	 bound	up	with	 the	 body	
and	 not	 with	 abstraction	 into	 non-corporeal	 	 experience	 and	 the	 artwork’s	
autonomy.	 This	 arc	 is	 contained	 or	 manifested	 in	 Krauss’s	 notion	 of	 a	 “soft	
primitivism”,	 a	 category	 that	 is	 both	 a	 contemporaneous	 consequence	 of	 and	
ultimately	 the	 avant-garde’s	 shortcoming	 vis-à-vis	 a	 project	 like	 Documents,	
which	Krauss	 claims	 to	 have	pursued	 this	 “hard	primitivism”	 since	 it	 precisely	
tied	these	exotic	novelties	to	phenomena	of	an	assumed	to	be	fully	rationalized	
yet	damaged	everyday	as	well	as	to	destabilized	representations	of	the	canon	of	
	Which	as	Hal	Foster	points	out	is	a	scenario	graspable	within	the	actual	historical	context	411
(which	Foster	however	locates	earlier	in	the	kind	of	precursor	artists	of	primitivism,	notably	Paul	
Gaugin).	It	is	not	acceptable	though	in	view	of	an	unrevised	reactivation	of	this	narrative	which	
Foster	sees	to	be	at	work	in	the	already	mentioned	MOMA	exhibition	and	its	accompanying	
catalogue	“Primitivism	in	20th	century	Art:	Afginity	of	the	Tribal	and	the	Modern”,	1984,	edited	by	
William	Rubin.	
States	Foster:	“	To	pose	the	relation	of	the	primitive	and	the	scientigic	as	a	benign	dialogue	is	
cruelly	euphemistic:	it	obscures	the	real	afgiliations	between	science	and	conquest,	
enlightenment	and	eradication,	primitivist	art	and	imperialist	power.	(This	can	be	pardoned	of	a	
romantic	artist	at	the	end	of	the	last	century	who,	immersed	in	the	ideology	of	a	scientisitic	[sic]	
avant-garde,	could	not	know	the	effectivity	of	these	ideas,	but	not	of	an	art	historian	at	the	end	of	
this	century	[Rubin].”	“The	‘Primitive’	Unconscious	of	Modern	Art”.	October,	Vol.	34,	1985,	p.	60			
One	should	add	that	Krauss’	essay	“No	More	Play”	which	in	part	addresses	this	art	historical	
revision	called	for	by	Foster	saw	its	initial	publication	in	this	very	catalogue.	
	Which,	to	recall	Einstein,	would	originally	not	have	served	an	aesthetic-contemplative	412
function.	
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Western	art,	countering	sublimation,	emphasizing	decomposition	and	historico-
aesthetic	 deviances	 (say,	 the	 Gnostics’).	 This	 differentiation	 between	 hard	 and	
soft	 is	ultimately,	 in	 this	case,	what	positions	a	political	deployment,	or	at	 least	
ambition,	 of	 an	 anti-aesthetic	 à	 la	 Documents	 opposite	 a	 merely	 primitivist	
formal	 import,	 the	 latter	 eventually	 allowing	 for	 a	 smooth	 integration	 into	
bourgeois	commodity	culture:	 to	cite	Bataille;	 to	be	experienced	 in	 form	of	 the	
“the	ecstasy	in	art	journals”,	and	to	cite	Krauss;	as	“a	primitivism	gone	formal	and	
therefore	 gutless” .	 Opposite	 this	 commercially	 successful	 yet	 “gutless”	 “soft”	413
primitivism	stands	the	“hard	primitivism”	whose	historical,	societal	and	political	
implications	 Krauss	 derives	 specigically	 from	 her	 analysis	 of	 Documents.	 The	
analysis	 therefore	 somewhat	 soberingly	 condenses	 into	 her	 discussion	 of	 the	
venerated	Suspended	Ball	 sculpture	by	Giacometti	 (1930-31).	This	work	 to	her	
performs	 Bataille’s	 formlessness	 as	 a	 process	 of	 a	 destructive	 destabilizing	 of	
neat	dualisms,	i.e.	classifying	systems:	
Informe	denotes	what	alteration	produces,	not	by	contradiction	–	which	would	
be	dialectical	–	but	by	putrefaction:	the	puncturing	of	the	limits	around	the	term,	
	Krauss,	1985,	p.51	413
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the	 reduction	 of	 the	 sameness	 of	 the	 cadaver	 –	which	 is	 transgressive.	 Round	
phallicism	[the	“quality”	of	Supended	Ball]	is	a	destruction	of	meaning/being.	 			414
Suspended	 Ball	 for	 Krauss	 becomes	 a	 “machine[s]”	 that	 “collapse[s]	
difference” :	not,	 importantly,	by	sublating	it	(augheben)	(i.e.	dialectically)	but	415
essentially	by	downright	spoiling	the	assurance	of	difference,	the	assumption	of	
the	 possibility	 of	 telling	 things	 apart,	 here	 the	 phallic	 from	 the	 emasculating	
round	and	so	forth. 	This	application	of	the	formless	by	Krauss	is,	however,	also	416
a	girst	glimpse	of	how	this	hard	primitivism	ultimately	speaks	less	-	if	at	all	-	to	
any	 heterogeneities	 other	 than	 those	 registering	 in	 the	 gine	 arts	 proper	 (i.e.	 a	
Giacometti	sculpture),	and	more	importantly,	along	foremost	formal	parameters,	
which	is	already	quite	a	different	application	than	that	of	Bataille’s,	even	though	
he	 did	 employ	 this	 antagonism	 towards	 the	 dismissal	 of	 Bréton’s	 surrealism.	
	Ibid.,	p.64.	This	is	the	key	difference/critique	vis-à-vis	Didi-Huberman’s	manifold	dialectics	of	414
the	informe	described	in	his	book.	For	all	the	differentiating	between	her	non-dialectical	informe	
that	basically	always	“putregies”	any	elevated,	disincorporated	form(alism)	be	that	by	
decomposition	or	perversion	thus	leading	back	to	the	body,	I	don’t	quite	see	the	difference	to	
Didi-Huberman	other	than	rejecting	the	use	of	dialectic	as	a	notion	itself,	“the	third	term”	as	Bois	
says.	“’The	informe”	which	in	Didi-Huberman	after	the	various	dialectics	he	plays	through	settles	
for	the	symptom,	i.e.	as	Bois	correctly	points	out	spoils	Hegelian	sublation	by	“neatly	
substituting”	it	with	the	symptom	(of	crisis,	trauma,	discontent	etc)…	But	then	isn’t	
decomposition	and	perversion	not	symptomatic	of	a	form	of	(the	body’s)	deterioration	in	the	girst	
place?	Krauss	aligns	(as	does	Didi-Hubernan)	the	informe	with	alteration	which	she	however	
degines	as	a	contradiction,	contrary	to	the	informe	which	is	according	to	her	precisely	not	
unfolding	as	contradiction:	”I	said	before	that	alteration	functions	as	a	Bataillean	concept	because	
of	the	primal	contradiction	that	operates	its	relation	to	meaning,	such	that	the	signigier	oscillates	
constantly	between	two	poles”.	Is	this	“oscillation	between	two	poles”	not	equivalent	with	the	
“va-et-vient”	of	the	formless,	and	since	it	is	a	declassing	oscillation,	symptomatic	in	the	sense	
Didi-Huberman	uses	it?	So	I	guess,	it	comes	down	to	a	rhetorical	schism	between	unsettling	non-
meaning	versus	a	no	less	troubling	ambiguous	symptom	(as	in,	for	what	disease?);	both	of	which,	
more	important	to	this	study,	defy	idealizing	representation	and	a	sublimation	through	
formalism.	
	Krauss,	1985,	p.	64.		415
	Somewhat	attenuating	Krauss’s	promotion	of	Giacometti	to	a	proto-gender-bender	polysexual	416
sculptor	are	concurrent	works	of	his	like	Man	and	Woman	(1928-29)	which	could	not	be	more	
clear	in	demonstrating	its	“meaning”.
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(Which	 thus	 pertained	much	more	 to	 theory	 and	 literature	 than	 works	 of	 art	
since	 these	 were	 concomitantly	 claimed	 by	 both	 Bréton	 and	 Bataille	 for	 their	
respective	 (anti-)aesthetic	 position,	 e.g.	 Dali,	 Picasso	 etc.).	 Hard	 and	 soft	
primitivism	 is	a	 conglict	 girst	 and	 foremost	between	 two	Giacometti	 sculptures,	
between	 the	 aforementioned	 Suspended	 Ball	 and	 Spoon	 Woman,	 another	
Giacometti	piece	 from	1926.	Spoon	Woman	 is	Krauss’s	key	example	of	 this	 soft	
primitivism:	 the	work	 being	 clearly	 formally	 imitative	 of	 the	 anthropomorphic	
spoon	 statuettes	 from	 the	 Ivory	 Coast	 held	 at	 the	 Musée	 de	 l’Homme,	 while	
furthering	 Giacometti’s	 notion	 of	 sculpture	 that	would	 decidedly	 settle	 for	 the	
“vertical”,	 i.e.	 eschewing	 the	 occasional	 glirtation	 with	 the	 base,	 the	 body’s	
debasement,	its	alteration	and	by	extension	“expansion”	of	any	kind.	(Except	for,	
in	 Krauss’s	 reading,	 as	 an	 upward	 expansion,	 i.e.	 as	 “erection”,	 reafgirming	 the	
phallus/father	etc.)	
The	 second,	 and	 more	 “fateful”	 tangent	 in	 view	 of	 the	 decade	 later	
“Formless”	show,	is	Krauss’s	resurrection	of	Bataille	as	a	quasi-postmodern	critic	
of	 high	 modernism,	 as	 a	 contemporary	 ally	 in	 Krauss’s	 critique	 of	 this	
modernism	 as	 it	 was	 predominantly	 corroborated	 by	 the	 Oedipal	 gigure	 of	
Clement	 Greenberg	 and	 her	 contemporary	 Michael	 Fried .	 Bataille’s	417
contribution	 to	 Krauss’s	 critique	 of	 modernism,	 of	 formal	 autonomy	 and	
	A	criticism	which	of	course	took	many	forms,	is	not	one	single-themed	critique,	and	comes	417
not	only	in	her	deployment	of	Bataille	but	more	famously	in	her	renowned	theorization	of	1970s	
practices	of	(post-)minimalism	and	land	art,	her	“Sculpture	in	the	Expanded	Field”	(1977),	
basically	an	across-the-board	eversion	of	Fried’s	critique	of	Minimalism	of	some	years	earlier	in	
his	“Art	and	Objecthood”	(1969).	An	eversion/expansion	that	consequently	returns	in	
“Antivision”	as	a	“witness	[of]	the	alignment	of	the	body	with	the	earth	[…]”,	“Antivision”,	October	
36,	1986,	p.154,		
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opticality,	 comes	 in	 the	 form	 of	what	 she	 called	 	 “antivision”	 ,	more	 or	 less	418
around	 the	 same	 time	 of	 her	 coinage	 of	 a	 “hard	 primitivism”.	 Krauss,	 in	 the	
corresponding	text,	locates	this	anti-modernist	postmodern	critic	Bataille	not	in	
the	Bataille	of	Documents	but	 in	the	mature	art	historian	of	his	1950s	study	on	
Manet,	which	is	also	the	book’s	title.	Here,	according	to	Krauss,	Bataille	reiterates	
his	 own	 refutation	 of	 the	 genesis	 of	 prehistoric	 art	 in	 his	 text	 in	 Documents	
entitled	 “Primitive	 Art” 	 of	 twenty	 years	 earlier,	 now	 applying	 it	 to	 a	 split	419
genesis	of	modern	art.		
Goya	 then	 offers	 a	 quite	 different	 beginning	 for	 the	 history	 of	 modernism.	
Bataille	characterizes	it	as	an	art	of	excess,	an	art	that	recalls	the	violence	of	the	
sacred,	 as	 opposed	 to	 Manet’s	 and	 dominant	 modernism’s	 art	 of	 absence.	We	
thus	end	up	with	two	beginnings	that	are	opposed	in	character. 	420
	‘Antivision”,	October	36,	1986.		418
	In	this	text	Bataille	refutes	a	contemporaneous	evolutionary	argument	by	which	the	abject,	419
primitiveness	of	the	exhumed	pre-historic	representation	of	man	by	man	aligns	with	the	
rudimentary	visual	language	of	the	child.	Bataille	claims	that	from	the	start	man	engaged	a	kind	
of	self-debasing,	heterogeneous	anti-aesthetic,	one	denied	by	modernity.	Thus	any	such	
abjectness	is	intentional,	a	“willful	alteration”	as	he	writes.	A	claim	he	further	supports	by	
pointing	to	the	art	of	the	“Aurignician”	period,	in	which	“this	crude	and	deforming	art	was	reserved	
for	the	representation	of	the	human	form”	vis-à-vis	the	“meticulous”	“perfect”	renderings	of	
“reindeer,	bison	and	horses”.	2005,	p.40.	(A	striking	incongruity	visualized,	in	3d	no	less,	in	
Herzog’s	recent	gilm	Caves	of	Forgotten	Dreams	(2010),	shot	inside	the	Chavet	cave	in	France).	
This	in	fact	further	reveals	yet	another	instance	of	a	Bataillean	notion	of	self-alienation.	Bataille	
would	write	about	the	African	cave	art	discovered	by	Leo	Froebenius	in	1930:	“The	blatant	
heterogeneity	of	our	being	in	relation	to	the	world	that	gave	birth	to	it,	which	we	have	become	so	
incapable	of	proving	through	tangible	experience,	seems	to	have	been,	for	those	among	us	who	
lived	in	nature,	the	basis	of	all	representation.”	Ibid.	p.46	“The	Frobenius	Exhibit	at	the	Salle	
Pleyel”	(1930)	
	“Antivision”,	October	Vol.	36,	1986,	p.152	420
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She	thus	deduces	a	(her)	critique	of	(high)	Modernism	from	Bataille’s	scenario	of	
a	 split	 19th	 century	 modernism,	 basically	 conglating	 the	 two	 through	 the	
paradigm	of	dis-incorporated	vision	that	serves	as	a	pinnacle	of	modernity	that	
from	the	outset	is	apparently	sought	to	be	brought	down	in	this	congiguration:	by	
degrading	 dis-incorporated	 opticality	 back	 to	 the	 (sexual,	 dead)	 body	 and	
consequently	to	the	base,	yielding	a	modernist	proto-anti-aesthetic	in	the	vein	of	
Bataille’s	 proto-anti-aesthetic	 prehistoric	 art,	 one	 that	 is	 “willfully”	 self-
destructive.	
The	 ambivalence	 that	 arises	 in	 this	 moment	 within	 the	 description	 of	 the	
founding	moment	 of	modernism	 is	 a	 struggle	 precisely	 between	 the	 values	 of	
opticality	and	those	of	an	intensity	of	“blinding”,	“sight	destroying”,	and	in	which	
representation	dares	to	be	neither	appropriative	nor	productive 	421
The	 appeal	 of	 this	 argument,	 in	 view	 of	 engaging	 Bataille	 for	 a	 critique	 of	
“opticality”,	lies	in	fashioning	Goya	into	the	prototype	artist	depicting	the	real,	i.e.	
a	“documentary”	artist	in	the	spirit	of	Documents,	documenting	what	Krauss	calls	
“regressive,	 irrational	 power”	 in	 the	 painting	 The	 Third	 of	 May,	 1808	
(1814-15) .	 (“Irrational”,	 I	 presume,	 because	 the	 sovereign	brutality	 depicted	422
thwarts	the	progressive	idea	of	humanism	as	promised	by	reason).	The	problem	
is	 that	 this	 antagonism	 here	 plays	 out	 amongst	 two	 kinds	 of	 more	 or	 less	
historical	 representations	 (Manet	 vs.	 Goya,	 with	 Manet	 arguably	 blending	 out	
	“Ibid.	421
	Which	depicts	a	group	of	suspected	Spanish	insurgents	shot	by	a	giring	squad	of	the	422
Napoleonic	army	in	revenge/punishment	for	a	preceding	attack	on	the	French	by	the	Spanish	
resistance	under	Napoleonic	occupation.	
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(messy,	bloody)	history	in	the	sense	of	affording	representation	autonomy	 from	
it,	a	process	which	hence	would	shift	the	emphasis	towards	formal	aspects	and	a	
corresponding	 analysis	 and	 reception).	Whence	 to	 graft	 Bataille’s	 reception	 of	
the	 painting	 as	 “sight-destroying”	 and	 “blinding” 	 -	 notions	 that	 are	 almost	423
exclusively	allegorical,	i.e.	signifying	irrepresentable	historical	trauma,	“death”	as	
Bataille	 writes 	 -	 onto	 Bataille	 the	 critic	 pre-denouncing	 modernist	 vision,	424
“destroying”	“sight”,	i.e.	for	the	benegit	of	him	deglating	the	“values	of	opticality”,	
is	a	rerouting	that	would	be	decisive	in	Bois’s	and	Krauss’s	particular	evaluation	
of	 any	 “use	 value	 of	 the	 formless”	 a	 decade	 later.	 In	 other	 words,	 since	 high	
modernism	 is	 a	 priori	 anti-representational,	 to	 apply	 the	 antagonism	 of	 two	
representations	(as	described	by	Bataille)	to	the	antagonism	of	high	modernism	
and	post-modern	 critique	 is	quite	odd	 for	 a	 critique	 like	Krauss’s	 that	 stresses	
formal	 analysis,	 in	 the	 vein	 of	 Greenberg,	 to	 the	 ends	 of	 a	 representational	
critique,	a	critique	of	ideology.	
Krauss,	October,	1986,	p.	153.	A	“blinding”	if	one	wanted	to	discuss	it	formally,	is	usually	423
attributed	to	the	most	illuminated	part	of	the	canvas,	which	is	the	glaring	but	certainly	not	
blinding	white	shirt	worn	by	the	Spanish	insurgent	situated	in	the	left	half	of	the	painting,	at	the	
moment	of	being	shot	by	a	death	squad,	i.e.	the	French	army	executing	sovereign	power.	That	this	
painting	serves	as	a	predecessor	of	sorts	to	Manet’s	later	“The	Execution	of	the	Emperor	
Maximilian”	(alternate	versions,	1867,	1868-69)	is	not	mentioned.	
	Which	is	the	overriding	theme	in	Goya,	i.e.	his	etchings	of	horrendous/barbaric	tableaux	of	424
executions,	the	Disasters	of	War	(1810-1820),	representing	not	least	a	conglict	between	reason,	
Enlightenment	(not	avant-gardist	de-enlightenment!),	and	clerical	power,	with	religion	in	Goya	
indeed	becoming	aligned	with	the	irrational,	the	church	a	rational	body	of	power	regulating	the	
irrational	investment	into,	in	this	case,	Christianity	(i.e.	precisely	as	the	church	would	be	
theorized	later	by	Bataille).	This	is	in	a	tradition	of	Western	art	to	depict	barbarity/atrocity	as	
critique,	going	back	to	e.g.	Jacques	Callot’s	Les	Grands	Misères	de	la	Guerre	(1633)	graphically	
depicting	a	set	of	sovereign	executions:	“giring	squad”,	“hanging”,	“stake”,	“wheel”	etc..	(Or,	at	least,	
as	“acts	of	mourning”	as	Thomas	Crow	would	later	interpret	Warhol’s	Death	&	Disaster	series	
from	the	1960s).	The	opposite	deployment	of	this	kind	of	depiction	of	barbarity	would	be	Hans	
Staden’s	Wahrhaftige	Historia	(1557),	etchings	depicting	cannibalism	in	Brazil	by	the	Tupinamba	
tribe,	i.e.	to	assert	colonialism	as	a	judgment	of	ethical	civilization	over	the	colonized	subjects’	
barbarity	(or/and	to	also	exploit	the	spectacular	nature	of	these	scenes,	given	that	this	
publication	was	widely	disseminated	during	Staden’s	days).	
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What	 emerges	 through	 a	 retracing	 of	 these	 two	 strands	 (“hard	
primitivism”,	 “antivision”)	 is	 that	what	 is	at	 stake	 is	not	 so	much	Bataille	being	
“less	 interested	 in	 ‘class	 struggle’	 than	 in	 ‘de-classing’”,	 but	 rather	 Bois	 and	
Krauss	being	decidedly	more	interested	in	a	declassing	(of	form(alism))	than	in	
any	 aspects	 of	 class	 struggle	 (in	 content);	 not	 least	 by	 implicitly	 detaching	 the	
two	from	each	other	(or	sublating	class	struggle	in	a	formalist	declassing	in	the	
actual	Hegelian	sense?)	which,	as	discussed	in	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	are	
originally	much	more	enmeshed	in	Bataille.		
This	 ultimate	 detachment	 is,	 I	 think,	 the	 crux	 of	 the	 contradiction	 of	
Krauss’s/Bois’s	 “informe”	serving	as	 their	key	curatorial	mission	 to	 “pick	apart	
categories	 that	 seemed	 to	 us	 increasingly	 useless	 –	 even	 as	 they	 had	 become	
increasingly	contentious	–	namely	‘form’	and	‘content’.” 	.	For	the	way	the	works	425
were	 contextualized	 along	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 formless	 is	 precisely	 by	 being	
categorized	in	relation	to	a	User’s	Guide	devised	by	Krauss	and	Bois	that	is	part	
Bataillean	terminology	of	the	“Critical	Dictionary”	and	part	theirs:		
A	 gloor	piece	by	Mike	Kelley	closed	the	section	on	“horizontality”,	 several	 large	
mildew	 photographs	 by	 Cindy	 Sherman	 in	 the	 section	 devoted	 to	 “base	
	Ibid.	p.9.	A	further	contradiction	if	not	confusion	around	the	term	of	the	formless	and	its	task	to	
undo	 a	 dualism	 comes	 courtesy	 of	 the	 blurb	 inside	 the	 dust	 jacket	 of	 the	 User’s	 Guide,	
inconceivably	 to	have	been	written	by	either	Krauss	or	Bois:	 “[…]	Only	 in	 recent	years	has	 the	
idea	 of	 the	 ‘formless’	 been	 deployed	 in	 the	 theorizing	 and	 recongiguring	 of	 the	 very	 gield	 of	
twentieth	century	art.	This	 is	partly	because	 that	 gield	has	most	often	been	crudely	set	up	as	a	
battle	 between	 form	 and	 content;	 whereas	 ‘formless’	 constitutes	 a	 third	 term	 which	 stands	
outside	that	opposition	of	form	and	content,	outside	of	the	binary	thinking	which	is	itself	formal.
”	Compare	Bois:	 “The	 ‘informe’,	 ‘base	materialism’,	 ‘heterology’	and	 ‘division	 into	 two’	are	 to	425
our	minds	all	terms	that	imply	the	exclusion	of	the	third	term”.	Ibid.,	p.69	Bois	here	refers	to	why	
his	schema	of	the	Informe	cannot	be	a	dialectic.		
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materialism”,	a	 gilm	by	 James	Coleman	 gigured	 in	 the	“pulse”	section,	and	Allan	
McCollum’s	multiple	casts	of	dinosaur	tracks	[…]	devoted	to	entropy. 	426
“Theme	 turns	out	to	be	more	tenacious	(thematization	is	a	danger	that	dogs	all	
non-monographic	 presentations:	 nothing	 would	 be	 easier	 than	 to	 imagine	
something	like	the	‘formless	in	art’)” :	so	Krauss	and	Bois	alert	themselves,	yet	427
the	way	 these	 categories	 above	 contain	 the	works,	 regardless	 of	 the	 professed	
curatorial	 “glagrant	 diversity”,	 seems	 to	 invite	 such	 a	 thematization.	 The	
limitation,	however,	lies	not	in	the	formalist	or,	better,	structuralist	organization	
of	the	works	to	the	end	of	an	argument	declassing	another	formalist	argument	(of	
high	 modernism),	 which	 the	 show	 no	 doubt	 exactingly	 enacted.	 Rather,	 if	
“content”	and	“form”	are	not	 thought	of	as	discreet	and	autonomous	entities	 in	
art	 but	 operate	 in	 a	 state	 of	 suspense	 or	 indeed	 contradiction	 (which	 is	 still	 a	
relation,	not	a	separation),	then	issues/markers	of	class	are	of	course	entangled	
with	a	process	of	 (aesthetic)	declassing	 (while	 I	 should	add	 that	 “class”	 in	 this	
context	 serves	 as	 a	denomination	of	 any	 form	of	 interest,	 be	 that	 an	economic,	
religious	or	post-colonial	one	etc.,	 intertwined	as	these	usually	are).	Thus,	what	
is	 at	 issue	 here	 is	 that	 the	 clearly	 identigied	 appeal	 of	 barbarism	 via	 a	
theorization	of	Bataille	(for	the	benegit	of	this	discussion,	an	appeal	that	lies	in	its	
critical	 potential)	 was	 recognized	 yet	 left	 unexplored,	 presumably	 out	 of	 the	
concern	 “to	 cater	 to	 voyeurism”,	 to	 pander	 to	 any	 notion	 of	 “the	 abject	 in	 art/
Powers	of	Horrors”,	which	as	Krauss	and	Bois	fully	underwrite	is	not	in	fact	really	
implied	 by	 Bataille	 in	 his	 text	 “Abjection	 and	 Miserable	 Forms”	 (1934)	 –	
	Krauss/Bois,	1997,	p.	23	426
	Ibid.,	p.	22427
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miserable	forms	being	an	expression	Bataille	had	seized	on	himself,	emphasizing	
the	 enmeshment	 of	 class	 and	 declassing	 (of	 content	 and	 form	 if	 one	must)	 by	
subtitling	 	 the	 text	 “Les	 Misérables”.	 Thus,	 the	 politically	 and	 culturally	
“expulsory”/”excremental”	processes	that	inform	Bataille’s	notion	of	abjection	as	
much	as	they	do	his	aforementioned	text	“The	use-value	of	DAF	de	Sade”	gigured	
in	 the	Formless	 show	as	 for	 example	 the	 (formless)	mass	 of	Robert	 Smithson’s	
Asphalt	Rundown	(1969),	i.e.	as	formalized	“expulsion”.		
That	the	notion	of	the	“excremental”	and	“expulsory”	developed	by	Bataille	in	the	
de	Sade	text	would	not	have	required	including	Manzoni’s	in	this	case	literalizing	
“Artist’s	Shit”	(1961)	may	actually	come	down	to	a	respective	reading	of	this	text,	
not	least	to	which	part	one	picks,	as	already	discussed	above.	Mike	Kelley,	whose	
work	 “Riddle	 of	 the	 Sphinx”	 (an	 earlier	 version	 of	 the	 later	 gloor	Afghan	 piece	
“Lumpenprole”)	was	featured	in	the	Formless	show,	 in	 fact	referred	to	this	very	
same	 text	 by	 Bataille	 in	 an	 essay	 from	 1989,	 i.e.	 not	 long	 after	 Krauss’s	 initial	
deployments	of	Bataille.	Quoting	a	different	passage	of	the	de	Sade	text	(already	
partly	introduced	above),	his	reading	centers	on	cultural	production,	very	much	
situating	the	discussion	around	“class	conglict”:		
Bataille	writes	that	there	is	“the	necessity	of	division	between	the	economic	and	
political	organization	of	society	on	one	hand,	and	on	the	other,	an	antireligious	
and	 asocial	 organization	 having	 as	 its	 goal	 orgiastic	 participation	 in	 different	
forms	 of	 destruction,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 collective	 satisfaction	 of	 needs	 that	
correspond	to	the	necessity	of	provoking	the	violent	excitation	that	results	from	
the	 expulsion	 of	 heterogenous	 elements”.	 SRL	 aligns	 itself	 with	 this	 second	
category	 that	 exists	 in	 American	 culture.	 In	 contrast	 to	 culture-afgirming,	
nationalistic,	middle-class	spectacles	 […]	 there	are	 those	events	 that	marry	the	
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joys	of	conspicuous	accumulation	with	those	of	mass	destruction.	SRL	seems	to	
have	responded	by	creating	an	industrial	machine	show	of	mistakes	infused	with	
the	negative	images	associated	with	rock	music	and	horror	gilms	-		the	images	of	
death,	 destruction,	 riot,	 crime	 and	war	 so	 loved	 by	 the	masses	 (yet	 denied	 by	
ofgicial	 culture).[…].	 SRL’s	 similarity	 to	 these	 low	 spectacles,	 and	 their	 use	 of	
kitsch,	automatically	raises	questions	of	class	conglict	[….]. 	428
“Death,	 destruction,	 riots,	 crime	 and	 war	 so	 loved	 by	 the	 masses” 	 in	429
conjunction	with	 Bataille	was	 of	 course	 not	 addressed	 by	Warhol’s	 “Oxidation	
Paintings”	 (1978)	(the	 “piss	paintings”	as	 they	are	also	referred	 to)	 featured	 in	
the	 Formless	 show	 (which	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 something	 like	 the	 piss	 paintings	
would	 not	 have	 appealed	 to	 Bataille,	 although	 the	 work	 itself	 surely	 risks	
presenting	 yet	 another	 instance	 of	 sublimation	 by	 turning	 piss	 into	 “gold”).	
Rather,	 the	Warhol	 of	 his	 earlier	Death	 and	Disaster	 series	 comes	 to	mind,	 not	
only	 because	 the	 images	 depict	 violence,	 accidents,	 brutality	 etc.	 but	 because	
they	 furthermore	 speak	 to	 friction	 and	 crises	 in	 US	 society	 as	much	 as	 to	 the	
investment	 and	 consumption	 of	 these	 mass	 media	 images	 which	 the	 work	
arguably	 both	 exploits	 and	 voids.	 This,	 it	 would	 seem,	 pertains	 more	 to	 this	
discussion,	 in	 that	Death	 and	 Disasters	 negotiates	 the	 kind	 of	 aesthetic,	 social,	
economic	 and	 political	 enmeshment	 that	 Bataille	 located	 at	 the	 core	 of	 any	
barbarous	 aesthetics,	 if	 they	 were	 to	 suggest	 ”a	 contradictory	 social	 state”.	
(1929).	
	Kelley:	“Mekanik	Destruktive	Kommandoh:	Survival	Research	Laboratories	and	Popular	428
Spectacle”,	in	Foul	Perfection,	ed.	John	Welchman,	Cambridge/Mass.	2003	[1989]	p.130	
	Bataille:	“It	seems	that	the	desire	to	see	is	stronger	than	horror	or	disgust.”	“X	Marks	The	429
Spot”,	Documents	II	7,	1930	
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VIII	Barbaric	Formation	
Since	Death	and	Disasters	-	as	a	work	of	and	“about”	1960s	American	politics	and	
mass	media	 -	 the	 economic	 incentive	 of	widely	 disseminated	 depictions	 of	 the	
kind	Warhol	drew	on	has	become	further	solidigied	and	part	of	everyday	visual	
consumption	 (and	 certainly	 had	 done	 by	 the	 time	 of	 Kelley’s	 aforementioned	
essay	in	1989).	Depictions	not	just	of	violence,	but	of	spectacular	violence	(that	
in	their	pull	as	“media	scandal”	are	valorized	as	what	that	same	media	proclaims	
to	 be	 “barbaric”)	 may	 still	 be	 “denied”	 (classigied)	 by	 sovereign	 power	 in	 the	
management	 efforts	 over	 its	 public	 image	 (i.e.	 the	 scandal	 surrounding	 the	
leaked	images	of	abuse	at	Abu	Ghraib	prison	in	2003 ).	The	potential	however,	430
of	engaging	these	kinds	of	visual	disruptions	to	the	ends	of	artistic	critique	had	
already	been	severely	doubted	a	few	years	earlier.		
It	was	in	1983	that	Fredric	Jameson,	in	Hal	Foster’s	ingluential	anthology	
The	 Anti-Aesthetic,	 sketched	 a	 trajectory	 by	 which	 in	 his	 view	 the	 traditional	
avant-garde	 notions	 of	 “ugly,	 dissonant,	 bohemian,	 sexually	 shocking”	 –	 in	 the	
sense	of	performing	rawness	 if	not	 “realness”	–	had	not	only	been	accepted	by	
visual	culture	at	large	but	were	increasingly	accumulating	solid	market	value:	
[…]	There	is	very	little	in	either	the	form	or	the	content	of	contemporary	art	that	
contemporary	 society	 ginds	 intolerable	 and	 scandalous.	 The	 most	 offensive	
forms	of	 this	art	–	punk	rock,	say,	or	what	 is	sexually	explicit	material	–	are	all	
	For	a	wide-ranging	study	on	the	various	investments	of	these	kinds	of	images	within	a	430
contemporary	image	community	see	Judith	Butler,	Frames	of	War.	When	is	Life	Grievable?,	
London/New	York,	2009.
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taken	 in	 stride	 by	 society,	 and	 they	 are	 commercially	 successful,	 unlike	 the	
productions	of	the	older	high	modernism.	 	431
It	 was	 in	 conjunction	 with	 Jameson’s	 cultural	 diagnosis	 above 	 that	 Foster	432
himself	enquired	about	the	viability	of	any	such	anti-aesthetic	 in	contemporary	
practice.	 “How	 can	 we	 break	 with	 a	 program	 that	 makes	 value	 of	 crisis	
(modernism)	 […]	 or	 transgress	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 transgressive	 (avant-
gardism)?” 	 Foster	 asked.	 How	 to	 resist	 an	 “[…]‘anti-aesthetic’	 […]	 which	 so	433
often	transgressed	the	law	only	to	congirm	it	[…]”?	
The	notion	of	a	revised	anti-aesthetic	proposed	by	Foster	would	thus	have	
to	signigicantly	stay	clear	of	so-called	“transgressive”	acts	and	signs	vis-à-vis	“the	
law”	 (thus	 rendering	 any	 deviating,	 intentionally	 inarticulate	 and	 lawless	
barbaric	 anti-aesthetic	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 Bataille’s	 Gauls	 arguably	 futile	 in	 this	
scenario).	 The	 “law”	 Foster	 speaks	 of	 presumably	 conceived	 twofold:	 bearing	
	Fredric	Jameson:	“Postmodernism	and	Consumer	Society”,	in	Foster	(ed)	The	Anti-Aesthetic,	431
New	York	2002	[1983],	pp.142-143.	Somewhat	unusual	that	Jameson	here	would	conglate	
contemporary	art	and	pop	culture	wholesale.	One	movement	in	the	early	1980s	in	New	York	that	
certainly	embraced	such	“explicit	material”	without	however	signigicantly	partaking	in	either	the	
contemporary	art	discourse	or	in	the	gallery	scene	of	SoHo	(let	alone	in	mainstream	culture)	was	
the	group	of	the	“Cinema	of	Transgression”	around	Nick	Zedd,	Richard	Kern	and	David	
Wojnarowicz	(the	latter	however	participating	in	for	example	the	Whitney	Biennial	1985).	
	Which	as	persuasive	as	it	is	when	situated	in	Jameson’s	overall	argument	did	somewhat	432
ignore	that	these	“strides	by	society”	are	obviously	not	taken	as	one	universal	stride	but	are	tied	
to	local	trajectories	of	cultural	production	and	reception.	As	much	as	these	strides	seem	to	be	
suffering	from	non-linear	intervals	of	setbacks:	The	Jesse	Helms/Andres	Serrano	controversy	
only	a	few	years	after	Jameson’s	statement	above;	Rudi	Giugliani’s	public	viligication	of	the	
Sensations	show	more	than	a	decade	later.	The	initially	irate	reception	of	the	YBA’s	orthodox-
transgressive	histrionics/tepid	post-Duchampian	gestures	in	Britain	itself.	Which	reafgirms	a	
continued	relevance	of	Bürger’s	notion	of	(now	lucrative)	“provocation”	serving	as	
“manifestation”	for	outrage	and	rejection/regression.	That	may	actually	be	less	a	manifestation	of	
(petit-)bourgeois	bigotry	per	se	than	shielding	the	frustration	of	an	audience	faced	with	a	system	
unintelligible	to	them	due	to	a	lack	of	information;	not	unlike	the	frustration	and	
incomprehension	experienced	when	giling	taxes	etc.	
	Foster,	“Introduction”,	The	Anti-Aesthetic,	pp.	x,	xvi	433
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girst	 on	 the	 historical	 legacy	 of	 the	 avant-garde,	 whether	 consciously	 or	 not,	
serving	as	propaganda	for	ultimately	regressive	political	power	(e.g.	the	Russian	
avant-garde’s	 eventual	 partial	 alliance	 with	 Stalinism	 or	 Futurism’s	 initial	
endorsement	 of	 Italian	Fascism) .	And	 secondly,	 the	 already	 invoked	 “law”	of	434
capitalism’s	 happily	 all-accommodating	 purchase	 of	 intentionally	 polarizing	
entities	to	be	returned	as	progitable	ones:	basically	Benjamin’s	presumption	that	
shock	would	 essentially	 lose	 any	 critical	 (or	 obsolete	 “moral”)	 function	 it	may	
have	had	as	a	negational-combative	 stance	 in,	 say,	Dada.	The	 “transgressive”	 in	
this	 trajectory	 turning	 from	 being	 the	 avant-garde’s	 promise	 into	 being	 its	
problem,	since	its	formerly	critical	expectancy	had	–	in	1983	–	been	diagnosed	as	
being	fully	subsumed,	not	merely	by	a	Bataillean	“play	of	transpositions”,	but	by	
what	Foster	called	the	“ofgicial	culture”	both	high	and	low:	“in	the	university,	 in	
the	museum,	in	the	street” .	Which	is	to	say	in	this	constellation	transgression	435
had	become	safely	(in)stalled	in	a	Western	dispositif.		
When	Foster	here	spoke	about	“transgressive”	acts	and	practices	as	well	
as	“transgressing”	laws	he	most	probably	sought	to	distinguish	these	terms	from	
transgression	proper	as	Bataille	had	conceived	it	in	L’Erotisme	(1953),	which	was	
	T.J.	Clark	not	long	ago	discussed	a	similar	aspect	pertaining	to	this	problematic	historical	434
trajectory	of	an	explicitly	politically	engaged	anti-aesthetic	vis-à-vis	practices	devoid	of	such	
revolutionary	aspirations:	“Better	Chagalle’s	fetid	fantasy	of	the	shtettl	[…]	than	Rodchenko’s	
aesthetization	of	a	death	camp	in	the	wilderness.	Better	Duchamp’s	silly	secret	peek-a-boo	than	
De	Stijl’s	dream	of	hygiene	for	middle	management”.	(In	reference	to	Rodchenko,	Clark	
presumably	refers	to	Stalin’s	Gulag	“White	Sea	Canal”	project	(1931-33),	forced	labor	dressed	as	
a	heroic	public	works	project,	not	only	obscured	but	lionized	by	Rodchenko’s	black	and	white	
photo	series	thereof.	T.J.	Clark,	“The	End	of	the	Anti-Aesthetic”,	Texte	zur	Kunst	81,	2011,	p.	164	
	Foster,	2002,	p.	x	435
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taken	up	by	Michel	Foucault	a	decade	 later	 in	his	 “Preface	 to	Transgression” 	436
(published	shortly	after	Bataille’s	death).	Transgression	in	Bataille	via	Foucault	is	
precisely	not	 negation	 or	 any	 form/act	 of	 illicitness.	 It	 is	 not	 antagonistic,	 but	
essentially	 an	 overcoming	 of	 delimitations,	 situated	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 personal	
expansion,	suggesting	a	kind	of	secular	sacred	state:		
Transgression,	then,	is	not	related	to	the	limit	as	black	to	white,	the	prohibited	to	
the	 lawful,	 the	outside	 to	 the	 inside	 […].	 Since	 this	 existence	 [transgression]	 is	
both	 so	 pure	 and	 so	 complicated,	 it	 must	 be	 detached	 from	 its	 questionable	
associations	 of	 ethics 	 […];	 it	 must	 be	 liberated	 from	 the	 scandalous	 or	437
subversive,	 that	 is,	 from	 anything	 aroused	 by	 negative	 associations.	
Transgression	does	not	seek	to	oppose	one	thing	to	another,	nor	does	it	achieve	
its	purpose	through	mockery	or	by	upsetting	the	solidity	of	foundations .	438
	While	not	explicitly	so	in	The	Anti-Aesthetic,	proof	of	this	distinction	would	come	a	decade	436
later	in	his	brief	discussion	of	Bataillean	transgression	in	the	context	of	his	The	Return	of	the	Real	
(1996).	Foster	here	specigically	tied	the	transgressive	to	Julia	Kristeva’s	concept	of	the	“abject”	
which	registers	both	as	“disturbance”	to	the	“symbolic	order”	as	well	as	a	regulatory	procedure	
by	that	order	(law):	as	“abjection”.	Whence	Foster	delineates	the	transgressive	from	abjection	as	a	
kind	of	super-regulatory	societal	process	(absolute	exclusion	and	thus	totality),	structurally	
similar	to	Foucault’s	reading	of	Bataille’s	transgression	(which	essentially	absorbs	regulation,	
demarcation,	antagonism	–	however	not	in	the	name	of	order	but	by	precisely	to	totally	dissolve	
order).	Foster,	1996,	p.	156.	In	a	slightly	earlier	essay	“Obscene,	Abject,	Traumatic”	Foster	
suggested	in	a	footnote	a	“third	option”	of		“trangressive	value	[as]	a	function	of	ambiguity”	that	
he	associates	as	much	with	Bataille	as	with	Freud.	Foster,	“Obscene,	Abject,	Traumatic”,	October	
Vol.	78,	1996,	p.	115	f12.		More	importantly	an	“ambiguity”	that	would	seem	essential	to	any	anti-
aesthetic	Foster	had	discussed	a	decade	earlier	in	the	eponymous	publication	and	which	he	
would	eventually	associate	with	“[…]	avant-garde	practice	at	its	best	[that]	is	contradictory,	
mobile	and	otherwise	diabolical”.	Foster,	The	Return	of	the	Real.	Cambridge/Mass.	1996,	p.16	
	Cf.	Agamben:	“The	only	ethical	experience	(which	as	such	cannot	be	a	task	or	subjective	437
decision)	is	the	experience	of	being	(one’s	own)	potentiality,	of	being	(one’s	own)	possibility	–	
exposing,	that	is,	in	every	form	one’s	own	amorphousness	and	in	every	act	one’s	inactuality.”	The	
Coming	Community,	Minneapolis,	1993,	p.	43.	
	 Michel	 Foucault,	 Language,	 Counter-Memory,	 Practice:	 Selected	 Interviews	 and	 Essays,	 ed.	438
Donald	Bouchard,	1977,	p.35	[1963,	as	an	essay	in	Bataille’s	journal	Critique,	No.	195-196].	
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While	some	of	these	deginitions	by	Foucault	seem	to	run	counter	to	a	Bataillean	
notion	 of	 transgression	 (at	 least	 at	 the	 time	 of	Documents)	 –	 Bataille	 certainly	
being	 inclined	 towards	 “upsetting	 the	 solidity	 of	 foundations”	 –	what	 Foucault	
seems	 to	 be	 saying	 is	 that	 transgression	 arises	 from	 not	 even	 recognizing,	 or	
better,	 not	 even	 thinking	 through	 a	 dualistic	 framework,	 in	 line	with	 Bataille’s	
original	deginition:	 ”Transgression	does	not	deny	 the	 taboo	but	 transcends	and	
completes	it” 	(which	essentially	also	means	that	transgression	was	to	Bataille	439
what	sublation	was	to	Hegel,	needless	to	say	structurally	speaking	only).	Foster	
would,	 a	 decade	 after	 the	 Anti-Aesthetic,	 call	 this	 properly	 antagonistic/
negational	 transgression	 that	 Foucault	 differentiated	 from	 Bataille’s	
transgression	 “this	 old	 vocation	 of	 the	 avant-garde”.	 As	 an	 alternative	 to	
historically	deglated	transgression	–“to	reformulate	 this	vocation”	as	he	put	 it	–	
Foster	proposed	“to	rethink	transgression	not	as	a	rupture	produced	by	a	heroic	
avant-garde	outside	the	symbolic	order	[…]	but	to	expose	it	[order]	in	crisis”,	the	
consequence	drawn	from	a	revised	self-conception	as	a	 from	thereon	“strategic	
avant-garde	within	 the	order” .	This	 location	of	 transgression	as	essentially	a	440
critique	operating	within	the	order	is	a	methodology	that	Denis	Hollier	identigied	
in	 the	mid-1970s	 as	 being	 at	 the	 core	 of	 any	notion	of	 a	Bataillean	barbarism.	
Contrary	 to	 the	 historical	 usage	 of	 the	 barbaric	 to	 denote	 unintelligibility	 and,	
essentially,	 a	 kind	 of	 non-value	 as	 external	 expression	 of	 any	 kind	 (as	 did	 the	
	Bataille,	Erotism:	Death	and	Sensuality,	San	Francisco,	1986	p.	63.	[1953]	439
	Foster,	1996,	p.157	440
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Greeks	 vis-à-vis	 the	 Persians,	 seen	 in	 the	 Histories	 of	 Herodotus,	 with	 the	
Persians	here	replacing	Bataille’s	Gauls ),	Hollier	posited	that:	441
Barbarism	[…]	is	characterized	by	a	certain	type	of	ideological	expression	[…]	a	
phenomenon	 that,	 consequently,	 could	 not	 be	more	 ‘cultural’,	 but	 in	 a	manner	
that	 attacks	 a	 social	 order	 rather	 than	 defends	 it.	 Barbarism	 opposes	 to	 the	
defense	 system	 dominated	 by	 architecture	 [here	 thought	 as	 dispositif]	 and	
organized	 by	 it,	 to	 all	 these	 surrounding	 forms	 of	 expression	 –	 to	 all	 these	
languages	 that	 conform	 and	 reinforce	 each	 other	 –	 its	 noncumulative	
counterattacks. 	442
For	Hollier	 this	 also	meant	 that	 in	 the	 context	of	 any	 “order”	 (symbolic,	 social,	
etc.),	barbarism	“[…]	is	not	a	type	of	society	that	is	independent	from	civilization,	
and	 specigically	would	 be	 distinguished	 from	 it	 from	 it	 by	 its	 lack	 of	 ‘culture’”.	
Presaging	 Foster’s	 strategic	 transgression	 from	 within,	 the	 barbaric	 in	 this	
constellation	was	“not	[an	entity]	in	itself”	–	excluded/outside	–	but	only	became	
manifest	in	“operate[ing]	in	a	relation	with”	a	system.	 	Contrary	to	Foster,	while	
bearing	in	mind	that	Hollier’s	discussion	of	the	barbaric	still	departed	from	the	
historical	subtext	of	Bataille’s	Gauls,	the	latter’s	proactive	“counterattacks”	were	
in	fact	more	that	of	an	impertinent	“rupture	produced”	than	a	strategic	“fracture	
traced” .	 Nevertheless,	 if	 the	 barbaric	 is	 not	 merely	 a	 “disturbance	 in	 the	443
	Histories,	5th	century	B.C.,	frequently	treated	as	historical	accounts	as	much	as	imaginary	441
travelogues	since	the	actual	voyages	undertaken	by	Herodotus	providing	the	factual	information	
to	his	Histories	remain	contested.	
	Hollier,	Against	Architecture,	Cambridge/Mass.	1992,	p.50	442
	Foster,	1996,	p.157	443
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academic	 expressive	 code” 	 –	 in	Batailles’s	 case	 study,	 affecting	 the	 “code”	 of	444
Greek	coins	–	but	a	disturbance	that	could	potentially	affect	any	“code”	produced	
and	disseminated	by	systems	of	image	production,	be	that	commodity	culture	or	
historical	 and	 political	 representations	 presented	 as	 truths	 by	 the	 respective	
institutions,	 it	 would	 reconvene	 with	 a	 strategy	 “to	 expose	 it	 [order/code]	 in	
crisis”	 (Foster).	 If	 Hollier	 spoke	 of	 these	 “counterattacks”	 as	 being	
“noncumulative”,	 he	 was	 directly	 referring	 back	 to	 the	 Gaul’s	 particular	
“counterattacks”,	 that	 because	 of	 their	 cultural	 make-up	 are	 “noncumulative”	
since	 concepts	 of	 intellectual	 and	 economic	 accumulation	 were	 quasi	 alien	 to	
them	–	at	least	according	to	the	picture	Bataille	had	painted	of	them.	For	a	more	
general	 deployment	 of	 the	 barbaric	 as	 such	 a	 quintessential	 “cultural”	
expression,	 this	 “noncumulative”	 aspect	 is,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 discussion	 above,	
ambiguous	to	say	the	least:	barbarism	carrying	use-value	as	a	cultural	expression	
certainly	can	accumulate	exchange-value	by	being	solidly	integrated	into	cultural	
production	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	 institutionalized	 and	 subsequently	 valorized	
“disturbance”/”counterattack”	 –	 not	 least	 because	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	
market	and	the	institution	has	become	largely	untenable.	Having	said	that,	if	the	
barbaric	is	not	only	a	valid	expression	intrinsic	to	(any)	culture	but	is,	therefore,	
equally	subject	to	constant	redeginition	and	shifts,	one	could	equally	discuss	 its	
continued	 import	 for	 an	 artistic	 practice	 that	 invites	 or	 performs	 discord,	
discrepancy,	 disarray,	 disorder,	 dysfunction	 or,	 for	 a	 (only)	 slightly	 more	
	Hollier,	1992,	p.50	444
	249
contemporary	 choice	 of	 terms,	 dis-agreement	 and	 dissensus ,	 as	 a	 form	 of	445
critique .		446
Since	 there	has	been	rather	an	abundance	of	heads	 in	 the	course	of	 this	
discussion	 –	 both	 right	 and	 left,	 decapitated	 and	 deformed	 –	 I	 would	 like	 to	
conclude	with	 two	works	of	 the	 last	decade	 that	not	only	 feature	such	afglicted	
heads	 but	 that	 contain	 visual	 material	 traditionally	 associated	 with	 barbaric	
content,	or	rather	material	pointing	to	barbaric	conditions,	arguably	as	a	form	of	
critique	stemming	from	such	conditions.		
In	2007,	Thomas	Hirschhorn	showed	a	series	of	collages	titled	Concretions	
(I-XVII)	 at	 the	 Galerie	 Chantal	 Crousel	 in	 Paris	 that	 were	 embedded	 into	 the	
	“The	essence	of	politics	resides	in	the	modes	of	dissensual	subjectigication	that	reveal	the	445
difference	of	a	society	to	itself.	The	essence	of	consensus	is	not	peaceful	discussion	and	
reasonable	agreement	as	opposed	to	conglict	or	violence.	Its	essence	is	the	annulment	of	
dissensus	as	the	separation	of	the	sensible	from	itself,	the	annulment	of	surplus	subjects,	the	
reduction	of	the	people	to	the	sum	of	the	parts	of	the	social	body,	and	of	the	political	community	
to	the	relationship	of	interests	and	aspirations	of	these	different	parts.	Consensus	is	the	
reduction	of	politics	to	the	police”.	
Jacques	Rancière,	“Ten	Theses	on	Politics”,	in	Theory&Event,	Vol.5	,	No.3,	2001.	This	notion	of	
dissensus	invokes	Nancy’s	community	of	plural	singularity	(and	Chantal	Mouffe	&	Ernesto	Laclau	
who	Clare	Bishop	draws	on)	while	it	furthermore	betrays	an	import	of	Bataille	when	Rancière	
speaks	of	“the	difference	of	a	society	to	itself”	the	embrace	of	its	own	heterogeneity	vis-à-vis	
social	life	which	again	strives	for	self-estrangement.	
	At	this	point	at	the	latest,	the	historical	sentinel	critique	appears	to	not	only	having	to	recuse	446
itself	but	in	need	of	redeginition	by	a	revised	set	of	terms.	Recent	renegotiations	of	such	terms,	
tied	explicitly	to	the	legacy	of	a	1980s	anti-aesthetic,	have	been	outlined	by	for	example	T.J.	Clark	
and	Juliane	Rebentisch.	Clark,	interestingly	enough	for	this	discussion,	proposes	“immediacy”,	
“intensity”,	“defensiveness”,	“hiding”;	a	“radical	worldlessness”,	all	of	which	sounds	intriguing	as	
much	as	it	simultaneously	readmits	the	ghosts	of	fallen	vanguards	through	the	back	entrance.	
Clark,	Texte	zur	Kunst,	2011,	p.	164.	Rebentisch,	in	a	direct	response	to	such	a	“radical	
worldlessness”,	offers	an	already	semantically	less	charged	“aesthetic	difference”;	one	very	much	
situated	in	the	world	one	should	think,	while	being	through	with	both	“utopias”:	“sublation”	(in	
the	sense	of	Bürger)	and	(Modernist)	“autonomy”	–	presumably	both	as	tragedy	and	as	farce.	
Juliane	Rebentisch,	“On	the	Alliance	between	the	Anti-Aesthetic	and	the	Aesthetic	of	Experience”,	
Texte	zur	Kunst	86,	2011,	pp.	167-168	
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artist’s	 trademark	overwhelming	environments .	The	collages	are	 in	a	 square	447
format	and	condense	the	legible	signature	of	Hirschhorn’s	aesthetic	-	large	scale	
environments	 that	exuberantly	 take	over	 the	space	 -	by	assembling	all	kinds	of	
detritus	 and	 cheap	 materials	 (cardboard,	 packing	 tape,	 photocopies	 of	
philosophical	 texts,	printouts	of	 imagery	 from	the	 internet	alternating	between	
explicit	 depictions	 of	 bodily	 violence,	 advertising	 and	 soft	 porn;	 as	 well	 as	
mannequins,	 banners,	 glea	 market	 “modernist”	 artworks,	 counterfeit	
merchandise	 etc.) .	 In	 the	 Concretion	 series,	 images	 of	 women	 cut	 out	 of	448
fashion	 and	men’s	magazines	 share	 this	 square	 format	with	 cutouts	 of	 bloody,	
severed	body	parts,	seemingly	of	mostly	male	victims	and	obtained	online.	This	
crude	collage	is	in	all	of	the	works	in	the	series	punctured	by	cut	out	images	of	
bullet	holes	in	a	concrete	surface.	(A	ginal	element	comes	in	the	form	of	marker	
scribbles,	 the	 sole	 “hand-made”	 feature	 of	 this	 collage).	 This	 accumulation	 is	
ginally	shrink-wrapped	in	clear	plastic	foil.	The	following	collage	discussed	here	
is	titled	Power	of	Brazil	and	is	from	2006,	presenting	a	kind	of	prototype	to	the	
following	 Concretion	 series.	 Here	 this	 middle	 area	 of	 bullet	 holes	 roughly	
diagonally	dissects	the	square	format.	The	upper	right	part	centers	on	a	female	
naked	 headless	 torso	 with	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 breasts,	 appearing	 doubly	 in	
	Hirschhorn’s	g	variety	of	collage	is	clearly	a	strategy	deemed	imperative	by	him	to	his	overall	447
endeavor	since	he	has	repeated	it	several	times	since,	most	notably	in	the	Ur-Collages	(2008),	and	
as	late	as	this	year	in	the	series	Collage	Truth	(2013)(both	series	were	shown	at	the	Susanna	Kulli	
Gallery	in	Zurich).	
	This	direct	relationship	between	the	self-contained	collages	and	the	“formless”	large-scale	448
environments	is	maintained	by	Hirschhorn	himself,	for	whom	all	his	work	is	essentially	a	collage:	
“I	don’t	make	‘installation	art’.	I	never	use	this	word!	I	want	to	confront	my	two-dimensional	
thoughts	within	the	third	dimension	without	thinking	about	volume”.	Hirschhorn,	“Mit	meiner	
Arbeit	will	ich	Form	geben.	Form	geben	heißt	nicht	Form	machen”.	In	Michaela	Ott/Harald	Strauß	
(eds.),	Ästhetik	+Politk,	Hamburg	2009,	p.222	(Transl.	by	the	author).	
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slightly	 different	 scales	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 imaged	 echo;	 the	 lower	 bottom	 corner	 is	
dominated	 by	 a	 severed	 blood–covered	 male	 head	 that	 repeats	 this	 above	
mentioned	imaged	echo.	Smaller	cutouts	of	a	female	model’s	head,	of	what	seem	
to	 be	 surgically	 augmented	 breasts,	 and	 more	 mutilated	 body	 parts	 are	
interspersed	more	randomly	across	the	collage.	This	bisection,	this	50/50 	deal	449
between	two	image	banks	formally	and	thematically	yields	a	kind	of	rectangular	
yin	and	yang	of,	 in	 this	case,	 the	narcotics-body	cult-advertising	complex	 if	one	
will:	 female/male,	 beauty/ugliness,	 mediated	 “pleasure”/mediated	 “pain”,	 sex/
death	and	so	forth.	A	contextual	place	is	hinted	at	by	a	hand-written,	and	equally	
echoed,	 “Power	 of	 Brazil”	 at	 the	 center	 bottom	 of	 the	 image.	 The	 collage	 thus	
concretizes	 girst	 and	 foremost	 already	 circulating	 popular	 ideas	 about	 Rio	 de	
Janeiro:	 the	 exhibitionistic	 sexiness	 of	 glawless-to-grotesque	 bodies	 thronging	
the	Copacabana	 glanking	 the	savagery	associated	with	 the	drug	 trade	and	gang	
wars	of	the	bordering	favelas.	It	reproduces	a	precarious	Third	World	sexiness	as	
successfully	adapted	for	the	screen	by	gilms	like	the	Oscar-nominated	City	of	God	
(2002).	 The	 “Power	 of	 Brazil”	 may	 thus	 ultimately	 be	 that	 of	 “Capital	 always	
wins” ,	as	Hirschhorn	has	previously	stated	in	a	different	context.	450
	One	of	Hirschhorn’s	earliest	series	of	works	is	in	fact	titled	Fifty-Fifty	(1992-93),	consisting	of	449
adhesive	tape	applied	to	pieces	of	wood,	as	well	as	cut	out	mass	media	images	pasted	onto	pieces	
of	cardboard,	each	covering	roughly	half	of	the	respective	substrate.	
	As	quoted	saying	in	Pamela	M.	Lee,	Forgetting	the	Art	World,	Cambridge/Mass.	2012,	p.	118.450
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Thomas	Hirschhorn,	Power	of	Brazil,	2006	
While	 the	 title	 of	 the	 later	 Concretion[s]	 clearly	 underlines	 the	 condensing,	
accumulative	formal	aspect	it	also	asserts	a	rendering	concrete	–	making	visible	–	
of	 a	 certain	 state	 of	 things	 that	 on	 the	 surface	 literally	 registers	 as	 messy,	
irreconcilable,	disastrous,	heterogeneous 	 if	one	will.	(Such	a	claim	to	uncover	451
this	state,	to	expose	the	messy	relations	underneath	a	world	of	surfaces	through	
sheer	surfaceness,	is	quite	obvious	in	titles	of	collages	made	that	same	year,	such	
as	 Collateral	 Thinking	 and	 Uncomfortable	 Truths).	 Hirschhorn	 however	 has	
mostly	spoken	of	these	collages	as	“chaos”,	one	that,	however,	“asserts	the	Form”,	
that	is	“brave”	and	thus	“accepts	to	be	ridiculous	and	silly”;	without	ever	failing	
	I’m	using	this	term	very	much	in	the	Bataillean	sense	not	least	since	Bataille	gigures	as	one	of	451
the	thinkers	celebrated	by	Hirschhorn	(he	created	a	“Bataille-Monument”	on	the	outskirts	of	
Kassel	for	dOCUMENTA	11	in	2002).	Hirschhorn	frequently	declares	himself	to	be	a	“fan”	of	not	
only	Bataille	but	furthermore	Spinoza,	Foucault,	Deleuze	&	Guattari	etc.	Whether	this	clearly	
aspired	to	heterogeneity	in	Hirschhorn’s	work	is	as	such	engaging	Bataille’s	thinking	about	
heterogeneity	is	explored	in	this	chapter.	
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however,	 since	 “defending	 the	 Form	 is	 never	 a	 lost	 gight”.	 “Asserting”	 and	
“Defending”	the	“Form”	are	acts	of	aggression:	“a	warlike	act	that	makes	one	an	
artist”. 	 	Furthermore,	this	method	of	Concretion	is	both	a	means	and	an	end	to	452
yield	 “Truth”,	 that	 in	 its	 “clearness”	 “goes	 beyond	 history”.	 	 Hirschhorn’s	
deliberate	heavy-handedness	in	claiming	this	uppercase	“Truth”	for	his	collages	
is	meant	to	offer	an	aggressive	counterpoint	to	what	he	considers	conventionally	
accepted	truths:	those	of	the	news	media,	journalism,	research	and	by	extension	
art	history,	art	criticism	etc.		“Truth”	resisting	“information”	and	“Truth”	“[…]	that	
isn’t	validated	[…]	through	debate,	discussion,	communication	or	even	analysis;	
but	 one	 that	 compels	 recognition	 through	 its	 capacity	 to	 enlighten	 the	 Form	
itself” .	 Conceptually,	 Hirschhorn’s	 aspired	 “Form”	 thus	 aligns	 almost	 exactly	453
with	 the	 demands	 for	 a	 kind	 of	 post-anti-aesthetic	 that	 T.J.	 Clark	 not	 long	 ago	
called	“the	non-discursiveness	of	visual	depiction”	and	a	“radical	worldlessness”	
	(even	though,	with	regard	to	the	latter,	Hirschhorn	would	presumably	much	454
prefer	 to	 see	his	work	divulging	 the	very	 radicalities	of	 this	world).	Clark,	who	
surely	 envisions	 the	 opposite	 from	 Hirschhorn’s	 ultimately	 referential	
	Which	is	as	such	an	aggressive	act	being	crucial	to	art	Bataille	had	similarly	conceived	in	his	452
discussion	of	grafgiti	by	Abyssinian	children	(“bizarre	rantings”),	applied	to	“the	columns	or	
doors	of	churches”;	Bataille	couched	it	in	Freudian	terms	and	with	de	Sade	in	mind:	“Art	[…]	
proceeds	in	this	way	by	successive	destructions.	Insofar	as	it	liberates	libidinal	instincts,	these	
instincts	are	sadistic.”	Bataille,	2009	[1930],	p.	41.	
	All	quotations	by	Hirschhorn	so	far	are	from	a	two-page	statement	written	by	him	on	the	453
occasion	of	his	exhibition	“Concretion	Re”	at	the	Galerie	Chantal	Crousel	in	2007.	Online	at	
http://www.crousel.com/static/uploads/collective/press/PRconcretion.pdf	.	Retrieved	March	
5th	2013	
	Clark,	Texte	zur	Kunst,	2011,	p.164.	He	continues:	“[…]	the	possibility	of	at	least	partial	escape	454
from	the	time	and	the	place	of	the	slogan,	the	sound	bite,	the	sentence,	the	image-that-obeys-the-
logic-of-a-sound-bite/brand-name/sales-pitch-world”.		
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collages ,	equally	speaks	of	a	return	 to	 ”defensiveness”	and	of	 “intensity”	and	455
“immediacy”	that	corresponds	with	Hirschhorn’s	repeated	demands	of	(his)	art’s	
priority	 of	 “energy”	 over	 “quality”	 and	 the	 aforementioned	 “defending”	 of	 the	
“Form” .	 This	 generous	 quoting	 of	 the	 artist	 speaking	 about	 his	 own	work	 is	456
necessary	 in	 this	 case	 because	 I	 think	 it	 is	 as,	 if	 not	more	 important	 than	 the	
actual	works	themselves .	Not	only	do	these	persisting	assertions	and	defenses	457
on	 the	side	of	Hirschhorn	present	a	 stark	contrast	 to	 the	actual	 formal	 logic	of	
the	works	under	discussion,	which	will	be	addressed	in	a	moment.	Furthermore,	
they	 illustrate	 a	 key	 contemporary	 example	 fraught	 with	 the	 historical	
ideological	 claims	 and	 aspirations	 of	 a	 counter	 aesthetic	 discussed	 so	 far,	 not	
least	 in	 connection	 with	 the	 barbaric	 as	 an	 aesthetic	 device	 and	 a	 social	
performative	 position	 complete	 with	 any	 acuity	 it	 may	 possess	 in	 a	
	Clark	considers	Philippe	Parreno’s	gilm	work	June	8,	1968	(2009)	to	be	moving	towards	such	455
a	“non-discursiveness”	and	“worldlessness”	(The	gilm	shows	a	highly	stylized	reenactment	of	
Robert	Kennedy’s	cofgin’s	train	journey	from	New	York	to	Washington	D.C.,	pointing	the	lens	onto	
various	groups	of	spectators	beholding	this	procession,	passing	through	a	pristinely	verdant	
countryside	back	to	the	city.	It	thus	presents	a	completely	different	treatment	of	quasi-Warholian	
subject	matter:	a	reversal	of	the	gaze	that	dissolves	Pop	iconicity).	
	“I	have	always	believed	in	‘Quality	=	No,	Energy	=	Yes’	“.	Thomas	Hirschhorn,	“Why	Is	It	456
Important	–	Today	–	To	Show	and	Look	At	Images	Of	Destroyed	Human	Bodies?”	2013.	Text	
published	on	the	occasion	of	his	exhibition	“Collage	Truth”,	Galerie	Susanna	Kulli	Zurich,	2013	
.http://www.susannakulli.ch/sites/default/giles/
Thomas%20Hirschhorn_Why%20Is%20It%20Important_Galerie%20Susanna%20Kulli_Zurich_2
013.pdf		Retrieved	March	6th	2013	
	That	Hirschhorn’s	so	far	sporadic	manifesto-like	written	output	is	considered	essential	to	his	457
practice	is	evinced	by	the	fact	that	his	collected	writings	will	be	published	in	August	of	this	year	
by	MIT	Press:	Critical	Laboratory:	The	Writings	of	Thomas	Hirschhorn,	edited	by	Hal	Foster	(with	
Lisa	Lee).		
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contemporary	 context .	 Just	 like	 Bataille’s	 notion	 of	 a	 base	 materialism	 and	458
formlessness,	 Hirschhorn	 seeks	 to	 furnish	 “chaos”	 and	 a	 virulent	 base	
heterogeneity	 with	 the	 power	 and	 the	 agency	 to	 undo	 and	 declass	 accepted	
congigurations	of	power:	of	knowledge	production,	image	hierarchies,	the	logic	of	
rational	organization	of	representation	and	the	power	relations	these	systems	or	
codes	 seek	 to	 thereby	 maintain.	 Not	 at	 all	 unlike	 proto-fascist	 aspirations	 to	
conceive	 forms	 –	 Sinnbilder	 –	 that	 are	 true	 because	 they	 resist	 and	 denounce	
interpretation,	 are	 ahistorical ,	 divulge	 meaning	 through	 their	 very	 form	459
independent	of	rationalizing	powers	of	the	will,	Hirschhorn	demands	this	kind	of	
non-linguistic	powerful	 “autonomy”	 for	 the	 images	he	creates.	The	 interest	and	
investment	in	universal	totalities	similar	to	the	kind	of	“Ur-time”	of	both	Bataille	
and	 the	 concurrent	 fascist	 aesthetic	 are	 implicated	 in	 Hirschhorn’s	 work,	 not	
	Rancière:	“The	main	procedure	of	political	or	critical	art	consists	in	setting	out	the	encounter	458
and	possibly	the	clash	of	heterogeneous	elements.	The	clash	of	these	heterogeneous	elements	is	
supposed	 to	 provoke	 a	 break	 in	 our	 perception,	 to	 disclose	 some	 secret	 connection	 of	 things	
hidden	behind	the	everyday	reality.	The	hidden	reality	may	be	the	absolute	power	of	dream	and	
desire	 hidden	 by	 the	 prose	 of	 bourgeois	 life,	 as	 it	 is	 in	 the	 surrealist	 poetics.	 It	 may	 be	 the	
violence	of	capitalist	power	and	class	war	hidden	behind	the	great	ideals,	as	it	is	in	the	militant	
practices	 of	 photomontage,	 showing	 us	 for	 instance	 the	 capitalist	 gold	 in	 Adolf	 Hitler’s	
throat”	 [John	 Heartgield,	 “Adolf	 der	 U| bermensch:	 Schluckt	 Gold	 und	 redet	 Blech”,	 1932].	
(Hirschhorn	has	mentioned	these	Dada	works	as	“speaking	to	him”,	i.e.	historically	informing	the	
ambitions	of	his	work.)	
From	a	lecture	given	in	Frankfurt	a.M.	2004,	online	at		
http://www.16beavergroup.org/mtarchive/archives/001877print.html	 Retrieved	 January	 23rd	
2009	
	Hirschhorn:	“That	is	the	point:	to	make	a	work	in	your	time	that	goes	beyond	your	time,	a	459
work	that	is	a-historic”	in	“Im	Rahmen	der	Ausstellung”,	online	publication	on	the	occasion	of	his	
“Ur-Collage	show”	at	the	Susanna	Kulli	Gallery	in	2008,	essentially	a	dialogue	between	
Hirschhorn	and	Sebastian	Egenhofer,	2008,	p.49	Online	at	
http://www.susannakulli.ch/sites/default/giles/Thomas%20Hirschhorn_Ur-
Collage_a%20conversation%20with%20Sebastian%20Egenhofer_english%20and%20german.p
df	
Retrieved	March	12th	2013	
	256
least	 by	 titling	 a	 later	 series	 of	 collages	Ur-Collages	 (2008) .	What	makes	 his	460
statements	however	wholly	incompatible	with	any	homogenizing	(and	needless	
to	say,	fascist)	ambition/exploitation	is	his	frequent	emphasis	on	the	exceptional	
individual	vision	and	creation	that	informs	his	resistant	“Form”:		
A	form	which	comes	from	me,	 from	myself	only,	which	can	only	come	from	me	
because	I	see	the	form	that	way,	I	understand	it	that	way	and	because	I	am	the	
only	one	to	know	that	form.	 	461
Drawing	on	Hollier’s	deginition	of	 the	barbaric	as	a	 “disturbance”	and	 “cultural	
expression”,	 it	 seems	 not	 implausible	 for	 Hirschhorn	 to	 concur	 with	 such	 a	
barbaric	formal	methodology,	one,	to	recall	Hollier,	that	“oppose[s]	[…]	all	these	
surrounding	 forms	 of	 expression	 –	 [to]	 all	 these	 languages	 that	 conform	 and	
reinforce	 each	 other	 […]”.	 I.e.,	 in	 Hirschhorn’s	 version,	 all	 these	 languages	 of	
conventional	 truths,	 to	which	he	 “opposes”	an,	 in	his	estimation,	unique	quasi-
unintelligible	 barbaric	 “Form[s]”.	 And,	 while	 his	 “Form[s]”	 may	 be	
“noncumulative”	as	knowledge	production,	i.e.	in	properly	utilitarian	terms,	they	
of	course	not	only	accumulate	signigicant	market	value	as	artworks	but,	as	Peter	
Geimer	has	recently	pointed	out,	are	being	praised	by	institutions	and	academics	
alike	 for	 their	 apparently	 already	 visually	 unglinching	 criticality	 in	meeting	 the	
	The	signigicant	appeal	of	such	anti-rational	totalities	for	the	Collège	de	Sociologie	as	much	as	460
to	fascist	propaganda	has	recently	been	briegly	taken	up	by	Didi-Huberman:	“Quant	à	l’autre	face	
du	sacré,	elle	fait	surgir	[surge]	la	dépense	[expenditure]	ou	la	fête.	[Roger]	Caillois	y	voit	une	
actualization	de	l’Urzeit,	un	phenomène	de	‘depense	et	paroxysme’	réperable	[retrievable]	depuis	
le	carnaval	jusqu’aux	foules	[crowds]	electrisées	de	Nuremberg.”	Georges	Didi-Huberman,	“La	
colère	oubliée”,	Critique	788-789,	Jan/Feb	2013,	p.24	
	Hirschhorn,	“Doing	art	politically:	What	does	this	mean?”	(2008).	Online	manifesto	461
http://www.artandresearch.org.uk/v3n1/fullap01.html	
Retrieved	on	March	12th	2013	
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barbaric	conditions	of	our	times	head	on	(thus	further	consolidating	the	work’s	
overall	value ).	Geimer	writes:	462
To	 date,	 the	 art-critical	 and	 theoretical	 response	 to	 the	 ‘Ur-Collages’	 has	 been	
exceptionally	 favorable.	 The	 work,	 a	 critic	 writes,	 possess	 ‘both	 ethical	 and	
political	 force’,	 achieving	 a	 ‘creaturely	 opening’	 that	 allows	 the	 creature	 to	
appear	in	its	obscenity	and	indicate	cracks	in	the	symbolic	order.	 	463
The	“critic”	Geimer	paraphrases	is	Hal	Foster,	one	of	the	staunchest	champions	to	
have	 further	 theorized	 Hirschorn’s	 work	 over	 the	 last	 few	 years	 (along	 with	
Benjamin	Buchloh	and	Pamela	M.	Lee,	to	limit	 it	to	a	North-American	academic	
context).	When	 Foster	 via	 Geimer	 speaks	 of	 Hirschhorn’s	 collages’	 capacity	 to	
register	 “creaturely	 openings”	 and	 “cracks	 in	 the	 symbolic	 order”	 it	 becomes	
quite	obvious	that	Foster	considers	Hirschhorn	the	legitimate	heir	to	the	Warhol	
of	the	Death	and	Disasters;	or,	at	the	very	least,	a	Warhol	of	his	time.	For	Foster	
located	Warhol’s	works’	intensity	not	primarily	in	the	actual	troubling	content	of	
the	media	images	but	precisely	in	the	process	of	reproducibility	of	these	images	
interrupted	 by	 technical	 errors	 and	 glitches.	 A	 treatment	 which,	 according	 to	
Foster:	 “[…]	 works	 less	 through	 content	 than	 through	 technique,	 especially	
through	 the	 ‘gloating	 glashes’	 of	 the	 silkscreen	 process	 […]”	 with	 Warhol	 “[…]	
	“Thomas	Hirschhorn's	"Tattoo"	series	explores	the	themes	of	violence,	sex,	consumerism,	and	462
global	 politics.	 Photos	 of	 airbrushed	breasts,	 tattooed	 limbs,	 and	blown-up	body	parts	 of	 Iraqi	
citizens	are	buried	among	printed	matter	cut-outs,	cryptic	messages,	signage,	and	obsessive	blue	
and	red	scribbling.	Hirschhorn's	work	summons	references	to	philosophy,	popular	culture,	mass	
media,	 economics,	 and	poetry.	Layering	 information	and	 imagery,	Hirschhorn	wants	 to	express	
the	 complexity	 and	 contradiction	 of	 our	 fragmented	 world	 through	 work	 that	 voices	 his	
discontent	with	 contemporary	politics	 and	public	discourse.”	Regen	Projects	press	 release,	 Los	
Angeles,	2009	
	Peter	Geimer,	“The	Necessity	of	Critique	and	the	Love	of	Art”,	Texte	zur	Kunst	87,	2012.	p.	54	463
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selecting	moments	when	this	spectacle	cracks	(the	JFK	assassination,	the	Monroe	
suicide,	 racist	 attacks,	 car	wrecks)	 but	 cracks	 only	 to	 expand.”	 Foster	 specigied	
these	 “cracks”	and	 “glashes”	as	 the	signigiers	of	 trauma	and	shock	which	he,	by	
drawing	 on	 Lacan’s	 irrepresentable	 Real,	 further	 tied	 to	 Barthes’	 pictorial	
punctum	 and	 ginally	 to	Lacan’s	own	notion	of	 “troumatic”,	which	comingles	 the	
gap/hole/opening	 (trou	 in	French)	with	 the	 traumatic,	dodging	 representation,	
all	“[…]	at	the	level	of	technique,	where	the	punctum	breaks	through	the	screen	
and	allows	the	real	to	poke	through.” 	464
I	 have	 chosen	 this	 Concretion	 series	 of	 Hirschhorn	 because	 if	 a	 similar	
process	 is	 indeed	operative	 in	 the	 surfaces	of	Hirschhorn	 I	would	argue	 that	 it	
not	 so	 much	 registers	 or	 produces	 but	 that	 it	 Ilashes	 the	 troumatic	 via	 those	
bullet	 holes.	 Indeed,	 one	 could	 posit	 that	 with	 Hirschhorn	 the	 troumatic	 as	
initially	 tied	 to	 the	 intangibility	 of	 the	 punctum	 by	 Foster	 has	 become	 pure	
surface	effect,	and,	if	anything,	is	wholly	integrated	into	the	studium;	as	an	effect	
by	way	of	which	Hirschhorn	seeks	to	resist	any	“information”	–	truths	–	to	be	had	
from	 any	 distrusted	 studium	 for	 the	 benegit	 of	 “Truth”.	 (Differently	 argued,	 the	
collages	 render	 punctum	 and	 studium	 redundant	 terms,	 which	 may	 be	 their	
foremost	 achievement ).	 In	 Hirschhorn’s	 diction	 “Truth”	 is	 a	 stand-in	 for	 the	465
“real”	 and	 thus,	 consequentially,	 when	 Foster	 spoke	 about	 Warhol’s	 works	
signaling	a	“rupture	[…]	between	the	perception	and	consciousness	of	a	subject	
	Foster,	1996,	p.	136	464
	For	the	original	deginition	of	these	two	terms	by	Barthes	see	his	La	Chambre	claire:	Note	sur	la	465
photographie	(Paris,	1980)		
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touched	 by	 an	 image” ,	 this	 is	 no	 doubt	 exactly	 what	 Hirschhorn	 endeavors	466
when	 he	 titled	 recent	 collages	 –	 again	 setting	 up	 fashion	 advertising	 imagery	
against	grisly	pictures	of	 Iraqi	or	Afghan	corpses	–	Touching	Reality	 (2012).	To	
touch	reality	 is	 “being	capable	of	 touching	this	 inconsummerable	act” ;	hence	467
to	deny	 the	 collage’s	 “relational	 antagonism”	 (Claire	Bishop )	 transgixed	onto	468
paper,	now	that	of	the	military-industrial-commodity	complex	proper,	equals	to	
“avoid	 touching	 Truth”	 while	 this	 antagonistic	 collage	 “Form”	 is	 one	 of	
“resistance”	and	a	“way	to	touch	Truth”	 .	Why	superimposing	an	explicit	image	469
of	 disaster	 and	 defacement	 over	 the	 brand	 name	 of	 a	 fashion	 ad	 constitutes	 a	
“warrior-like”,	 “brave”,	 “new”	 truth/act	 is	 also	 an	 act	 difgicult	 to	 reconstruct,	
replicating	as	 it	does	 the	dualistic	 attributes	 familiar	 from	run-of-the-mill	 anti-
War/anti-Globalization	demonstration	placards	(which	could	make	the	(wobbly)	
case	 for	 a	 certain	 democracy	 of	 forms	 and	 contexts	 strived	 for,	 of	 a	 common	
	Foster,	1996,	p.	132	466
	Hirschorn,	Kulli	PR,	2013	467
	Claire	Bishop,	“Antagonism	and	Relational	Aesthetics”,	October	Vol.	110,	2004,	pp.	51-79.	468
Bishop	only	skirted	the	collages	in	her	discussion	of	Hirschorn’s	overall	practice,	which	she	
presented	as	a	counter	position	of	a	more	exacting	criticality	vis-à-vis	concurrent	practices	
commonly	associated	with	Nicolas	Bourriaud’s	notion	and	eponymous	book	Relational	Aesthetics	
(Esthetique	rélationelle,	Dijon	1998).	I	am	using	her	neologism	as	an	already	established	one	here	
then,	somewhat	detached	from	her	original	(con)text.		
	Which	may	be	the	very	gist	of	the	crass	incongruity	between	the	artist’s	and	his	proponents’	469
claims	for	these	collages	and	the	latters’	amazingly	orthodox	formal	logic.	It	thus	appears	that	
this	incongruity	boils	down	to	medium-specigicity:	while	the	“3d”	collages	do	succeed	at	a	sense	
of	entrapment	through	the	sheer	density	and	virulence	of	these	images	in	conjunction	with	this	
human	architecture	of	death/mannequins,	indeed	late	capitalist	surrogate	tzompantlis/ossuaries,	
the	neat	juxtapositions	of	two	image	banks	transgixed	as	a	transgressivity	in	the	most	
conservative	sense	simply	does	not	generate	anything	close	to	the	purported	transgixion	on	
behalf	of	the	viewer	in	my	view.	
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fandom	of	ideas	and/of	resistance ).	Pamela	Lee	congirms	as	much	in	her	recent	470
discussion	 of	 these	 collages,	 which	 she	 contextualizes	 with	 Hirschhorn’s	 brief	
stint	at	a	politically	engaged	Paris	graphic	design	girm	in	the	mid-1980s:	
Designing	 for	 Grapus	 –	 and	 by	 extension	 the	 ‘Partie	 Communiste	 Francaise’	 –	
was	 no	 better,	 as	 he	 [Hirschhorn]	 put	 it,	 than	 designing	 advertisements	 for	
yoghurt.	Audacious	though	the	remark	is	–	putting	the	interest	of	the	communist	
Party	 on	 the	 same	 rhetorical	 footing	 as	 yoghurt,	 both	 neutralized	 through	 the	
ideological	 transparency	of	 the	graphic	 sign	–	 it	has	 the	virtue	of	 illustrating	a	
central	problem	for	any	artist	laboring	under	the	long	shadow	not	only	of	1968	
but	by	now	of	1989:	that	is,	the	ways	in	which	this	kind	of	medium,	the	carrier	of	
radically	different	types	of	 information,	can	be	mobilized	to	temporally	specigic	
purposes	as	the	usual	bait	and	switch	of	co-optation	sets	in.	 	471
Lee	however	affords	the	works	not	only	this	“Truth”	(the	one	underpinning	this	
discussion	as	a	given )	but	this	braveness,	indeed,	this	“audacious[ness]”	on	the	472
side	 of	 Hirschhorn,	 again	 begging	 the	 question	 as	 to	 why	 re-representing	 her	
	A	similar	point	may	be	made	in	view	of	Martha	Rosler’s	series	Bringing	the	War	Home,	470
updated	as	they	are	by	her	to	reglect	on	the	respective	wars	being	fought	by	the	U.S.	(1967-72,	
2004,	2008).	Hirschhorn,	while	calling	her	work	“very	beautiful”,	is	anxious	to	differentiate	his	
collages	from	what	he	calls	are	Rosler’s	“photomontages”	that	in	his	view	derive	their	efgicacy	by	
“literally	bringing	the	war	home”	whereas	his	Ur-Collages	are	“autonomous”	and	“cannot	be	
‘discussed’”.	It	should	be	noted	that	since	then	his	latest	series	Collage	Truths	(2013)	employ	
montage	and	spatial	perspective.	.	
	Lee,	2012,	p.	118	471
	As	opposed	to	the	“Truth”	Hirschhorn,	as	Geimer	argues	in	his	essay,	seems	to	deduce	both	472
from	an	orthodoxly	irrevocable	artistic	autonomy	as	much	as	from	“a	diffuse	awareness	of	shared	
humanity”;	the	latter	a	critique	Geimer	in	turn	extracts	from	Barthes’	essay	“Family	of	Man”	in	
Mythologies	on	the	seminal	eponymous	MoMA	photography	exhibition	that	was	subsequently	
taken	on	a	kind	of	world	tour.	Geimer,	Texte	zur	Kunst,	2011,	p.54	
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(and	others’)	accepted	analysis	above,	“Truth”	if	you	will,	through	an	antagonism	
of	 two	 image	banks 	 (that	 are	 agreed	 to	be	held	 at	 the	 same	bank),	 arguably	473
obliging	Foster’s	demand	of	“a	fracture	traced”,	is	couched	in	the	language	of	the	
“heroic	avant-garde”	“producing”	“rupture”?	Perhaps	it	is	to	be	taken	not	at	face	
value	 but	 as	 a	 performative	 gesture,	 within	 which	 the	 manifesto-like	 style	 of	
Hirschhorn’s	 writing	 would	 further	 attest	 to	 this	 “neutraliz[ation]”	 and	 “co-
optation”	 (by	 the	 market,	 by	 the	 institution)	 Lee	 speaks	 of.	 This	 discrepancy	
between	 the	analysis	and	 the	claims	made	 for	 illustrating	 it	by	 the	very	means	
that	are	considered	to	have	been	shed	of	any	acuteness	 	–	“the	 free	play	of	 the	
signigier” 	 –	 i.e.,	 to	 literally	 juxtapose	 these	 signigiers	 back	 into	 a	 historical	474
transgressive	antagonism,	also	rolls	back	the	trajectory	of	criticism	over	the	last	
decade.	Just	at	the	same	time	that	Foster	had	called	for	a	critical	art	that	would	
“expose”	 “crisis”,	 to	 “register”	 “breakdown”	 within	 the	 “order”,	 Georges	 Didi-
Huberman	 exhumed	 Bataille’s	 scorned	 art	 gallery-cum-pharmacy	 whose	
“windows”,	 according	 to	 Didi-Huberman,	 had	 been	 “smashed”	 by	 the	 critical	
discourse	and	the	art	advanced	in	Documents.	Didi-Huberman,	however,	did	not	
leave	it	at	this	historical	claim	but	restated	it	for	a	contemporary	context:	as	“the	
most	radical	and	paradoxical	demand	one	can	ask	of	the	art	world”	–	the	“will	to	
the	 symptom”.	 […]	 “Because	 the	 essential	 task	 of	 art	 is	 in	 general	 to	
‘communicate’	 disease,	 discontent,	 being-unwell” ,	 he	 wrote	 in	 1996,	 using	475
	Sebastian	Egenhofer,	a	frequent	dialogue	partner	of	Hirschhorn’s,	calls	it	a	‘bipolar	battery’.	473
Hirschhorn/Egenhofer,	2008,	p.	41	
	Lee,	2012,	p.	120	474
	Didi-Huberman,	Munich	2010	[1995],	pp.	333-334.	Translation	by	the	author.	475
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Freud	 against	 Freud’s	 soothing	 and	 gratifying	 function	 of	 art.	 While	 on	 girst	
reading	Didi-Huberman’s	“demand”	for	art	to	“smash”	any	“windows”	smacks	of	
Foster’s	 concomitantly	 dismissed	 “old	 vocation”,	 one	 should	 not	 overlook	 that	
while	Didi-Huberman	called	it	“radical”	he	equally	thought	it	to	be	“paradoxical.”	
Thus	 this	 essentially	 art	historical	 discussion	 is	 indeed	 one	 of	 form	 and	
hardly	 of	 content.	 Does	 any	 barbaric	 “disturbance”	 to	 the	 “code”	 (Hollier)	
precluding	 classigication,	 information,	 explanation,	 rationalization	 and	
voyeuristic	 consumption	 of	 the	 horrors	 and	 grievances	 of	 the	world	 as	 clearly	
strived	 for	 by	Hirschorn	 –	 his	 “will	 to	 the	 symptom”	 –	 register	 in	 the	 forms	 he	
devises?	They	may	be	symptomatic	not	because	of	any	heterogeneity	but,	on	the	
contrary,	 by	 being	 homogenous	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 collages	 mirror	 and	
condense	 the	 New	 York	 Times’	 generic	 (in)form(ation),	 whose	 layout	 already	
contains	 incessant	 images	 of	 catastrophe	 placed	 next	 to	 a	 Tiffany/Gucci/Rolex	
advertisement	 and	 suchlike	 on	 a	 24-hour	 basis. 	 Even	 though	 Hirschhorn	 is	476
right	 to	 maintain	 that	 explicit	 images	 of	 the	 US’	 wars	 in	 the	 Middle	 East	 are	
hardly	 the	 order	 of	 the	 day	 in	 American	 mainstream	 media,	 the	 images	 he	
“shockingly” 	 exhumes	 and	 presents	 to	 the	 public	 are	 all	 easily	 retrievable	477
online,	 raising	 the	 question	 as	 to	who	 these	 gallery	 goers	 are	 exactly	 that	 are	
	Peter	Geimer	further	points	out	the	“assimilation”	between	these	purported	factions:	“This	476
arrangement	[The	Ur-Collages]	generates	a	stark	contrast	between	antagonistic	visual	domains;	
but	then	they	are	also	assimilated	to	each	other,	as	fashion	and	war	appear	as	equally	anonymous	
situations	devoid	of	context.	Like	the	paid	models	of	fashion	advertising,	the	dead	of	the	Iraq	War	
have	no	names.	In	the	‘Ur	Collages’	they	represent	pure	types	of	the	victim,	disgigured	by	a	diffuse	
and	unidentigied	violent	power”.	Geimer,	Texte	zur	Kunst,	2011,	p.52	
	Indeed	there	seems	to	be	a	re-investment	taking	place	here	into	Benjamin’s	notion	of	Dada’s	477
“moral	shock”	effect,	i.e.	a	return	to	that	notion	of	shock	despite	–	or	because	of	–	being	safely	
installed	and	incorporated	into	popular	culture	at	large,	a	situation	the	collages	may	seek	to	
address	(or	overturn?).	
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apparently	so	appalled	and	shocked	by	 the	collages,	seeking	 to	“avoid	 touching	
Truth” .	(Elderly	collectors	unacquainted	with	navigating	the	Internet?)		478
	
Los	Angeles	Times,	April	18th,	2012	(The	image	is	no	longer	posted	on	the	LA	Times	website	but	
remains	retrievable	on	cbsnews.com	and	various	other	sites).	
	“I	am	astonished	time	and	again	when	viewers	say,	‘I	can’t	see	that,or	even	worse,	«I	don’t	478
have	to	see	that»	or	‘I	don’t	want	to	see	that.’	That	is	an	incredible	thing	to	say,	that	is	an	exclusion	
of	the	other,	and	it	is	pure	egotism	when	someone	claims	that	he	has	the	option	of	not	seeing.	Of	
not	seeing	the	world	as	it	is.” Hirschhorn, 2008, p.41		
“Sometimes	I	hear	viewers	saying,	while	looking	at	images	of	destroyed	human	bodies,	‘I	can’t	
look	at	this,	I	must	not	see	this,	I’m	too	sensitive.’	This	is	a	way	of	keeping	a	comfortable,	
narcissistic,	and	exclusive	distance	from	today's	reality,	from	the	world”.	Hirschhorn,	2013,	p.	4	
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Thomas	Hirschhorn,	Ur-Collage,	2008	
	
Seth	Price,	Digital	Video	Effects	(Holes),	2003	(video	still)	
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Hirschhorn	 clearly	 considers	 his	 project	 of	 truth	 touching	 to	 be	 resuming	 the	
Western	canon	of	a	fearless	enlightening	à	la	Goya	(reproductions	of	the	latter’s	
Disasters	of	Wars	are	sometimes	integrated	into	his	exhibitions),	not	 least	since	
he	 speaks	 about	 “enlightening”	 the	 “Form” .	 Within	 this	 arguably	 already	479
shelved	discussion	of	critique	and	representation,	a	basically	eye-opening,	truth-
telling	 position	 such	 as	Hirschhorn’s	 presents	 the	 alternative	 to	 a	 concomitant	
kind	of	jaded,	self-conscious	cynicism	as	told	by	for	example	Seth	Price:	
Whatever	 concepts	 you	 signal	 through	 your	 making	 of	 things,	 you	 end	 up	
sanctifying	 the	 current	 state	 of	 affairs.	 Anyone	who	 gazes	 upon	 your	 products	
might	well	wonder:	 ’Must	 I	 consult	 some	 picture	 or	 trinket	 to	 learn	 that	 power	
corrupts,	 desires	 are	 commodiIied,	 control	 is	 paramount,	 subjectivity	 is	
administered?’ 	480
Price’s	 comingling	 and	 indeed	 collaging	of	 vanguard/drop-out	 aspirations	with	
hands-on	 instructions	 for	 quasi-domestic	 terrorism	 seems,	 like	 Hirschhorn,	 to	
place	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 form(at),	 as	 in	 his	 2008	 book	How	To	Disappear	 in	
America,	 from	 which	 the	 above	 quote	 stems.	 In	 his	 case,	 by	 accumulating	
“information”	 liberally	 scraped	 from	 online	 forums	 as	 much	 as	 from	 archival	
	Speaking	of	truth	touching	and	Foster’s	notion	of	poking	the	real/a	real	poking	through	this	479
may	explain	why	Hirschhorn’s	latest	treatise	on	“Why	Is	It	Important–Today–To	Show	And	Look	
At	Images	Of	Destroyed	Human	Bodies”	(2013)	is	illustrated	with	Michelangelo	da	Caravaggio’s	
The	Incredulity	of	St	Thomas	(1601-02)	in	which	the	“Doubting	Thomas”	(we	as	spectators?)	
pokes	a	ginger	in	Jesus’	glesh	wound.	
	Seth	Price,	How	To	Disappear	in	America,	New	York	2008,	p.6.	It	is	perhaps	due	to	this	480
conclusion	(that	may	well	be	a	rhetorical	gesture,	performing	a	voice,	since	subjectivity	and	
authorship	is	almost	routinely	thrown	into	limbo	in	his	work)	that	Price’s	work	has	noticeably	
paused	incorporating	these	kinds	of	images	in	his	work	roughly	since	the	last	give	years.	
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arcana	–	both	plausible	and	ludicrous	–	into	what	is	essentially	a	heterogeneous	
text/work,	 with	 any	 artist’s	 voice	 authoritatively	 stating	 truth	 being	 paranoid-
polyphonic	at	best	(if	not	literally	unemployable).	Some	years	earlier	though,	at	
the	 onset	 of	 the	 Iraq	war	 then	 led	 by	 the	 Bush	 administration,	 Price	 explicitly	
drew	on	material	identical	to	Hirschhorn’s	inventory	stock	of	horrors.	In	lieu	of	
the	glossy	makeweight	courtesy	of	Vogue	 and	mens’	magazines,	Price’s	 take	on	
the	“endless	logic	of	exchangeability” 	took	the	form	of	declassing	the	atrocious	481
content	(severed	and	grossly	disgigured	heads,	predominantly	from	accidents)	to	
serve	 as	 disposable	 footage	 for	 demonstrating	 generic	motion	 graphics	 effects	
such	 as	 spreading	 and	 receding	 perforation,	 turning	 –	 fusing	 –	 both	 video	
components	 into	 non-gixable	 digital	 formlessness .	 In	 lieu	 of	 the	 literal	482
troumatic	bullet	holes	of	Concretion	 the	 image	here	 is	untroumatically	punched	
(only	 to	 be	 virtually	 reassembled	 by	 these	 punctures	 to	 its	 original	 if	 gleeting	
dismal	spectacular)	within	Price’s	framework	of	Dispersion .	An	accompanying	483
soundtrack	consists	of	 the	artist’s	base	 level	enunciations	of	 “Uhhs”	and	“Ahhs”	
	Lee,	2012,	p.	138	481
	States	Price:	“The	“content”	here	consists	of	pictures	taken	from	websites	that	function	as	482
clearinghouses	of	grisly	or	brutal	images,	mostly	pictures	of	people	who	have	been	in	accidents,	
supposedly	supplied	by	police	examiners,	morgue	workers,	or	photojournalists	who	couldn’t	
publish	the	material.	A	lot	of	these	could	be	fabrications,	but	the	point	is	really	about	circulation	
and	redundancy.	You	know,	these	kinds	of	images	have	been	around	forever,	but	now	they	have	a	
new	form	of	circulation.”	Available	on	distributedhistory.org	
	The	title	of	a	text	by	Price	that	has	been	widely	circulated,	discussed	and	reprinted	since	its	483
publication	in	2002	and	serves	as	kind	of	template	to	Price’s	overall	work/strategy.	Available	
online	at	http://www.distributedhistory.com/Dispersion08.pdf.		
David	Joselit	has	recently	made	an	interesting	observation	that	this	detached	non-corporeal	
“dispersion”	Price	applies	to	whatever	content	can	nevertheless	at	times	register	as	“an	explicitly	
biological	form	of	‘dispersion’,	in	which	a	head	is	parted	from	its	torso.	The	catastrophe	of	his	
[Nicholas	Berg’s]	decapitation	results	in	the	abject	wasting	of	the	body.”	“What	to	Do	with	
Pictures”,	October	Vol.	138,		2011,	p.	85	
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having	 been	 fed	 through	 some	 sort	 of	 Auto-Tune	 software;	 a	 score	 which,	
interestingly	in	connection	with	Hirschhorn,	has	previously	been	described	as	a	
kind	of	“ur-voice”,	“at	once	sexualized	and	deadened”. 		484
When	Fredric	Jameson	turned	his	discussion	of	postmodern	culture	to	the	Death	
and	Disaster	works	of	Warhol	he	spoke	of	these	works	as	exemplary	of	a	“waning	
of	 affect” ,	 symptomatic	 of	 a	 postmodern	 audience’s	 reception	 and	485
consumption	in	encountering	these	kind	of	images.	Jameson	however,	similar	to	
Foster,	 tied	 this	 change	 in	affect	not	 to	 the	 content	depicted	but	 to	 the	 form	 in	
which	 it	was	 cast,	 a	 “new	kind	of	 supergiciality	 in	 the	most	 literal	 sense”	as	he	
wrote:	
Here	 [in	Warhol’s	Diamond	Dust	 Shoes	 1980]	 it	 is	 as	 though	 the	 external	 and	 colored	
surface	of	things	–	contaminated	and	debased	in	advance	by	their	assimilation	to	glossy	
advertising	 images	 –	 has	 been	 stripped	 away	 to	 reveal	 the	 deathly	 black	 and	 white	
substratum	that	subtends	them.	Although	this	kind	of	death	of	the	world	of	appearance	
becomes	thematized	in	certain	of	Warhol’s	pieces,	most	notably	the	trafgic	accidents	or	
electric	chair	series,	this	is	not,	I	think,	a	matter	of	content	any	longer	but	of	some	more	
fundamental	mutation	both	 in	 the	object	world	 itself	 […]	and	 in	 the	disposition	of	 the	
subject. 	486
	Johanna	Burton,	“Seth	Price:	A	Human	Interest	Story”	in	Guyton,	Price,	Smith,	Walker,	484
Kunsthalle	Zurich	Exh.	Catalogue	(ed.	Beatrix	Ruf),	2006,	p.	76	
	Jameson,	Postmodernism,	or,	the	Cultural	Logic	of	Late	Capitalism,	Durham/NC	1991,	p.10.	The	485
essay	drawn	on	here	was	originally	published	in	1984	in	New	Left	Review	No.	146	
	Ibid.	p.9	486
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In	 Price,	 one	 may	 see	 this	 in	 retrospect	 fairly	 tangible	 photographic	
“substratum	 that	 subtends”	 death	 and	 disasters	 to	 have	 been	 updated	 by	 the	
immaterial	 digital	 gile	 circulating	 endlessly	 congigurable,	 interchangeable	
content;	circulating	here	“the	ugliest	 lessons	of	general	equivalence	 in	a	wholly	
mediated	world”. 	Which	 further	means	 that	 with	 Price	 affect	 and	 effect	 are	487
sought	to	be	perpetually	con-	and	deglated	 	(which	they	already	are	by	default	488
in	Hirschhorn,	yet	where	there	seems	to	be	a	contradiction	as	to	whether	their	
distinctiveness	is	still	claimed).	With	Price	then,	the	horror	of	the	mutilated	body	
is	 less	a	“return	of	 the	real”	or,	 if	 it	 is,	 it	 is	returning	 incessantly,	 its	subtending	
substratum	(Jameson)	not	 the	photographic	negative	as	 the	 indexical	matrix	of	
barbarism,	but	that	of	the	gile	subjected	to	endless	alterations.	Jameson’s	notion	
of	a	“fundamental	mutation	in	the	object	world”	remains	apposite	though	in	this	
context,	which	in	the	case	of	Price	however	has	mutated	into	the	lingua	franca	of	
the	digital	age:	of	“formatting” 	according	to	David	Joselit.	“Formatting	[…]	is	as	489
much	a	political	as	an	aesthetic	procedure	because	the	same	image	may	easily	be	
adduced	as	‘evidence’	in	support	of	various	and	even	contradictory	propositions	
–	determining	a	format	thus	introduces	an	ethical	choice	about	how	to	produce	
	Lee	on	Hirschhorn,	2012,	p.140.	Lee	continues	to	speak	of	Hirschhorn’s	collages’	“Radical	487
heterogeneity	of	his	source	material	[that]	is	continuous	with	its	nonhierarchical	organization	
and	lateral	extension”,	which	may	serve	as	an	apt	description	of	Price’s	work	in	this	case.	
	Another	description	is	offered	by	Tim	Grifgin	who	considers	Price	to	act	as	a	kind	of	Neo-488
Warholian	“gilter”:	“Price	looks	at	and	mimics	the	ways	in	which	meaning	is	both	lost	and	
produced	with	any	change	of	context.	He	behaves	as	a	kind	of	gilter,	continually	reintroducing	a	
sense	of	this	loss	in	his	work,	this	emptying	of	memory,	in	order	to	mine	the	effects	and	affects	of	
such	depletion.”	“The	Personal	Effects	of	Seth	Price”,	Artforum,	Summer	2008,	p.	282	
	David	Joselit	employs	“formatting”	to	discuss	the	methodology	of	Price’s	practice	which	he	489
delineates	from	the	notion	of	“medium”:	“”Formatting”	–	the	capacity	to	congigure	data	in	
multiple	possible	ways	–	is	a	more	useful	term	than	“medium”,	which,	all	heroic	efforts	to	the	
contrary,	can	seldom	shed	its	intimate	connection	to	matter”.	Joselit,	October	Vol.	138,		2011,	p.	82	
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intelligible	 information	 from	 raw	 data.” 	 As	 much	 as	 these	 “contradictory	490
propositions”	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 “adduced”	 in	 this	 very	 discussion	 since	 Price	 and	
Hirschhorn	 utilize	 the	 exact	 same	 image/gile	 in	 their	 work,	 lifted	 from	 a	
presumably	identical	online	source	(see	above).		
Without	discussing	Hirschhorn’s	 collage	 format	 Joselit	 further	 speaks	of	
“[…]	 forms	of	critique	that	once	would	have	been	conducted	through	dissonant	
content	 […]”	 as	 opposed	 to	 for	 example	 Price,	 who,	 even	 when	 resorting	 to	
“heterogenous”	content	such	as	in	the	work	discussed	above	“[…]	seeks	to	format	
(and	 not	 merely	 ‘reveal’)	 image-power”. 	 Joselit	 focuses	 his	 discussion	 on	491
another	decapitation	involving	the	American	businessman	Nicholas	Berg,	whose	
execution	with	a	knife	by	an	Iraqi	militant	group	in	2004	went	viral	online	at	the	
time	 and	which	presented	 the	 raw	material	 to	Price’s	work	Hostage	Video	 Still	
with	 Time	 Stamp	 (2004).	 In	 his	 reading	 Price,	 by	 printing	 almost	 wholly	
unrecognizable,	 reductive	 monochrome	 renderings	 of	 Berg’s	 head	 abstracted	
from	 video	 stills	 onto	 plastic	 gilm	 crumpled	 on	 the	 wall,	 “slows	 down	 the	
circulation	of	images”,	“slowing	down	the	trajective”.	Joselit	writes:	
Price	 curbs	 the	 frictionless	 motion	 and	 instantaneous	 spatial	 jumps	
	Ibid.	For	Joselit,	Colin	Powell’s	notorious	power	point	presentation	before	the	UN	security	490
council	in	2003	in	support	of	the	invasion	of	Iraq	on	the	grounds	of	the	country’s	alleged	
weapons	of	mass	destruction	program	is	“one	of	the	most	powerful	examples	[…]	of	formatting.”	
	Ibid.,	p.	86.	This	“image-power”	for	Joselit	seems	to	be	less	one	in	the	traditional	sense	of	the	491
image’s	heterogeneity	and	thus	visual	force	as	disruption,	nor	does	it	derive	its	power	now	as	
Warholian	mass	iconicity,	but	has	more	to	do	again	with	the	myriad	capacities	of	re-
contextualizing	images	to	a	heterogeneity	of	contexts,	with	image	as	data	having	become	“a	
resource	like	coal	or	diamonds”	(Joselit).	A	resource	that	however	is	not	bound	by	scarcity	and	
whose	value	is	permanently	tracked	and	reset	through	consumers’	and	corporations’	interactions	
with	it.	
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characteristic	of	navigation	on	the	Internet	and	allows	them	to	pile	up	in	unruly	
masses;	 the	 gruesome	 decapitation	 he	 represents	 is	 also	 the	 gigure	 of	 an	
acephalous	media. 	492
Thus	 Price’s	 “slowing	 down”	 and	 quasi	 non-legibility	 applied	 in	 the	 re-
presentation	of	this	troubling	content	would	again	arguably	deviate	and	frustrate	
this	 content’s	 “natural	 behavior”	 in	 the	 reigning	 environment	 of	 visual	
consumption	 –	 of	 online	 consumption	 –	 thus	 enacting	 a	 kind	 of	 barbarism.	 A	
barbarism	–	now	devoid	of	claiming	to	be	an	“ideological	expression”	(Hollier)	of	
any	kind	 –	 although,	 one	might	 ask,	 to	what	 ends.	 If	 there	 is	 such	 a	 thing	 as	 a	
boon	 to	 be	 had	 in	 the	 past	 from	 engaging	 both	 barbaric	 content	 and	 barbaric	
form,	 a	 hypothesis	 seemingly	 congirmed	 by	 and	 traceable	 from	 the	 history	 of	
modern	 (Goya/Manet)	 to	 contemporary	 Western	 art,	 has	 the	 trajectory	 of	
criticism	 inextricably	 tied	 to	 a	 trajectory	 of	 “image-power”	 not	 exhausted	 this	
boon?	(Less	abstractly:	Is	there	more	to	it	than	a	mere	personal	shift	of	artistic	
interests	–	which	unromantically	and	non-heroically	are	informed	by	market	and	
institutional	 considerations	 –	 if	 a	 practice	 such	 as	 Price’s	 has	 largely	
discontinued	to	employ	both	“barbaric”	form	and	content	in	the	manner	outlined	
above	since	the	last	give	or	more	years?	True,	the	Bush	years	have	been	swept	up	
by	the	“change”	brought	on	by	the	Obama	era;	which	naturally	has	no	effect	on	
the	 unimpeded	 atrocities,	 with	 individuals	 outgitted	 with	 machetes	 hacking	 a	
person	into	pieces	in	daylight	on	a	London	street. )	493
	Ibid.	p.86	492
	“The	words	“terrorist	attack’	only	dignify	the	barbarism”,	The	Spectator,	May	23rd,	2013.	Etc.	493
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When	Price	discussed	this	Digital	Video	Effects:	Holes	(2003),	he	implicitly	
addressed	 what	 Jacques	 Rancière	 once	 called	 “some	 secret	 of	 power	 and	
violence” ;	a	“secret”	however,	to	quote	Rancière,	that	has	largely	“vanished”:	494
Last	 year	 [not	 specigied]	 it	 came	 out	 that	 American	 troops	 in	 Iraq	were	 being	
awarded	 free	 porn-site	 memberships	 in	 exchange	 for	 uploading	 grisly	 war	
photographs	to	these	other	sites	[from	which	Price	obtained	the	images	for	this	
work],	which	are	often	owned	by	the	same	company.	 	495
Whether	 or	 not	 this	 obscene	 trivia	 of	 the	 military-industrial-porn	 complex	 is	
verigiable	 or	 not	 is	 actually	 less	 decisive	 than	 the	 very	 notion	 of	 alleged	
“exchange”,	since	it	in	fact	bluntly	performs	another	“ugliest	lesson[s]	of	general	
equivalence”	under	the	paradigm	of	late	capitalist	consumption	which	all	parties	
from	 Buchloh	 to	 Lee	 to	 Hirschhorn,	 from	 Rancière	 to	 Joselit	 to	 Price	 seem	 to	
attest	to.	(In	Rancière’s	enviably	suave	diction	this	“equivalence”	settles	 into	an	
ethereal	 “mystery	 of	 co-presence”).	 However,	 the	 realm	which	 partly	 serves	 as	
the	very	“raw	material”	for	collages	of	global	barbarity	seems	to	actually	operate	
along	 more	 archaic,	 strictly	 symbolic	 parameters,	 or	 better,	 forms	 of	 (self)	
	“The	heterogeneous	elements	are	put	together	in	order	to	provoke	a	clash.	Now	the	clash	is	494
two	things	at	once.	On	the	one	hand	it	is	the	glash	that	enlightens	[!].	[…].	It	points	to	some	secret	
of	power	and	violence.”	[…]	The	question	is:	what	exactly	happened	to	the	dialectical	clash?	What	
happened	to	the	formula	of	critical	art?	[…]	So	in	both	cases	an	image	of	American	happiness	was	
juxtaposed	to	its	hidden	secret:	war	and	economical	violence	in	Martha	Rosler,	sex	and	profanity	
in	Wang	Du.	But	in	Wang	Du's	case,	both	political	conglictuality	and	the	sense	of	strangeness	had	
vanished.	There	remained	an	automatic	effect	of	delegitimization:	sexual	profanity	delegitimizing	
politics,	the	wax	gigure	delegitimizing	high	art.	But	there	was	no	more	anything	to	delegitimize.	
The	mechanism	 spun	 around	 itself.	 It	 played	 in	 fact	 a	 double	 play:	 on	 the	 automaticity	 of	 the	
delegitimizing	effect	and	on	the	awareness	of	its	spinning	around	itself.			
Rancière:	 “The	 Politics	 of	 Aesthetics”	 lecture	 Frankfurt	 a.M.,	 2004.	 Online	 at	 http://
www.16beavergroup.org/mtarchive/archives/001877print	Retrieved	January	23rd	2009	
	Price,	distributedhistory.org495
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-representation.	The	Mexican	drug	cartel	of	 the	Zetas	(the	current	candidate	of	
Bataille’s	Aztec-Chicago	Mob	variety)	routinely	enthralls	 the	news	cycle	by	way	
of	their	careful	mise-en-scènes-cum-sacrigices-cum-slaughterings	that	betray	an	
eerie	 discourse	 with	 Western	 art	 history’s	 enlightening	 representations	 of	
barbarity.	 Their	 “image-power”	 (Joselit),	 its	 use-	 and	 exchange	 value,	 is	 of	 a	
systematic,	unambiguous,	stable	nature;	 the	spectacular	atrocity	serves	both	as	
the	grim	implementation	of	social	cohesion	of	the	cartel	vis-à-vis	rival	cartels	as	
much	as	possible	apostates;	and	as	media-savvy	compositions	created	with	the	
full	 knowledge	 and	 intention	 to	 be	 disseminated	 and	 consumed	 as	 striking	
content	widening	–	dispersing	–	 the	cartel’s	sphere	of	symbolic	recognition	and	
thereby	 its	 barbaric	 power.	 Yet	 again,	 however,	 where	 is	 one	 to	 locate	 the	
punctum	here?	(Is	 it	 the,	what	appear	 to	be	plastic,	garlands	curled	around	the	
column,	both	kitschy	yet	 somehow	also	 classical?	 Is	 it	 the	pastel	 palette	of	 the	
photograph	 itself,	 the	 pale	 pink,	 green	 and	 alabaster	 hues	 of	 the	 corpses	
evocative	of	Caravaggio	et	al?	Or	is	it	the	signigier/Sinnbild	par	excellence	serving	
the	 studium:	 the	 ‘Z’’-s	 carved	 into	 the	 bodies,	 an	 atavistic	 laceration/tribal	
ornament/registration	mark/corporate	logo?)	
In	 terms	 of	 any	 “Truth”	 then	 as	 well	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 perverse,	 apolitical	
timelessness	these	images	alone,	along	with	the	intermittently	leaked	images	of	
snapshots	taken	by	soldiers	with	corpses	and	body	parts	paraded	as	trophies	of	
their	 “tour”,	 out-enlighten	 their	 incorporation	 into	 “[…]	 endless	 dialectical	
mimicry	of	numbness	and	surface-ness” .	496
	 Clark,	 Texte	 zur	 Kunst	 2012,	 p.163.	 This	 “dialectical	 mimicry”	 corresponds	 to	 Rancière’s	496
notion	of	the	“dialectical	clash”	operative	in	what	Rancière	terms	“critical	art”,	in	which	“it	is	that	
tension	which	underpins	and	somehow	undermines	the	seemingly	simple	project	of	a	political	or	
"critical"	art	that	would	serve	politics	by	arousing	the	awareness	of	the	forms	of	domination	and	
enhancing	thereby	energies	of	resistance	or	rebellion.”	Rancière,	2004.
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Martha	Rosler,	Make	Up/Hands	Up	(from	House	Beautiful:	Bringing	the	War	Home,	1967-72)	
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Francisco	de	Goya	y	Lucientes,	Disasters	of	War						Zeta	cartel	execution																																																									
(Plate	39)	(1810-14)	
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Théodore	Gericault,	Têtes	de	suppliciés,	1810s																					
																																																																																								
																																																																							 																				
																																																																																						Zeta	cartel	execution																																																													
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Archival	online	image	from	the	US-army	deployment	in	Vietnam	
	
Online	image	from	the	US-army	deployment	in	Afghanistan	
Due	not	so	much	to	these	images’	actual,	real,	non-transpositional	barbarity	as	to	
their	formal	economy	and	their	permeating	circulation	within	the	public	sphere,	
they	already	render	unmistakable	the	systemic	and	logical	irrationality	they	are	
the	products	of;	complete	with	all	the	irreconcilabilities	and	inexplicableness	any	
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juxtaposition	 of	 these	 “bastard	 siblings”/”bad	 apples”	 etc.	 with	 that	 same	
civilization’s	models	seems	to	vie	for.	Consequently	(or	if	being	cynical)	one	could	
very	well	 retort	 by	 asking	why	Rosler’s	 recurrences	 of	Bringing	 the	War	Home	
should	 change	 at	 all	 in	 their	 formal	 and	 critical	 inertia,	 given	 that	 the	 images	
discussed	 above	 attest	 to	 just	 that	 timelessness	 and	 continuance,	 indeed	 to	 a	
classic	 iconography,	 sublating	 art	 into	 life.	 Or	 death,	 rather.	 (Note	 that	 the	
corpses’	 private	 parts	 are	 commonly	 concealed	 by	 some	 kind	 of	 cloth	 in	 the	
manner	 of	 the	 Crucigixion).	 It	 thus	 appears	 that	 forms	 seeking	 to	 register	
barbarity	 or	 that	 attempt	 to	 barbarize	 an	 existing	 dominant	 code	 not	 only	
contend	 with	 capital	 that	 always	 wins	 but	 the	 real	 barbarity	 that	 also	 always	
wins,	interrelated	as	these	spheres	are.		
													“In	nuce	–	The	task	of	art	today	is	to	bring	chaos	into	the	order”	 .	Hardly.	497
And	 yet,	 as	 anachronistic	 as	 this	 call	 of	 chaotic	 duty	 reads	 now,	 what	 Adorno	
meant	 of	 course	was	 less	 about	 any	 antagonism	 as	 it	was	 to	meet	 chaos	with	
chaos,	any	other	form	presumably	deemed	utterly	inapt	by	him	in	view	of	any	so-
called	post-War	“order”.	Both	the	“damaged”	order	of	the	day	as	well	as	the	order	
to	get	on	with	it.	
	Theodor	W.	Adorno,	“In	nuce”.	Minima	Moralia.	ReIlexionen	aus	dem	beschädigten	Leben.	In	497
Gesammelte	Schriften	Bd.	4	(ed.	Rolf	Tiedemann),	Frankfurt	a.M.,	1980	[1946/47]	p.	251.	English	
translation:	
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/adorno/1951/mm/ch03.htm
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